EU Lisbon Treaty: Right is might

The Declaration of independence by the Second Continental Congress of the Union of the American States (4 July 1776) said it like this:

“We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, …”.

For the subjects of parliamentary sovereignty it may be difficult to understand that right is might, not the other way around.

The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in Germany has, again, scrutinized an EU reform treaty with the rights of the citizens as its yardstick, under the German Basic Law (Constitution; Grundgesetz).

As long as the European Union remains an organization based on sovereign states, the equality and the rights of citizens have to be safeguarded by the member states, by the national constitutional bodies which act on behalf of the peoples.

At the current stage of development, including the Treaty of Lisbon, these bodies are the Bundestag and Bundesrat (the German Parliament), and their participation needs to be enhanced.


If and when a uniform European people is constituted as the subject of legitimisation, and it is able to express its majority will in a politically effective manner that takes due account of equality in the context of the foundation of a European federal state, the road to a European federation is clear.

This would naturally require a change of the national Constitutions, in Germany and elsewhere.

The Federal Constitutional Court has closed no doors to the future. It just requires that the rights of the citizens are respected, to the extent possible under the Lisbon Treaty, or in a future federation based on EU citizens.



Ralf Grahn


P.S. For comparison, read the divergent conclusions by Nosemonkey: German Constitutional Court Lisbon Treaty ruling (30 June 2009).

German ruling on EU Lisbon Treaty (in English)

The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in Germany has now issued a press release in English with the main points of its Lisbon Treaty ruling:



Federal Constitutional Court - Press office -

Press release no. 72/2009 of 30 June 2009

Judgment of 30 June 2009
– 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 und 2 BvR 182/09 –

________________________________________
Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon compatible with the Basic Law;
accompanying law unconstitutional to the extent that legislative bodies
have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation
________________________________________


The Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court has decided today
that the Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon (Zustimmungsgesetz zum
Vertrag von Lissabon) is compatible with the Basic Law. In contrast, the
Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the
Bundesrat in European Union Matters (Gesetz über die Ausweitung und
Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union) infringes Article 38.1 in
conjunction with Article 23.1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz - GG)
insofar as the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have not been accorded
sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking procedures and
treaty amendment procedures. The Federal Republic of Germany’s
instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited
as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the
parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force. The
decision was reached unanimously as regards the result, by seven votes
to one as regards the reasoning (for the facts see German press releases
no. 2/2009 of 16 January 2009 and no. 9/2009 of 29 January 2009).

In essence, the decision is based on the following considerations:

1. Overview of the central aspects of the judgment
The judgment focuses on the connection between the democratic system
prescribed by the Basic Law on the level of the Federation and the level
of independent rule which has been reached on the European level. The
structural problem of the European Union is at the centre of the review
of constitutionality. The extent of the Union’s freedom of action has
steadily and considerably increased, not least by the Treaty of Lisbon,
so that meanwhile in some fields of policy, the European Union has a
shape that corresponds to that of a federal state, i.e. is analogous to
that of a state. In contrast, the internal decision-making and
appointment procedures remain predominantly committed to the pattern of
an international organisation, i.e. are analogous to international law;
as before, the structure of the European Union essentially follows the
principle of the equality of states.

As long as, consequently, no uniform European people, as the subject of
legitimisation, can express its majority will in a politically effective
manner that takes due account of equality in the context of the
foundation of a European federal state, the peoples of the European
Union, which are constituted in their Member States, remain the decisive
holders of public authority, including Union authority. In Germany,
accession to a European federal state would require the creation of a
new constitution, which would go along with the declared waiver of the
sovereign statehood safeguarded by the Basic Law. There is no such act
here. The European Union continues to constitute a union of rule
(Herrschaftsverband) founded on international law, a union which is
permanently supported by the intention of the sovereign Member States.
The primary responsibility for integration is in the hands of the
national constitutional bodies which act on behalf of the peoples. With
increasing competences and further independence of the institutions of
the Union, safeguards that keep up with this development are necessary
in order to preserve the fundamental principle of conferral exercised in
a restricted and controlled manner by the Member States. With
progressing integration, fields of action which are essential for the
development of the Member States’ democratic opinion-formation must be
retained. In particular, it must be guaranteed that the responsibility
for integration can be exercised by the state bodies of representation
of the peoples.

The further development of the competences of the European Parliament
can reduce, but not completely fill, the gap between the extent of the
decision-making power of the Union’s institutions and the citizens’
democratic power of action in the Member States. Neither as regards its
composition nor its position in the European competence structure is the
European Parliament sufficiently prepared to take representative and
assignable majority decisions as uniform decisions on political
direction. Measured against requirements placed on democracy in states,
its election does not take due account of equality, and it is not
competent to take authoritative decisions on political direction in the
context of the supranational balancing of interest between the states.
It therefore cannot support a parliamentary government and organise
itself with regard to party politics in the system of government and
opposition in such a way that a decision on political direction taken by
the European electorate could have a politically decisive effect. Due to
this structural democratic deficit, which cannot be resolved in a
Staatenverbund, further steps of integration that go beyond the status
quo may undermine neither the States’ political power of action nor the
principle of conferral.

The peoples of the Member States are the holders of the constituent
power. The Basic Law does not permit the special bodies of the
legislative, executive and judicial power to dispose of the essential
elements of the constitution, i.e. of the constitutional identity
(Article 23.1 sentence 3, Article 79.3 GG). The constitutional identity
is an inalienable element of the democratic self-determination of a
people. To ensure the effectiveness of the right to vote and to preserve
democratic self-determination, it is necessary for the Federal
Constitutional Court to watch, within the boundaries of its competences,
over the Community or Union authority’s not violating the constitutional
identity by its acts and not evidently transgressing the competences
conferred on it. The transfer of competences, which has been increased
once again by the Treaty of Lisbon, and the independence of
decision-making procedures therefore require an effective ultra vires
review and an identity review of instruments of European origin in the
area of application of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The standard of review
a) The Act Approving the Treaty of Lisbon is measured by the Federal
Constitutional Court against the standard of the right to vote. As a
right that is equivalent to fundamental right, a violation of the right
to vote can be challenged by a constitutional complaint (Article 38.1
sentence 1 in conjunction with Article 93.1 no. 4a GG). The right to
vote specifies the right to democratic self-determination, to free and
equal participation in the state authority exercised in Germany and to
compliance with the principle of democracy including the respect of the
constituent power of the people. The review of a violation of the right
to vote also comprises encroachments on the principles which are
codified in Article 79.3 of the Basic Law as the identity of the
constitution. The citizens’ right to determine, in equality and freedom,
public authority affecting them with regard to persons and
subject-matters through elections and other votes is anchored in human
dignity and is the fundamental element of the principle of democracy.
The principle of democracy is not amenable to weighing with other legal
interests. Amendments of the Basic Law affecting the principles laid
down in Article 1 and Article 20 of the Basic Law shall be inadmissible
(Article 79.3 of the Basic Law). The so-called eternity guarantee takes
the disposal of the identity of the free constitutional order even out
of the hands of the constitution-amending legislature. The constituent
power has not granted the representatives and bodies of the people a
mandate to change the constitutional principles which are fundamental
pursuant to Article 79.3 GG.

b) At the same time, the elaboration of the principle of democracy by
the Basic Law is open to the objective of integrating Germany into an
international and European peaceful order. The German constitution is
oriented towards opening the state system of rule to the peaceful
cooperation of the nations and towards European integration. Neither the
integration pari passu into the European Union nor the integration into
peacekeeping systems such as the United Nations necessarily lead to a
change in the system of exercise of public authority in the Federal
Republic of Germany. Instead, it is a voluntary, mutual commitment pari
passu, which secures peace and strengthens the possibilities of shaping
policy by joint coordinated action. The constitutional mandate to
realise a united Europe which follows from Article 23.1 of the Basic Law
and its Preamble means with regard to the German constitutional bodies
that participation in European integration is not left to their
political discretion. The Basic Law wants European integration and an
international peaceful order. Therefore not only the principle of
openness towards international law (Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit), but
also the principle of openness towards European law
(Europarechtsfreundlichkeit) applies.

c) The authorisation to transfer sovereign powers to the European Union
pursuant to Article 23.1 GG is, however, granted under the condition
that the sovereign statehood of a constitutional state is maintained on
the basis of a responsible integration programme according to the
principle of conferral and respecting the Member States’ constitutional
identity, and that at the same time the Federal Republic of Germany does
not lose its ability to politically and socially shape the living
conditions on its own responsibility. Article 23.1 GG and the Preamble
do not say anything about the final character of the political
organisation of Europe. With its Article 23, the Basic Law grants powers
to participate and develop a European Union which is designed as an
association of sovereign national states (Staatenverbund). The concept
of Verbund covers a close long-term association of states which remain
sovereign, an association which exercises public authority on the basis
of a treaty, whose fundamental order is, however, subject to the
disposal of the Member States alone and in which the peoples of their
Member States, i.e. the citizens of the states, remain the subjects of
democratic legitimisation. The European Union must comply with
democratic principles as regards its nature and extent and also as
regards its own organisational and procedural elaboration (Article 23.1,
Article 20.1 and 20.2 in conjunction with Article 79.3 of the Basic
Law). This means firstly that European integration may not result in the
system of democratic rule in Germany being undermined. This does not
mean that a number of sovereign powers which can be determined from the
outset or specific types of sovereign powers must remain in the hands of
the state. European unification on the basis of a union of sovereign
states under the Treaties may, however, not be realised in such a way
that the Member States do not retain sufficient room for the political
formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life.
This applies in particular to areas which shape the citizens’
circumstances of life, in particular the private space of their own
responsibility and of political and social security, which is protected
by the fundamental rights, and to political decisions that particularly
depend on previous understanding as regards culture, history and
language and which unfold in discourses in the space of a political
public that is organised by party politics and Parliament. To the extent
that in these areas, which are of particular importance for democracy, a
transfer of sovereign powers is permitted at all, a narrow
interpretation is required. This concerns in particular the
administration of criminal law, the civil and the military monopoly on
the use of force, fundamental fiscal decisions on revenue and
expenditure, the shaping of the circumstances of life by social policy
and important decisions on cultural issues such as the school and
education system, the provisions governing the media, and dealing with
religious communities.

d) The Basic Law does not grant the German state bodies powers to
transfer sovereign powers in such a way that their exercise can
independently establish other competences for the European Union. It
prohibits the transfer of competence to decide on its own competence
(Kompetenz-Kompetenz). The principle of conferral is therefore not only
a principle of European law (Article 5.1 of the Treaty on European Union
; Article 5.1 sentence 1 and 5.12 of the Treaty on European Union
in its version of the Treaty of Lisbon ), but, just like the
European Union’s obligation to respect the Member States’ national
identity (Article 6.3 TEU; Article 4.2 sentence 1 TEU Lisbon), it takes
up constitutional principles from the Member States. The integration
programme of the European Union must therefore be sufficiently precise.
To the extent that the Member States elaborate the law laid down in the
Treaties in such a way that, with the principle of conferral
fundamentally continuing to apply, an amendment of the law laid down in
the Treaties can be brought about without a ratification procedure, a
special responsibility is incumbent on the legislative bodies, apart
from the Federal Government, as regards participation, which, in
Germany, must, on the national level, comply with the requirements under
Article 23.1 of the Basic Law (responsibility for integration). The act
approving a treaty amending a European Treaty and the national
accompanying laws must therefore be such that European integration
continues to take place according to the principle of conferral without
the possibility for the European Union of taking possession of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz or to violate the Member States’ constitutional
identity which is not amenable to integration, in this case, that of the
Basic Law. For borderline cases of what is still constitutionally
admissible, the German legislature must, if necessary, make arrangements
with its laws that accompany approval to ensure that the responsibility
for integration of the legislative bodies can sufficiently develop.

e) The Federal Constitutional Court reviews whether legal instruments of
the European institutions and bodies, adhering to the principle of
subsidiarity under Community and Union law (Article 5.2 ECT; Article 5.1
sentence 2 and 5.3 TEU Lisbon), keep within the boundaries of the
sovereign powers accorded to them by way of conferred power (ultra vires
review). Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court reviews whether
the inviolable core content of the constitutional identity of the Basic
Law pursuant to Article 23.1 sentence 3 in conjunction with Article 79.3
of the Basic Law is respected (identity review). The exercise of these
competences of review, which are constitutionally required, safeguards
the fundamental political and constitutional structures of sovereign
Member States, which are recognised by Article 4.2 sentence 1 TEU
Lisbon, even with progressing integration. Its application in a given
case follows the principle of the Basic Law’s openness towards European
Law.

3. The subsumption
a) There are no decisive constitutional objections to the Act Approving
the Treaty of Lisbon.

aa) With the present status of integration, the European Union does,
even upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, not yet attain a
shape that corresponds to the level of legitimisation of a democracy
constituted as a state. It is not a federal state but remains an
association of sovereign states to which the principle of conferral
applies.

The European Parliament is not a body of representation of a sovereign
European people but a supranational body of representation of the
peoples of the Member States, so that the principle of electoral
election, which is common to all European states, is not applicable with
regard to the European Parliament. Other provisions of the Treaty of
Lisbon, such as the double qualified majority in the Council (Article
16.4 TEU Lisbon, Article 238.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union ), the elements of participative, associative and
direct democracy (Art. 11 TEU Lisbon) as well as the institutional
recognition of the national Parliaments (Article 12 TEU Lisbon) cannot
compensate the deficit of European public authority that exists when
measured against requirements on democracy in states, but can
nevertheless increase the level of legitimisation of the Staatenverbund.

bb) With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Federal
Republic of Germany will remain a sovereign state. In particular, the
substance of German state authority is protected. The distribution of
the European Union’s competences, and their delimitation from those of
the Member States, takes place according to the principle of conferral
and according to other mechanisms of protection, in particular according
to provisions concerning the exercise of competences. The transfer of
sovereign powers to the European Union, which is thus performed in a
controlled and responsible manner, is not called into question by
individual provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. This applies first of all
to the simplified amendment procedure (see in particular Article 48.6
TEU Lisbon). The “approval” of the Federal Republic of Germany in
simplified revision procedures requires a law within the meaning of
Article 23.1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law as a lex specialis with regard
to Article 59.2.

cc) To the extent that the general bridging clause under Article 48.7
TEU Lisbon makes possible the transition from the principle of unanimity
to the principle of qualified majority in the decision-making of the
Council, or the transition from the special to the ordinary legislative
procedure, this is also a Treaty amendment under primary law, which is
to be assessed pursuant to Article 23.1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law. The
national parliaments’ right to make known their opposition (Article
48.7(3) TEU Lisbon) is not a sufficient equivalent to the requirement of
ratification. The representative of the German government in the
European Council may only consent to a Treaty amendment brought about by
the application of the general bridging clause if the German Bundestag
and the Bundesrat have adopted within a period yet to be determined a
law pursuant to Article 23.1 of the Basic Law, which takes the purpose
of Article 48.7(3) TEU Lisbon as an orientation. This also applies in
case of the special bridging clause pursuant to Article 81.3(2) TFEU
being used.

dd) A law within the meaning of Article 23.1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law
is not required to the extent that special bridging clauses are
restricted to areas which are already sufficiently determined by the
Treaty of Lisbon, and which do not provide for a right for national
Parliaments to make known their opposition. Also in these cases,
however, it is incumbent on the Bundestag and, to the extent that the
legislative competences of the Länder are affected, on the Bundesrat, to
comply with their responsibility for integration in another suitable
manner. The veto right in the Council may not be waived without the
participation of the competent legislative bodies even as regards
subject-matters which have already been factually determined in the
Treaties. The representative of the German government in the European
Council or in the Council may therefore only consent to an amendment of
primary legislation through the application of one of the special
bridging clauses on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany if the
German Bundestag and, to the extent that this is required by the
provisions on legislation, the Bundesrat, have approved this decision
within a period yet to be determined, which takes the purpose of Article
48.7(3) TEU Lisbon as an orientation.

ee) Also the flexibility clause under Article 352 TFEU can be construed
in such a way that the integration programme envisaged in the provisions
can still be predicted and determined by the German legislative bodies.
With a view to the undetermined nature of possible cases of application,
the use of the flexibility clause constitutionally requires ratification
by the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat on the basis of Article 23.1
sentences 2 and 3 of the Basic Law.

ff) The Federal Constitutional Court’s competence of review is not
affected by Declaration no. 17 on Primacy annexed to the Final Act of
the Treaty of Lisbon. The foundation and the limit of the applicability
of European Union law in the Federal Republic of Germany is the order to
apply the law which is contained in the Act Approving the Treaty of
Lisbon, which can only be given within the limits of the current
constitutional order. In this respect, it is insignificant whether the
primacy of application, which the Federal Constitutional Court has
already essentially recognised for Community law, is provided for in the
Treaties themselves or in Declaration no. 17 annexed to the Final Act of
the Treaty of Lisbon.

gg) The competences that have been newly established or deepened by the
Treaty of Lisbon in the areas of judicial cooperation in criminal and
civil matters, external trade relations, common defence and with regard
to social concerns can, within the meaning of an interpretation of the
Treaty that does justice to its purpose, and must, in order to avoid
imminent unconstitutionality, be exercised by the institutions of the
European Union in such a way that on the level of the Member States,
tasks of sufficient weight as to their extent as well as their substance
remain which legally and practically are the precondition of a living
democracy. In this context, the following aspects must be given
particular attention:

- Due to the fact that democratic self-determination is affected in an
especially sensitive manner by provisions of criminal law and law of
criminal procedure, the corresponding foundations of competence in the
Treaties must be interpreted strictly - on no account extensively -,
and their use requires particular justification.

- The use of the dynamic blanket authorisation pursuant to Article
83.1(3) TFEU to extend the list of particularly serious crimes with a
cross-border dimension “on the basis of developments in crime” is
factually tantamount to an extension of the competences of the European
Union and is therefore subject to the requirement of the enactment of
a specific statute under Article 23.1 sentence 2 GG.

- In the area of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, particular
requirements must additionally be placed on the provisions which accord
a Member State special rights in the legislative procedure (Article
82.3, Article 83.3 TFEU: so-called emergency brake procedure). From the
perspective of German constitutional law, the necessary measure of
democratic legitimisation via the national parliaments can only be
safeguarded by the German representative in the Council exercising the
Member State’s rights set out in Article 82.3 and Article 83.3 TFEU
only on the instruction of the Bundestag and, to the extent that this
is required by the provisions on legislation, of the Bundesrat.

- The mandatory requirement of parliamentary approval for the deployment
of the armed forces abroad will continue to exist upon the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon does not confer on
the European Union the competence to use the Member States’ armed
forces without the approval of the respective Member State affected or
of its parliament. It also does not restrict the possibilities of
action of the German Bundestag in the area of social policy to such an
extent that this would impair the principle of the social state
(Article 23.1 sentence 3 in conjunction with Article 79.3 GG) in a
constitutionally objectionable manner and inadmissibly curtail the
democratic scope for decision-making that is required in this context.

b) There are also no decisive constitutional objections against the Act
Amending the Basic Law (Articles 23, 45 and 93) (Gesetz zur Änderung des
Grundgesetzes ). A violation of democratic
principles pursuant to Article 79.3 GG occurs neither by Article 23.1a
GG, new version, which elaborates the right to bring a subsidiarity
action as a minority right and sets the quorum at one fourth of the
Members, nor by Article 45 sentence 3 GG, new version.

c) In contrast, the Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the
Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters infringes Article
38.1 in conjunction with Article 23.1 of the Basic Law insofar as rights
of participation of the German Bundestag and the Bundesrat have not been
elaborated to the constitutionally required extent. If the Member States
elaborate the European law laid down in the Treaties on the basis of the
principle of conferral in such a way that an amendment of the Treaty law
can be brought about solely or decisively by the institutions of the
European Union - albeit under the requirement of unanimity in the
Council -, a special responsibility is incumbent on the national
constitutional bodies in the context of participation. In Germany, this
responsibility for integration must on the national level comply with
the constitutional requirements made in particular under Article 23.1
GG.


This press release is also available in the original german version.



***


The reasoning is interesting for everyone who studies the unique political construct the European Union is at its current stage of development.



Ralf Grahn

German ruling on EU Lisbon Treaty

The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in Karlsruhe has ruled on the constitutionality of the EU Treaty of Lisbon.




The text of the press release is here:



Bundesverfassungsgericht - Pressestelle -

Pressemitteilung Nr. 72/2009 vom 30. Juni 2009

Urteil vom 30. Juni 2009
– 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 1259/08 und 2 BvR 182/09 –

________________________________________
Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon mit Grundgesetz vereinbar;
Begleitgesetz verfassungswidrig, soweit Gesetzgebungsorganen keine
hinreichenden Beteiligungsrechte eingeräumt wurden
________________________________________


Der Zweite Senat des Bundesverfassungsgerichts hat heute entschieden,
dass das Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon mit dem Grundgesetz
vereinbar ist. Dagegen verstößt das Gesetz über die Ausweitung und
Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union insoweit gegen Art. 38 Abs. 1 in
Verbindung mit Art. 23 Abs. 1 GG, als Bundestag und Bundesrat im Rahmen
von europäischen Rechtssetzungs- und Vertragsänderungsverfahren keine
hinreichenden Beteiligungsrechte eingeräumt wurden. Die
Ratifikationsurkunde der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zum Vertrag von
Lissabon darf solange nicht hinterlegt werden, wie die von Verfassungs
wegen erforderliche gesetzliche Ausgestaltung der parlamentarischen
Beteiligungsrechte nicht in Kraft getreten ist. Die Entscheidung ist im
Ergebnis einstimmig, hinsichtlich der Gründe mit 7:1 Stimmen ergangen
(zum Sachverhalt vgl. Pressemitteilungen Nr. 2/2009 vom 16. Januar 2009
und Nr. 9/2009 vom 29. Januar 2009).

Der Entscheidung liegen im Wesentlichen folgende Erwägungen zu Grunde:

1. Zentrale Gesichtspunkte des Urteils im Überblick
Das Urteil konzentriert sich auf den Zusammenhang zwischen dem vom
Grundgesetz vorgeschriebenen demokratischen System auf Bundesebene und
dem erreichten Niveau selbständiger Herrschaftsausübung auf europäischer
Ebene. Das Strukturproblem der Europäischen Union wird in den
Mittelpunkt der Verfassungsprüfung gestellt: Der Umfang politischer
Gestaltungsmacht der Union ist - nicht zuletzt durch den Vertrag von
Lissabon - stetig und erheblich gewachsen, so dass inzwischen in einigen
Politikbereichen die Europäische Union einem Bundesstaat entsprechend -
staatsanalog - ausgestaltet ist. Demgegenüber bleiben die internen
Entscheidungs- und Ernennungsverfahren überwiegend völkerrechtsanalog
dem Muster einer internationalen Organisation verpflichtet; die
Europäische Union ist weiterhin im Wesentlichen nach dem Grundsatz der
Staatengleichheit aufgebaut.

Solange im Rahmen einer europäischen Bundesstaatsgründung nicht ein
einheitliches europäisches Volk als Legitimationssubjekt seinen
Mehrheitswillen gleichheitsgerecht politisch wirksam formulieren kann,
bleiben die in den Mitgliedstaaten verfassten Völker der Europäischen
Union die maßgeblichen Träger der öffentlichen Gewalt, einschließlich
der Unionsgewalt. Für den Beitritt zu einem europäischen Bundesstaat
wäre in Deutschland eine Verfassungsneuschöpfung notwendig, mit der ein
erklärter Verzicht auf die vom Grundgesetz gesicherte souveräne
Staatlichkeit einherginge. Ein solcher Akt liegt hier nicht vor. Die
Europäische Union stellt weiterhin einen völkerrechtlich begründeten
Herrschaftsverband dar, der dauerhaft vom Vertragswillen souverän
bleibender Staaten getragen wird. Die primäre Integrationsverantwortung
liegt in der Hand der für die Völker handelnden nationalen
Verfassungsorgane. Bei wachsenden Kompetenzen und einer weiteren
Verselbständigung der Unionsorgane sind Schritt haltende Sicherungen
erforderlich, um das tragende Prinzip der begrenzten und von den
Mitgliedstaaten kontrollierten Einzelermächtigung zu wahren. Auch sind
eigene für die Entfaltung der demokratischen Willensbildung wesentliche
Gestaltungsräume der Mitgliedstaaten bei fortschreitender Integration zu
erhalten. Insbesondere ist zu gewährleisten, dass die
Integrationsverantwortung durch die staatlichen Vertretungsorgane der
Völker wahrgenommen werden kann.

Durch den Ausbau der Kompetenzen des Europäischen Parlaments kann die
Lücke zwischen dem Umfang der Entscheidungsmacht der Unionsorgane und
der demokratischen Wirkmacht der Bürger in den Mitgliedstaaten
verringert, aber nicht geschlossen werden. Das Europäische Parlament ist
weder in seiner Zusammensetzung noch im europäischen Kompetenzgefüge
dafür hinreichend gerüstet, repräsentative und zurechenbare
Mehrheitsentscheidungen als einheitliche politische Leitentscheidungen
zu treffen. Es ist gemessen an staatlichen Demokratieanforderungen nicht
gleichheitsgerecht gewählt und innerhalb des supranationalen
Interessenausgleichs zwischen den Staaten nicht zu maßgeblichen
politischen Leitentscheidungen berufen. Es kann deshalb auch nicht eine
parlamentarische Regierung tragen und sich im
Regierungs-Oppositions-Schema parteipolitisch so organisieren, dass eine
Richtungsentscheidung europäischer Wähler politisch bestimmend zur
Wirkung gelangen könnte. Angesichts dieses strukturellen, im
Staatenverbund nicht auflösbaren Demokratiedefizits dürfen weitere
Integrationsschritte über den bisherigen Stand hinaus weder die
politische Gestaltungsfähigkeit der Staaten noch das Prinzip der
begrenzten Einzelermächtigung aushöhlen.

Die Völker der Mitgliedstaaten sind Träger der verfassungsgebenden
Gewalt. Das Grundgesetz erlaubt es den besonderen Organen der
Gesetzgebung, der vollziehenden Gewalt und Rechtsprechung nicht, über
die grundlegenden Bestandteile der Verfassung, also über die
Verfassungsidentität zu verfügen (Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 3, Art. 79 Abs. 3
GG). Die Verfassungsidentität ist unveräußerlicher Bestandteil der
demokratischen Selbstbestimmung eines Volkes. Zur Wahrung der
Wirksamkeit des Wahlrechts und zur Erhaltung der demokratischen
Selbstbestimmung ist es nötig, dass das Bundesverfassungsgericht im
Rahmen seiner Zuständigkeit darüber wacht, dass die Gemeinschafts- oder
die Unionsgewalt nicht mit ihren Hoheitsakten die Verfassungsidentität
verletzt und nicht ersichtlich die eingeräumten Kompetenzen
überschreitet. Die mit dem Vertrag von Lissabon noch einmal verstärkte
Übertragung von Zuständigkeiten und die Verselbständigung der
Entscheidungsverfahren setzt deshalb eine wirksame Ultra-vires-Kontrolle
und eine Identitätskontrolle von Rechtsakten europäischen Ursprungs im
Anwendungsbereich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland voraus.

2. Zum Prüfungsmaßstab
a) Das Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon wird vom Gericht am
Maßstab des Wahlrechts gemessen. Das Wahlrecht ist als
grundrechtsgleiches Recht mit der Verfassungsbeschwerde rügefähig (Art.
38 Abs. 1 Satz 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 93 Abs. 1 Nr. 4a GG). Es
konkretisiert den Anspruch auf demokratische Selbstbestimmung, auf freie
und gleiche Teilhabe an der in Deutschland ausgeübten Staatsgewalt sowie
auf die Einhaltung des Demokratiegebots einschließlich der Achtung der
verfassungsgebenden Gewalt des Volkes. Die Prüfung einer Verletzung des
Wahlrechts umfasst hier auch Eingriffe in die Grundsätze, die Art. 79
Abs. 3 GG als Identität der Verfassung festschreibt. Das Recht der
Bürger, in Freiheit und Gleichheit durch Wahlen und Abstimmungen die sie
betreffende öffentliche Gewalt personell und sachlich zu bestimmen, ist
in der Würde des Menschen verankert und elementarer Bestandteil des
Demokratieprinzips. Das Demokratieprinzip ist nicht abwägungsfähig. Eine
Änderung des Grundgesetzes, durch welche die in Art. 1 und Art. 20 GG
niedergelegten Grundsätze berührt werden, ist unzulässig (Art. 79 Abs. 3
GG). Mit der sogenannten Ewigkeitsgarantie wird die Verfügung über die
Identität der freiheitlichen Verfassungsordnung auch dem
verfassungsändernden Gesetzgeber aus der Hand genommen. Die
verfassungsgebende Gewalt hat den Vertretern und Organen des Volkes kein
Mandat erteilt, die nach Art. 79 Abs. 3 GG grundlegenden
Verfassungsprinzipien zu verändern.

b) Zugleich ist die grundgesetzliche Ausgestaltung des
Demokratieprinzips offen für das Ziel, Deutschland in eine
internationale und europäische Friedensordnung einzufügen. Die deutsche
Verfassung ist auf Öffnung der staatlichen Herrschaftsordnung für das
friedliche Zusammenwirken der Nationen und die europäische Integration
gerichtet. Weder die gleichberechtigte Integration in die Europäische
Union noch die Einfügung in friedenserhaltende Systeme wie die Vereinten
Nationen führen dabei notwendig zu einer Veränderung im System
öffentlicher Gewaltausübung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Es handelt
sich vielmehr um freiwillige, gegenseitige und gleichberechtigte
Bindung, die den Frieden sichert und die politischen
Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten durch gemeinsames koordiniertes Handeln stärkt.
Der aus Art. 23 Abs. 1 GG und der Präambel folgende Verfassungsauftrag
zur Verwirklichung eines vereinten Europas bedeutet für die deutschen
Verfassungsorgane, dass die Beteiligung an der europäischen Integration
nicht in ihrem politischen Belieben steht. Das Grundgesetz will eine
internationale Friedensordnung und eine europäische Integration: Es gilt
deshalb nicht nur der Grundsatz der Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit, sondern
auch der Grundsatz der Europarechtsfreundlichkeit.

c) Die Ermächtigung zur Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten auf die
Europäische Union nach Art. 23 Abs. 1 GG steht allerdings unter der
Bedingung, dass die souveräne Verfassungsstaatlichkeit auf der Grundlage
eines verantwortbaren Integrationsprogramms nach dem Prinzip der
begrenzten Einzelermächtigung und unter Achtung der
verfassungsrechtlichen Identität als Mitgliedstaat gewahrt bleibt und
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ihre Fähigkeit zu selbstverantwortlicher
politischer und sozialer Gestaltung der Lebensverhältnisse nicht
verliert. Art. 23 Abs. 1 GG und die Präambel sagen nichts aus über den
endgültigen Charakter der politischen Verfasstheit Europas. Das
Grundgesetz ermächtigt mit Art. 23 GG zur Beteiligung und Entwicklung
einer als Staatenverbund konzipierten Europäischen Union. Der Begriff
des Verbundes erfasst eine enge, auf Dauer angelegte Verbindung souverän
bleibender Staaten, die auf vertraglicher Grundlage öffentliche Gewalt
ausübt, deren Grundordnung jedoch allein der Verfügung der
Mitgliedstaaten unterliegt und in der die Völker - das heißt die
staatsangehörigen Bürger - der Mitgliedstaaten die Subjekte
demokratischer Legitimation bleiben. Die Europäische Union muss sowohl
in Art und Umfang als auch in der organisatorischen und
verfahrensrechtlichen Ausgestaltung demokratischen Grundsätzen
entsprechen (Art. 23 Abs. 1, Art. 20 Abs. 1 und Abs. 2 in Verbindung mit
Art. 79 Abs. 3 GG). Dies bedeutet zunächst, dass die europäische
Integration nicht zur Aushöhlung des demokratischen Herrschaftssystems
in Deutschland führen darf. Zwar müssen nicht eine bestimmte Summe oder
bestimmte Arten von Hoheitsrechten in der Hand des Staates bleiben. Die
europäische Vereinigung auf der Grundlage einer Vertragsunion souveräner
Staaten darf jedoch nicht so verwirklicht werden, dass in den
Mitgliedstaaten kein ausreichender Raum zur politischen Gestaltung der
wirtschaftlichen, kulturellen und sozialen Lebensverhältnisse mehr
bleibt. Dies gilt insbesondere für Sachbereiche, die die Lebensumstände
der Bürger, vor allem ihren von den Grundrechten geschützten privaten
Raum der Eigenverantwortung und der persönlichen und sozialen Sicherheit
prägen, sowie für solche politischen Entscheidungen, die in besonderer
Weise auf kulturelle, historische und sprachliche Vorverständnisse
angewiesen sind, und die sich im parteipolitisch und parlamentarisch
organisierten Raum einer politischen Öffentlichkeit diskursiv entfalten.
Sofern in diesen besonders demokratiebedeutsamen Sachbereichen eine
Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten überhaupt erlaubt ist, ist eine enge
Auslegung geboten. Dies betrifft insbesondere die Strafrechtspflege, die
polizeiliche und militärische Verfügung über das Gewaltmonopol,
fiskalische Grundentscheidungen über Einnahmen und Ausgaben, die
sozialpolitische Gestaltung von Lebensverhältnissen sowie kulturell
bedeutsame Entscheidungen wie Erziehung, Bildung, Medienordnung und
Umgang mit Religionsgemeinschaften.

d) Das Grundgesetz ermächtigt die deutschen Staatsorgane nicht,
Hoheitsrechte derart zu übertragen, dass aus ihrer Ausübung heraus
eigenständig weitere Zuständigkeiten begründet werden können. Es
untersagt die Übertragung der Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Das Prinzip der
begrenzten Einzelermächtigung ist deshalb nicht nur ein
europarechtlicher Grundsatz (Art. 5 Abs. 1 EGV; Art. 5 Abs. 1 Satz 1 und
Abs. 2 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union in der Fassung des
Vertrags von Lissabon ), sondern nimmt - ebenso wie die
Pflicht der Europäischen Union, die nationale Identität der
Mitgliedstaaten zu achten (Art. 6 Abs. 3 EUV; Art. 4 Abs. 2 Satz 1
EUV-Lissabon) - mitgliedstaatliche Verfassungsprinzipien auf. Das
Integrationsprogramm der Europäischen Union muss deshalb hinreichend
bestimmt sein. Sofern die Mitgliedstaaten das Vertragsrecht so
ausgestalten, dass unter grundsätzlicher Fortgeltung des Prinzips der
begrenzten Einzelermächtigung eine Veränderung des Vertragsrechts ohne
Ratifikationsverfahren herbeigeführt werden kann, obliegt neben der
Bundesregierung den gesetzgebenden Körperschaften eine besondere
Verantwortung im Rahmen der Mitwirkung, die in Deutschland
innerstaatlich den Anforderungen des Art. 23 Abs. 1 GG genügen muss
(Integrationsverantwortung). Das Zustimmungsgesetz zu einem europäischen
Änderungsvertrag und die innerstaatliche Begleitgesetzgebung müssen so
beschaffen sein, dass die europäische Integration weiter nach dem
Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung erfolgt, ohne dass für die
Europäische Union die Möglichkeit besteht, sich der Kompetenz-Kompetenz
zu bemächtigen oder die integrationsfeste Verfassungsidentität der
Mitgliedstaaten, hier des Grundgesetzes, zu verletzen. Für Grenzfälle
des noch verfassungsrechtlich Zulässigen muss der deutsche Gesetzgeber
mit seinen die Zustimmung begleitenden Gesetzen Vorkehrungen dafür
treffen, dass die Integrationsverantwortung der Gesetzgebungsorgane sich
hinreichend entfalten kann.

e) Das Bundesverfassungsgericht prüft, ob Rechtsakte der europäischen
Organe und Einrichtungen sich unter Wahrung des gemeinschafts- und
unionsrechtlichen Subsidiaritätsprinzips (Art. 5 Abs. 2 EGV; Art. 5 Abs.
1 Satz 2 und Abs. 3 EUV-Lissabon) in den Grenzen der ihnen im Wege der
begrenzten Einzelermächtigung eingeräumten Hoheitsrechte halten
(Ultra-vires-Kontrolle). Darüber hinaus prüft das
Bundesverfassungsgericht, ob der unantastbare Kerngehalt der
Verfassungsidentität des Grundgesetzes nach Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 3 in
Verbindung mit Art. 79 Abs. 3 GG gewahrt ist (Identitätskontrolle). Die
Ausübung dieser verfassungsrechtlich geforderten Prüfungskompetenzen
wahrt die von Art. 4 Abs. 2 Satz 1 EUV-Lissabon anerkannten
grundlegenden politischen und verfassungsmäßigen Strukturen souveräner
Mitgliedstaaten auch bei fortschreitender Integration. Sie folgt bei der
konkreten Ausübung dem Grundsatz der Europarechtsfreundlichkeit des
Grundgesetzes.

3. Zur Subsumtion
a) Gegen das Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon bestehen keine
durchgreifenden verfassungsrechtlichen Bedenken.

aa) Die Europäische Union erreicht auch bei Inkrafttreten des Vertrags
von Lissabon noch keine Ausgestaltung, die staatsanalog ist und deshalb
dem Legitimationsniveau einer staatlich verfassten Demokratie
entsprechen müsste. Sie ist kein Bundesstaat, sondern bleibt ein Verbund
souveräner Staaten unter Geltung des Prinzips der begrenzten
Einzelermächtigung. Das Europäische Parlament ist kein
Repräsentationsorgan eines souveränen europäischen Volkes, sondern ein
supranationales Vertretungsorgan der Völker der Mitgliedstaaten, so dass
der allen europäischen Staaten gemeinsame Grundsatz der Wahlgleichheit
auf das Europäische Parlament keine Anwendung findet. Andere Regelungen
des Vertrags von Lissabon, wie die doppelt-qualifizierte Mehrheit im Rat
(Art. 16 Abs. 4 EUV-Lissabon, Art. 238 Abs. 2 des Vertrags über die
Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union ), die partizipativen,
assoziativen und direkten Demokratieelemente (Art. 11 EUV-Lissabon)
sowie die institutionelle Anerkennung der nationalen Parlamente (Art. 12
EUV-Lissabon) können das - gemessen an staatlichen
Demokratieanforderungen - bestehende Defizit der europäischen
Hoheitsgewalt nicht aufwiegen, das Legitimationsniveau des
Staatenverbundes aber gleichwohl erhöhen.

bb) Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bleibt bei Inkrafttreten des Vertrags
von Lissabon ein souveräner Staat. Insbesondere bleibt die deutsche
Staatsgewalt in ihrer Substanz geschützt. Die Verteilung und Abgrenzung
der Zuständigkeiten der Europäischen Union von denen der Mitgliedstaaten
erfolgt nach dem Prinzip der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung und weiteren
materiell-rechtlichen Schutzmechanismen, insbesondere
Zuständigkeitsausübungsregeln. Die so kontrollierte und verantwortbare
Übertragung von Hoheitsrechten auf die Europäische Union wird durch
einzelne Vorschriften des Vertrags von Lissabon nicht in Frage gestellt.
Dies gilt zunächst für das vereinfachte Änderungsverfahren (vgl.
insbesondere Art. 48 Abs. 6 EUV-Lissabon). Die „Zustimmung“ der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland im vereinfachten Änderungsverfahren setzt ein
Gesetz im Sinne des Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG als lex specialis zu Art.
59 Abs. 2 GG voraus.

cc) Soweit die allgemeine Brückenklausel des Art. 48 Abs. 7 EUV-Lissabon
den Übergang vom Einstimmigkeitsprinzip zum qualifizierten
Mehrheitsprinzip in der Beschlussfassung des Rates oder den Übergang vom
besonderen zum ordentlichen Gesetzgebungsverfahren ermöglicht, handelt
es sich ebenfalls um eine nach Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG zu beurteilende
Vertragsänderung. Das Ablehnungsrecht der nationalen Parlamente (Art. 48
Abs. 7 UAbs. 3 EUV-Lissabon) ist kein ausreichendes Äquivalent zum
Ratifikationsvorbehalt. Der deutsche Regierungsvertreter im Europäischen
Rat darf einer Vertragsänderung durch Anwendung der allgemeinen
Brückenklausel deshalb nur zustimmen, wenn der Bundestag und der
Bundesrat innerhalb einer noch auszugestaltenden Frist, die an die
Zwecksetzung des Art. 48 Abs. 7 UAbs. 3 EUV-Lissabon angelehnt ist, ein
Gesetz nach Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG erlassen haben. Dies gilt ebenso
für den Fall, dass von der speziellen Brückenklausel nach Art. 81 Abs. 3
UAbs. 2 AEUV Gebrauch gemacht wird.

dd) Ein Gesetz im Sinne des Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG ist nicht
erforderlich, soweit spezielle Brückenklauseln sich auf Sachbereiche
beschränken, die durch den Vertrag von Lissabon bereits hinreichend
bestimmt sind, und kein Ablehnungsrecht der nationalen Parlamente
vorsehen. Auch in diesen Fällen obliegt es allerdings dem Bundestag und,
soweit die Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse der Länder betroffen sind, dem
Bundesrat, die Integrationsverantwortung in anderer geeigneter Weise
wahrzunehmen. Das Vetorecht im Rat darf auch bei sachlich in den
Verträgen bereits bestimmten Gegenständen nicht ohne Beteiligung der
zuständigen Gesetzgebungsorgane aufgegeben werden. Der deutsche
Regierungsvertreter im Europäischen Rat oder Rat darf deshalb einer
Änderung des Primärrechts durch Anwendung einer der speziellen
Brückenklauseln nur dann für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland zustimmen,
wenn der Deutsche Bundestag und, soweit die Regelungen über die
Gesetzgebung dies erfordern, der Bundesrat innerhalb einer noch
auszugestaltenden Frist, die an die Zwecksetzung des Art. 48 Abs. 7
UAbs. 3 EUV-Lissabon angelehnt ist, ihre Zustimmung zu diesem Beschluss
erteilt haben.

ee) Auch die Flexibilitätsklausel des Art. 352 AEUV kann in einer Weise
ausgelegt werden, dass das in den Vorschriften in Aussicht genommene
Integrationsprogramm durch die deutschen Gesetzgebungsorgane noch
vorhersehbar und bestimmbar ist. In Anbetracht der Unbestimmtheit
möglicher Anwendungsfälle setzt die Inanspruchnahme der
Flexibilitätsklausel verfassungsrechtlich die Ratifikation durch den
Bundestag und den Bundesrat auf der Grundlage von Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2
GG voraus.

ff) Die verfassungsrechtlich gebotene Kontrollkompetenz des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts ist durch die der Schlussakte zum Vertrag von
Lissabon beigefügte Erklärung Nr. 17 zum Vorrang nicht berührt. Der
Grund und die Grenze für die Geltung des Rechts der Europäischen Union
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist der im Zustimmungsgesetz
enthaltene Rechtsanwendungsbefehl, der nur im Rahmen der geltenden
Verfassungsordnung erteilt werden kann. Es ist insoweit nicht von
Bedeutung, ob der Anwendungsvorrang des Unionsrechts, den das
Bundesverfassungsgericht bereits für das Gemeinschaftsrecht im Grundsatz
anerkannt hat, in den Verträgen selbst oder in der der Schlussakte zum
Vertrag von Lissabon beigefügten Erklärung Nr. 17 vorgesehen ist.

gg) Die durch den Vertrag von Lissabon neu begründeten oder vertieften
Zuständigkeiten in den Bereichen der Justiziellen Zusammenarbeit in
Strafsachen und Zivilsachen, der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen, der
Gemeinsamen Verteidigung sowie in sozialen Belangen können im Sinne
einer zweckgerechten Auslegung des Vertrages und müssen zur Vermeidung
drohender Verfassungswidrigkeit von den Organen der Europäischen Union
in einer Weise ausgeübt werden, dass auf mitgliedstaatlicher Ebene
sowohl im Umfang als auch in der Substanz noch Aufgaben von
hinreichendem Gewicht bestehen, die rechtlich und praktisch
Voraussetzung für eine lebendige Demokratie sind. Dabei ist insbesondere
Folgendes zu beachten:

- Wegen der besonders empfindlichen Berührung der demokratischen
Selbstbestimmung durch Straf- und Strafverfahrensnormen sind die
entsprechenden vertraglichen Kompetenzgrundlagen strikt - keinesfalls
extensiv - auszulegen und ihre Nutzung bedarf besonderer
Rechtfertigung.

- Die Nutzung der dynamischen Blankettermächtigung nach Art. 83 Abs. 1
UAbs. 3 AEUV, „je nach Entwicklung der Kriminalität“ eine Ausdehnung
des Katalogs besonders schwerer grenzüberschreitender Straftaten
vorzunehmen, entspricht in der Sache einer Erweiterung der
Zuständigkeiten der Europäischen Union und unterliegt deshalb dem
Gesetzesvorbehalt des Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG.

- Im Bereich der Justiziellen Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen sind
zusätzlich besondere Anforderungen an die Regelungen zu stellen, die
einem Mitgliedstaat spezielle Rechte im Gesetzgebungsverfahren
einräumen (Art. 82 Abs. 3, Art. 83 Abs. 3 AEUV: sogenanntes
Notbremseverfahren). Das notwendige Maß an demokratischer Legitimation
über die mitgliedstaatlichen Parlamente lässt sich aus dem Blickwinkel
des deutschen Verfassungsrechts nur dadurch gewährleisten, dass der
deutsche Vertreter im Rat die in Art. 82 Abs. 3 und Art. 83 Abs. 3
AEUV genannten mitgliedstaatlichen Rechte nur nach Weisung des
Bundestages, und soweit die Regelungen über die Gesetzgebung dies
erfordern, des Bundesrates ausübt. - Auch bei Inkrafttreten des
Vertrags von Lissabon besteht der konstitutive Parlamentsvorbehalt für
den Auslandseinsatz der Streitkräfte fort. Der Vertrag von Lissabon
überträgt der Europäischen Union keine Zuständigkeit, auf die
Streitkräfte der Mitgliedstaaten ohne Zustimmung des jeweils
betroffenen Mitgliedstaats oder seines Parlaments zurückzugreifen. Er
beschränkt auch die sozialpolitischen Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten des
Deutschen Bundestages nicht in einem solchen Umfang, dass das
Sozialstaatsprinzip (Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 3 in Verbindung mit Art. 79
Abs. 3 GG) in verfassungsrechtlich bedenklicher Weise beeinträchtigt
und insoweit notwendige demokratische Entscheidungsspielräume
unzulässig vermindert wären.

b) Gegen das Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 23, 45 und
93) bestehen ebenfalls keine durchgreifenden verfassungsrechtlichen
Bedenken. Eine Verletzung demokratischer Grundsätze nach Art. 79 Abs. 3
GG erfolgt weder durch Art. 23 Abs. 1a GG n.F., der das Recht zur
Erhebung der Subsidiaritätsklage als Minderheitenrecht ausgestaltet und
das Quorum auf ein Viertel der Mitglieder festlegt, noch durch Art. 45
Satz 3 GG n.F.

c) Dagegen verstößt das Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der
Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der
Europäischen Union insoweit gegen Art. 38 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art.
23 Abs. 1 GG, als Beteiligungsrechte des Deutschen Bundestages und des
Bundesrates nicht in dem von Verfassungs wegen erforderlichen Umfang
ausgestaltet worden sind. Gestalten die Mitgliedstaaten auf der
Grundlage des Prinzips der begrenzten Einzelermächtigung das europäische
Vertragsrecht in einer Art und Weise aus, dass eine Veränderung des
Vertragsrechts bereits ohne Ratifikationsverfahren allein oder
maßgeblich durch die Organe der Europäischen Union - wenngleich unter
dem Einstimmigkeitserfordernis im Rat - herbeigeführt werden kann,
obliegt den nationalen Verfassungsorganen eine besondere Verantwortung
im Rahmen der Mitwirkung. Diese Integrationsverantwortung muss in
Deutschland innerstaatlich den verfassungsrechtlichen Anforderungen
insbesondere des Art. 23 Abs. 1 GG genügen.



***

The Federal Constitutional Court has also published the ruling, which will be studied with interest both in Germany and the rest of Europe.


Ralf Grahn

European Parliament reform

Those who think that the European Union should develop according to the agreed and ratified treaty aims of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe are likely to favour the emergence of a parliamentary system, based on the votes of EU citizens, with European level government.

In this respect, the Treaty of Lisbon is a step forward, because it strengthens the legislative powers of the European Parliament, by extending co-decision (the ordinary legislative procedure) to a number of policy areas or issues.

The importance of the Lisbon Treaty should not be exaggerated. Special legislative procedures remain in many areas, with the Council in a privileged position. Treaty reform is still in the hands of the member states, not the representatives of EU citizens. Foreign, security and defence policy continue to be outside the effective control of the European Parliament, and even the Council’s powers are basically subject to unanimity, ensuring that the European Union remains a relative midget in world affairs. The member states block the resources (taxation) and make the strategic spending decisions (long term budget), although the European Parliament is allowed a wider role with regard to annual budgets.

Regardless of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, an effective and democratic European Union is still a long way off.


***

New European Parliament

The newly elected European Parliament will convene for the first time in about two weeks. It should start to formulate its priorities for the coming five years.

There are questions, where the European Parliament can function as a conscience and a catalyst or debate. There are also matters, where the EP has all the tools to gain the trust of EU citizens by wise internal decisions and practices.


As the only EU institution directly elected by the citizens, the European Parliament has an obligation to keep the question of EU reform alive. This requires the judicious use of own initiative reports on long term institutional reform towards real parliamentary democracy.

In the future, all running political affairs should be decided by simple majorities, abolishing the need for majorities of the component members (and thus the stifling “grand coalitions”).

The European elections 2009 and the political parties at European level (Europarties) showed weaknesses, which demand constructive initiatives and proposals in order to strengthen European level democracy.

The European Parliament needs to take a critical look at itself and its image. As shown by the Westminster expenses scandal, the EP has to change its attitude to openness, transparency and sound financial practices, although it has curbed some of the most flagrant excesses from the beginning of the new parliamentary term.

The European Parliament does a better job than the Council at informing the public about its legislative work (committee agendas, proposed amendments, reports) than the Council, but the same standards should be extended to the EP’s internal bodies, such as the Bureau and the Conference of Presidents, including the meeting documents. They should be made automatically and visibly accessible to the public in the same manner.

Internal audit reports should be made available automatically and followed up by proposals and decisions, including actions taken against wayward MEPs. Whistleblowers should be promoted instead of demoted.

Despite differing views on the ultimate goals of European integration, the European Parliament has many reasons to take on board criticism of its practices, such as Open Europe’s publication The European Parliament - What does it do and how does it affect your everyday life? (April 2009)



For instance, the following proposals by Open Europe (with some modifications by me) merit serious consideration:

• The Parliament should publish the official figures for MEPs’ salary, pension and expense entitlements in one easily accessible document. (This should include information about EU and national taxation.)
• MEPs need to be open and transparent about how they spend their allowances and should publish all this information.
• MEPs should be obliged to produce receipts for all expenses, and receive allowances accordingly, rather than receive flat-rate expenses for office equipment, etc.
• All unused allowances, and allowances not supported with receipts, should be reimbursed back to the EU budget.
• Any MEP who is caught misusing allowances should, after a proper legal inquiry, be suspended and replaced.
• A robust register of MEPs’ financial interests
• The European Parliament should regularly propose to the Council treaty reform leading to an end to the “traveling circus” between Brussels and Strasbourg
• An end to opaque back-room deals with regard to MEPs rights and obligations (Open committee preparation. See also Bureau and Conference of Presidents publicity above)
• Publish full minutes of Committee meetings
• Allow MEPs greater freedom in debates
• MEPs need to make it clear what they stand for (much facilitated, if the need for grand coalitions is scrapped)



Ralf Grahn

EU Lisbon Treaty: Irish guarantees explained

The Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA) in Dublin has published an explanation of the Lisbon Treaty guarantees to Ireland.





Ralf Grahn

European Union: Better regulation

On its road to an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, the European Union has as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities, to promote throughout the European Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States (Article 1 TEC).


Social market economy

Among the modernised aims of the European Union, in the Lisbon Treaty Article 3(3) TEU, we find “a highly competitive social market economy”:

“3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.

It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.

It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.

It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”


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Legislation and regulation

Legislation is an important instrument for the European Union promotes its aims, and the stream of Directives, Regulations and Decisions is impressive.

In principle, the objectives of the legislative acts are worthy, such as improved environmental standards, consumer protection, human safety, health and wellbeing.

While the legislation is often addressed to the member states, much of it targets businesses. Regulation leads to compliance costs for enterprises, and the combined cost of business regulation is too great to ignore at national and European level.

Much can be said for replacing different national rules by common norms for 27 EU member states (or 30 countries of the European Economic Area, EEA), but the economy in the internal market is not meant to be only “social”, but also “highly competitive”.

Given the importance of the European Union, both benefits and costs of business regulation need to be scrutinised carefully, because European level legislation affects about 500 million people.


***

Better regulation

The European Commission pursues a Better Regulation strategy, with the following courses of action:



 Promoting the design and application of better regulation tools at the EU level, notably simplification, reduction of administrative burdens and impact assessment.
 Working more closely with Member States to ensure that better regulation principles are applied consistently throughout the EU by all regulators.
 Reinforcing the constructive dialogue between stakeholders and all regulators at the EU and national levels


The Commission’s own assessment of its agenda is the Communication Third strategic review of Better Regulation in the European Union (Brussels, 28.1.2009, COM(2009) 15 final).



The Communication presents efforts to cut “red tape” by scrapping obsolete legislation and codifying existing legal acts. The implications of proposed new laws are scrutinised through impact assessments, with new Impact assessment guidelines (since 15 January 2009; SEC(2009) 92).




***

Open Europe

Open Europe’s publication Out of control? Measuring a decade of EU regulation was published in February 2009, which means that some of the questions it raises may have been addressed in the Communication (and accompanying documents) as well as the new Impact assessment guidelines.




Still, the publication raises valid points about regulatory costs at both national (UK) and European level. (It does not look at the benefits.)

Despite the efforts, the costs of regulation have continued to rise.

Administrative costs have been at the centre of attention, with the EU scrapping obsolete legislation and simplifying existing laws. The wider costs of compliance with regulation, fees and licenses as well as knock-on effects have been less well scrutinised.

Open Europe correctly underlines the importance of European level regulation, meaning that a purely domestic (UK) agenda is too limited in scope.


***

New Commission

The newly elected European Parliament is starting its work and the legislative engine, the new Commission, will begin to set its priorities from the end of this year (1 November 2009).

Open Europe’s remarks and suggestions need to be taken seriously by the EU institutions, comparing them to the latest Communication and Impact assessment guidelines.

Although Open Europe dealt with national issues from a British perspective, all national governments could profit from many of the suggestions, both with regard to their contributions to Council work and to their domestic agendas on sensible regulation.

A level playing-field within the EU (EEA) is desirable, but far from enough. A highly competitive social market economy needs to be competitive in a global context as well.



Ralf Grahn

Ever closer union

Right after the dignitaries, the first words of the 1957 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome) read like this:

DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, …


***

The United Kingdom refused to join at the beginning, then applied for membership in 1961, and was finally accepted as a member from 1973.

Time enough to read the first two lines of the treaty, I would think.


Ralf Grahn

Open Europe's EU reform

Open Europe lobbies actively on European issues through critical comment, a daily press summary highlighting almost every derogatory news item available, media appearances, op-ed articles and participation in events.



The torrent of negative comment raised my interest to find out what Open Europe is lobbying for, in other words what the “reformed” European Union would look like.

I found a web document called Our vision. When I asked, Open Europe admitted that they do not have one document that sets out their reform agenda in one place. However, for specific reform proposals they recommended Chapter 5 of their publication Out of control? Measuring a decade of EU regulation and The European Parliament – What does it do and how does it affect your everyday life?




***


Finalité

Every member state has signed up to the aim of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. This aim is the first one stated in the preamble of the Treaty establishing the European Community (since the Treaty of Rome, 1957, EEC Treaty). Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union sets out that the establishment of the EU marks a new step in the process of creating this closer union among the peoples of Europe.

The process and the direction are clear, but the treaties do not spell out the speed or the ultimate goals (finalité) of European integration.

Since I am primarily interested in the overall vision of Open Europe, Our vision remains the main source for assessing their alternative vision. For systematic reasons, I will choose the order of the issues and the comments.



Main aim

By calling for a flexible European Union, based on voluntary cooperation, Open Europe rejects the basic aim of the treaties, at least for the United Kingdom.

It looks hard to reconcile a repudiation of an organisation’s main aims with continued membership. The logical option would be for Britain to withdraw from the European Union.



Practical alternatives

Withdrawal

Open Europe sees that the current process of integration leads to failure, deadlock and crisis. The UK (and other member states) could seek a looser relationship with the centre - for example replacing their current mode of membership by free trade and single market agreements with the other member states.

Logically, the “looser relationship” would mean secession.

This option would be clear-cut, with participation in the single market through international agreements with the European Union (member states). The models already exist.

Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway together with the 27 EU member states form the European Economic Area (EEA), which allows them access to the internal market as well as the option to participate in EU programmes of choice. (In addition, they are part of the Schengen area of free travel and common controls at the external borders.)

Then there is the Swiss model, marginally more independent. Switzerland concludes bilateral agreements with the European Union (including Schengen).

The drawback of both models is that the outsiders can mainly accept (or reject) what the European Union has cooked up. They can influence outcomes through consultation and lobbying, but they are not present when the EU institutions reach the internal outcomes.

In my opinion, Open Europe needs to do much more to indicate the course of action to take and to assess the consequences if Britain withdraws from the European Union, which would be the logical option considering its rejection of the basic treaty aims.


Dismantled EU

Open Europe’s other option is that the EU as a whole could be restructured to accommodate different members’ conflicting interests.

Apart from a minimum core of common rules, participation in EU policies should be voluntary. The less integrationist member states should not stop groups of other countries from pursuing deeper integration among themselves within the EU framework.

Countries would be allowed to opt in or out of: the common foreign and security policy; border control; justice and home affairs legislation; the CAP and CFP; cross-Europe emissions trading; external aid and other EU spending policies (e.g. on research). It would also mean allowing member states to take back control of regional aid and to repeal some legislation which is currently tacked inappropriately onto the internal market (like the Working Time Directive).


In my view, Open Europe’s view of the future European Union is incompatible with the aim to achieve ever closer union, under the existing treaties, as expressed by the timid reforms in the Treaty of Lisbon and especially with regard to the global challenges of the 21st century. Beyond the Lisbon Treaty, a unified foreign and security policy, including a future common defence, are prerequisites for Europe as an influential actor on the global stage. Effective powers require democratic government at EU level. Economic policy, resources (taxation) and some internal policies need to be strengthened.

But Open Europe’s vision of the dismantled European Union à-la-carte has one redeeming feature, worth further study.

Open Europe recognises that less integrationist countries should not stop (groups of) other countries from pursuing deeper integration within the EU framework. It does, however, raise a number of questions, which need to be addressed.

The European Union is based on international treaties, concluded between the member states, subject to unanimous agreement and ratification by all member states. The powers (competences) of the EU are laid down in these treaties, in some detail.

The enlarged European Union is almost impossible to reform, as shown by the painful road since the Nice summit in December 2000. The proposed reforms (Lisbon Treaty) are at the level of the least reform-minded countries.

Open Europe’s principles of unhindered progress and voluntary participation require new ground rules. In the near future, as long as intergovernmental conferences (with or without conventions) agree on treaty reform, a qualified majority of member states should be allowed to progress, as long as the minority is allowed to opt out of the policy area and future implementation.

It is hard to believe that anti-integrationist countries would abide by a promise to let the majority progress, or that future treaties would be ratified by all member states. Therefore, the European Union would have to agree on coming treaties entering into force among the ratifying states.

It is more natural that the minority opts out, than that the majority is forced to establish special procedures among itself, such as enhanced or permanent structured cooperation. The participating countries would constitute the Council with regard to each policy area. Governance would be messy, but somehow possible.

The supranational institutions of the European Union would, however, give rise to more serious questions. Should the MEPs of the opting-out nations be allowed to legislate on all matters, if their states of origin are exempt from duties pertaining to important policy areas? Should the fringe nations be given the same weight in the Commission, the Court of Justice, the consultative bodies and agencies?

On the other hand, after massive opt-outs some member states would be quick to demand lower contributions to the EU budget.

Open Europe needs to look closer at the implications of a European Union à-la-carte, if it wants to present it as a credible alternative.

Long term, the EU treaties need to be replaced by a basic law, which can be amended at EU level, by democratically legitimate institutions, by qualified majorities. How does Open Europe envision the situation of fringe countries in this context?



***

Open Europe has been consistently long on critique, but short on constructive proposals. It is high time to set out the alternatives for the United Kingdom (and perhaps some other member states) in much more detail, both secession and some sort of minimal membership, which would satisfy not only British preferences but the aspirations of the European mainstream.



Ralf Grahn

European Conservatives: Prague declaration analysis (Part three)

What does the Prague declaration of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG) in the European Parliament tell us about the future policies of the new political group, built around the UK Conservative Party of David Cameron and William Hague (26 MEPs), the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) of the Kaczynski twins (15 MEPs) and the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Mirek Topolanek (formerly Vaclav Klaus) (9 MEPs), with a fluctuating number of individual representatives from other member states?




The ECRG has presented ten short principles. The part looked at the preamble. The second part presented the principles from 1 to 5, and this third part contains the remaining principles, one at a time, with subjective comments.



***


NATO first

6. The overriding value of the transatlantic security relationship in a revitalised NATO, and support for young democracies across Europe.



Comment

The plethora of common interests between the United States and the European Union – values, trade, foreign, security and defence – are reduced and made subservient to the defence alliance NATO, although the US needs a coherent Europe to deal with in all mutual areas and as an ally in the world. Despite the importance of NATO, the US has more pressing global challenges to think about, and twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union it has a right to expect that the EU will be able to defend itself in most conceivable situations before long.

The ECRG says nothing about developing the foreign, security and defence policy, or the common defence, of the European Union. The most fundamental challenges for the EU are left unanswered (but the UK Conservatives’ European Election Manifesto was outright hostile towards the timid Lisbon Treaty reforms in the foreign policy area.)

My reading is that it is an error to do anything to keep the UK within the European Union based on its foreign policy influence or military capabilities, as long as Britain is opposed to using them for the common good.

Young democracies need support, from Morocco to Murmansk, but the crux of the matter is how we are going to achieve coherent and cohesive European Union action with regard to the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean or Russia. The sovereign integrity of each EU member state is a recipe for disaster.



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Immigration control

7. Effectively controlled immigration and an end to abuse of asylum procedures



Comment


Improved immigration control and asylum procedures seem to be in line with the EU’s aims under the Hague Programme and the future Stockholm Programme on justice and home affairs (area of freedom, security and justice).

Given the participating parties, it is surprising thing that the European Conservatives mention these policies in a document on the European Union. Great Britain has opted out of the Schengen area of free internal travel and external border control. Under the Lisbon Treaty Britain would opt out of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and together with Poland from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights containing the guiding values with regard to individuals.

The ECRG parties are hardly the ones most famous for promoting effective, but fair responses to the common challenges of migration and asylum.



***

Public services

8. Efficient and modern public services and sensitivity to the needs of both rural and urban communities.


Comment

Who could oppose such gifted platitudes?

***

Waste

9. An end to waste and excessive bureaucracy and a commitment to greater transparency and probity in the EU institutions and use of EU funds.


Comment

Who could oppose such gifted platitudes?



***

Equality of member states

10. Respect and equitable treatment for all EU countries, new and old, large and small.



Comment

Who could oppose such gifted platitudes?



***


The European Conservatives are potential saboteurs in the evolving foreign, security and defence area. They are hardly credible as European reformers in the area of freedom, security and justice, either.

With almost nothing to give, it remains a mystery why they don’t act forcefully for their countries to withdraw from the European Union.



Ralf Grahn

European Conservatives: Prague declaration analysis (Part two)

What does the Prague declaration of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG) in the European Parliament tell us about the future policies of the new political group, built around the UK Conservative Party of David Cameron and William Hague (26 MEPs), the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) of the Kaczynski twins (15 MEPs) and the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Mirek Topolanek (formerly Vaclav Klaus) (9 MEPs), with a fluctuating number of individual representatives from other member states?




The ECRG has presented ten short principles. The previous post looked at the preamble. Now we present the principles, one at a time, with subjective comments.


***

Free enterprise


1. Free enterprise, free and fair trade and competition, minimal regulation, lower taxation, and small government as the ultimate catalysts for individual freedom and personal and national prosperity.


Comment

Conspicuously absent is any mention of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, the main aim of European integration since the Treaty of Rome (EEC Treaty) more than 50 years ago; thus, an objective every member state has embraced when joining the European Communities or the European Union. The ECRG rejects the basic tenet of the European Community (European Union).

Free enterprise is but an unnamed part of the European Community task to promote a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities and a high level of employment and of social protection. In the Treaty of Lisbon this has been defined as a highly competitive social market economy. The ECRG does not pay even lip service to the European Community’s (European Union’s) concept of a social market economy.

The member states form a customs union and they are treaty bound to contribute to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers. The ECRG’s aim to promote free and fair trade is compatible with the stated aims of the EC (EU), and the ECRG is probably a force for positive change with regard to foot-dragging member states.

Free and fair competition is in line with the EC (EU) aim to ensure competition in the internal market.

Minimal national regulation has contributed to burdening taxpayers with trillions of debt because of reckless financial institutions and failing regulators, so the minimal regulation credo seems to come from the backbone of Conservative thought rather than from the brain.

The huge socialised liabilities caused by the financial mess and the economic downturn undermine the credibility of the call for lower taxation. Add the rising burdens of ageing societies, and lower taxation (a national competence) turns intellectually dishonest.

Small government is a populist and reductionist view of the public sector. I would prefer smart government, i.e. effective and efficient.

Individual freedom seems to be designed for the privileged, and the ECRG makes no effort to indicate how their (national) prosperity would benefit society as a whole.

All in all, there is nothing compassionate about this brand of Conservatism, and precious little to place it near the European mainstream of socially responsible government.



***

Freedom

2. Freedom of the individual, more personal responsibility and greater democratic accountability.


Comment

Freedom of the individual seems to be rooted in the absence of government action, and more personal responsibility looks like the free choice to sink or swim without societal help. Most Nordic Conservatives would see these unadorned principles as callous, because they lack any reference to the wellbeing of society as a whole.

If the ECRG is interested in a rounded and modern message on EU citizens’ rights, it should promote the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

There is no attempt to explain where and how of greater democratic accountability.



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Energy security

3. Sustainable, clean energy supply with an emphasis on energy security.


Comment

The energy policy targets are crucial and commendable, but much more is needed to make them into viable policies.



***

Family

4. The importance of the family as the bedrock of society.


Comment

Is this a sop to the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), a tacit approval of its Catholic agenda against deviants?



***

Nationalism

5. The sovereign integrity of the nation state, opposition to EU federalism and a renewed respect for true subsidiarity.


Comment

The ECRG does not use the words nationalism or nationalistic, but that is what the sovereign integrity of the nation state indicates as their ideological backbone.

Anti-federalism further underlines the commitment to solve European level and global problems at national level.

Every EU legislative proposal is screened with regard to subsidiarity and proportionality, so this is the third phrasing in one sentence of a minimalist view of the role of the European Union.



***

This far, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG) could contribute to the European Union’s aims with regard to international trade and competition in the internal market, although they reject the consensus on economic and social policy.

On the other hand, the European Conservatives reject the basic aim of European integration and they prefer nationalism to common procedures and solutions. They offer no promise of a European Union able to speak with one voice on the global stage. Their minimalist message is not only anti-federalist, but against European mainstream political thought.

In the third part we look at the remaining principles of the European Conservatives. (It is better to leave out the Reformists, when revisionists would be more apt.)



Ralf Grahn

European Conservatives: Prague declaration analysis (Part one)

What do we know about the politics of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG) in the European Parliament?

The strongest manifestation is the establishment of the new political group, built around the UK Conservative Party of David Cameron and William Hague (26 MEPs), the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) of the Kaczynski twins (15 MEPs) and the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Mirek Topolanek (formerly Vaclav Klaus) (9 MEPs), with a fluctuating number of individual representatives from other member states.

The Tories and the ODS left the EPP-ED group, the home of the mainstream group of the European People’s Party (EPP) and the sub-group European Democrats (ED). The divorce from the European mainstream is accentuated by the new union with the nationalist and populist PiS on the fringes.

Prague declaration

There is not much to go on with regard to policies, but the three main parties have agreed on some common principles, the so called Prague declaration.



Let us look at the declaration and provide some subjective comment on its contents.

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Preamble

The Prague declaration of principles of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group in the European Parliament

Conscious of the urgent need to reform the EU on the basis of Eurorealism, openness, accountability and democracy, in a way that respects the sovereignty of our nations and concentrates on economic recovery, growth and competitiveness, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group shares the following Principles: …


Comment

The euphemism Euroskeptic is mainly used by people who oppose European integration and in many cases propose breaking up the European Union, or at least their country’s secession from the EU. Anti-EU and anti-European are preferable terms.

Eurorealism is seen as a softer version of anti-EU action. European integration as a process leading to closer political union is rejected. Dismantling parts of the institutional EU and repatriating some powers to the member states are distinct possibilities. This is the first – and key – auto-definition of the ECRG.

Without using the word, the ECRG defines itself as nationalist, because the Eurorealism, openness, accountability and democracy it mentions as the cornerstones of EU reform are all subject to the respect of the sovereignty of their nations, i.e. the member states.

The political scope of the “reformed” European Union is practically reduced to the economic area: economic recovery, growth and competitiveness.



Ralf Grahn


P.S. The European Citizen has written a thoughtful blog post on the new political group: The European Conservatives and Reformists (24 June 2009).

Regards-citoyens: Quality Euroblog

Here is a recommendation to those who want to read quality posts (in French) on European, international and French political and legal issues: Regards-citoyens.



The blog is run by a collective and frequently updated. The posts are well documented.

Here is a sample of the latest posts:

• "Les Européens peuvent-ils encore imprimer leur marque au nouveau concept stratégique de l’OTAN ?", par Olivier Jehin (Agence Europe)
• Puissance et intelligence, par Pierre Lacoste
• Vers une nouvelle architecture institutionnelle transatlantique ? par Jolyon Howorth
• Comment les européens et les partenaires internationaux de la France vont-ils interprêter la nomination de Pierre Lellouche au poste de secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires européennes ?
• France / Remaniement ministériel
• Considérations sur les questions que le Conseil européen n'a pas tranchée, par Ferdinando Riccardi
• Communauté européenne : Rapport 2009 sur les finances publiques: une relance budgétaire était nécessaire pour soutenir l'économie, mais son succès dépend d'une stratégie crédible de sortie d
• La compétence de l’Union en matière d'action extérieure (y inclus la PESC) selon le Traité de Lisbonne
• Les coopérations " spécialisées " : une voie de progrès pour la construction européenne (2)
• Les coopérations " spécialisées " : une voie de progrès pour la construction européenne (1)



***

The only disturbing aspect is the lack of description of the aims of the blog and the team behind it (impressum). There is no reason to be ashamed or even modest about either.


Ralf Grahn

European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG)

The UK Conservatives have announced the establishment of a new political group in the European Parliament: the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG).



At least the following Euroblogs have commented: Jon Worth, Nosemonkey, Julien Frisch, Coulisses de Bruxelles and La Oreja de Europa.



***

At the latest count the new group seems to have 56 MEPs, and it may pick up a few more before the inaugural session of the EP on 14 July 2009. The ECRG will probably be the fourth largest group in numbers.

There is no group in the European Parliament with enough votes to amend legislation on its own, so a majority of the component members (736) has to be sought over party lines. These coalitions will be formed among the four groups in the European mainstream.

According to the Wikipedia article European Parliament election, 2009 these probable groups and sizes are the following (latest update 23 June 2009):



• European People’s Party (EPP) 263

• Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (PASD) 183

• Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 82

• European Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) 53


The European Parliament is going to function through the mainstream groups. The British voters have backed only 29 MEPs (out of 72) who will exert real influence by sitting in the groups with power.

Opposition groups to the left and the right of the European mainstream will be able to table and to air their alternative proposals, or vote with the majority, but they are going to remain marginal.

British business interests and the US administration have seen the first omens of a future Conservative government led by David Cameron and William Hague.

***

By the way: Looking at the make-up, the addition of the word “Reformists” to the name of the ECRG expresses a profound sense of humour.


Ralf Grahn

Swedish EU Council Presidency programme

Sweden has published the Work programme for the Swedish Presidency of the EU 1 July --- 31 December 2009.



As an overview, here are the contents of the 46 page work programme:


Table of contents

PART 1
Taking on the challenge

1. Economy and employment - EU emerges stronger from the economic crisis

2. Climate – a new climate agreement in place

3. Justice and Home Affairs – a Stockholm Programme that safeguards security and the rights of individuals

4. The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea, a cleaner marine environment and a more competitive region

5. The EU, its neighbourhood and the world

6. New Parliament, Commission and Treaty of Lisbon


PART 2
Priorities within each Council configuration

1. Horizontal issues for a better EU
GAERC – General affairs

2. The EU as a global actor
GAERC - External relations

3. Reversing economic developments
ECOFIN – the Economic and Financial Affairs Council

4. A more secure and open Europe
Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA)

5. Full employment and good health
The Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO)

6. A competitive Europe
Competitiveness Council

7. Towards an eco-efficient economy
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE)

8. Using resources without using them up
Agriculture and Fisheries Council

9. A credible EU for the environment
Environment Council

10. High standards promote better growth
Education, Youth and Culture Council

Annex: Planned meetings of the Council during the Swedish Presidency of the EU




Ralf Grahn

EU Lisbon Treaty: Spectre of Vaclav Klaus

A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Vaclav Klaus.

The Czech Republic has a problem, which has become a European embarrassment. His name is Vaclav Klaus, and he was elected for a second term as President in 2008 by the Czech Parliament. According to the Wikipedia article on Vaclav Klaus, his term ends on 6 March 2013.



Klaus defies overwhelming scientific and political opinion on global warming, and he wants to dismantle the European Union.

The Treaty of Lisbon has been agreed by 27 member state governments and approved by 26 national parliaments including the Czech one, but Klaus stubbornly refuses to sign the ratification instrument. His arguments are rubbish, but he has signalled that in reality he waits for a British referendum to sink the Lisbon Treaty.

The consequences of multiple unanimity rules and ratification by all member states are clearly visible, but the member states have to think about damage limitation and the future of European integration.

The first question goes to the Czech government, because the Czech President and the Czech Constitution are Czech-made problems: What can the Czech government and parliament do and what will they do to break the deadlock in order to secure the timely formal ratification?

If the Czech constitutional and political machinery is unable or unwilling to conclude the ratification procedure, their European embarrassment becomes a serious European problem.


Option 1: Do nothing

The EU member states can conclude that the European Union they have built is beyond reform. Even if they reach timid unanimous agreements on treaty reform, sheer numbers in an enlarged union will practically guarantee that there is perverse opposition in at least one member state, probably more. The Treaty of Nice would remain the crowning achievement of European integration. Politically, the enlargement process could be halted in perpetuity, but it would not improve the existing EU.


Option 2: New union

Old stumbling blocks: In a week we are going to know if the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has ruled that the Lisbon Treaty is compatible with the Constitution. In less than four months Ireland has voted for the amending treaty having received assurances from all member states. Soon after that it will be clear if the Polish President Lech Kaczynski has completed formal ratification.

New hurdles: We will also know the results of the general election in the United Kingdom and the colour of its new government. The British parliament will probably have started the debate on the Tory government’s referendum bill.

If the rest of the member states are not content to continue on the basis of the Nice Treaty, they have to consider other options.

The only realistic alternative seems to be a new union, leaving the rejectionists behind. There are least two different scenarios.

The new European Union could be formed quickly by the member states, which approve the Lisbon Treaty without the requirement for ratification by all. This closer union could then convene a convention to prepare further reform towards a more effective and democratic union.

A second scenario would be to start by calling a new convention, but it would be encumbered by the rejectionists and in the end they would not agree on and ratify a true reform treaty anyway. In practice, this alternative would be a waste of time, as shown by the tortuous reform road since the Nice Treaty.


***

If the core member states of the European Union stand up to Vaclav Klaus and the other rejectionists, he has (unintentionally) set in motion a process leading to a more effective and democratic European Union, without the Czech Republic and Britian, perhaps a few more.

The next months will tell if the European leaders have the resolve to separate the wheat from the chaff, or if they opt for immobility.

For the rejectionists, the proposed path should come as a blessing. They would be able to negotiate the looser relationship they want, but they would not harm the rest of Europe.



Ralf Grahn

EU Lisbon Treaty: “Meaningless” Irish guarantees?

Yesterday’s blog post, EU Lisbon Treaty: Vaclav Klaus is wrong, showed that Czech President Vaclav Klaus did not quite attain the standards of "every normal human being, a first form pupil” in his understanding of the guarantees to Ireland. He can hardly have been caught unawares, because the assurances were outlined by the European Council in December 2008, and Klaus has missed few opportunities to pontificate on Lisbon Treaty matters.




***

“Meaningless guarantees” to Ireland

The lobby group Open Europe has attacked the assurances given to Ireland on different grounds: Irish to vote on exactly the same text of Lisbon Treaty – EU admits that nothing has changed (19 June 2009).




The core argument of Open Europe – which seems to contradict Klaus’ statements – is that the deal makes no change whatsoever to the text of the Treaty, meaning Irish voters will be voting on exactly the same text they rejected last year.


If the Lisbon Treaty remains the same, are the guarantees meaningless?

We are in agreement with Open Europe that the European Council can retain a Commissioner from each member state and that the rest of the Treaty remains unchanged.

The Irish government has asked for the assurances based on the distorted claims of No campaigners ahead of the first referendum. Many Irish voters were confused by forceful, but erroneous assertions, and they felt that they did not understand the Lisbon Treaty.

Thus, it is only logical that the government of Ireland has sought correct interpretations on some issues, which confused the electorate. The assurances are shorter to read and easier to understand than a presentation of the whole amending treaty. The other EU member states have given these clarifications their seal of approval.


***

Neutrality

Open Europe has found one expert opinion to support the assertion that Irish military neutrality is at risk.

In my view, Dr Karen Devine’s interpretation is not correct. There is no need for a specific opt-out, because the Lisbon Treaty text on both defence policy in general and the mutual assistance clause already allows for each member state to define its own policy and action. Thus, Ireland does not need an opt-out.

The Presidency Conclusions of the June 2009 European Council seem to respond adequately to the concerns of Irish citizens with regard to neutrality, including the issue of mutual assistance, by clarifying the text of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Naturally, one can discuss if the lack of solidarity by Ireland is a desirable state of affairs in a political union such as the EU, but that is another story.


***

The guarantees are not meaningless, because they explain why major concerns in Ireland are groundless.

Open Europe has given No campaigners dud ammunition.



Ralf Grahn

EU Lisbon Treaty: Vaclav Klaus is wrong

If the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, it will affect the size of the Commission. But Czech President Vaclav Klaus is wrong about the need for renewed ratification.

Lisbon Treaty

Let us start with the Treaty of Lisbon, intended to streamline the institutions of the European Union.

Originally, one of the intended Lisbon Treaty reforms was to shrink the Commission after 1 November 2014. Article 17(4) and (5) of the amended Treaty on European Union states (OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115/25):

Article 17(4) and (5) TEU

4. The Commission appointed between the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and 31 October 2014, shall consist of one national of each Member State, including its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who shall be one of its Vice-Presidents.

5. As from 1 November 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of members, including its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this number.

The members of the Commission shall be chosen from among the nationals of the Member States on the basis of a system of strictly equal rotation between the Member States, reflecting the demographic and geographical range of all the Member States. This system shall be established unanimously by the European Council in accordance with Article 244 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.


***

December 2008 European Council

Point 2 of the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council 11 to 12 December 2008 (Council document 17271/1/08 REV 1 CONCL 5) contains a political decision to scrap the reform, following the negative outcome of the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon:




2. On the composition of the Commission, the European Council recalls that the Treaties currently in force require that the number of Commissioners be reduced in 2009. The European Council agrees that provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, a decision will be taken, in accordance with the necessary legal procedures, to the effect that the Commission shall continue to include one national of each Member State.


***

June 2009 European Council

Under the heading I. Institutional issues, Ireland and the Treaty of Lisbon, the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council 18 to 19 June 2009 reiterate the undertaking of the heads of state or government (Council document 11225/09 CONCL 2):



2. Having carefully noted the concerns of the Irish people as set out by the Taoiseach, the European Council, at its meeting of 11-12 December 2008, agreed that, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, a decision would be taken, in accordance with the necessary legal procedures, to the effect that the Commission shall continue to include one national of each Member State.


***

President Vaclav Klaus

Reuters quotes the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, demanding renewed approval of the Lisbon Treaty by the Czech Parliament: Czechs concerned about changes to Lisbon treaty (20 June 2009):



"Although it is written in the treaty that not all countries ... will have their own commissioner, now suddenly it is promised that they will," news Web site novinky.cz quoted Klaus as saying.

"Every normal human being, a first form pupil, would know that it is a change and that somebody is promising it. So it is a change," he said.

Klaus, a staunch opponent of the EU charter, said earlier this week the guarantees would need to win parliamentary approval in the Czech Republic to comply with the constitution.

***

Within the Lisbon Treaty

Klaus is right about the original intention with the Lisbon Treaty, to reduce the size of the Commission (which has swollen following enlargement).

But Klaus “forgot” to mention the proviso “unless the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this number”.

This is in effect, what two unanimous European Council meetings have promised to do, if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. The decision is compatible with the Treaty of Lisbon, and it is within the powers of the European Council. The formal decision can be taken when the Lisbon Treaty is in force. (Under the Treaty of Nice, the Commission has to be reduced this autumn.)

Klaus is not only wrongheaded – he is plain wrong.


Ralf Grahn

Lisbon Treaty: Åland Islands

Fourteen months have now passed since the Åland Parliament registered the request from the President of Finland, Tarja Halonen, to approve the European Union’s Treaty of Lisbon (on 21 April 2008).

The matter is still lingering in the Legal Committee of the Åland Parliament, which has failed to issue a report for the plenary. (Earlier posts have dealt with the background.)

National parliaments in 26 EU member states have approved the reform treaty. Finland has completed its ratification procedure, but the Åland Islands have not resolved if they want the Lisbon Treaty to apply, if it becomes the primary law of the European Union.

A positive vote requires a two thirds majority in the regional parliament, if the matter advances that far.


Ralf Grahn

Did the European Council nominate Barroso?

The European Council giveth and the European Council taketh away?

Yes, I have to admit that I find the antics of the European Council disturbing. The media have reported that José Manuel Barroso has been nominated as the intended President of the Commission, but read the Presidency Conclusions carefully:



European Council 18 to 19 June 2009 – Presidency Conclusions (Council document 11225/09 CONCL 2)




“Nomination of the President of the Commission

6. The Heads of State or Government agreed unanimously on the name of Mr. José Manuel DURÃO BARROSO as the person they intend to nominate as President of the European Commission for the period 2009-2014.

7. The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic and the Prime Minister of Sweden, as the present and the incoming Presidents of the European Council, will have discussions with the European Parliament in order to determine whether the Parliament is in a position to approve that nomination at its July plenary session.

8. In the light of these discussions, the Council, in the composition of Heads of State or Government, will, on the basis of Article 214(2), 1st subparagraph, of the EC Treaty, formalise its decision on the nomination of the person it intends to appoint as President of the Commission.

9. The process of nomination of the other persons who will be appointed as members of the Commission can only be initiated when the legal basis for the nomination procedure has become clear.”

***

Point 6 tells the same story as the media reports, but point 8 of the Presidency Conclusions makes the nomination conditional. There will be a formal nomination only at a later date.

How can the European Parliament (and the newly elected EP convenes and constitutes the political groups only on 14 July 2009) respond formally to an informal inquiry?

Are the heads of state or government going to formalise their nomination before the EP’s inaugural session, if the informal discussions with the EP indicate that a majority would be prepared to back Barroso?

Has the European Council scored an own goal, by being too clever by half? If not, what does it expect to gain during the coming three weeks?



Ralf Grahn

Instant Barroso ─ delayed Commission?

The European Council moved quickly after the European elections to name José Manuel Durão Barroso as the person it intends to appoint as President of the Commission. According to Article 214(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), the nomination shall be approved by the European Parliament.

But the formal nomination of the chastened Barroso will be confirmed later, subject to discussions with the European Parliament.

***

EP approval

The nomination has now been placed in the in-tray of the new European Parliament, which convenes to its inaugural session on 14 July 2009. According to the Treaty of Nice, a majority of the votes is enough, but under the Treaty of Lisbon a majority of the component members is required (376).

The Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) cannot secure the approval of Barroso on its own, so it needs support from other political groups.

Ahead of and formally at its first session, the European Parliament has to make up its mind on procedural issues and possibly on the approval.

If there is a majority for Barroso, the EP may decide to approve the nomination during the first few days, which is what the Czech and Swedish Council Presidencies have been tasked to find out. But the European Parliament will hardly take a decision without a formal nomination from the Council, in the composition of heads of state or government (by written procedure).

The office of the President of the Commission is the most important nomination the EP is allowed to approve or reject. The European Parliament can hardly dispense with some sort of public hearing of the nominee. It is possible that a majority argues that both Barroso and the rest of the Commission are in office until 31 October 2009, and that they should all be approved at the same time and according to the same procedure (possibly the Lisbon Treaty).

Despite unanimous backing by heads of state or government, Barroso is far from universally acclaimed, and the Greens, parts of the socialists and some other MEPs can hardly fail to capitalise on his relative unpopularity. In other words, some will most probably vote to slow down the procedure and against approval.

***

New Commission

We know that there is going to be a President of the Commission, although it is not absolutely clear under which treaty the ‘election’ procedure is going to be brought to an end.

With regard to the rest of the Commission, there are material differences depending on the treaty in force at the time and the decisions to be taken by the European Council.

If the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, the European Council has promised to disregard its system of rotation between the member states and to opt for an exceptional decision, requiring unanimity. The Commission would continue to have one national from each member state.

If the Nice Treaty remains in force, the Commission has to be reduced.

But is there a compelling reason to separate the appointment of the Commission President and the Commission as a body?

***

Presidency Conclusions

European Council 18 to 19 June 2009 – Presidency Conclusions (Council document 11225/09 CONCL 2)




“Nomination of the President of the Commission

6. The Heads of State or Government agreed unanimously on the name of Mr. José Manuel DURÃO BARROSO as the person they intend to nominate as President of the European Commission for the period 2009-2014.

7. The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic and the Prime Minister of Sweden, as the present and the incoming Presidents of the European Council, will have discussions with the European Parliament in order to determine whether the Parliament is in a position to approve that nomination at its July plenary session.

8. In the light of these discussions, the Council, in the composition of Heads of State or Government, will, on the basis of Article 214(2), 1st subparagraph, of the EC Treaty, formalise its decision on the nomination of the person it intends to appoint as President of the Commission.

9. The process of nomination of the other persons who will be appointed as members of the Commission can only be initiated when the legal basis for the nomination procedure has become clear.”


***


Even if the financial crisis and economic downturn is used as a reason, how convincing is it to have a President in place, without the new Commissioners?



Ralf Grahn

Barroso: Our opinion counts?

I owe this post to Jean Quatremer’s Coulisses de Bruxelles: Toi aussi hacke le site de la présidence tchèque de l’UE ! (17 June 2009)



Instead of convening to anoint José Manuel Barroso as chief of the European Commission, the European Council should study the outcome of the survey of the Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

The Czech government asked, in three languages: Should José Manuel Barroso be re-appointed as President of the European Commission?

The results against Barroso (No-votes) were (per 8 June 2009, according to the web page; when I checked a little while ago):


• English 75%
• Czech 82%
• French 89%

Such polls are not especially reliable, but if the acting Council Presidency asks the citizens of the European Union, one would expect their opinion to be taken into account.

We live in a union where decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen, don’t we?


Ralf Grahn

Shrinking the Commission?

EurActiv reported that Germany will opt for a 12 to 18 member Commission, if the Treaty of Nice remains in force, implying the “problem countries” would not be represented in the college. See: Ireland to re-vote to weigh on new Commission’s appointment (15 June 2009).




“Ominous noises”

On The European Citizen blog, Eurocentric noted the EurActiv article with the question about the size of the Commission: The Irish (Provisional) Guarantees (16 June 2009):



“The most important part of the guarantee will be that of one commissioner per member state, as the other guarantees really just restate and clarify the situation under the Lisbon Treaty. There have been some ominous noises out of Germany that it could push for a drastically reduced Commission if the Lisbon Treaty isn't passed - from 27 to between 12 and 18 commissioners. Under the Nice Treaty the number of commissioners must be reduced for the next Commission to be lower than that of the number of member states.”


***

Name speculation

On the other hand, some information and speculation is emerging with regard to possible names to fill Commissioners’ jobs.

Jon Worth’s Euroblog has collected a number of comments with information about possible proposals from the member states and interested citizens: Think European Commission (since 15 June 2009).

/

EurActiv: Poland kicks off race for EU commissioner jobs (17 June 2009)



***

Problem

A new Commission is needed after 31 October 2009, and a number of posts have to be filled. What we do not know, at this stage, is the applicable treaty, procedure and number of Commissioners.

If the European Council is prepared to play with open cards, it should publicly agree on two alternative scenarios, one for the Treaty of Nice and another for the Lisbon Treaty, before the discussion starts in earnest.


Ralf Grahn

Gordon Brown as President of the European Council?

The European level parties, which could have offered alternatives, failed before the European elections, contributed to their defeat at the elections, and they look set to fail in the newly elected European Parliament.

Without a coalition in the European Parliament with the necessary votes behind a better candidate, how much point is there in discussing the second term for José Manuel Barroso as President of the European Commission?

Show me a realistic alternative, and I will gladly continue the discussion, but Barroso is practically anointed, by an electoral college of 27.

Politics is the art of the possible. It is time to look ahead.

***

Two top jobs

If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, two top jobs will be filled: the new semi-permanent President of the European Council and the empowered High Representative/Vice-President.

This is why I presented the framework in the mock jobs advertisement: European Council recruitment: President and High Representative (14 June 2009).



Tony Barber on the FT Brussels blog added a concrete element to the discussion by speculating: Food For Thought: Gordon Brown as the EU’s First Full-Time President? (15 June 2009)



By adding a known personality, Barber does the discussion a service. For or against, he helps to ignite a forward-looking discussion.

***

Personality test or objective criteria?

Admittedly, at least one of the three top spots should go to a national of one of the big member states. What I find less convincing is that the President of the European Council would be a much greater asset for the European Union if he or she is an internationally known ex-leader (such as Tony Blair or Gordon Brown).

First of all, the Treaty of Lisbon seems to be written with a more ceremonial European Council President in mind; the member states have not presented a detailed job description even for public discussion. Secondly, the High Representative (not the President) is the one designed to run the foreign policy of the European Union. Thirdly, an ex-leader has no special muscle; other world leaders coolly assess the strengths and weaknesses of the European Union based on the force and cohesion of the EU, or the lack thereof; personalities come a distant second.

In my view, the candidates should be evaluated with a view their coming tasks: the whole panoply of EU affairs for the President of the European Council and foreign, security and defence policy for the High Representative.

***


More objective criteria

Gordon Brown and any other candidate should be judged on the merits – of country and person.

A European defence has to be the long term goal of the European Union, with NATO as an important military alliance.

In my opinion, due to their ambiguous relation to an EU defence and the transatlantic NATO relationship, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden had disqualified themselves from filling the posts of President of the European Council and double-hatted High Representative.

Denmark has an opt-out in place concerning the common security and defence policy, although it is a NATO member.

The remaining countries and persons should be evaluated on their contributions.

***

The President of the European Council is supposed to chair and drive forward the work of the European Council. Therefore, the other evolving core areas of the European Union are important, when assessing the track record.

Schengen agreement

The Schengen agreement abolishes border controls between the member states. Ireland and the United Kingdom have opted out.

Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania are not yet inside, but for new member states a firm intent should be enough.

***

Eurozone

Denmark and the United Kingdom have opted out of the common currency. Sweden has not bothered to join, despite its treaty obligation to adopt the euro.

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania have committed themselves to entry, but have not made it yet. The commitment should suffice at this stage.

***

Justice and home affairs

Ireland and the United Kingdom have opted out of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under the Treaty of Lisbon. Denmark has opted out of justice and home affairs (JHA) as well as EU citizenship (de iure).

***

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – politically binding since December 2000 – would become legally binding. Poland and the United Kingdom have opted out.

***

Democratic reform

As long as the Czech President Vaclav Klaus and the Polish President Lexh Kaczynski prolong the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, their countries should be excluded from consideration for the top jobs.

Long term, a commitment to an effective and democratic European Union, beyond the Lisbon Treaty, should be the hallmarks of the contenders for the top offices.

***

Talent pool

If we strike the unwilling or negligent countries, we are left with the talent pool coming from 17 EU member states: Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

According to these criteria, the EU member states outside one or more core areas at this point are: Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

***

Is it unreasonable to expect that Tony Blair, Gordon Brown or any other candidate for the office of President of the European Council or empowered High Representative comes from a member state engaged in all the core areas of EU policy (or committed to joining)?

***

Election procedure

The heads of state or government have granted themselves the right to appoint the President of the European Council and the new High Representative, but nothing prevents them from seeking open debate and the backing of the citizens of the European Union.

Public nominations of candidates within set deadlines and open campaigns with media debates are easy to arrange, if the political will is there.


Ralf Grahn

European Union Legal Materials (Columbia Law School)

Students of politics, law or economics need guidance on how to access material about the European Union as soon as they have to write or present something on their own.

One of the guides on offer is the Columbia Law School’s Arthur W. Diamond Law Library Research Guide: European Union Legal Materials, written by Duncan Alford and updated by Karin Johnsrud (latest update 30 January 2008).



Here are a few comments based on a cursory reading of the Research Guide on the resources:

• Under Brief overview, the words and the acronym for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) are presented in inverted order.
• The pillar structure has evolved, with justice and home affairs (JHA) migrating to the first (Community pillar), with the exception of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which remain within the intergovernmental third pillar.
• Enlargement: There may be better definitions than mine, but since the big EU enlargement 2004 and 2007 I have tended to use the term Central Europe for the new member states (sometimes including historic ‘Mitteleuropa’ Germany and Austria), while leaving Eastern Europe for the countries between the EU and Russia. – But I am glad for comments and reasons.
• The enlargement process needs an update. Fresh information is available on the Commission’s website.
• Euro currency: There are now 16 Eurozone countries, with Slovakia the latest entrant. Sweden has no opt-out, but is de facto outside the Eurozone. I would recommend the web pages of the European Central Bank (ECB) for information to the general public (brochures etc.) and for serious information about the euro area.
• Constitution: The guide is in need of an update for the time since the ratification processes of the Constitutional Treaty petered out. This includes the 2007 intergovernmental conference, the December 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty (May 2008) and the state of the ratification processes.
• European Council and Council: Although the European Council (heads of state and government) would formally become an EU institution through the Treaty of Lisbon, it would be natural to admit its leadership role and treat it in tandem with the Council of the European Union.
• European Parliament: The EP has 736 directly elected members under the modified Treaty of Nice, still in force. The latest elections were held on 4 to 7 June 2009. The EP has powers to amend (not only approve; co-decision) legislative proposals, and if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, these powers would increase.
• European Council: See above. Heads of state (in practice Presidents, since Kings or Queens are nominal heads of state) or government (Prime Ministers) currently meet four times each year, but extraordinary meetings can be convened.
• European Court of Justice: The Civil Service Tribunal could be mentioned for staff cases.
• Committee of the Regions, Economic and Social Committee: The current membership is 344.
• Treaties: The most convenient link would be to the Treaties web page of Eur-Lex, with the consolidated version (2006) of the current treaties, including an Annex with the modifications through the 2007 accession of Bulgaria and Romania; the consolidated version of the Treaty of Lisbon (May 2008) as well as a selection of earlier treaties and accession treaties. – Generally, the improved Eur-Lex portal could be underlined as the primary source for EU law.
• Pre-Lex and the legislative Observatory could have been highlighted more as primary tools for following legislative procedures.
• The Eur-Lex Preparatory acts and the new Directory of Community legislation in preparation are worth mentioning.
• MEPs: The number of MEPs is 736, but grows if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force.
• Languages: Irish (Gaelic) has been added.

***
Conclusions

I scanned the contents and tested some of the links on offer, without rigorous checking.

The Columbia Research Guide: European Union Legal Materials is still a useful tool for the budding researcher, but an update of the contents and the links would be in order.

Personally, I would structure the materials around the general Europa portal and the legal Eur-Lex portal (starting from the index page). [I did not look into the print resources, the library’s collections or the commercial databases.]


Ralf Grahn

European Council recruitment: President and High Representative

The European Council has been tardy in preparing for the possible entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, so I decided to lend them a helping hand by publishing this job advertisement (at no expense to the EU).

***

Senior EU positions

Subject to the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council is hiring highly qualified individuals for the following posts:

• President of the European Council, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. Relevant experience: Prime Minister or comparable.
• High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission. Relevant experience: Foreign Minister or comparable.

To check the general job description and your eligibility, be a sport and read the Treaty of Lisbon (at least the relevant Articles).

Detailed responsibilities, authority, staff, salary and fringe benefits have yet to be worked out by your employers, 27 member states governments of the European Union, but understand that this is not a football transfer.

General profile

The European Council attaches particular importance to candidates' ability to grasp problems that are often complex and varied in nature, to react rapidly to changing circumstances, and to communicate effectively. Candidates are expected to show initiative and imagination and to be highly motivated. They should be able to work both independently and in a team and should be able to adjust to a multicultural working environment. They will also be expected to develop their professional skills throughout their career. Recruitment aims to secure for the European Council the services of officials of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity, recruited on the
broadest possible geographical basis from among the citizens of the Member States of the European Union. [Adapted from the European Personnel Selection Office’s General rules governing open competitions; OJEU 26.2.2009 C 47 A/1]

When appointing the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission (almost sealed) and the High Representative, due account is taken of the need to respect the geographical and demographic diversity of the EU and its member states. [See Lisbon Treaty Declaration 6.]

If you are unsure about if political affinities and gender are seen as geographical or demographic diversity factors, or if you have other questions, the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union is available for discreet inquiries from 1 July 2009.

Citizens of the European Union are requested not to meddle in the selection process, but are anyway to be ignored.

***

Is this your next career move?


Ralf Grahn

European Union: Rising Poland

In the European Voice, Peter S. Rashish mentions the emergence of Poland to complement the European heavyweights Germany and France, and he looks at the implications for the transatlantic relationship: A new balance of power emerges (12 June 2009).




European election results

The internal power balance in the European Union and the relationship with the USA are determined primarily on state level, but the European Parliament elections strengthen the position of Poland.

The Civic Platform (PO) of Prime Minister Donald Tusk was victorious, with 25 seats in the European Parliament and 44.3% of the vote. Together with 3 MEPs from the Polish People’s Party (PSL), the Polish representatives make up the fourth largest contingent in the Group of the European People’s Party (EPP), the biggest political group in the European Parliament, with 264 out of 736 seats.

Thus, they are anchored in the European political mainstream, which means that they are better able to influence policies both at government level (Council) and in the European Parliament.

Poland’s ex-Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek is one of the prime candidates to become President of the European Parliament, as reported by Dominika Pszczółkowska in the Gazeta Wyborcza: Poland's Buzek Closer to European Parliament Presidency (9 June 2009).




***

PiS

During the previous government, the Kaczynski twins became famous for their confrontational and obstructionist EU policies. The Kaczynskis watered down the Lisbon Treaty and opted out of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Despite approval of the Treaty of Lisbon by the Polish Parliaent, President Lech Kaczynski has refused to sign the ratification document.

The Kaczynskis were increasingly seen as an embarrassment for Poland, and they were swept from government power by the Civic Platform, but still hold on to the Presidency of Poland.

In the European elections the Law and Justice Party (PiS) of Jaroslaw Kaczynski (and his twin, the President of Poland Lech Kaczynski) took a beating, but got 15 MEPs elected on 27.4% of the vote.

The PiS exits the disparate EP political group UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations), outside the political mainstream, in favour of the new political group (European Conservatives?), which will be formed around the UK Conservative Party, the Czech ODS (Civic Democrats) of former Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek; ex-party of President Vaclav Klaus, with additions from other EU member states yet to be announced.

This means that the ultra-conservative Polish main opposition party will remain entrenched outside the European political mainstream, with presidential elections coming up in 2010.


Sources:

European Parliament: Results of the 2009 European elections: Distribution by member state: parties and political groups (provisional 11 June 2009 11:26 CEST).



Wikipedia: List of political parties in Poland




***


Germany has its parliamentary elections (Bundestag) scheduled for September, but already the composition of the European Parliament and the national governments are in sync in France, Italy and Poland through the preponderance of the European People’s Party (EPP) and its national parties.

Poland is well positioned to profit from its strategic positioning.

The treaties force the political groups to reach majorities of the component members of the European Parliament (369) in order to amend legislative proposals. The EPP is likely to continue to work closely with the second largest EP group, the socialists and democrats (ASDE, ex PES), with the two other mainstream groups, the liberals and democrats (ALDE) and the Greens in supporting roles.


Ralf Grahn

Alain Lamassoure on the next challenges for the European Union

Euros du Village is an important provider of information, comment and analysis related to the European Union. In addition to the French web pages, they produce information in English (theEuros), German (dieEuros) and Italian (gliEuros). The Euros are well worth following.




This time, we recommend their French pages, where they have a long interview with Alain Lamassoure, a veteran of the European Parliament and EU politics. Lamassoure represents the French UMP (Sarkozy’s party) and the European People’s Party (EPP):

Alain Lamassoure : « Le front anti-Barroso n’existe que dans la tête de Daniel Cohn-Bendit »



Lamassoure presents partisan, but extremely well informed opinions on a host of themes, including:

• The European election campaign
• A grand coalition between the EPP and the Socialists (to be renamed ASDE) in the European Parliament
• The election of José Manuel Barroso as President of the European Commission
• The increasing homogeneity of the EPP group in the spirit of the founding fathers and the social market economy, when the UK Conservatives and the Czech ODS leave the EPP-ED
• The need for a real budget for the European Union and budgetary powers for the European Parliament
• The incredible lack of discussion about the (socialist) President of the European Council, even if the Lisbon Treaty might be in force in a few months time


Whatever you think about Lamassoure’s opinions, don’t miss the interview.




Ralf Grahn

To the Press service of the European Parliament

You have informed the public ahead of the European Parliament elections, and you continue to update the official results. I am grateful for your innovative and informative work.

We have now entered a new stage, where the political parties negotiate to establish the political groups. Officially, the formations are announced at the inaugural session on 14 July 2009.

There is still a month to go, and even longer before the announcements are published in the Official Journal of the European Union.

I wonder, could you do something to bridge the gap, by collecting unofficial announcements of the political groups and parties, and by publishing them in one place?

Could you add an unofficial page on the election results, with the anticipated group sizes, because as it is, “known” changes are not reflected on the official results page?

I understand that you cannot take responsibility for informal agreements or statements by players, but you could indicate the sources responsible.



Ralf Grahn

European Parliament: Rules on political groups (from July 2009)

During the coming days and weeks, the existing political groups in the European Parliament and various national parties with elected members of the EP negotiate to form the political groups, which are central to parliamentary work.

As always, knowledge of the rules is a key element for an appreciation of the game, is sports as well as in politics.

The European Parliament has amended its Rules of Procedure, with changes taking place from the beginning of the new parliamentary term (version: 7th parliamentary term, July 2009).

Here are the provisions on the political groups in the European Parliament for the new parliament:




POLITICAL GROUPS



Rule 30
Formation of political groups

1. Members may form themselves into groups according to their political affinities.

[Interpretation: Parliament need not normally evaluate the political affinity of members of a group. In forming a group together under this Rule, Members concerned accept by definition that they have political affinity. Only when this is denied by the Members concerned is it necessary for Parliament to evaluate whether the group has been constituted in conformity with the Rules.]

2. A political group shall comprise Members elected in at least one-quarter of the Member States. The minimum number of Members required to form a political group shall be twenty-five.

3. Where a group falls below the required threshold, the President, with the agreement of the Conference of Presidents, may allow it to continue to exist until Parliament's next constitutive sitting, provided the following conditions are met:

- the members continue to represent at least one-fifth of the Member States;

- the group has been in existence for a period longer than one year.

The President shall not apply this derogation where there is sufficient evidence to suspect that it is being abused.

4. A Member may not belong to more than one political group.

5. The President shall be notified in a statement when a political group is set up. This statement shall specify the name of the group, its members and its bureau.

6. The statement shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union.



Rule 31
Activities and legal situation of the political groups

1. The political groups shall carry out their duties as part of the activities of the Union, including the tasks allocated to them by the Rules of Procedure. The political groups shall be provided with a secretariat on the basis of the establishment plan of the Secretariat, administrative facilities and the appropriations entered for that purpose in Parliament's budget.

2. The Bureau shall lay down the rules relating to the provision, implementation and monitoring of those facilities and appropriations, as well as to the related delegations of budget implementation powers.

3. Those rules shall determine the administrative and financial consequences in the event of the dissolution of a political group.



Rule 32
Intergroups

1. Individual Members may form Intergroups or other unofficial groupings of Members, to hold informal exchanges of views on specific issues across different political groups, drawing on members of different parliamentary committees, and to promote contact between Members and civil society.

2. Such groupings may not engage in any activities which might result in confusion with the official activities of Parliament or of its bodies. Provided that the conditions laid down in rules governing their establishment adopted by the Bureau are respected, political groups may facilitate their activities by providing them with logistical support. Such groupings shall declare any external support in accordance with Annex I.



Rule 33
Non-attached Members

1. Members who do not belong to a political group shall be provided with a secretariat. The detailed arrangements shall be laid down by the Bureau on a proposal from the Secretary-General.

2. The Bureau shall also determine the status and parliamentary rights of such Members.

3. The Bureau shall also lay down the rules relating to the provision, implementation and auditing of appropriations entered in Parliament's budget to cover secretarial expenses and administrative facilities of non-attached Members.



Rule 34
Allocation of seats in the Chamber

The Conference of Presidents shall decide how seats in the Chamber are to be allocated among the political groups, the non-attached Members and the institutions of the European Union.


***


The significant thresholds for political groups have changed to at least 25 MEPs, elected in at least one-quarter of the member states (now 7).

The MEPs who fail to form or to join a political group, or who decide to stay on the sidelines, are called non-attached members (NI = non-inscrits).



Ralf Grahn

EU consumer protection: Injunctions (entities qualified to bring actions)

In the blog post EU consumer interests (injunctions), on 1 May 2009, we recorded the publication of the codified Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 1.5.2009 L 110/30.



Directive 2009/22 enters into force on 29 December 2009, so until then the repealed Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests is still in force.
Directive 98/27 was originally published in the Official Journal 11.6.1998 L 166/51, but the latest consolidated version is of 28.12.2006.



According to Article 4(3), “[t]he Commission shall draw up a list of the qualified entities referred to in paragraph 2, with the specification of their purpose. This list shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities; changes to this list shall be published without delay, the updated list shall be published every six months.”


***

Qualified to bring action

Since the old Directive 98/27 is still in force, the Commission has published the entities qualified to bring actions under Article 2 of the old Directive:

Commission communication concerning Article 4(3) of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, concerning the entities qualified to bring an action under Article 2 of this Directive, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 13.6.2009 C 135/1.




It states:

The authorities of the Member States concerned have recognised the entities mentioned below as being qualified to bring actions for an injunction under Article 2 of Directive 98/27/EC.

It then goes on to list, for each EU member state, the competent entities, engaged to protect the collective interests of consumers.


Ralf Grahn

EU JHA: Stockholm programme building blocks

Eight million EU citizens live in another member state than their native country, there are 18.5 million registered third country nationals and an estimated 8 million illegal immigrants.

Cross-border aspects of justice and home affairs (JHA), or the evolving area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ), are becoming increasingly important for individuals within the European Union.

Yesterday we started to look at the experiences so far, in the blog post: EU justice: Towards the Stockholm programme.



***

Background

The Commission presented a background note on the evaluation of the Hague programme and the challenges for the future Stockholm programme in: Questions et réponse sur le futur programme de Stockholm . Quelle est la situation actuelle? Où en est la construction de l'espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice? (MEMO/09/266, Brussels, 10 Juin 2009 ; available only in French).



The aim is that the European Council adopts the Stockholm programme in December 2009, and that an action programme is adopted next spring.



Future vision

The Commission published a press release with the main proposals for the Stockholm programme: European Commission outlines its vision for the area of freedom, security and justice in the next five years (IP/09/894, 10 June 2009; available in several languages).




***

Extended evaluation of the Hague programme

The Communication we mentioned in yesterday’s post, COM(2009) 263 final, was accompanied by a more detailed version, posted on the web pages of the Commission:

Justice, Freedom and Security in Europe since 2005: An evaluation of the Hague programme and action plan ─ An extended report on the evaluation of the Hague Programme (Brussels, 10.6.2009, SEC(2009) 766 final; 131 pages).




***


Legal instruments


The Communication was also accompanied by the Communication:

Follow-up of the implementation of legal instruments in the fields of justice, freedom and security at national level ─ Implementation Scoreboard (Brussels, 10.6.2009, SEC(2009) 765 final; 45 pages).




***


Scoreboard


In addition the Commission published the following Communication:
General overview of instruments and deadlines provided in the Hague Programme and Action Plan in the fields of justice, freedom and security ─ Institutional Scoreboard (Brussels, 10.6.2009, SEC(2009) 767 final; 120 pages).






***

The Commission has laid the foundations for the coming Stockholm programme.


Ralf Grahn

EU cutting red tape (fisheries)

It may not be the world record setting exercise in cutting red tape, but a small step to repeal outdated EU legislation.

If you want to see it with your own eyes, look at the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 12.6.2009 L 149 to see 25 legislative acts become history at one fell swoop.



First, there is (page 1):

Council Regulation (EC) No 492/2009 of 25 May 2009 repealing 14 obsolete Regulations in the field of the Common Fisheries Policy.



Then there is (page 62):

Council Decision 2009/447/EC of 25 May 2009 repealing Directive 83/515/EEC and 11 obsolete Decisions in the field of the Common Fisheries Policy.


***

If this continues, my fellow EU law bloggers and I may run out of things to write about in a few thousand years.

:-)


Ralf Grahn

European Union Accounting and Reporting: IAS and IFRS amendments

Two Commission Regulations amend the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements and replace the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3 Business Combinations, respectively:



Commission Regulation (EC) No 494/2009 of 3 June 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 adopting certain international accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards International Accounting Standard (IAS) 27 was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 12.6.2009 L 149/6.



Article 1 of Regulation 494/2009 indicates the main contents:


Article 1

The Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 is amended as follows:

1. International Accounting Standard (IAS) 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements is amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation;

2. International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 1, IFRS 4, IFRS 5, IAS 1, IAS 7, IAS 14, IAS 21, IAS 28, IAS 31, IAS 32, IAS 33, IAS 39 and Interpretation 7 of the Standing Interpretations Committee (SIC) are amended in accordance with the amendments to IAS 27 as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.


***


Commission Regulation (EC) No 495/2009 of 3 June 2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 adopting certain international accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3 was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 12.6.2009 L 149/22.



The main contents of Regulation 495/2009:

Article 1

The Annex to Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 is amended as follows:

1. International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3 Business Combinations is replaced by the revised IFRS 3 as set out in the Annex to this Regulation;

2. IFRS 1, IFRS 2, IFRS 7, International Accounting Standard (IAS) 12, IAS 16, IAS 28, IAS 32, IAS 33, IAS 34, IAS 36, IAS 37, IAS 38, IAS 39 and Interpretation 9 of the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) are amended in accordance with the amendments to IFRS 3 as set out in the Annex to this Regulation.

***

Both texts have EEA relevance.



Ralf Grahn

EU Commission President: Facts and speculation Barroso vs Verhofstadt

If the European Council 18 to 19 June 2009 nominates José Manuel Barroso, by a qualified majority, to become President of the Commission, the matter appears before the newly elected European Parliament for approval.

Under the Treaty of Nice, still in force, the approval requires a simple majority (Article 214 of the Treaty establishing the European Community; TEC).

The political groups in the European are not fully formed yet, but with 264 MEPs the biggest group, the European People’s Party (EPP) is still far from a majority for Barroso.

The official Election results are somewhat behind the events with regard to the groups, but offer the main facts.




Rainbow coalition?

In principle, a rainbow coalition of the Left, ASDE (ex PES), the Greens and ALDE (Liberals) would now have 347 votes, after the Italian Partito Democratico joined the renamed Socialist Group.

This is fairly close to a majority of the representatives (369), but it still looks like a chimera, even if Barroso is seen as a weak choice by swathes of politicians and public opinion.

Many socialist and liberal MEPs belong to national parties led by heads of governments behind a re-election of Barroso.

British, Spanish and Portuguese PES representatives were among these long before the European elections. Only the Democrats part of ALDE has indicated that it will vote against Barroso. Other groups and individual MEPs might fall into line with the nomination by the European Council, possibly unanimous.

Without clear indications to the contrary, there is no pot of gold at the end of this rainbow, although a secret ballot offers MEPs with reservations about Barroso the chance to defy their national party leaders by voting for Guy Verhofstadt.


EPP plus?

The ‘European Conservatives’ of the UK Tories, the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the Czech ODS have 49 MEPs at the moment, but we are still waiting for the announcements on further recruitment among the remaining 76 MEPs (provisionally classified as Others, UEN, IND/DEM).

In theory, these presently unsorted MEPs could boost the EPP vote to 389, and it is possible that many among the 125 nationalists, anti-federalists and others prefer Barroso as the lesser evil.

However, some of them are rejectionists at heart, with scant inclination to vote constructively. For Barroso and the heads of state or government it would be an embarrassment to have the Commission President carried into office on the votes of ultra-nationalists, xenophobes and fascists.

Therefore, expect the members of the European Council to lean on MEPs to pre-empt a rainbow coalition.


Ralf Grahn

Barroso vs Verhofstadt: President of the EU Commission

News services report and Euroblogs discuss the next President of the European Commission. Here are a few examples:


• The European Citizen: Parliamentary Shifts and Whatnot



• Julien Frisch: Make Guy Verhofstadt the next European Commission President!



• Stephen Spillane: Deadlock in the new Parliament?



• Stephen Spillane: It finally gets interesting: Barroso vs Verhofstadt


• EurActiv: Support growing for Verhofstadt to replace Barroso



• EUobserver: Barroso urges EU states to appoint new commission president next week



• EUbusiness: France, Germany back EU’s Barroso ahead of summit




***

I will return with some facts and speculation on the Barroso vs Verhofstadt issue.



Ralf Grahn

Merkel and Sarkozy push for EU progress

Today’s meeting showed that Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy want progress at the European Council meeting 18 to 19 June 2009. The press conference was a show of quiet determination.



Merkel and Sarkozy want to push for:

• The nomination of José Manuel Barroso to become the President of the Commission, with a programme, and subject to the approval of the European Parliament, if possible on 14 July 2009.
• Formal guarantees to the government of Ireland on its concerns with regard to the Treaty of Lisbon, and all the help they can give to achieve a positive vote, given that the EU needs Ireland and Ireland needs the EU.
• The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in order to give the European Union a stable framework.
• Financial regulation based on the De Laroisière report, hoping to get the United Kingdom on board.

Merkel stressed the importance of the European Union’s work to secure a deal on combating climate change.


Ralf Grahn

European elections 2009: MEPs from Sweden

Here are the 18 elected Swedish members of the European Parliament, as presented by the EU Information Centre (EU-upplysningen):




Socialdemokraterna
PES 5

Marita Ulvskog
Olle Ludvigsson
Åsa Westlund
Göran Färm
Anna Hedh



Moderaterna
EPP 4

Gunnar Hökmark
Anna Maria Corazza Bildt
Christofer Fjellner
Anna Ibrisagic



Folkpartiet
ALDE 3

Marit Paulsen
Olle Schmidt
Cecilia Wikström



Miljöpartiet
Greens 2

Carl Schlyter
Isabella Lövin



Centerpartiet
ALDE 1

Lena Ek



Kristdemokraterna
EPP 1

Alf Svensson



Vänsterpartiet
GUE/NGL 1

Eva-Britt Svensson



Piratpartiet
(Greens or ALDE?) 1

Christian Engström



Totalt 18

Gender balance: Ten women and eight men.


Ralf Grahn

EU justice: Towards the Stockholm programme

Justice and home affairs (JHA), or the area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ), is one of the evolving policy fields of the European Union, and it is highly relevant for individuals (unlike many policy areas, which primarily concern governments and businesses).

Under the Treaty of Lisbon the procedures in the FSJ policy field would become more ‘normal’ and less intergovernmental with regard to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

The so called Hague programme is nearing its end (2010), to be replaced by what will probably be called the Stockholm programme.

One step on the road is the Commission’s evaluation of the Hague programme:

The Communication Justice, freedom and security in Europe since 2005 – An evaluation of the Hague programme and action plan (Brussels, 10.6.2009 COM(2009) 263 final).





Hague programme


The objectives of the Hague Programme were:

• to improve the common capability of the Union and its Member States to guarantee fundamental rights, minimum procedural safeguards and access to justice;

• to provide protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and other international treaties to persons in need;

• to regulate migration flows and to control the external borders of the Union;

• to fight organised cross-border crime and repress the threat of terrorism;

• to realise the potential of Europol and Eurojust;

• to carry further the mutual recognition of judicial decisions and certificates both in civil and in criminal matters; and

• to eliminate legal and judicial obstacles in litigation in civil and family matters with cross-border implications.


***


Useful JHA overview with up-to-date references


The well documented 18 page Communication is a treasure trove for anyone who wants to find the relevant legislative acts and policy instruments in this vast and rapidly evolving policy area, in addition to the descriptions and assessments of the Commission.


There have been advances, but the Commission acknowledges the mixed results, especially on the ‘third pillar’ issues, which require unanimity in the Council. The Treaty of Lisbon would be an important step forward. The conclusions indicate main issues to be tackled under the Stockholm programme.


***

Additional information


For those who need more detailed information, the Commission has produced three accompanying documents, hopefully soon available through the Eur-Lex web pages on preparatory acts, under SEC documents:




SEC(2009) 765 final

SEC(2009) 766 final

SEC(2009) 767 final



Ralf Grahn

European Union: Modernising the Lugano Convention

The European Community is about to ratify the Convention replacing the Lugano Convention. The Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 10.6.2009 L 147 contains the following relevant headlines:





COUNCIL DECISION 2009/430/EC of 27 November 2008 concerning the conclusion of the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.



CONVENTION on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (text).



CORRIGENDA Procès-verbal of rectification to the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Lugano on 30 October 2007 (Official Journal of the European Union L 339 of 21 December 2007).


***



In the light of the parallelism between the Brussels and the Lugano Convention regimes on jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, the rules of the Lugano Convention are aligned with the rules of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in order to achieve the same level of circulation of judgments between the EU Member States and the EFTA States concerned.



Ralf Grahn

European Parliament: Two mainstream majorities

The overall results of the European Parliament election results shifted only marginally yesterday, with the recount awarding one MEP to the Greens at the expense of the PES (provisional results 10 June 2009 12:20 CEST).



The European Citizen has written a thoughtful post on the power balance and prospects in: The Battle for the Commission Presidency (10 June 2009).



The results of the vote counting are probably almost final, so the potential changes will have to do more with how the political groups are formed.

Beyond the question of the vote for the Commission President and the various internal EP posts, the European Parliament needs a majority of its constituent members to amend legislative proposals: 369 out of 736 MEPs.

Let us assume that the mainstream groups prefer to work with each other, instead of courting the fringe groups (which have yet to materialise). In that case there would be one constant and two possible variations (with the numbers we have today).


Indispensable EPP

In each case, there is no going around the Group of the European People’s Party (EPP), the largest political group with 264 representatives.


Grand coalition

The traditional “grand alliance” would add the Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PES), which is second largest with 161 members of the EP.

This alternative reflects the current coalition government in Germany, but there it seems to be in its dying days. It is also possible that the socialists, social democrats and Labour movements at European level feel the need to rebuild their political message, without being tainted by daily compromises.


Non-socialist coalition

It looks probable that the German voters will offer the Christian Democrats and the Liberals a mandate at the next election. In German terms this would be a black-yellow coalition, but in the EP blue-yellow (incidentally like the Swedish Council Presidency).

The problem is that in the European Parliament a coalition of the EPP and the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) would fall short of the needed majority (by 25 votes at the present time; as it happens, the exact number of the emigrating UK Conservatives).

The Greens made a strong showing in the European elections, so it would be an acknowledgement of the vote to include them in a coalition. With the Greens on board, an EPP-ALDE-Green coalition would represent 397 votes, which attains the needed majority.

But the Greens have campaigned with a view to build a coalition with the PES. They have resisted the appointment of Barroso. A shift in alliances might not go down well with their MEPs or voters, despite the obvious advantages.


Jokers in the pack?

The decisive issue will be, where the EPP finds its future partners. For them the ideal would be to entice into their group a sufficient number from the ranks of nationalists and others, MEPs who at the present time are labelled as Others, UEN or IND/DEM. The second option might be a permanent understanding without group membership.

Here the EPP competes with the nationalist ‘European Conservatives’, who have already bagged 49 MEPs and are looking for representatives from at least four additional member states to be able to form a group.

Neither the EPP nor the ‘European Conservatives’ can contemplate recruiting the most xenophobic and fascistoid elements among the remaining 97 MEPs, so the remaining options are fairly slim for both of them.

We are still waiting for the fat lady to sing.


Ralf Grahn

EU Defence transfers directive published

The Directive, which aims to simplify the transfer of defence-related products within the internal market has been finalised and published:


Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community.




This text with EEA relevance was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 10.6.2009 L 146/1.



The EU member states have time until 30 June 2011 to transpose the Directive, and its provisions become applicable from 30 June 2012.



Ralf Grahn

EU free movement: Tax exemptions for personal property

Here is information for those who move to another EU member state. A new codified Directive has been published on tax exemptions for personal property:

Council Directive 2009/55/EC of 25 May 2009 on tax exemptions applicable to the permanent introduction from a Member State of the personal property of individuals (Codified version), published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 10.6.2009 L 145/36.




However, the scope of Directive 2009/55 excludes some of the taxes and duties most interesting to individuals:



Article 1
Scope

1. Every Member State shall, subject to the conditions and in the cases hereinafter set out, exempt personal property introduced permanently from another Member State by private individuals from consumption taxes which normally apply to such property.

2. The following shall not be covered by this Directive:

(a) value added tax;

(b) excise duty;

(c) specific and/or periodical duties and taxes connected with the use within the country of property referred to in paragraph 1, such as for instance motor vehicle registration fees, road taxes and television licences.


***

Regulation 2009/55 is based on Article 93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), on harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation.


Ralf Grahn

European Union: Excessive deficit procedure

Even if the European Union has a single currency, the euro, economic policy is mainly in the hands of national governments, although with EU level coordination and common rules on sound public finances.

Article 104 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) lays down rules on the avoidance of excessive government deficits. It is complemented by the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, annexed to the treaty.

In addition, there is Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community, which has been substantially amended several times.

***

New Regulation

In the interests of clarity and rationality Regulation 3605/93 has now been replaced by a codified Regulation:

Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (Codified version), published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 10.6.2009 L 145/1.



The new and codified Regulation 479/2009 is the reference for those who want to look into the finer details of the procedure. Given the economic climate and the development of government finances, there will be more than a few to find an interest.


Ralf Grahn

Political groups in European Parliament: Nationalists and others

Here is an invitation to a virtual collaborative effort. We need the help from readers who know the various national parties, which made it into the European Parliament 2009.


At least temporarily outside the mainstream groups in the European Parliament 2009 are the MEPs from domestic parties I have bunched together as nationalists or others.

At this point there are 146 MEPs (20%), distributed among the unspecified collection Others (93), Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN) (35) and Independence/Democracy Group (IND/DEM) (18).


***

Others


The nationalist anti-federalists will reduce the Others group by at least 34 MEPs: UK Conservatives 25 and Czech ODS 9.

The Italian Partito Democratico (21) will probably join the PES group (or ALDE).

The Swedish Pirate Party (1) aims to sit with the Greens or the Liberals.

There isn’t going to be a Libertas group, so Timo Soini of the True Finns (Perussuomalaiset) will have to look for a new option.

These moves would leave 37 members to join some political group if they want to avoid the fate of non-attached representatives (NI). Where are they going to end up?


Others
• Belgium 3 (Vlaams Belang 2, List Dedecker 1)
• Bulgaria 2 (National Union Attack - Ataka 2)
• Czech Republic 9 (Civic Democrats - ODS 9)
• Estonia 1 (I. Tarand Independent 1)
• Ireland 1 (Socialist Party - SP 1)
• Spain 1 (Union, Progreso y Democracia - UpyD 1)
• France 4 (Front National 3, Alliance des Outre-mers 1)
• Italy 21 (Partito Democratico 21)
• Cyprus 1 (Dimokratiko Komma - DI KO 1)
• Latvia 2 (Saskanas Centrs - SC 2)
• Lithuania 1 (Lietuvos lenku rinkimu akcija - LLRA 1)
• Hungary 3 (Jobbik 3)
• Netherlands 4 (Freedom Party - PVV 4)
• Austria 5 (Liste Dr Martin 3, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs - FPÖ 2)
• Romania 3 (Paridul Romania Mare - PRM 3)
• Slovakia 1 (Ľudová strana - Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko - LS-HZDS 1)
• Finland 1 (True Finns 1)
• Sweden 1 (Pirate Party 1)
• United Kingdom 29 (Conservatives 25, British National Party - BNP 2, UUP 1, DUP 1)


***

UEN

When the Polish Law and Justice Party, PiS, of the Kaczynski twins leaves for the new nationalist group, the current UEN fails to reach the country and membership thresholds to establish a political group, without recruiting new members.

The battered Irish Fianna Fáil will join ALDE.

Is the new nationalist Tory-PiS-ODS group going to welcome the populist Danish People’s Party?

What else is going to happen?


Union for Europe of the Nations Group UEN
• Denmark 2 (Dansk Folkeparti - O 2)
• Ireland 3 (Fianna Fáil FF 3)
• Italy 9 (Lega Nord - LN 9)
• Latvia 3 (Pilsoniska Savieniba PS 2, Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK TB/LNKK 1)
• Lithuania 2 (Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas - TT 2)
• Poland 15 (Law and Justice Party - PiS 15)
• Slovakia 1 (Slovenská národná strana - SNS 1)


***

IND/DEM


The IND/DEM group is well below the needed seven member states and 25 MEPs, so it is not viable as a group without hefty recruitment.


Independence/Democracy Group IND/DEM
• Greece 2 (Popular Orthodox Rally - LA O S 2)
• France 1 (Libertas MPF-CPNT 1)
• Netherlands 2 (ChristenUnie-SGP 2)
• United Kingdom 13 (UKIP 13)

***

Will xenophobic and fascistoid parties be able to form a group of their own, or to join one?

***

If you know what the EP “loose ends” are going to do, please share your knowledge in the comments section.


Ralf Grahn

European Parliament: Forming political groups

The European Parliament’s web page Election results offers an update as of yesterday (provisional 9 June 2009 18:51 CEST)



If we sort the parties into rough categories, we get the following preliminary view of the balance of power in the European Parliament 2009 to 2014.

***

LEFT

Left 32 (4%)
• Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) 32

***

MAINSTREAM


Centre-left 162 (22%)
• Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PES) 162


Centre 132 (18%)
• Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) 52
• Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 80


Centre-right 264 (36%)
• Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) (EPP) 264

***


NATIONALISTS AND OTHERS


Nationalists and others 146 (20%)
• Others 93
• Union for Europe of the Nations Group (UEN) 35
• Independence/Democracy Group (IND/DEM) 18


***


The categories are mainly based on historical affinities, although the sub-group of European Democrats has been eliminated.

Theoretically 369 is a majority, but often it is needed in practice, when a majority of the component members is required. The total number of MEPs is 736.

The combined strength of the mainstream groups is 558 at this moment. This number will probably rise as others, like the Italian Partito Democratico and the Irish Fianna Fail, join the mainstream political groups.

***

The nationalists and others are most fascinating, because considerable movement is to be expected. The UK Conservatives, the Polish Law and Justice Party and the Czech Civic Platform (49 MEPs) will be joined by others to establish the announced nationalist and anti-federalist group, probably the fourth largest.

***

At this stage, the Independence/Democracy Group does not reach the threshold of 25 MEPs from seven EU member states. In its present incarnation, the Union for Europe of the Nations Group is doomed as well, because the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) will part with 15 MEPs.

Ultra-nationalists often serve their xenophobic and/or anti-EU views in similar populist packages, but their nationalisms tend to be mutually exclusive.


Ralf Grahn

European Parliament election results (updates)

Reporting on the outcome of the elections to the European Parliament has changed during the cause of the events. In some cases it started with exit polls, then partial results and projections, later provisional counts etc.

The European Parliament’s web page Election results: towards the new Parliament follows the developments, so minor changes were noted yesterday (provisional 8 June 2009 17:19 CEST). Yesterday’s figure for turnout was 42.94%.



The official, final results will be confirmed later in the member states.

The politically interesting events will take place in the negotiations to form the political groups in the European Parliament, ahead of the inaugural session on 14 July 2009.

Changes can take place in any group, but especially the large group Others (93), UEN (35) and IND/DEM (19) are worth following.

From the beginning of the new term, a political group needs at least 25 MEPs from seven EU member states.

***

EP Rules of Procedure

The European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure are useful for those, who want to follow the decisions to be taken at the beginning of the new parliamentary term. The latest update posted on the EP’s web pages is of 6 April 2009.




Ralf Grahn

European Union: Coordination of social security systems (institutional triangle)

This is an axample of the so called co-decision procedure, according to Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), when the European Parliament has proposed amendments to the common position of the Council of the European Union.

The EP amendments require an absolute majority of the component members (one of the reasons why the European Parliament needs to find consensus solutions rather than seek headline-grabbing confrontation internally). The Commission has to deliver an opinion on the amendments.

***

Social security systems

The Commission has now published two opinions:


OPINION OF THE COMMISSION pursuant to Article 251 (2), third subparagraph, point (c) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament's amendments to the Council's common position regarding the proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems AMENDING THE PROPOSAL OF THE COMMISSION pursuant to Article 250 (2) of the EC Treaty; Brussels, 5.6.2009 COM(2009) 264 final (available in all the official EU languages).



Procedure number: 2006/0006 (COD)


The complex structure of the European Union extends the consensus approach beyond the walls of the European Parliament, as you can see from the following excerpts. According to Article 250(2) TEC, as long as the Council has not acted, the Commission may alter its proposal at any time:


“The Commission accepts all 8 amendments adopted by Parliament. The 8 amendments were agreed following informal contacts between Parliament and Council with a view to a second reading agreement. The amendments are of a technical nature, aiming in particular to ensure that the persons concerned receive a timely answer to their requests from the competent institution and appropriate information, including guidance on administrative procedures.”


“5. CONCLUSION

Pursuant to Article 250(2) of the EC Treaty, the Commission amends its proposal as set out
above.”


***


The related second matter is:

OPINION OF THE COMMISSION pursuant to Article 251 (2), third subparagraph, point (c) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament's amendments to the Council's common position regarding the proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, and determining the contents of its annexes AMENDING THE PROPOSAL OF THE COMMISSION pursuant to Article 250 (2) of the EC Treaty; Brussels, 5.6.2009 COM(2009) 265 final (available in English, French and German).




Procedure number: 2006/0008 (COD)


***


These are examples of the “institutional triangle” – Commission, Council, European Parliament – in action, following the steps of a choreography called the institutional balance.

Naturally, some readers may be interested in the subject matter – the coordination of social security systems – but having led you to the water, I leave you to drink.


Ralf Grahn

European elections: A snapshot of gender equality and democratic choice

The European Parliament has not yet published the 2009 gender distribution of the elected MEPs. After the 2004 European elections 31 per cent of MEPs were women.

The election result in Finland will shift the balance to a degree: eight women (about 61%) and five men were elected out of a total of 13 MEPs.

If there is anything remarkable about the result, it is the fact that it is based on the individual choices of voters. Each citizen votes for an individual candidate, on a party list. The lists function as teams, being awarded proportional representation according to their total number of votes. Within the list the order of the candidates is determined by their individual votes.

This means that the outcome is not based on quotas, or closed lists manipulated in a politically correct manner. They reflect the choices of the individual electors.

Besides, the electoral system allows the voter to assess all the qualities of a candidate, of which gender is but one.

In Finland, with a population of 5.3 million, the whole country was one electoral district, so each voter was able to select among all the available candidates (241 representing 13 parties).

Elections are democratic, but some systems are more democratic than others.


Ralf Grahn

Richard Corbett MEP

These things happen, when people vote from other motives than securing the best possible representation in the European Parliament. Dr Richard Corbett, MEP, loses his seat when the newly elected EP convenes on 14 July 2009.

Corbett was one of the foremost representatives for the PES and Labour in the European Parliament, and he drafted many of the EP’s reports and opinions on institutional affairs, with Europe-wide significance.

He was also a frequent blogger, although the absence of comments and discussion was a sad indication of the quality of the EU debate in Britain.. His Blog – Richard Corbett MEP explained the workings and the issues of the European Parliament in reasoned terms.



Britain’s troubled relationship with Europe seems to be about to take a turn for the worse. Whatever happens, Dr Richard Corbett’s knowledge and capacity will be needed during the trying times ahead.


Ralf Grahn

European election results 2009: Finland

I will just pass on the detailed information in the biggest Finnish daily, Helsingin Sanomat, for those interested: SUNDAY NIGHT: True Finns and Greens advance in European Parliament elections as big parties suffer.





Ralf Grahn

European elections 2009: What happens next?

The European Parliament election results are provisional, but almost final results can be expected during the day.

Four out of ten EU citizens voted in these elections (43.09%), continuing the downward trend in turnout.

***

Left failed

Politically, I find the weakening of the centre-left (PES) and left (GUE/NGL) parties most astounding for the long term. In the middle of a financial crisis and a deep economic recession, the mainly opposition left parties failed to put forward a candidate for the Commission Presidency and to convince voters on alternative economic and social policies.

Only one out of four (about 26.3%) voted left, although the PES will remain the second largest political group in the European Parliament (159 MEPs); GUE/NGL 33 seats.

Source: European Parliament: Results of the 2009 European elections (provisional 8 June 2009 03:07 CEST).



***

Governable EP

The mainstream centre-right group of the European People’s Party seems set to remain the dominant group in the EP, with 267 seats (36.3% of the total).

The new European Parliament is governable. Taken together, the “constructive” or mainstream groups – EPP, PES, ALDE, Greens – would total 558 seats, or more than three quarters of the MEPs (75.8%), based on historical affinities, but the gains were generally made by hard or extreme right parties.

***

New political groups

Before the new European Parliament convenes on 14 July 2009, intense negotiations are going to take place to form the political groups, which are the instruments for parliamentary work.

Changes will take place among the nationalist right.

Especially the large group Others (90 seats), which includes the UK Conservatives, and UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations), with 35 seats, and IND/DEM (Independence/Democracy Group), with 20 MEPs, will see considerable movement.

The anti-federalist coalition announced by the UK Conservative Party (24 MEPs according to the BBC), the ultra-conservative Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS, Kaczynski twins) with 16 seats and the Czech ODS (Topolanek, ex Klaus) with 9 MEPs, already has 49 MEPs in the bag. It will encounter no problems with the minimum size of a political group (25), but it needs members from at least four additional member states.

The anti-federalists will have to find their new friends among the remaining 96 MEPs, who represent a wide variety of national populist and protest parties, some of them fascist and racist.

For the sake of propriety, the British Conservatives have to draw a line somewhere, but they will probably take on board enough allies to get the group formed.

For the UK Conservative Party the European Parliament is of secondary importance. They are doing all they can to expedite the demise of Gordon Brown’s Labour government, and to win the next general election.

In government, the Tories can start to put European integration in reverse gear, by demanding repatriation of powers, rejecting the Lisbon Treaty and blocking progress. Nobody seems to doubt the outcome of the next UK general election, but the timing of the election and the possible entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon have profound consequences for Europe.

***

Barroso Commission

The EPP will have to look for support in order to secure a majority for José Manuel Barroso as the President of the Commission. Under the Treaty of Nice, a simple majority is enough, but the EPP is about 102 votes short if they want to be on the safe side.

On the other hand, it is difficult to know how many of the British, Portuguese and Spanish PES MEPs (and perhaps others) are going to vote for Barroso in line with their party leaders and members of the European Council, which will put forward Barroso, probably on 18 to 19 June 2009.

Even theoretically it would be difficult to build a sufficient anti-Barroso coalition, to say nothing about a constructive alliance for a specific alternative candidate, although Guy Verhofstadt and Mario Monti have been mentioned.


Ralf Grahn

European election quiz answers

The quiz ahead of the European elections posed ten more or less serious questions about the European Union and the history of European integration.

There have been quite a few readers, although only one brave soul attempted to answers the questions.

Here are the questions and answers:



1) Which head of state would be your guess to think and act in the spirit of the Sun King, Louis XIV: L’Europe c’est Moi?


The country is the same, and for those who have followed the messages from the French President and the Elysée Palace it is hardly a surprise that Nicolas Sarkozy seems to fit the bill.

***

2) An insular political party which dismisses the obligation of the Article 1 TEU aim of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe as an outmoded irrelevance?

The UK Conservative Party has promised to repatriate EU powers, which is putting European integration in reverse. In addition, they promise to arrange a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, already ratified by the UK, or at least to take action if it is already in force.

***

3) A pan-European party on an anti-sleaze campaign, but practicing no openness or accountability with regard to its own affairs, political or financial?

This has been the stand of Libertas.

***

4) A political foundation in the United States contends that the Lisbon Treaty, approved by the national parliaments in 26 EU member states, lacks legitimacy?

The Heritage Foundation interprets the rules of representative democracy in this way, but they see the European Union as a threat.

***

5) A portal aggregating about 375 Euroblogs?

The number has grown since then, but the answer is Bloggingportal.eu.

***

6) The high official, who after securing behind-closed-doors support for a second term, has recorded a message that “Your vote matters. Please use it” for the European elections 2009?

The present and probably the future President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso.

***

7) An elder statesman, who in 1946 called for a kind of United States of Europe?

British Conservative leader Sir Winston Churchill in his September 1946 speech at Zurich University.

***

8) A younger activist, imprisoned by the Fascists, who wrote the Ventotene Manifesto (1941) together with Ernesto Rossi?

Altiero Spinelli.

***

9) The architect of the European Parliament’s Draft treaty establishing the European Union (1984)?

Altiero Spinelli.

***

10) The only member state with more opt-outs from the existing treaties than the United Kingdom?

Denmark has four opt-outs at the present time (although the government sees them as problems rather than solutions).

The United Kingdom would reach the number of four under the Treaty of Lisbon.


***

In a few hours we will have a fairly accurate picture of the kind of European Parliament we are going to have for the legislative and budgetary work and scrutiny during the next five years.


Ralf Grahn

Towards a free and united Europe

Per un’Europa libera e unita – Towards a free and united Europe (1941).

***

We are not there yet, but we have come a long way:


Draft Treaty establishing the European Union (1984)

Preamble

With a view to continuing and reviving the democratic unification of Europe, of which the European Communities, the European Monetary System and European Political Cooperation represent the first achievements, and convinced that it is increasingly important for Europe to assert its identity;

Welcoming the positive results achieved so far, but aware of the present need to redefine the objectives of European integration, and to confer on more efficient and more democratic institutions the means of attaining them;

Basing their actions on their commitment to the principles of pluralist democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law;

Reaffirming their desire to contribute to the construction of an international society based on cooperation between peoples and between States, the peaceful settlement of disputes, security and the strengthening of international organizations;

Resolved to strengthen and preserve peace and liberty by an ever closer union, and calling on the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts;

Determined to increase solidarity between the peoples of Europe, while respecting their historical identity, their dignity and their freedom within the framework of freely accepted common institutions;

Convinced of the need to enable local and regional authorities to participate by appropriate methods in the unification of Europe;

Desirous of attaining their common objectives progressively, accepting the requisite transitional periods and submitting all further development for the approval of their peoples and States;

Intending to entrust common institutions, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only with those powers required to complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily than the States acting independently;

The High Contracting Parties, Member States of the European Communities, have decided to create a European Union


[Source: ENA]



***

Voting in the European elections today is a small step on this road, leading to a better future for our children and grandchildren.


Ralf Grahn

BBC’s election coverage

BBC World News on the radio just told us that tough choices are made when people are heading to the polls … in Lebanon (population 4 million).

Nothing in the headline news about 19 European countries, with something in the region of 300 milion potential voters, voting today.

Well, about 12 pas the hour, in the World Today programme I heard two questions. One on the unfolding story about UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, where the words ‘European elections’ were mentioned in passing as a part of his troubles, and one about “Europe in general”, answered in about five seconds.

Great coverage for half an hour of listening. Is this the Auntie accused of having a crush on Europe?


Ralf Grahn

European elections: Diverted in unity

Julien Frisch has shown more desperation than euphoria in his reflections on the European Parliament elections, and it is easy to see a number of reasons why.



On the other hand, this Sunday is the big day. On the BBC’s web page (European) Elections 2009 we find the 19 member states, where people are voting for their representatives in the European Parliament:



Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

The political parties at European level have remained on the sidelines, the choices are limited and the campaigns have been mainly national in scope.

The motto “United in diversity” is like a pale shadow of “E pluribus unum”, and today European Union citizens will probably be more diverted than united.

Despite the shortcomings, these are the most European elections we have at this point in history. The 40 per cent or whatever proportion of EU citizens who bother to vote will vote for a candidate or a party aiming for one of the institutions of the European Union, of growing importance at that.

It is true that national elections lead to the formation of governments, and that the Prime Ministers and other Ministers in the Council of the European Union have more of a say in what the EU becomes or isn’t allowed to become. But the weight of European affairs is even less in general elections.

There is something to be said for smooth interaction between national governments and parliaments in EU affairs, but scrutiny through 27 national prisms will never compensate for the lack of real parliamentary democracy and accountable government at EU level.

What would it look like, if national affairs were run by representatives of local Boards, and the important decisions had to be ratified by the local Councils, with a Parliament allowed to have a say on part of the issues?

***

Whatever the outcome of today’s European elections (and the earlier votes), the EU institutions will work the next four years, eleven months and 20-something days.

How well or badly will depend in part on today’s vote. Even when the choices and the impact are limited, some alternatives are more constructive than others.


Ralf Grahn

European elections: Ceterum censeo

With a piffling 19 EU member states to vote today, the BBC has – in an act of rare courage – allowed Mark Mardell to re-post his allusions about the sack of Carthage: Invasion relived (6 June 2009).



“Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam”. The words of Cato the Elder must still hit a raw nerve in the former Empire.

Moreover, I think that the European Union has to be destroyed, is as tenaciously proclaimed by many in Great Britain today.

There have always been people who see only zero sum games.


Ralf Grahn

EU Baltic Sea Strategy

Yesterday’s post Baltic Sea Report (Finland) highlighted that the government of Finland has adopted a report, addressed to the Parliament.



The Commission is going to adopt a Communication on its EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region together with an indicative Action Plan on the Strategy on Wednesday, 10 June 2009.

The Strategy will be presented to the European Council in June 2009 and be one of the main priorities of the Swedish EU Presidency during the second half of 2009.

According to the Commission’s web pages on the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region:



The aim of the Strategy will be to coordinate the efforts of various actors in the Region (Member States, regions, financing institutions, the EU, pan-Baltic organisations, non-governmental bodies etc.) so that by working together they would promote a more balanced development of the Region.

After the 2004 enlargement, the potential and the challenges of the Baltic Sea Region have attracted more attention. There are wide differences in economic development between the EU Member States. The whole region is also facing major challenges like the demographic change and the pollution of the Sea. The common problems of the Region call for cooperation of the whole Region.

The Strategy will aim at four main objectives:

1. to improve the environmental state of the Baltic Sea Region and especially of the Sea;
2. to make the Baltic Sea Region a more prosperous place by supporting balanced economic development across the Region;
3. to make the Baltic Sea Region a more accessible and attractive place for both its inhabitants, for competent labour force and for tourists;
4. to make the Baltic Sea Region a safer and more secure place.


Ralf Grahn

How much law is EU law?

A while ago Nosemonkey sparked off a lengthy discussion by asking: What percentage of laws come from the EU? (2 June 2009)



***

Over at the French think tank Notre Europe, Yves Bertoncini has published an assessment of the proportion of EU legislation: La législation nationale d’origine communautaire : briser le mythe des 80% (Les Brefs de Notre Europe No 13, mai 2009).




Bertoncini notes that the 80 per cent figure has caught on rapidly among both anti-Europeans and Euro-enthusiasts. It is difficult to reach a reliable figure, when assessing two different legal systems, but many have not been especially diligent in explaining that.

On 1 July 2008 the acquis communautaire comprised 28,031 legal acts (secondary acts, based on the treaties). Of these, 9,685 were Directives or Regulations.

Each year, the European Community produced between 2,181 (from 1978 to 2007) and 2,744 (from 1998 to 2007) Directives and Regulations.

In 2008 there were 2,249 Regulations and 247 Directives published in the Official Journal of the European Union (total 2,496).

The proportion of Community norms to French norms was a little less than 15 per cent.

The most heavily regulated areas were agriculture with about 42.6 per cent of all Regulations and Directives, the internal market including free movement with about 20 per cent and external relations (technical, economic and financial) with about 10 per cent.

The proportion of Community norms among legal norms applicable in France vary hugely between different sectors:

• Almost half in the agricultural sector
• About 20 per cent in the field of the economy and “foreign affairs”
• A little less than 5 per cent in “ecology”
• Less than 2 per cent in ten other sectors studied

Even given the methodological difficulties, Bertoncini concludes that the proportion of Community norms is closer to 20 than to 80 per cent.


Ralf Grahn

EU: Data protection

Readers, who are interested in the protection of personal data, can find a number of opinions of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 6.6.2009 C 128:



Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Final Report by the EU-US High Level Contact Group on information sharing and privacy and personal data protection

Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee towards a European e-Justice Strategy

Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare

Second opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the review of Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)

Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a Council directive imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products


***

European Data Protection Supervisor

The pace of the official publication of the opinions is measured, to say the least, so it serves the needs of those, who look at the reasoning and older material.

More up-to-date material is found on the web pages of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).



There you find more information about the EDPS, supervision, consultation (including fresh opinions) and cooperation. There are links to relevant legislation.

The publications include a Position paper on the role of Data Protection Officers in ensuring effective compliance with Regulation (EC) 45/2001, which concerns the Community institutions.




Ralf Grahn

EU: Passport biometrics

According to Article 62(2)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), the Council shall establish standards and procedures to be followed by the member states in carrying out checks on persons at the external borders. The so called co-decision procedure applies (Articles 67 and 251 TEC).


Existing provisions are found in Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, , published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 29.12.2004 L 385/1.



Regulation 2252/2004 aimed at enhanced harmonised security standards for passports and travel documents to protect against falsification. At the same time biometric identifiers were integrated in the passport or travel document in order to establish a reliable link between the genuine holder and the document.

The Regulation concerning free movement of people is not applicable in Denmark, Ireland or the United Kingdom, but it applies to the Schengen area states Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, as well as Liechtenstein.


***


Amendments


Amendments are on their way. Although the provisions of the directly applicable Regulation are addressed to the EU member states, this is an example of EU legislation with direct consequences for ordinary citizens, who apply for passports for themselves and their under-age children.

Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2009 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 6.6.2009 L 142/1.



According to the Regulation, passports are issued as individual documents, which means that children need their own passports.

In addition to a photo, the passport requires fingerprints. Because of difficulties getting reliable fingerprints of children, under 12 year olds are provisionally exempted, but existing national lower age limits of at least 6 years of age can continue for four years.

Additional technical specifications will be established for passports and travel documents in accordance with international standards, including in particular the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).


Ralf Grahn

Baltic Sea report (Finland)

The Baltic Sea joins eight member of the European Union and Russia. The EU is preparing a Baltic Sea strategy, geared towards economic opportunities.

The government of Finland has prepared a national report, which deals with the marine environment, marine traffic and economic cooperation.

Here is the text of the Finnish government’s press release:

Government Communications Unit
5.6.2009 12.05

Government outlined measures to save the Baltic Sea

At its plenary session on Friday 5 June, the Government approved a report on measures to improve the marine environment of the Baltic Sea, to increase the safety of marine traffic and to strengthen economic cooperation.

The report concentrates on actions that, for Finland, are the most important and most urgent in terms of the Baltic Sea. The most serious problem concerning the Baltic Sea is eutrophication, which is most visible in the form of water surface algal proliferations recurring every summer. To stop eutrophication, measures to reduce the nutrient load from households, industry and agriculture are needed.

In Finland, agriculture accounts for the largest burden on water bodies. The Government proposes in the report measures that will decrease the nutrient load from agriculture in Finland in the next few years. This will take place especially by means of a more careful targeting of agri-environmental support at the most risk-prone areas and field parcels.

The higher traffic volumes in oil and chemical transports and passenger traffic, particularly in the narrow Gulf of Finland, increase accidents risks. The report outlines measures to improve the safety of marine traffic and to prevent accidents in advance. Oil-spill response capabilities will be enhanced by drawing up concrete plans together with Sweden, Estonia and Russia in order to correct shortfalls in equipment, for example.

For Finland, the Baltic Sea region is also an economic opportunity and a route for transports and energy. These issues are treated comprehensively in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, currently under preparation. The Government report focuses on economic issues that are the most important for Finland, such as the promotion of the business environment of Finnish companies in the Baltic Sea countries.

The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region forms a central instrument for Finland’s Baltic Sea policy and a channel for exerting influence. The achievement of concrete results concerning the Baltic Sea calls for parallel and simultaneous measures and close cooperation with all countries in the Baltic Sea region. The Northern Dimension provides a functional forum for Baltic Sea cooperation with non-EU countries, particularly Russia.


Further information: Kare Halonen, State Secretary for EU Affairs, Government Secretariat for EU Affairs, tel. +358 9 1602 2180 and Mikaela Grönqvist, Special Adviser, Ministry of the Interior, tel. +358 9 1604 3511


***

Report

The Report is addressed to the Parliament of Finland: Itämeren haasteet ja Itämeripolitiikka. Hallistuksen selonteko (in Finnish).



In Swedish: Östersjöns utmaningar och Östersjöpolitiken. Statsrådets redogörelse




Ralf Grahn

European Parliament: Financial report 2008

The European Parliament has published its report on its budgetary and financial management during financial year 2008. It outlines the financial situation and the events which have had a significant influence on activities during the year (in parts I and II)and gives a synthetic account of the achievement of the objectivesfor the year (in part III).


Source:

European Parliament: Report on budgetary and financial management Section I of the EU budget, Financial year 2008, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 5.6.2009 C 127/1.



***

Parliamentary scrutiny is fine, but even parliaments need watching.

The Report contains a lot of factual information about an important but expensive institution, which is about to start a new five year term, hopefully reform-minded with regard to its internal affairs and active in its work for EU citizens and businesses in legislative and budgetary matters.


Ralf Grahn

EU: European level political parties and their foundations

The Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 5.6.2009 C 125 has two important announcements for the fledgling Europarties and their political foundations (and indirectly for the forming of a European awareness and for the expression of the political will of the citizens of the EU).

They are the European Parliament’s:


Call for proposals IX-2010/02 — Grants to political foundations at European level





Call for proposals IX-2010/01 — Grants to political parties at European level




***

Given the millions on offer, I sincerely hope that the European level parties and their foundations finally start to offer some value for money in 2010.



Ralf Grahn

EU: Organic production ─ group for technical advice

Mundane and boring, or raising passions? A bit of both, I suppose.

Much of what the European Union institutions do, looks sleep-inducing as soon as you glance at a headline. For example, take:


Commission Decision 2009/427/EC of 3 June 2009 establishing the expert group for technical advice on organic production, just published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 5.6.2009 L 139/29.



The Decision is based on Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production and labelling of organic products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91, which defines objectives and principles applicable to organic production and lays down basic requirements with regard to production, labelling and control of organic products in the plant, livestock and aquaculture production.

The tasks of the expert group sound innocuous and boring enough:

Article 2
Task

The group’s task shall be to assist the Commission in:

(a) evaluating products, substances and techniques which can be used in organic production, taking into account objectives and principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 834/2007;

(b) improving existing rules and developing new production rules;

(c) bringing about an exchange of experience and good practices in the field of organic production.


***

On the other hand, there are producers who dedicate their lives to organic production and growing numbers of consumers who swear by it.

Is it boring for them? Are they indifferent to what advice the Commission is getting?

***

There is a strange dichotomy between a general feeling that the tentacles of the European Union reach almost everywhere – among more strident anti-EU campaigners transformed into the assertion that the EU “messes up our daily lives” - and the wide-spread ignorance and lack of interest in even the basics of what the EU is and really does.

The EU has opened up new vistas for individuals to travel and to work across borders, but contrary to some beliefs it has done very little to influence the public services we get at local level (education, health, social services; taxes).

The groups affected are often much smaller.

EU legislation affects some businesses to a high degree, through internal market regulation. It is not necessarily a bad thing that regulation comes from “Brussels”, when the alternative would be to have 30 different sets of red tape from 30 different capitals.

Agriculture and fisheries are common policies, and highly regulated at that. They can almost be called planned economies, although with private producers. Here enterprises, some on a very small scale, bring individuals into direct contact with often intrusive EU regulation: forms to fill, quality requirements, subsidies, inspections etc.

The organic farmer, for instance.

But is it enough for him to know that the Commission is getting expert advice? Who is giving it? What are they saying? Which changes are they contemplating?

In these respects the EU institutions are less than transparent. Council and Commission committees and groups are highly impenetrable. Even the members’ names are guarded as state secrets.

We are still a long way from open and accessible government at European level.


Ralf Grahn

British referendum on EU membership

One of the sad things about the British EU debate is how self-centred it is.

Let us take the Treaty of Lisbon. It has been agreed unanimously between 27 governments and approved by 26 national parliaments. It is the expression of what our governments and parliaments want the European Union to be. With Ireland pending, the reform treaty is fully legitimate.

If a new government changes tack in a country, which has already formally ratified the Lisbon Treaty, I expect the government to act in a responsible manner.

Wrecking the Lisbon Treaty, against the will of the other EU member states, is callous and abrasive in the extreme.

If the British want to change course, they should act in the manner least destructive to their European partners and to themselves.

The fundamental question is if Britain wants to be a member of the European Union, or if it wants to withdraw. If that requires a referendum, so be it. The question is simple: In or out?

The UK government of the day would then have a clear mandate either way, without wreaking havoc among the countries which see European integration as a constructive team effort.

The Conservative Party has tabled the wrong Referendum Bill.


Ralf Grahn

Bruno Waterfield and a truly constitutional EU debate

Bruno Waterfield ends his column in The Telegraph, The EU elections that we can only lose (4 June 2009), by calling for a truly constitutional debate about the European Union: “The EU debate needs … to become constitutional in the true sense of the word. It needs to be about the nature of politics, who participates in politics, and to ask for whom political structures are organised. It needs to become an argument about what politics should be, in opposition to how it is - I don't see that in this European election.”



Our preferred solutions may point in different directions, but Waterfield is right about the need for a discussion about the fundamentals of European integration. What purposes should the European Union serve, if any? If the EU is necessary, how should it be organised in a democratic manner? Are referendums the way forward?

In my view, the European Union is an imperfect system, and the Treaty of Lisbon is the result of timid consensus. These European elections are not going to bring about sudden radical change, but during the coming five years the European Parliament can at least keep the torch alive. Among the main institutions, the EP is the most respected by and the best hope for EU citizens.

Sensible voting can help.


Ralf Grahn

European elections: Four constructive choices

Most of the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) we vote into office in the European elections 4 to 7 June 2009 are going to work in and with the political groups, which form the backbone of EP work.

Inside the European Parliament, the mainstream political groups run the show, so a vote for a fringe group serves little beyond promoting protest and antics.


The sensible choice is therefore to vote for a candidate or party, which is serious about the work of the European Parliament during the next five years: legislation, budget and scrutiny, as well as initiatives on the future of Europe and selected important issues of general concern.

The Treaty of Lisbon would improve the directly elected EP’s role in legislative and budgetary work (although the member states still hoard important policy areas, and we are far from a parliamentary EU level government).

In my view, there are four constructive choices (despite my critical opinion of internal EP reform).

Here are the four responsible political groups:



EPP

The centre-right Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) will probably be the largest political group in the European Parliament, even after the UK Conservatives, the Czech ODS (Topolanek) and the Polish Law and Justice Party (Kaczynskis) and a few others split to form an anti-Federalist group on the right.

One can hardly blame the EPP for fielding the only candidate to become President of the Commission.






PES

The Socialist Group in the European Parliament (Party of European Socialists; PES) is the second largest political group in the European Parliament, a wide coalition like the EPP. It contains different centre-left shades, from ardent socialists to Labour and social democrats.

In the United Kingdom, the “duck-house scandal” threatens to cause collateral damage among honourable and hard-working Labour MEPs, which would be a pity (as long as the UK remains a member of the EU, despite a probable Conservative government around the corner).






ALDE

Although a coalition like the rest of the groups, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) is perhaps the most pro-European and it has a good record on openness.

For thinking British voters, left without an attractive European home when the Tories split from the mainstream right to the hard right, the Liberal Democrats offer a sensible choice (together with the Greens and Labour).






The Greens/European Free Alliance

The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) are not alone in professing the virtues of sustainable development and the importance of environmental, cultural and democratic rights, but they have a certain credibility in this area, and are widely seen as a constructive force. The press for a New Green Deal.

In common with ALDE, the Greens have a good record on transparency.




***

You can agree or disagree with my suggestions, but shouldn’t it be self-evident that we vote the right person for the job at hand?


Ralf Grahn

European elections in Britain: In or out?

The European elections today in Britain mark the break-up of the Conservative Partys’s civil union with the European mainstream right and moving in with the right-far right in the European Parliament. The European elections will be an indication of the UK’s future position in Europe.

David Cameron wants to put European integration in reverse gear, but keep the United Kingdom inside the EU. Blocking the Lisbon Treaty and repatriating powers, using Britain’s veto on the EU’s next long term budget, are telling signs of a trajectory towards the fringes.


Social Europe Journal

In the Social Europe Journal, Henning Meyer takes a more principled stand. He sees that the ambiguity of the UK’s attitude towards European integration can only be resolved by a referendum on the membership question: “The Union is far from perfect but becoming better and it is the best hope for Europe to play a leading role in the politics of the 21st century. Britain should decide whether to stay in warts-and-all or leave.”

Britain’s Future in the European Union – Stay in warts-and-all of Leave (3 June 2009) is worth reading before the ballots are cast.



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Federal Union

Richard Laming on the Federal Union blog has posted: Conservative policy on Europe becomes clearer (3 June 2009).



Laming does not see that a new intergovernmental conference under a veto threat concerning the long term budget would succeed or make Britain more influential.

***

Holding Europe hostage

If the latest UK governments have been fairly unconstructive, the probable future government party has chosen a style even more abrasive and confrontational. This calls for an assessment of their threats.

The advantages of the European Union, including the internal market, are naturally much wider than the “membership fees”, but anti-Europeans are usually obsessed by them.

In addition, it makes sense to evaluate the stranglehold the British contribution has on the European Union financially.


Nosemonkey’s EUtopia referred to the HM Treasury Report: European Community Finances Statement on the 2008 EC Budget and measures to counter fraud and financial mismanagement (Cm 7462, September 2008), which showed the following net contributions of the United Kingdom (£ billion):

(2006) 3.9
(2007) 4.6
(2008) 3.6 (estimated)





The UK net contribution is roughly £4 billion annually, which translates into something like €4.6 billion.

Switzerland and the non-EU members of the European Economic Area (EEA), Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, with access to the internal market, contribute to the EU budget.

***

Voters in the European elections in Britain send a signal on their country’s future relations with Europe. A vote for one of the parties in or near the European mainstream – the Liberal Democrats, the Greens or Labour – is a voice for some sort of constructive engagement.



Ralf Grahn

EU: Eurojust amendments

The intergovernmental nature of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under the existing Treaty on European Union (Title VI) is illustrated by amendments concerning Eurojust, based on Articles 31(2) and 34(2)(c) TEU.



The amendments were initiated by the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and the Kingdom of Sweden. The European Parliament has been consulted.

Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 4.6.2009 L 138/14.




The amended Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, consolidated version of 1 October 2003.




***

Eurojust information


General information about the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit can be found on the Eurojust web pages.




Ralf Grahn

European Union: What to do with Britain?

In the short term there are two problems of strategic importance with regard to the European Union itself. In the case of Britain, they are intertwined.

***

After tying the knot with ultra-conservative homophobes and other Europhobes, David Cameron and William Hague have continued their quest to cut a United Kingdom under a Conservative government even further adrift from Europe.

The latest demonstration is their


B I L L

TO Make provision for a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon signed at Lisbon on 13 December 2007 for the suspension of the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 until the result of that referendum; and for its repeal if the Treaty is not approved in the referendum.


***

The reader is reminded of the fact that the United Kingdom has already completed formal ratification of the EU Treaty of Lisbon, after approval by both Houses of Parliament.

The Lisbon Treaty has been approved by the parliaments in 26 out of 27 member states. Ireland has announced a referendum on the “better deal”.


***


Britain’s options

If the next general election brings in a Conservative government, the suspension and rejection of approval would either

a) frustrate the treaty reform process of the EU member states since 2000, leaving the European Union with the unsatisfactory Treaty of Nice (minus further UK repatriation of common policies), in case the Lisbon Treaty has not entered into force; or

b) lay the foundations for substantial renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with Europe, if the Lisbon Treaty is already in force.


The problem with the Conservatives’ attitude is that they seemingly want to eat the cake and have it too.

The straightforward policy would be to make a decision for or against withdrawal, with or without a referendum (in the country of “parliamentary sovereignty”).

If the United Kingdom wants to secede from the European Union, nobody will stop them. It would require detailed negotiations to deconstruct the manifold relationships, and to erect new structures, but it’s up to the British to start the negotiations.

However, it looks as if the Tories want even less responsibilities and show no team spirit, but wish to stay on the inside, in order to block progress between the EU member states.

Under the Nice Treaty their goals would be more limited, but if the Lisbon Treaty is in force, it is the foundation of the European Union, which means that a rejection would be tantamount to secession.

Cameron has announced that the following (long term) budget negotiations will give the United Kingdom needed leverage to ram through its demands. Veto power is generally the weapon of the rejectionists and obstructionists.

The political, media and popular discourse on Europe is such that secession would be a natural solution for Britain. The European Union would count its losses and go on with life, and the UK would search for its own role in world affairs and commercial relations.

***

What to do with Britain?

The insular British discussion tends to forget that their moods and actions have consequences for others.

The ability to take an outside view seems to be an even more scarce commodity in contemporary Britain than a tolerably accurate picture of what the EU is and isn’t.

The twofold strategy of the Conservatives will make Britain one of the main strategic short term headaches for the European Union (the other one is the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty).

In about a year’s time, the new Conservative government is going to demand a renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with Europe, smaller changes under the Nice Treaty or larger under the Lisbon Treaty.

(The Lisbon Treaty would either have crashed, or the UK would repudiate major parts of it.)

It is easy to imagine the annoyance felt by European leaders in both cases.

Their timid and consensual treaty reforms would come to nought, or at least provide the UK with even greater exceptions from common rules, while being able to halt progress almost at will.

Cameron has already promised to hold the next long term budget hostage to his demands (naturally shrinking the relative size of the EU budget and keeping the UK rebate at the same time).


With regard to the Lisbon Treaty, the political leaders can mainly watch things unfold in the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland and Poland, so they are more or less reduced to passive bystanders.

But renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s membership terms requires treaty amendments. Here the national leaders have a real choice. This is actually one of the few instances, when veto powers favour a constructive policy.

***

Britain may feel that it has a problem with Europe, but Britain can cause a disproportionate amount of harm to Europe as a whole.

It is already clear, where a road paved with concessions would lead the EU’s member states and the European Union. Paralysis, palsy, impotence, immobility and erosion of team spirit offer a hint.

When approached, the member states should politely tell David Cameron and William Hague where to find the door. If the other EU leaders are quick about it, they might be able to agree on the next long term budget in a less poisoned atmosphere than promised by Cameron.


Ralf Grahn

Europawahlen ─ European elections in German

On the European election pages of CAP, Centrum für angewandte Politiksforschung (Center for Applied Policy Research) Themendossier zur Europawahl 2009, you can find a lot of information about the upcoming European Parliament elections, some available in English.



Some documents link to outside sources, such as the bpb (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) and European Alternatives, which we mentioned in the previous post.



The BPB has published a thematic issue on the European elections in their publication Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ 23-24/2009; 2 June 2009; 48 pages).

The publication Europawahlen contains the following essays on the European Parliament elections:



AndreasM. Wüst •Markus Tausendpfund
30 Jahre Europawahlen

Ulrike Hegewald • Lars Schmitt
Die Deutschen vor der Europawahl 2009

Max Haller
Die europäische Integration als Elitenprojekt

Erich Röper
Sinnhaftigkeit von Plebisziten in europäischen Fragen

Sonia Lucarelli • Lorenzo Fioramonti
Das globale Image der Europäischen Union

Barbara Pfetsch • Annett Heft
Europäische Öffentlichkeit

JürgenMittag
Europäische Parteien imWandel

***

The publication is one of many quality examples of the civic education the BPB offers Germans and foreigners.


Ralf Grahn

European Alternatives and European Parliament elections

European Alternatives has published European elections 2009, a guide to the manifestos of the European parties and political groupings (32 pages).




The publication offers a European perspective on the contending movements and contents page a pre-view of the groups covered in the analysis:


European People’s Party Overview and Manifesto analysis
National Member Parties

Party of European Socialists Overview and Manifesto analysis
National Member Parties

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats Overview and Manifesto analysis
National Member Parties

Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance Overview and Manifesto analysis
National Member Parties

Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left Overview
National Member Parties

Independence/Democracy Group Overview
National Member Parties

Union for a Europe of the Nations Group
National Member Parties

Notes


***

Recommended reading for readers who want an accessible comparison before casting their ballots.


Ralf Grahn

Nosemonkey’s EUtopia distinguishes fact from fiction

Nosemonkey’s EUtopia is one of the top Euroblogs. Far from enthusiastic about how the European Union (mal)functions, J Clive Matthews explains how the EU works and patiently engages in discussion with commentators, a number of them with the simplistic views of British anti-EU campaigners.

Nosemonkey is worth following continuously, but this time I would like to mention two posts, which try to set some persistent myths straight:

UKIP’s “Britain paying the EU £40 million a day” claim vs the REAL costs of UK EU membership (22 May 2009).



What percentage of laws come from the EU? (2 June 2009).



Include the comments in your reading, and wonder at Nosemonkey’s patience.



Ralf Grahn

Humorous side of EU: European Light

Despite the European elections – or perhaps exactly because of them – a few of us might need to look at Europe from a more humorous side.

The picture blog European Light does just that. Take a look!




Ralf Grahn

Disgraceful opt-out: EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are said to be common to the member states. The EU shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the member states, as general principles of Community law.

This is the situation according to Article 6 of the existing Treaty on European Union (TEU).

The amending Treaty of Lisbon would be somewhat more specific about these principles (Article 2 TEU), and it would make the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (slightly adapted on 12 December 2007) legally binding. The European Union would also accede to the European Convention, already binding for every member state (Article 6 TEU).

***

Poland and the UK

During the negotiations leading to the Lisbon Treaty, two member states decided to break the European consensus on fundamental rights for all EU citizens.

Poland, with Jaroslaw Kaczynski as Prime Minister and Lech Kaczynski as President, feared that the EU Charter would leave Poland open to attacks by a homosexualist lobby. The socially conservative Kaczynski twins demand a Christian and Catholic Europe.

Poland opted out of the Charter, and despite the resounding election defeat of the ultra-conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS), the new Prime Minister Donald Tusk of the winning Civic Platform had no option but to swallow the opt-out in order to secure the needed super-majorities needed for the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. (President Lech Kaczynski has still not signed the ratification instrument.)

The Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown watered down the Lisbon Treaty, both generally and with regard to Britain. Fears of fundamental rights for British people led to a break with the civilized European nations in the form of an opt-out from the EU Charter. In the United Kingdom, a somewhat desultory discussion is taking place about a British Bill of Rights, a national document with less teeth.

The Conservative opposition leader David Cameron goes even further in his rejection of European mainstream values and politics.

What Cameron calls a progressive reform agenda includes a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (leading to the revocation of the UK’s ratification if the Lisbon Treaty is not yet in force, or the end of Britain’s EU membership if the Lisbon Treaty is in force). In any case, the Tories have promised to renegotiate Britains relationship with Europe, repatriating at least social and employment legislation, requiring unanimous treaty amendments.

Cameron also wants a limited British Bill of Rights, redistributing power from judges.

This could only happen by extending the parliamentary discretion. It would not give power to the people, but potentially give them less legal protection. For this to happen, the coming government has to abolish or weaken the Human Rights Act and to revoke the European Human Rights Convention, taking Britain an additional step away from the community of civilized nations.

We begin to see some profound similarities between the Kaczynski twins and the Cameron-Hague tandem.

***

Symbolic value

The EU Charter is a fairly modern (mainly 2000) compilation of EU citizens’ rights, based on the European Convention and various rights under the EU treaties.

It does not create new rights for EU citizens, but the Charter makes them more visible and presents them in a systematic manner.

The Charters main function besides that is that it is an expression of a community of values, with the individual at its centre. Despite the underdeveloped political rights, the importance of the EU Charter is symbolic.

So is the rejection of these values.


***

Opt-out Protocol

Despite the legalese, every EU citizen, especially each British and Polish national, should be aware of this hall of shame (OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115/313-314):


PROTOCOL (No 30)
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO POLAND AND TO THE UNITED KINGDOM


THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

WHEREAS in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

WHEREAS the Charter is to be applied in strict accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Article 6 and Title VII of the Charter itself,

WHEREAS the aforementioned Article 6 requires the Charter to be applied and interpreted by the courts of Poland and of the United Kingdom strictly in accordance with the explanations referred to in that Article,

WHEREAS the Charter contains both rights and principles,

WHEREAS the Charter contains both provisions which are civil and political in character and those which are economic and social in character,

WHEREAS the Charter reaffirms the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in the Union and makes those rights more visible, but does not create new rights or principles,

RECALLING the obligations devolving upon Poland and the United Kingdom under the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Union law generally,

NOTING the wish of Poland and the United Kingdom to clarify certain aspects of the application of the Charter,

DESIROUS therefore of clarifying the application of the Charter in relation to the laws and administrative action of Poland and of the United Kingdom and of its justiciability within Poland and within the United Kingdom,

REAFFIRMING that references in this Protocol to the operation of specific provisions of the Charter are strictly without prejudice to the operation of other provisions of the Charter,

REAFFIRMING that this Protocol is without prejudice to the application of the Charter to other Member States,

REAFFIRMING that this Protocol is without prejudice to other obligations devolving upon Poland and the United Kingdom under the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and Union law generally,

HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:


Article 1

1. The Charter does not extend the ability of the Court of Justice of the European Union, or any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it reaffirms.

2. In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.


Article 2

To the extent that a provision of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, it shall only apply to Poland or the United Kingdom to the extent that the rights or principles that it contains are recognized in the law or practices of Poland or of the United Kingdom.


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These are opt-outs by those who fear legal protection for their citizens and willingly part company with the civilized nations of Europe.



Ralf Grahn

European elections: New political group

Phobia is the common denominator: Europhobes join homophobes.

Small wonder that the UK Conservative Party and the Polish Law and Justice Party are going to form a political group in the European Parliament after the European elections. They will be joined by the Czech Civic Democrats (ODS), hovering between the Europhobia of President Vaclav Klaus and more pragmatic market oriented nationalism. They will probably attract some MEPs from nationalistic fringe parties in order to have representatives from at least seven EU member states.

The Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) will become a bit more coherent, but the main effect is that the new group rejects the European mainstream, including Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy and other national leaders, broadly supportive of British aims on the single market and world trade.

The other member states can hardly have missed the profound problems the Conservative European Election Manifesto, David Cameron and William Hague promise, if Britain stays on the inside of the European Union.

If UK government relationships with Europe have looked less than constructive until now, you ain’t seen nothing yet. We will just have to wait for the Conservative government to be voted in.

Demonstratively outside the European mainstream, Cameron will arrange his referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.

Then he will try to woo sympathy to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with other EU member states, firmly committed to the Lisbon Treaty, possibly in force at the time.

The Tories’ policies on Europe have all the makings of a strategic disaster spiced with tactical blunders.

Why should the other leaders of Europe go out of their way to help Cameron? Shouldn’t he reap what he has sown?

After all, the (other) member states need a functioning European Union.


Ralf Grahn

Brainstorming at Conservative HQ ─ Cameron’s brainchild

They must really have gotten into their brainstorming sessions at the UK Conservative Party’s headquarters lately, during the final sprint towards the European elections.

The ever reliable Sun reports party leader David Cameron saying: BRITAIN'S EU Commissioner would have to publish expense claims for the first time under a Tory government.



Perhaps this latest brainchild should be accepted as a product of electioneering at high pressure, but glorious sound bites need a closer look, especially if they come from someone who may lead a government in a not too distant future.



***

If the EU’s Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, the United Kingdom is guaranteed a Commissioner from 2009 to 2014. Under the Treaty of Nice, the number of Commissioners has to be cut.

The next British national to enter the Commission will probably be nominated by the current Labour government.

In all probability, Cameron’s “promise” could take effect in 2014, at the earliest, if the person proposed by the Conservative government undertakes to let “Cameron publish” his or her expense claims.

I would, however, request David Cameron to seek legal advice on the matter. If he already has, I would appreciate the opportunity to see the reasoning.

True, the members of the Commission are nationals of the member states and proposed by them. But the Commission’s task is to look after the general interest of the European Community (European Union).

The Commissioners are to be completely independent in the performance of their duties. They shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body.

They are, of course, Commission officials and duty bound to follow its rules and procedures, and breaches are subject to the control of the Court of Justice.


***

Media politics has evolved into a universe of its own, but would you hand the keys of government to this man?



Ralf Grahn

Swedish EU Council Presidency site launched

One month ahead of the start Sweden’s Minister for EU affairs, Cecilia Malmström, has launched the web site of the Swedish EU Council Presidency at http://se2009.eu.



As far as I remember, this is the first Council Presidency to use the .eu top level domain, instead of the national one. A nice gesture, and the logo has style.

The pages are available in Swedish, English and French.

Another novelty is that the pages already have more information and interactive features than any Council Presidency I remember long into its term.

However, when I wanted to subscribe to a suitable RSS feed, the promised alternatives failed to show up. Hopefully, these teething problems will be sorted out shortly.

Let us hope that the substantial running of the Council will be a success.


Ralf Grahn

European elections: Voting for Europe

Plan A


When the heads of state or government signed the Treaty of Lisbon, they promised to take into account the elections to the European Parliament and to hold appropriate consultations before proposing a candidate for President of the Commission (Article 17(7) TEU).

Thinking that they were honourable ladies and gentlemen, I decided to vote for the (Euro)party launching the best candidate to head the Commission.

Long before most EU citizens were even aware of the upcoming European Parliament elections, a bunch of these heads of state or government (and national party leaders) had backed a new term for José Manuel Barroso and reduced their European level parties to impotence.

Actions speak louder than words, and our political leaders showed their disregard for one of the few concessions the Lisbon Treaty offered directly to the citizens of the European Union, and consequently for European level democracy.

In the end, only the European People’s Party (EPP) dutifully endorsed its candidate for the Commission Presidency, José Manuel Barroso backed in advance by a great portion of the electoral college of 27.

As a voter, I have been robbed of a choice.


***

Plan B

With Plan A on the scrap heap, the time has come to resort to a Plan B.

Despite the minimal impact of my one vote, it is still important for me. How should I decide?

I feel a moral obligation to use my limited vote in a constructive manner. The European Parliament has been growing in importance, and the Lisbon Treaty would improve its position, despite the overwhelming union of heads of state or government and their governments.

Even if I vote in a national election, my choice has European implications. I vote for an individual or a party, which will join one of the political groups in the European Parliament.


***

Admittedly, the EP is far from perfect. It has actively suppressed information on abuse of MEPs’ expenses and its late-coming reforms have been half-hearted. It should openly publish detailed information on expenses and audits. It should also automatically publish the meeting documents of its internal bodies (Bureau, Conference of Presidents).

But where the European Parliament has powers, it does a decent job to co-legislate and to debate, and its information is more readily available than the Council’s.

Lacking powers, the absence of accountable government with distinct government and opposition alternatives, sometimes required oversized majorities leading to fuzzy consensus, as well as the trend to agree on legislative acts between the institutions in advance tend to dampen the EP’s role as a vibrant arena.


***

The European Parliament should embrace real openness, transparency and accountability in its internal affairs. Hopefully the Westminster “duck-house scandal” propels the EP and national parliaments to mend their ways. The dominant political groups could do a lot to enhance the respect of their institution by embarking on a course of decisive reform.

The institutional limitations are harder to overcome, but the European Parliament is the citizens’ best hope for an effective and democratic European Union.

Luckily, the EP does not only vote on obligatory proposed laws, but it gains know-how in areas which the member states’ governments jealously guard as their prerogatives, such as foreign, security and defence policy, long term budget, economic and monetary policy, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and agriculture.

The European Union can debate any issue on its own initiative, and although its formal powers to propose laws are limited, it can call for legislation or action.


***

Four constructive choices

Despite the internal shortcomings and the external limitations, I see four constructive alternatives for the European voter. It is to vote for a candidate or party, which would join one of the responsible political groups in the EP. Inside the European Parliament, the mainstream political groups run the show, so a vote for a fringe group serves little beyond promoting protest and antics.



EPP

The centre-right Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) will probably be the largest political group in the European Parliament, even after the UK Conservatives, the Czech ODS (Topolanek) and the Polish Law and Justice Party (Kaczynskis) and a few others split to form an anti-Federalist group on the right.

One can hardly blame the EPP for fielding the only candidate to become President of the Commission.



PES

The Socialist Group in the European Parliament (Party of European Socialists; PES) is the second largest political group in the European Parliament, a wide coalition like the EPP. It contains different centre-left shades, from ardent socialists to Labour and social democrats.

In the United Kingdom, the “duck-house scandal” threatens to cause collateral damage among honourable and hard-working Labour MEPs, which would be a pity (as long as the UK remains a member of the EU, with a probable Conservative government around the corner).



ALDE

Although a coalition like the rest of the groups, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) is perhaps the most pro-European and it has a good record on openness.

For thinking British voters, left without an attractive European home when the Tories split from the mainstream right to the dubious right, the Liberal Democrats offer a sensible choice (together with the Greens and Labour).



The Greens/European Free Alliance

The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) are not alone in professing the virtues of sustainable development and the importance of environmental, cultural and democratic rights, but they have a certain credibility in this area, and are widely seen as a constructive force.

In common with ALDE, the Greens have a good record on transparency.


***


Vote for Europe

My vote is going to one of these four groups, which I see as responsible forces for a better Europe. I hope that increasing numbers of my fellow-Europeans decide to vote and that they, cast their votes for a responsible candidate. To reject sterile protest is a sign of civic duty and maturity.

A better Europe starts within ourselves.

Vote for Europe in the European elections.



Ralf Grahn