Pjotr Maciej Kaczýnski, Sebastian Kurpas and Peadar ó Broin have analysed the state of play in four EU member states, where the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon is on hold. ‘Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty ─ Ireland is not the only problem’ (EPIN Working Paper No. 18, published 24 September 2008; 16 pages) is available for downloading at:
http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1716
The issues and the coalitions for and against ratification in Ireland, Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland are treated in some detail, which makes the publication essential reading for everyone interested in the uncertain future of European integration.
Sweden is mentioned briefly, but the autonomous areas Gibraltar (United Kingdom) and the Åland Islands (Finland) remain outside the scope of the paper.
Ralf Grahn
Showing posts with label Sebastian Kurpas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sebastian Kurpas. Show all posts
Saturday, 27 September 2008
Wednesday, 25 June 2008
Lisbon Treaty rescue operation
Daniel Gros and Sebastian Kurpas of the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) have looked at the options for Europe after the Irish No vote. CEPS Policy brief No. 163 (June 2008) is available at:
http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1675
‘What next? How to save the Treaty of Lisbon’ starts with an assessment of different options under debate. These are:
1. Abandon the Treaty of Lisbon and continue with the Treaty of Nice
2. Reopening negotiations on a new Treaty
3. Increased efforts on flexible integration
4. Implementation of those elements in the Treaty of Lisbon that do not require ratification
5. Temporary withdrawal of Ireland from the EU
6. Continuing the ratification process followed by a second Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon
Gros and Kurpas then present what they call a feasible, legal and fair way ahead. Their Plan B proposes ratifying the consolidated treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. This would entail a speedy re-ratification by the member states that already have ratified the original Lisbon Treaty.
The second Irish referendum would be about a different question: Does Ireland wish to join the EU with the Lisbon Treaty in force?
***
The essentials of the CEPS proposal are the same as put forward by this blog, namely to save the substance of the Treaty of Lisbon within a new European Union among the ratifying states.
Given the potential unravelling of the Lisbon Treaty in a number of countries (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Poland) and the possibility that some might balk at the abandonment of the ‘liberum veto’, the authors are perhaps unduly optimistic in proposing mandatory ratification by 26 states.
In my view, the basic criteria should be that the ratifying states continue, but the treaty is open for later accessions, a customary procedure regarding international treaties.
Another difference is that Gros and Kurpas, focusing on the rescue of the Lisbon Treaty, do not enter into a discussion of the growing popular resistance against the European Union and the profound disillusionment spreading among pro-Europeans.
Without a solemn pledge to institute EU level democratic legitimacy and accountability, the European project is headed for failure. This blog argues that the European Council has to set a new course towards fundamental democratic reform if it wishes to avert a worse catastrophe than the ship-wreck of the Lisbon Treaty.
The missing link between governing and governed must be established in a manner suited to the 21st century.
Ralf Grahn
http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1675
‘What next? How to save the Treaty of Lisbon’ starts with an assessment of different options under debate. These are:
1. Abandon the Treaty of Lisbon and continue with the Treaty of Nice
2. Reopening negotiations on a new Treaty
3. Increased efforts on flexible integration
4. Implementation of those elements in the Treaty of Lisbon that do not require ratification
5. Temporary withdrawal of Ireland from the EU
6. Continuing the ratification process followed by a second Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon
Gros and Kurpas then present what they call a feasible, legal and fair way ahead. Their Plan B proposes ratifying the consolidated treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. This would entail a speedy re-ratification by the member states that already have ratified the original Lisbon Treaty.
The second Irish referendum would be about a different question: Does Ireland wish to join the EU with the Lisbon Treaty in force?
***
The essentials of the CEPS proposal are the same as put forward by this blog, namely to save the substance of the Treaty of Lisbon within a new European Union among the ratifying states.
Given the potential unravelling of the Lisbon Treaty in a number of countries (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Poland) and the possibility that some might balk at the abandonment of the ‘liberum veto’, the authors are perhaps unduly optimistic in proposing mandatory ratification by 26 states.
In my view, the basic criteria should be that the ratifying states continue, but the treaty is open for later accessions, a customary procedure regarding international treaties.
Another difference is that Gros and Kurpas, focusing on the rescue of the Lisbon Treaty, do not enter into a discussion of the growing popular resistance against the European Union and the profound disillusionment spreading among pro-Europeans.
Without a solemn pledge to institute EU level democratic legitimacy and accountability, the European project is headed for failure. This blog argues that the European Council has to set a new course towards fundamental democratic reform if it wishes to avert a worse catastrophe than the ship-wreck of the Lisbon Treaty.
The missing link between governing and governed must be established in a manner suited to the 21st century.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 7 June 2007
Realistic treaty assessment
With a slimmed-down treaty [as outlined above], the EU would become somewhat more efficient and democratic, but it is questionable whether it would really prepare the Union for the future, Sebastian Kurpas and Stefano Micossi of the Centre for European Policy Studies concluded (CEPS Policy brief No. 130, May 2007: Will the European Council end the institutional deadlock in the EU? The Narrow Trail to an Agreement).
I am going to report how the member states have positioned themselves, according to the Policy brief.
The authors noted that any solution will have to respect a fundamental constraint: whatever new treaty emerges from the negotiations, the French, Dutch and British governments demand it to be of such nature that it will not require them to hold a new referendum.
In its opposition to meaningful institutional change, the United Kingdom will be able to enlist the support of Poland and the Czech Republic, certainly as regards opposition to constitutional symbols in the new treaty. However, Poland’s main interest is to prevent the double majority voting system in the Council as it is outlined in the Constitutional Treaty, to preserve at least some of the disproportionate weight relative to its population that it currently enjoys under the rules agreed during the Nice inter-governmental conference, Kurpas and Micossi remarked.
On the other hand, any deal must pay due recognition to the fact that 18 member states have ratified the Constitutional Treaty. The bulk of provisions in Part I must be saved, as any other solution would inevitably unravel the delicate balancing of the interests of the member states that made agreement possible in the last inter-governmental conference, Kurpas and Micossi wrote.
In a crisis scenario, the majority of the members that want a stronger union may eventually decide to proceed without permission of those that do not want to proceed. Anyway, the enlarged European Union will increasingly depend on mechanisms for flexible integration. These mechanisms should be used as a constructive tool to overcome tensions between countries that want to go ahead faster and those that prefer not to participate, said the authors.
Even if a compromise far beyond a lowest common denominator is found, important issues will remain on the table: particularly the conditions for future treaty reforms, which are of central importance in order to avoid institutional inflexibility, and the lack of transparency in a Union of 27 member states, Kurpas and Micossi reminded.
The Policy brief dealt with more detailed questions under discussion, but those interested enough are best served by reading the brief in its entirety.
Somewhat more efficient and democratic, but unfit for the future; that is a realistic assessment of the outcome of possible EU treaty reform. Our best hope?
Ralf Grahn
I am going to report how the member states have positioned themselves, according to the Policy brief.
The authors noted that any solution will have to respect a fundamental constraint: whatever new treaty emerges from the negotiations, the French, Dutch and British governments demand it to be of such nature that it will not require them to hold a new referendum.
In its opposition to meaningful institutional change, the United Kingdom will be able to enlist the support of Poland and the Czech Republic, certainly as regards opposition to constitutional symbols in the new treaty. However, Poland’s main interest is to prevent the double majority voting system in the Council as it is outlined in the Constitutional Treaty, to preserve at least some of the disproportionate weight relative to its population that it currently enjoys under the rules agreed during the Nice inter-governmental conference, Kurpas and Micossi remarked.
On the other hand, any deal must pay due recognition to the fact that 18 member states have ratified the Constitutional Treaty. The bulk of provisions in Part I must be saved, as any other solution would inevitably unravel the delicate balancing of the interests of the member states that made agreement possible in the last inter-governmental conference, Kurpas and Micossi wrote.
In a crisis scenario, the majority of the members that want a stronger union may eventually decide to proceed without permission of those that do not want to proceed. Anyway, the enlarged European Union will increasingly depend on mechanisms for flexible integration. These mechanisms should be used as a constructive tool to overcome tensions between countries that want to go ahead faster and those that prefer not to participate, said the authors.
Even if a compromise far beyond a lowest common denominator is found, important issues will remain on the table: particularly the conditions for future treaty reforms, which are of central importance in order to avoid institutional inflexibility, and the lack of transparency in a Union of 27 member states, Kurpas and Micossi reminded.
The Policy brief dealt with more detailed questions under discussion, but those interested enough are best served by reading the brief in its entirety.
Somewhat more efficient and democratic, but unfit for the future; that is a realistic assessment of the outcome of possible EU treaty reform. Our best hope?
Ralf Grahn
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