If the European Council 18 to 19 June 2009 nominates José Manuel Barroso, by a qualified majority, to become President of the Commission, the matter appears before the newly elected European Parliament for approval.
Under the Treaty of Nice, still in force, the approval requires a simple majority (Article 214 of the Treaty establishing the European Community; TEC).
The political groups in the European are not fully formed yet, but with 264 MEPs the biggest group, the European People’s Party (EPP) is still far from a majority for Barroso.
The official Election results are somewhat behind the events with regard to the groups, but offer the main facts.
Rainbow coalition?
In principle, a rainbow coalition of the Left, ASDE (ex PES), the Greens and ALDE (Liberals) would now have 347 votes, after the Italian Partito Democratico joined the renamed Socialist Group.
This is fairly close to a majority of the representatives (369), but it still looks like a chimera, even if Barroso is seen as a weak choice by swathes of politicians and public opinion.
Many socialist and liberal MEPs belong to national parties led by heads of governments behind a re-election of Barroso.
British, Spanish and Portuguese PES representatives were among these long before the European elections. Only the Democrats part of ALDE has indicated that it will vote against Barroso. Other groups and individual MEPs might fall into line with the nomination by the European Council, possibly unanimous.
Without clear indications to the contrary, there is no pot of gold at the end of this rainbow, although a secret ballot offers MEPs with reservations about Barroso the chance to defy their national party leaders by voting for Guy Verhofstadt.
EPP plus?
The ‘European Conservatives’ of the UK Tories, the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the Czech ODS have 49 MEPs at the moment, but we are still waiting for the announcements on further recruitment among the remaining 76 MEPs (provisionally classified as Others, UEN, IND/DEM).
In theory, these presently unsorted MEPs could boost the EPP vote to 389, and it is possible that many among the 125 nationalists, anti-federalists and others prefer Barroso as the lesser evil.
However, some of them are rejectionists at heart, with scant inclination to vote constructively. For Barroso and the heads of state or government it would be an embarrassment to have the Commission President carried into office on the votes of ultra-nationalists, xenophobes and fascists.
Therefore, expect the members of the European Council to lean on MEPs to pre-empt a rainbow coalition.
Ralf Grahn
Showing posts with label coalition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label coalition. Show all posts
Friday, 12 June 2009
Thursday, 11 June 2009
European Parliament: Two mainstream majorities
The overall results of the European Parliament election results shifted only marginally yesterday, with the recount awarding one MEP to the Greens at the expense of the PES (provisional results 10 June 2009 12:20 CEST).
The European Citizen has written a thoughtful post on the power balance and prospects in: The Battle for the Commission Presidency (10 June 2009).
The results of the vote counting are probably almost final, so the potential changes will have to do more with how the political groups are formed.
Beyond the question of the vote for the Commission President and the various internal EP posts, the European Parliament needs a majority of its constituent members to amend legislative proposals: 369 out of 736 MEPs.
Let us assume that the mainstream groups prefer to work with each other, instead of courting the fringe groups (which have yet to materialise). In that case there would be one constant and two possible variations (with the numbers we have today).
Indispensable EPP
In each case, there is no going around the Group of the European People’s Party (EPP), the largest political group with 264 representatives.
Grand coalition
The traditional “grand alliance” would add the Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PES), which is second largest with 161 members of the EP.
This alternative reflects the current coalition government in Germany, but there it seems to be in its dying days. It is also possible that the socialists, social democrats and Labour movements at European level feel the need to rebuild their political message, without being tainted by daily compromises.
Non-socialist coalition
It looks probable that the German voters will offer the Christian Democrats and the Liberals a mandate at the next election. In German terms this would be a black-yellow coalition, but in the EP blue-yellow (incidentally like the Swedish Council Presidency).
The problem is that in the European Parliament a coalition of the EPP and the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) would fall short of the needed majority (by 25 votes at the present time; as it happens, the exact number of the emigrating UK Conservatives).
The Greens made a strong showing in the European elections, so it would be an acknowledgement of the vote to include them in a coalition. With the Greens on board, an EPP-ALDE-Green coalition would represent 397 votes, which attains the needed majority.
But the Greens have campaigned with a view to build a coalition with the PES. They have resisted the appointment of Barroso. A shift in alliances might not go down well with their MEPs or voters, despite the obvious advantages.
Jokers in the pack?
The decisive issue will be, where the EPP finds its future partners. For them the ideal would be to entice into their group a sufficient number from the ranks of nationalists and others, MEPs who at the present time are labelled as Others, UEN or IND/DEM. The second option might be a permanent understanding without group membership.
Here the EPP competes with the nationalist ‘European Conservatives’, who have already bagged 49 MEPs and are looking for representatives from at least four additional member states to be able to form a group.
Neither the EPP nor the ‘European Conservatives’ can contemplate recruiting the most xenophobic and fascistoid elements among the remaining 97 MEPs, so the remaining options are fairly slim for both of them.
We are still waiting for the fat lady to sing.
Ralf Grahn
The European Citizen has written a thoughtful post on the power balance and prospects in: The Battle for the Commission Presidency (10 June 2009).
The results of the vote counting are probably almost final, so the potential changes will have to do more with how the political groups are formed.
Beyond the question of the vote for the Commission President and the various internal EP posts, the European Parliament needs a majority of its constituent members to amend legislative proposals: 369 out of 736 MEPs.
Let us assume that the mainstream groups prefer to work with each other, instead of courting the fringe groups (which have yet to materialise). In that case there would be one constant and two possible variations (with the numbers we have today).
Indispensable EPP
In each case, there is no going around the Group of the European People’s Party (EPP), the largest political group with 264 representatives.
Grand coalition
The traditional “grand alliance” would add the Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PES), which is second largest with 161 members of the EP.
This alternative reflects the current coalition government in Germany, but there it seems to be in its dying days. It is also possible that the socialists, social democrats and Labour movements at European level feel the need to rebuild their political message, without being tainted by daily compromises.
Non-socialist coalition
It looks probable that the German voters will offer the Christian Democrats and the Liberals a mandate at the next election. In German terms this would be a black-yellow coalition, but in the EP blue-yellow (incidentally like the Swedish Council Presidency).
The problem is that in the European Parliament a coalition of the EPP and the Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) would fall short of the needed majority (by 25 votes at the present time; as it happens, the exact number of the emigrating UK Conservatives).
The Greens made a strong showing in the European elections, so it would be an acknowledgement of the vote to include them in a coalition. With the Greens on board, an EPP-ALDE-Green coalition would represent 397 votes, which attains the needed majority.
But the Greens have campaigned with a view to build a coalition with the PES. They have resisted the appointment of Barroso. A shift in alliances might not go down well with their MEPs or voters, despite the obvious advantages.
Jokers in the pack?
The decisive issue will be, where the EPP finds its future partners. For them the ideal would be to entice into their group a sufficient number from the ranks of nationalists and others, MEPs who at the present time are labelled as Others, UEN or IND/DEM. The second option might be a permanent understanding without group membership.
Here the EPP competes with the nationalist ‘European Conservatives’, who have already bagged 49 MEPs and are looking for representatives from at least four additional member states to be able to form a group.
Neither the EPP nor the ‘European Conservatives’ can contemplate recruiting the most xenophobic and fascistoid elements among the remaining 97 MEPs, so the remaining options are fairly slim for both of them.
We are still waiting for the fat lady to sing.
Ralf Grahn
Wednesday, 30 January 2008
EU Treaty of Lisbon: CSDP mission coalitions
On Monday, the Council of the European Union decided to launch an international military mission in support of UN peace-keeping missions in Darfur, Sudan. The Council conclusions stated i.a.:
“8. The Council launched the military bridging operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA. It authorised the
EU operation commander, with immediate effect, to release the activation order in order to execute the deployment of the forces and start the execution of the mission. The Council reaffirms its full commitment to contribute to the implementation of the UNSC-Resolution 1778 (2007) which authorises the deployment in Chad and Central African Republic of a multidimensional presence, including the EU providing the military element of it. In accordance with this resolution, the EU conducts this military bridging operation for a period of 12 months from the declaration of Initial Operational Capability which is planned to be reached in March 2008. A mid mandate review after 6 months, conducted in conjunction with the UN, will assess the need for a possible UN follow-on capability.”
According to the Council factsheet 14 EU member states will be present in the field and 22 at Operations Headquarters.
***
As we see, international missions – military and civilian – are not new to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) of the EU.
This operation, too, is a coalition of willing and able member state, even a broad one, with at least a token representation of more than two thirds of them.
The Lisbon Treaty clarifies the basic Treaty provisions on CSDP operations, but more than creating new rules it is a codification of existing (and evolving) practice, where the European Union acts to enhance peace and stability in troubled regions.
***
In the Treaty of Lisbon the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007) offers us one of its new and unmaimed Articles in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) Article 28c (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/35).
50) The following new Articles 28 B to 28 E shall be inserted:
-----
Article 28c
1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 28 B, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.
2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.
***
In the existing TEU the CSDP missions mentioned in Article 17(2) TEU (latest consolidated version OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/17), the Petersberg tasks, form the basis for the evolved CSDP Section in the Lisbon Treaty.
Article 17(2)
2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
***
The Convention fathered the rules on tasks entrusted to a group of member states in Article III-211 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/69):
Article III-211
1. Within the framework of the European decisions adopted in accordance with Article III-210, the Council of Ministers may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States having the necessary capability and the desire to undertake the task. Those Member States in association with the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall agree between themselves on the management of the task.
2. The Council of Ministers shall be regularly informed by the Member States participating in the task of its progress. Should the completion of the task involve major new consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions for implementation adopted by the Council of Ministers under Article III-210, the Member States participating shall refer the matter to the Council of Ministers forthwith. In such cases, the Council of Ministers shall adopt the necessary European decisions.
***
The IGC 2004 was the mother of the modified Article III-310 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe:
Article III-310
1. Within the framework of the European decisions adopted in accordance with Article III-309, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.
2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the European decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary European decisions.
***
The child, Reform Treaty Article 28c TEU, is almost a clone of its mother.
The CSDP provisions have to be read in conjunction. Article 28a TEU forms the background, with 28a(4) requiring a unanimous Council decision to launch a mission, and 28a(5) offering the option to entrust a task to a group of member states. Article 28b TEU describes the various missions – the expanded Petersberg tasks – and the contents to be settled in the Council decision. (Read the two previous posts.)
Article 28c TEU tries to strike a balance between the European Union as a whole and the group of member states which actually implements the task.
The operation is launched in the name of the EU, with the Council defining the objectives, the scope and the general conditions of the mission.
Based on this authorisation, the coalition then agrees on the management of the task, in association with the High Representative.
Basically, the ‘coalition of the willing and able’ runs the operation, and the rest of the member states (Council) only have a right to be informed.
If the mission runs into trouble, or if other major changes are needed, the Council takes on the role of decision maker.
Ralf Grahn
Sources:
Council of the European Union: Council conclusions, General Affairs and External Relations, 28 January 2008, 5624/08, Provisional version (p. 12-15)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/98460.pdf
European Union Council Secretariat: Background: EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), January 2008 (p. 2)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/98416.pdf
“8. The Council launched the military bridging operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA. It authorised the
EU operation commander, with immediate effect, to release the activation order in order to execute the deployment of the forces and start the execution of the mission. The Council reaffirms its full commitment to contribute to the implementation of the UNSC-Resolution 1778 (2007) which authorises the deployment in Chad and Central African Republic of a multidimensional presence, including the EU providing the military element of it. In accordance with this resolution, the EU conducts this military bridging operation for a period of 12 months from the declaration of Initial Operational Capability which is planned to be reached in March 2008. A mid mandate review after 6 months, conducted in conjunction with the UN, will assess the need for a possible UN follow-on capability.”
According to the Council factsheet 14 EU member states will be present in the field and 22 at Operations Headquarters.
***
As we see, international missions – military and civilian – are not new to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) of the EU.
This operation, too, is a coalition of willing and able member state, even a broad one, with at least a token representation of more than two thirds of them.
The Lisbon Treaty clarifies the basic Treaty provisions on CSDP operations, but more than creating new rules it is a codification of existing (and evolving) practice, where the European Union acts to enhance peace and stability in troubled regions.
***
In the Treaty of Lisbon the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007) offers us one of its new and unmaimed Articles in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) Article 28c (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/35).
50) The following new Articles 28 B to 28 E shall be inserted:
-----
Article 28c
1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 28 B, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.
2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.
***
In the existing TEU the CSDP missions mentioned in Article 17(2) TEU (latest consolidated version OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/17), the Petersberg tasks, form the basis for the evolved CSDP Section in the Lisbon Treaty.
Article 17(2)
2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
***
The Convention fathered the rules on tasks entrusted to a group of member states in Article III-211 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/69):
Article III-211
1. Within the framework of the European decisions adopted in accordance with Article III-210, the Council of Ministers may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States having the necessary capability and the desire to undertake the task. Those Member States in association with the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall agree between themselves on the management of the task.
2. The Council of Ministers shall be regularly informed by the Member States participating in the task of its progress. Should the completion of the task involve major new consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions for implementation adopted by the Council of Ministers under Article III-210, the Member States participating shall refer the matter to the Council of Ministers forthwith. In such cases, the Council of Ministers shall adopt the necessary European decisions.
***
The IGC 2004 was the mother of the modified Article III-310 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe:
Article III-310
1. Within the framework of the European decisions adopted in accordance with Article III-309, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.
2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the European decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary European decisions.
***
The child, Reform Treaty Article 28c TEU, is almost a clone of its mother.
The CSDP provisions have to be read in conjunction. Article 28a TEU forms the background, with 28a(4) requiring a unanimous Council decision to launch a mission, and 28a(5) offering the option to entrust a task to a group of member states. Article 28b TEU describes the various missions – the expanded Petersberg tasks – and the contents to be settled in the Council decision. (Read the two previous posts.)
Article 28c TEU tries to strike a balance between the European Union as a whole and the group of member states which actually implements the task.
The operation is launched in the name of the EU, with the Council defining the objectives, the scope and the general conditions of the mission.
Based on this authorisation, the coalition then agrees on the management of the task, in association with the High Representative.
Basically, the ‘coalition of the willing and able’ runs the operation, and the rest of the member states (Council) only have a right to be informed.
If the mission runs into trouble, or if other major changes are needed, the Council takes on the role of decision maker.
Ralf Grahn
Sources:
Council of the European Union: Council conclusions, General Affairs and External Relations, 28 January 2008, 5624/08, Provisional version (p. 12-15)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/98460.pdf
European Union Council Secretariat: Background: EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), January 2008 (p. 2)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/98416.pdf
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