Eurobarometer controversy

The UK based anti-EU lobby group Open Europe managed, perhaps unintentionally, to stir up a debate at European level when they accused the European Commission of spinning the results of the Eurobarometer poll of public opinion in the European Union. After – as they might have seen it – beating the Commission to pulp, they finally reached what they saw as the main result: declining support for EU membership.

The EU Commission’s press release branded as dishonest by Open Europe can be found here (26 August 2010, IP/10/1071; available in 22 languages):



Spring 2010 Eurobarometer: EU citizens favour stronger European economic governance




All guns firing, Open Europe delivered its broadside from its blog, its daily press summary, its fortnightly bulletin and on Director Mats Persson’s blog.



In my humble view, Open Europe gave in to its urge to bash the Commission, while missing a golden opportunity to discuss growing European awareness of the need for economic reform at macro and micro level; that is, if Open Europe really is interested in these issues with the European public good at heart.



British exceptionalism



I had first discussed the political atmosphere and media climate in the United Kingdom, resulting in a high level of distrust and a low level of trust for the European Union, then pointed out how unique British public opinion is in its exceptionalism.



Spin or policy pointers?


My intention was to move on to the issue of declining support for the European Union, but then I felt that I had to take a closer look at Open Europe’s accusations and the European Commission’s “offending” press release.


Shorthand

My reading was that Open Europe seemed to have found particularly offensive that the headline of the press release and Commissioner Viviane Reding had used the words stronger or enhanced “economic governance” as shorthand for the 75 per cent EU-wide support for a “stronger coordination of economic and financial policies among all the EU Member States”, the highest support (26 per cent) among institutions - national and international - for ability to “take effective actions against the financial and economic crisis”, as well as high support for some sort of economic reform agenda (reducing public deficit and debt in respondent’s own country, surveillance of international financial groups, and for priorities of the EU 2020 reform strategy).


Challenges


Whether openly accounted for or not, the issues debated reflect fundamental assumptions about politics and policies at European level. Despite my tentative findings, the ongoing discussion and the detailed Eurobarometer results still merit a closer look.




Ralf Grahn



P.S. Comments relevant to the topic discussed in each Grahnlaw blog post are most welcome. However, the number of spam comments has skyrocketed. This is the sad reason for comment moderation, so it may take a while before your valued comment appears.

It is easier to understand a language than to use it correctly. As Eurobloggers we could and should promote interaction among Europeans across borders and between linguistic communities. Grahnlaw has adopted a multilingual comment policy:

I do my best to read comments in Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish or Swedish, even if the Grahnlaw blog and my possible replies are in English.



Antonia on the Euonym blog (Talking about the EU) tells us that the European Commission in the UK arranges a Day of Multilingual Blogging on 26 September 2010, and the UK Representation has been joined by the multilingual aggregator Bloggingportal.eu and individual Eurobloggers. Join the event page on Facebook, spread the word through social media and personal contacts, begin preparing your blog posts and start learning a new language.

Daniel Hannan’s quaint love of Europe

Languages other than English may be better suited, if you want to gain a deeper understanding of European integration, I argued yesterday.

Daniel Hannan MEP, while professing a love for Europe, misses few opportunities to punish a good word about the European Union, or even a suggestion for greater interest in European affairs generally.



At least Hannan rushed to diminish the Guardian article by Martin Kettle about being trapped by the Anglosphere, I mentioned in the aftermath of the Eurogoblin blog post on the roots of European integration.



In 2009 the current account of the United Kingdom with regard to the European Union was GBP 277 billion and with New Zealand GBP 1.35 billion, but Hannan seems to imply that his constituents are better served if they stay in their comfort zone, the Anglosphere:

The Internet makes it as easy for my constituents to do business with a company in New Zealand as with a company in Belgium. Easier, indeed, because the Kiwi company shares our common law, accountancy practices, commercial traditions and language.

Hannan prefers to look for “folk of our blood and speech” in the Antipodes, as long as he can bypass Europe.



If Hannan had used German, he might as well have said “Blut und Boden”.

The Internet will finally turn the United Kingdom away from Europe. This will democratise something Hannan leaves unmentioned.

Hannan has produced another quaint declaration of love for Europe.




Ralf Grahn



P.S. Comments relevant to the topic discussed in each Grahnlaw blog post are most welcome. However, the number of spam comments has skyrocketed. This is the sad reason for comment moderation, so it may take a while before your valued comment appears.

It is easier to understand a language than to use it correctly. As Eurobloggers we could and should promote interaction among Europeans across borders and between linguistic communities. Grahnlaw has adopted a multilingual comment policy:

I do my best to read comments in Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish or Swedish, even if the Grahnlaw blog and my possible replies are in English.



Antonia on the Euonym blog (Talking about the EU) tells us that the European Commission in the UK arranges a Day of Multilingual Blogging on 26 September 2010, and the UK Representation has been joined by the multilingual aggregator Bloggingportal.eu and individual Eurobloggers. Join the event page on Facebook, spread the word through social media and personal contacts, begin preparing your blog posts and start learning a new language.

After Eurogoblin: Why is English not the lingua franca of European integration?

The free movement of goods, persons, services and capital has been popular in England, at least when headed towards the European Continent, but the free flow of thoughts less so in the reverse direction, if threatening to enrich Britain.



Have you ever seen a pious goblin? Me neither, until Eurogoblin took the “Finding Europe’s Mojo” motto seriously and posted a short essay (but long blog post) called The Christian Roots of European Unity.



I join Vihar Georgiev (of European Union Law) in his wish that many people will take the time to read the post because it raises important questions and Eurocentric (of The European Citizen) in his assessment: Brilliant post!

For now, I am going to make some remarks on languages and culture(s) in relationship to European integration.




Languages and culture(s)


English has become a lingua franca for commerce, as well as the second language for university and college students all over Europe. There are also great publishers, such as Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press and Palgrave Macmillan, with titles on the history, politics and law of European integration.




However, generally EUSSR myths, disinformation and constant sowing of discord seem to be much more in demand in the United Kingdom than interest in languages and cultures next door. The culture just is not there.

Beyond their mother tongue, many European students are limited to the offer in English, so their world view is formed by what they can access.



The roots and motives of European integration remain almost invisible, if left to British media (mainstream and social), politicians and expressions from an uninformed public.



The British are constantly hammered with myths that the UK was taken into the “Common Market”, without giving the people a choice, and that the EEC has surreptitiously turned into a European Union super-state. First of all, membership in the three European Communities was approved in a referendum in 1975. Secondly, every Treaty since the Treaty of Rome has visibly highlighted the quest for “ever closer union”. With slightly different wording, the idea of a future common destiny was laid out in the 1951 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. The Schuman declaration (1950) described the ECSC as “a first step in the federation of Europe”. Thirdly, in the international arena the European Union is almost as weak as Poland under the 'liberum veto', and almost as impossible to reform (multiple unanimity rules).



The “integration by stealth" myth is bollocks, despite daily disinformation. Actually, Britain joined a project of ever deeper integration, but has been in constant breach of the spirit of its commitment. Sir Humphrey’s parody of UK foreign policy in Yes, Minister (on YouTube) contains more than a grain of truth.



Martin Kettle describes the consequences for the UK of this linguistic and cultural “blindness” in The Guardian: Trapped in the Anglosphere, we’ve lost sight of next door.

In addition, one could remark, this tunnel vision affects increasing numbers of young Europeans for whom English is their only foreign language.



These are some of the reasons why the Council of Europe’s annual European Day of Languages on 26 September is important.



Antonia on the Euonym blog (Talking about the EU) tells us that the European Commission in the UK arranges a Day of Multilingual Blogging on 26 September 2010, and the UK Representation has been joined by the multilingual aggregator Bloggingportal.eu and individual Eurobloggers. Join the event page on Facebook, spread the word through social media and personal contacts, begin preparing your blog posts and start learning a new language.

The culture of European integration has often been nurtured with more thought and understanding in other European languages. Especially in the United Kingdom and the other later entrants among the EU member states (including my own, Finland), there is a need to look for sources beyond the confines of England and English.

Why not put free movement of thought on your agenda?




Ralf Grahn



P.S. Comments relevant to the topic discussed in each Grahnlaw blog post are most welcome. However, the number of spam comments has skyrocketed. This is the sad reason for comment moderation, so it may take a while before your valued comment appears.

It is easier to understand a language than to use it correctly. As Eurobloggers we could and should promote interaction among Europeans across borders and between linguistic communities. Grahnlaw has adopted a multilingual comment policy:

I do my best to read comments in Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish or Swedish, even if the Grahnlaw blog and my possible replies are in English.

This sceptred isle or Sallust? The British are Europeans – but unaware for how long?

In an earlier post we discussed the absence of a (modern) codified Constitution and the notion of citizenship (instead, subjects of the Crown) in the United Kingdom. Many of the sources, features and procedures of the British constitutional and political system are antiquated. Who in his right mind would today resist a codified Constitution, institute a Monarchy or establish a House of Lords?



The Parliament in Westminster (House of Commons) was an important model internationally, but the first-past-the-post system does not lead to fair representation. The domestic climate in the UK regarding modern fundamental rights has been hesitant, when not outright hostile, as is current public opinion on the European Union.

Legally protected fundamental rights for citizens (or everyone within the jurisdiction) against encroachment by government are cornerstones of modern liberal political entities.



All EU member states are parties to the mother of human rights in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; CETS No. 005 including amending protocols), which the European Union itself has pledged to accede to.



The EU also houses the next generation daughter, the more comprehensive and modern Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, legally binding since the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on 1 December 2009.



Britain, Poland and the Czech Republic have blotted their reputations by distancing themselves from the community of values formed around the EU Charter, but the Charter will still bind the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union (Article 51), offering legal protection to all citizens of the EU, including the people of the laggard nations.



Looking at present and future European relations through the prism of the Battle of Britain, totally negating that Britain and the British have representation in the European Union, painting eurozone bank stress tests as pure self-deception, rejoicing at a member state (Hungary) telling the EU and the IMF to “bugger off” [until it needs massive refinancing next year], transport of joy on ConservativeHome at the absence of the EU flag when president Nicolas Sarkozy visited London (via Jason O’Mahony), a proposal to repeal the Act on Britain’s [reduced] share in financing the European Union (via Euromove) are but brief glimpses of constant sowing of discord and disinformation, intended to get the United Kingdom out of the EU or from engaging constructively even “with” (instead of in) Europe.



Much of English discourse on European integration shares the Taliban feeling that they have nothing to gain and nothing to learn from (the rest of) the civilised world. However, are these feelings of superiority well founded, when we look at the constitutional and political system, or the relationship to citizenship and fundamental rights?



Is Shakespeare’s beautiful poetry, “this sceptred isle, ... This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England” (written in approximately 1595), really a healthy philosophical foundation for the fundamental rights, or the future security and prosperity of UK subjects and EU citizens in a globalising world?



For as long as it takes for British EU citizens as a whole to become willing and able to create a constructive and mutually learning relationship in the European Union, at least the rest of the 501 million inhabitants of the EU have cause to reflect on Sallust’s wise words in the Jugurthine War about the effects of discord on political constructs:

Nam concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia maxumae dilabuntur.

The British are Europeans; they are in Europe. When is awareness going to set in? Is Sallust going to age another two millennia before it happens?




Ralf Grahn



P.S. Comments relevant to the topic discussed in each Grahnlaw blog post are most welcome. However, the number of spam comments has skyrocketed. This is the sad reason for comment moderation, so it may take a while before your pertinent comment appears.

It is easier to understand a language than to use it correctly. As Eurobloggers we could and should promote interaction among Europeans across borders and between linguistic communities. Grahnlaw has adopted a multilingual comment policy:

I do my best to read comments in Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish or Swedish, even if the Grahnlaw blog and my possible replies are in English.



The European Commission in the UK arranges a Day of Multilingual Blogging on 26 September 2010, joined by the multilingual aggregator Bloggingportal.eu and individual Eurobloggers. Spread the word and start preparing for the event.

UK versus USA and EU: Oceans apart on fundamental rights

After yesterday’s blog posts on a new pocket-sized version of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and basic information about the Council of Europe and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is time to turn to the odd man out among civilised nations: the United Kingdom.



In the Declaration of Independence (1776), by the Second Continental Congress, the thirteen united States of America turned the tables on King George III:

We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness ─ That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, ...

Principles of the English Bill of Rights (1689) and Enlightenment philosophy also flowed into the Constitution of the United States of America (1787), including the first ten amendments known as the United States Bill of Rights, which came into effect in 1791.



In the United Kingdom, absent the notion of citizenship and a codified constitution, subjects of the Crown enjoy certain rights based on a patchwork of domestic statutory provisions and common law rules.



The set of laws and principles under which the United Kingdom is governed form the uncodified constitution. According to the fundamental doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, the UK Parliament can change any law including the constitutional rules by a simple Act of Parliament, so domestically the rights of a British subject hang by a thread, subject to the whims of each Parliament in Westminster.



English nationalists seem to worship a ragtag bag of domestic documents from Magna Carta onwards with fervour, as if these parchments and papers somehow conferred superior protection for Englishmen compared to the human rights enshrined in other EU countries or the United States. Have these fervent Crown subjects even read the Magna Carta?



The Magna Carta is a historically important document, but so is the Code of Hammurabi.



The Conservative election manifesto 2010 still saw superior human rights and fundamental freedoms as an encroachment [on Parliamentary sovereignty] and pledged to replace the Human Rights Act with a UK Bill of Rights (page 79).



Intellectually and politically an unqualified statement like that would have placed the United Kingdom on par with Belarus with regard to European human rights standards.



The latest general election led to a coalition government between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, so the UK Coalition programme 2010 shows restraining influences on the government’s urge to gain the upper hand against judges and the people (page 11):

We will establish a Commission to investigate the creation of a British Bill of Rights that incorporates and builds on all our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, ensures that these rights continue to be enshrined in British law, and protects and extends British liberties. We will seek to promote a better understanding of the true scope of these obligations and liberties.

Thanks to the Liberal Democrats, rights under the ECHR will be given continued protection, and there is even talk of potentially extending the rights of British subjects.

It is still amazing: Where in the civilised world of today can you, as the Conservatives, emerge as the biggest party in free and fair elections on a promise to curtail human rights?


Without UK membership in the European Union (indirectly benefiting from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights despite opting out) and the Council of Europe, with the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) finally brought into force in 2000 by the UK Human Rights Act 1998, individuals in Britain would have few guarantees against excesses by government or parliament.

The media climate and the political atmosphere in the United Kingdom are still oceans apart from the fundamental rights traditions protecting citizens across the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel.



I wonder why.




Ralf Grahn



P.S. The Grahnlaw blog invites comments relevant to the topics discussed, but the number and the variety of spam comments seems to be increasing steadily. This is the sad reason for comment moderation, so it may take a while before your pertinent comment appears.

It is easier to understand a language than to use it correctly. As Eurobloggers we could and should promote interaction among Europeans across borders and between linguistic communities. Grahnlaw has adopted a multilingual comment policy:

I do my best to read comments in Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish or Swedish, even if the Grahnlaw blog and my possible replies are in English.

Eurozone and economy now top themes on Bloggingportal.eu

Lately the ‘eurozone’ and the ‘economy’ generally have been top themes on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, which has grown to aggregate 577 euroblogs.

The new coalition government in the ‘unitedkingdom’ has also elicited a fair number of blog posts, as the tangled relationship between ‘britain’ and the rest of Europe.

However, practically all areas of EU activities are covered by passionate eurobloggers, many of them able to communicate more to the point than the institutions.

Although biased, as one of the Bloggingportal.eu editors, I feel that the portal has evolved into a solid and timely source for solid information and opinion on European Union affairs.




Besides the rewarding view of all headlines, you can opt for the editors’ choice on the front page, subscribe to RSS feeds of all posts or the promoted ones, as well as subscribe to the daily and weekly newsletter.



Take a look at Bloggingportal.eu!


Ralf Grahn

UK euro entry: Sour grapes?

The Liberal Democrats seem to have easily agreed to the demand by the Conservative Party to exclude the introduction of the euro currency, as stated in the coalition programme:

We will ensure that Britain does not join or prepare to join the Euro in this Parliament.

While the visceral hatred of all things EU and euro among the conservative power base should not be underestimated, one reason for this seemingly effortless agreement brings to mind the “sour grapes” in Aesop’s fable The Fox and the Grapes.




The latest edition from the House of Commons Library: Economic Indicators, May 2010 (Research Paper 10/35, 13 May 2010; 40 pages) tells us the following about government deficits:

The UK’s 12% deficit in 2010 is expected to be the largest in the EU, with Ireland’s 11.7% second highest. A 10% UK deficit in 2011 would be below Ireland’s 12.1% and only slightly above that of Greece (9.9%, though the IMF programme envisages 7.6%). However, the UK’s gross debt would remain less than two-thirds of Greece’s.

The UK’s gross public debt was estimated to rise from 68.1 per cent in 2009 to 86.9 per cent of GDP in 2011 (page vii).


According to the EMU convergence criteria (or Maastricht criteria) for the third stage in economic and monetary union (EMU) low inflation is a necessity, so the UK would fail the price stability test.

Britain has not participated in the exchange-rate mechanism for two years without devaluation against the euro (its favourite remedy for economic ills), so it clearly fails to qualify.

Failing on all grounds, the United Kingdom could not introduce the euro in a foreseeable future even if it wanted to. Somehow the invisible hand of the markets seems to guard Britain in comparison with the eurozone basket cases.

In such circumstances it is easy to trumpet defeat as victory.




Ralf Grahn

Eurozone governance: Cameron nixes treaty change

According to the BBC, UK prime minister David Cameron has politely told chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin that he wants to play a positive role in Europe and that a strong eurozone is in the UK’s own interest.

However, Cameron excludes any treaty change giving the European Union more powers to shore up the eurozone, and he referred to the unanimity rule and the British veto. Cameron also excluded British participation in “bolstering” the euro. (By this I understand financial stabilisation measures.)

These are essentially the same things Cameron said the previous day, when he met president Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris.



UK government programme



While adding non-participation in financial stabilisation, what Cameron said is contained in the agreement between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats: The Coalition: our programme for government.

Here are three relevant excerpts:

We will ensure that there is no further transfer of sovereignty or powers over the course of the next Parliament.


We will amend the 1972 European Communities Act so that any proposed future treaty that transferred areas of power, or competences, would be subject to a referendum on that treaty – a ‘referendum lock’. We will amend the 1972 European Communities Act so that the use of any passerelle would require primary legislation.


We will ensure that Britain does not join or prepare to join the Euro in this Parliament.

The inadequacy of the Lisbon Treaty rules on economic governance is in plain view. If monetary union without fiscal and political union is a structural weakness, there are two coherent responses for EU leaders:

1) Make necessary changes to the EU treaties, or
2) openly act to dismantle the eurozone.

Best wishes for the eurozone, while vetoing necessary treaty change, comes awfully close to the Leninist saying to give the Mensheviks support in the same way as the rope supports a hanged man.




Ralf Grahn

My two cents worth on the UK general election

When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with an antiquated Constitution, an unfair electoral system based on a duopoly of greed and unbalanced outcomes for the subjects (called citizens elsewhere) … they should vote for change.



(Hat tip John Hancock et al)

The general election on 6 May 2010 will set the political course for Britain for the next five years, but it has European implications as well.




Ralf Grahn

European arrest warrant: EU & UK

In the report Justice issues in Europe, the UK House of Commons Justice Committee discusses matters relevant to the development of the European Union’s area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ).

This timely report is interesting both generally and from a British point of view.

In this blog post we look at the European arrest warrant.





Stockholm Programme


In the European Union’s 2010─2014 Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, the European Council invited the European Commission to (document 5731/10; page 40):

… explore the results of the evaluation of the European Arrest Warrant, and, where appropriate, make proposals to increase efficiency and legal protection for individuals in the process of surrender, by adopting a step-by-step approach to other instruments on mutual recognition; ...

Stockholm Programme Action Plan


Since then, the proposed Action Plan for the implementation of the Stockholm Programme has been published in 21 official EU languages:




Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe's citizens - Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme; Brussels, 20.4.2010; COM(2010) 171 final


(The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council has issued its first conclusions on the Action Programme (document 8920/10).)


In the Action Plan, under the headline Furthering the implementation of mutual recognition (in the area of criminal law), the Commission has promised to report on the implementation of the Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant in 2010 and to contribute with “appropriate follow-up” in 2014.



European arrest warrant



For an overview of the European Arrest Warrant, you can consult the relevant summary of EU legislation on Europa (latest update 8 January 2010).




You can also read the Wikipedia encyclopedia entry European Arrest Warrant, including critical viewpoints (last update 29 April 2010).



Here is the consolidated version (28 March 2009) of:



COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States

The provisions defining the European arrest warrant and setting out its scope:

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PRINCIPLES



Article 1
Definition of the European arrest warrant and obligation to execute it


1. The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.

2. Member States shall execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of this Framework Decision.

3. This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.



Article 2
Scope of the European arrest warrant


1. A European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least four months.

2. The following offences, if they are punishable in the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as they are defined by the law of the issuing Member State, shall, under the terms of this Framework Decision and without verification of the double criminality of the act, give rise to surrender pursuant to a European arrest warrant:

— participation in a criminal organisation,
— terrorism,
— trafficking in human beings,
— sexual exploitation of children and child pornography,
— illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,
— illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives,
— corruption,
— fraud, including that affecting the financial interests of the European Communities within the meaning of the Convention of 26 July 1995 on the protection of the European Communities' financial interests,
— laundering of the proceeds of crime,
— counterfeiting currency, including of the euro,
— computer-related crime,
— environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal species and in endangered plant species and varieties,
— facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence,
— murder, grievous bodily injury,
— illicit trade in human organs and tissue,
— kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking,
— racism and xenophobia,
— organised or armed robbery,
— illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and works of art,
— swindling,
— racketeering and extortion,
— counterfeiting and piracy of products,
— forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein,
— forgery of means of payment,
— illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters,
— illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials,
— trafficking in stolen vehicles,
— rape,
— arson,
— crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court,
— unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships,
— sabotage.

3. The Council may decide at any time, acting unanimously after consultation of the European Parliament under the conditions laid down in Article 39(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), to add other categories of offence to the list contained in paragraph 2. The Council shall examine, in the light of the report submitted by the Commission pursuant to Article 34(3), whether the list should be extended or amended.

4. For offences other than those covered by paragraph 2, surrender may be subject to the condition that the acts for which the European arrest warrant has been issued constitute an offence under the law of the executing Member State, whatever the constituent elements or however it is described.

House of Commons Justice Committee


One of the relatively rare assessments of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in the European Union published after the Stockholm Programme and before the adoption of the implementing Action Plan is:




UK House of Commons Justice Committee: Justice issues in Europe (HC 162-I; published 6 April 2010; 60 pages)



On page 19 the Committee noted that according to the Ministry of Justice, the European arrest warrant had:

• transformed extradition arrangements between EU member states
• played an important role in the UK’s fight against international and trans-national criminality
• prevented countries from refusing to surrender fugitives
• reduced the time taken to surrender fugitives from an average of 18 months under previous extradition arrangements to around 50 days, and
• enabled the UK to extradite over 1000 fugitives to other EU member states (since introduction) and, in 2008, nearly 100 wanted persons were surrendered back to the UK to face criminal proceedings.

Some problematic questions have surfaced as shown by the cases mentioned in Box 2 (pages 21 and 22).


After a discussion of difficulties with regard to individuals’ rights, the possible need for a proportionality test and potential means to remedy application problems, the Justice Committee concluded (on pages 24 to 25; point 50):

50. It is unfortunate that the successful use of the European arrest warrant, and the reduced time taken to process intra-EU extraditions, has been overshadowed by perceived injustices in individual cases. We welcome the conclusions of the evaluation of the warrant, adopted by the Council in June 2009, and the subsequent progress that has been made. However, we believe that the time it takes to review and reform such instruments undermines the mutual trust approach. Legislation should be used only as a last resort to resolving the issues over proportionality and we hope that the current approach bears fruit before the predicted growth in demand for European arrest warrants takes place.

The Committee then went on to discuss the threshold of inoperability regarding amending or accompanying EU measures, when the United Kingdom does not opt in. Regarding future developments under the Lisbon Treaty, matters were left suspended in thinnish air (page 26; point 54):

54. We are encouraged that neither the Minister, nor any of our witnesses, were able to provide a convincing example of a situation in which an existing measure would be rendered inoperable as a result of the UK’s decision not to participate. Nevertheless, we are concerned that the term “inoperable” is not defined in the protocol and that guidance is not available on its interpretation.

Ralf Grahn



P.S. If you have information about general or national publications assessing the EU’s justice and home affairs (JHA), the Stockholm Programme or the proposal for the implementing Action Plan, please feel free to share it with the readers of Grahnlaw, by posting a comment or by sending me an e-mail.

UK & EU: Justice issues in Europe (Introduction)

One of the relatively rare assessments of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in the European Union published after the Stockholm Programme and before the adoption of the implementing Action Plan is:




UK House of Commons Justice Committee: Justice issues in Europe (HC 162-I; published 6 April 2010; 60 pages)


In this blog post we summarise the Introduction.



Introduction


The Committee Report is the result of a fairly detailed (page 5):

…inquiry into justice issues in Europe with a particular focus on developments and the implications for the 2.2 million British citizens living in other member states and 2.12 million people living in the UK who were born in another member state.

The Report briefly recapitulates the history of the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ): the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Tampere Programme and the Hague Programme (page 5).


The Report describes the area of freedom, security and justice as still very much a “work in progress”, before embarking on an outline on the future work to be done under the Stockholm Programme (page 6).


The Committee notes that mutual trust is fairly easy to grasp, but hard to achieve in the field of legislation and policy on justice (page 6).


Box 1 on pages 8 and 9 contains a convenient overview of justice priorities in the Stockholm Programme, under the following headlines:

• Promoting citizenship and fundamental rights
• A Europe of law and justice
• A Europe that protects
• Improving the quality of legislation and its implementation

With the establishment of mutual trust as a cornerstone of judicial cooperation and the fundamental rights of EU (and UK) citizens as starting points, the Committee chose the following key themes for its inquiry (page 9):

• The need to strike balances between proportionality, the rights of suspects and the accused in criminal proceedings, and the enforcement of security at EU and national level through mutual co-operation.
• The balance between basic principles of justice and fairness for victims and the rights of suspects and defendants rights and levels of awareness of those rights
• The cost-benefits of activity to create an area of freedom, security and justice
• The extent of monitoring and evaluation and the relative lack of enforcement.

The emphasis is on criminal justice issues (page 9).



The Committee starts its treatment of the Lisbon Treaty with a short historic overview from the Treaty of Amsterdam, before a summary of the changes brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon and the UK opt-in protocol, as well as a description of the emergency brake (pages 10 to 12).


The extended jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is explained on page 12. It remains unclear if Britain will opt in to the jurisdiction of the CJEU within the five year timeframe (page 17).


The Committee describes the legal entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and mentions that the European Union aims to accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (page 12 to 13).


Will the Lisbon Treaty facilitate legislation and policy-making in the field of justice? The initial response of the Committee is cautious (page 13 to 14).


Naturally, the extraordinary position of the United Kingdom has to be discussed. The Committee argues that the position of UK participation has become more flexible, but clarifications are needed with respect to amendments Britain opposes, although it has consented to the original provisions. The Committee depicts the UK’s role in EU justice and home affairs as a key one (page 14 to 16).


The Committee welcomed the Government’s pragmatic attitude (evidence-based practical measures; “look before you legislate”) and it was encouraged by seeing this perspective reflected in the Stockholm Programme (page 16).


The Committee notes that mutual recognition is at the heart of what the EU is trying to achieve in the area of freedom, security and justice under the Stockholm programme and the Lisbon Treaty. The Government of Britain is extremely cautious about approximation (harmonisation) of criminal law, but the Committee remarks that the proposals in the Stockholm Programme and the Lisbon Treaty together give rise to the potential for a significant body of new law (pages 17 and 18).




Ralf Grahn



P.S. Information about materials from different member states and in various EU languages on the Stockholm Programme and the proposed Action Plan for implementation is most welcome. Write a comment or send me an e-mail about unofficial and official publications

UK & EU: Stockholm Programme home affairs

In an earlier Grahnlaw blog post House of Lords on EU Stockholm Programme (10 November 2009), ahead of the adoption of the Stockholm Programme, we highlighted the publication of:




UK House of Lords European Union Committee: The Stockholm Programme: home affairs (HL Paper 175; published 9 November 2009; 32 pages).


Since then, the Stockholm Programme has been adopted (document 17024/09 or 5731/10) and the proposed Action Programme COM(2010) 171 final for implementation has been published in three official EU languages. The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council has issued its first conclusions on the Action Programme (8920/10).



Background note


Despite the peculiar status of the United Kingdom and these later developments, the report by the European Union Committee is worth reading as a guide to and background note on the home affairs issues within the EU’s emerging area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ).


The Introduction (page 5 to 6) offers a brief outline of the area of freedom, security and justice: the Treaty of Amsterdam (since 1999), the Tampere Programme (2000─2004), the Hague Programme (2005─2009) and the process leading towards the Stockholm Programme (2010─2014), as well as the effects of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which opens up new possibilities.


The European Union Committee rightly criticised the lack of public consultation, involvement and publicity of the Interior Future Group, which laid the foundations for the Stockholm Programme (page 6).


The House of Lords Committee noted the heavy weight of immigration and asylum matters ─ more than half of the initiatives ─ in its outline of priority issues in the Commission’s Communication (page 7).


The Commission wanted to see progress regarding other home affairs matters: data protection; the fight against organised crime, including improvement of methods for seizing the proceeds of crime; strengthening civil protection and critical infrastructure protection; the fight against terrorism, including a strategy for dealing with CBRN attacks (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) (page 8).


Like the UK Government, the HL European Union Committee was supportive of a five year programme, and it wanted to see early action on the proposals from the Commission (page 8).



Comment: Heavy on security, light on rights


Both the Stockholm Programme ─ An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens (document 5731/10) ─ and the proposed plan for implementation ─ Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe's citizens - Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme; Brussels, 20.4.2010, COM(2010) 171 final ─ heavily stress citizens at headline level.


However, the HL Committee report indicates a heavy legacy of more effective repressive policy measures in the making, directed at illegal immigrants and failed asylum seekers, as well as (outside) plotters of terrorist acts.


Ever more draconian security measures tend to spill over unto EU citizens and legal migrants, and comparatively little seems to have emanated from fresh thoughts about the direct involvement and the extension of the legal ─ not to say political ─ rights of EU citizens.


Given the roots, is this the JHA agenda we need for the next five years?




Ralf Grahn

Britain exiting the EU: Norman Tebbit proposes divorce

Norman Tebbit, a former chairman of the UK Conservative Party, has recently written two Telegraph columns where he sees the underlying history and culture which have formed the institutions of the other EU members as deeply different and hostile to British ones.

Tebbit imagines that citizens’ rights guaranteed under European constitutions [and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights] are less than “rights” for UK subjects under common law (including parliamentary supremacy?).



Tebbit concludes that Britain should leave the European Union and start thinking about the nature of its future relationship with Europe: I used to believe that Britain had a lot in common with Europe. How wrong I was (20 January 2010) and Britain and the EU: time for a divorce (22 January 2010).

A short while ago, the first column had received 396 comments and the more recent one 261, most of them enthusiastic.

Soon a general election will offer Her Majesty’s subjects the opportunity to elect a Parliament prepared to move from Tebbit’s proposal to a filing for divorce. It would, however, require a major shift, because the current leadership of the three major parties is against secession.

Should David Cameron be ousted, or the majority handed to either UKIP or the BNP?

If Britain sorts out its intention to leave, the Lisbon Treaty guarantees the right for each EU member state to withdraw from the union, although most sane persons agree on the usefulness of a negotiated settlement and a deal on the future relationship.

In my humble opinion, the Norman Conquest (1066) and Magna Carta (1215) offer scant advice on the future of Britain in the world and its relationship with the rest of Europe after withdrawal. Some serious thought should go into that ahead of the general election in order to make the divorce case convincing.




Ralf Grahn





P.S. The UK is a heavyweight among EU member states, and Charlemagne’s notebook (The Economist) offers a gateway to some important shades of British thought about European integration.

Charlemagne’s notebook is listed with more than 500 great Euroblogs on growing multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, your useful one-stop-shop for fact, opinion and gossip on European affairs, i.a. politics, policies, communication, economics, finance, business, civil society and law. You can also subscribe to the RSS feed for new blog posts appearing on Bloggingportal.eu.

By the way, I also discuss European issues in Finnish on Eurooppaoikeus and in Swedish on Grahnblawg.

Charlemagne fixing Europe?

I started reading the promising blog post on Charlemagne’s notebook, Europe realises that Lisbon does not fix Europe (5 January 2010), with a degree of anticipation.

Noteworthy continental journalists had lamented the complexity of the Lisbon Treaty institutions, although previously in favour of adoption of the reform treaty.

A number of links were offered as proof of the foresight of The Economist, but they led to invitations to subscribe to the contents of the paper. It is hard to judge the prescience of the editors on these grounds.

Did the blog post proper open any vistas for how the European Union should be reformed, or how the institutional complexity under the Lisbon Treaty should be remedied?

Charlemagne ended with a few potshots at the citizens’ initiative, without offering any constructive vision for Europe.

(Announcement of bias, although on grounds more than two decades old: The Economist still owes me a one year subscription paid by me, but never honoured by them.)


Qualified Lisbon Treaty support

The Lisbon Treaty is not a great achievement. It is an expression of the “convoy principle”, as applied between the governments of the member states. As long as treaty changes require unanimous agreement and ratification by all member states, the least willing set the pace.

Great Britain, for one, has made heavy use of this structural weakness during practically every round of treaty reform. If the EU is weak, complex and opaque, some of the main reasons can be found quite near the newspaper’s offices.

This blog came around to defend the disappointing Lisbon Treaty on a few crucial grounds. The Treaty of Nice was worse. The Lisbon Treaty was the only reform on offer. The Lisbon Treaty had, during the later stages, not only been agreed by 27 national governments, but been ratified by 26 national parliaments. According to the rules of representative democracy at national level, it expressed an overwhelming common pan-European view of the next step in the integration process.

One can hardly argue that federal systems are simple, but a federal European Union would allow for clear lines of political responsibility and decisive input from the citizens of the union.

India and the United States somehow manage to function as democracies. Why should a democratic and federal Europe in the 21st century be beyond the grasp of a paper founded to take part in a severe contest between intelligence, which presses forward, and an unworthy, timid ignorance obstructing our progress?




Ralf Grahn



P.S. Joe Litobarski is an active blogger and podcaster, as well as a builder of the community known as the euroblogosphere. His blog is listed among the more than 500 great euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, our common “village well” for fact, opinion and gossip on European affairs.

Britain in 2010: A better year for Europe?

Yesterday’s Grahnlaw blog post dealt with Charles Grant’s view through the CER’s rose-tinted spectacles at the UK Conservatives’ aims in Europe: Britain: A constructive EU curmudgeon? (5 January 2010).

This British “best case scenario” envisioned a Tory government selective about the repatriation fights to pick with the EU member states, mindful of national budget and financial sector interests to pursue, and ready to contribute constructively to some parts of the European agenda.

European engagement in UK terms is setting the bar at basement level in comparison to the European Union as a whole.

Moderation and constructive approach have to be compared to other British opinions in order to appear.



On 1 January 2010 Open Europe Blog published a post with the headline: 2010: A Better Year For Europe?. In essence, it was only an advert for an article on Conservative Home:



Lorraine Mullally: The Conservatives must do better than Labour at representing Britain’s interests in Europe (31 December 2009)

What Mullally labels as needed “radical reform” translates into a call for party leader David Cameron and the Conservative Party to stop and to reverse the process of European integration, at least with regard to Britain.

The comments section brims with distrust of Cameron’s resolve, threats of defection to UKIP, proposals for unilateral revocation of the Lisbon Treaty, calls for various referendums on the European Union, denouncements of the undemocratic nature of the EU, complete disbelief in the possibility to reform the EU etc.

Well, there is one commentator with positive views on the European Union. He is from Ireland.


The best way to describe the mentality of the Conservative activists is by misquoting Douglas Jerrold: The best thing I know between the European Union and England is – the sea.

Not much constructive participation for European integration to expect from that quarter, I would think.




Ralf Grahn



P.S. Ideas on Europe is an experiment by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies UACES to entice academics down from their ivory towers to engage in informed analysis, comment, dialogue and debate on all things European in the “real”, i.e. virtual world of ordinary mortals. This potentially important multi-user blog is listed among the nearly 500 great euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, our common “village well” for fact, opinion and gossip on European affairs.

Britain: A constructive EU curmudgeon?

In the Grahnlaw blog posts Denouncing the EU Lisbon Treaty – UK Tories and the long grass (1 January 2010) and British and Irish opt-outs from EU JHA law (3 January 2010) we turned to one of the recurring themes of this blog: the (future) relationship between the United Kingdom and Europe.




In the comments section of a blog post on Nosemonkey’s EUtopia about the benefits of EU level regulation, the expert participant DOCM drew my attention to what he called the outstanding analysis of Charles Grant of the CER of the path ahead after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, based on Cameron’s major speech (comment 24).

Time to refresh or reframe my prejudices by taking a look at an outside contribution, I thought:



Charles Grant: Cameron’s Europe: Can the Conservatives achieve their EU objectives? (Centre for European Reform essays, December 2009; 40 pages)



Grant discusses in detail the three domestic laws the Conservative Party leader David Cameron promised to introduce in his 4th November 2009 speech:

1) Amending the European Communities Act 1972 to prohibit the transfer of power to the European Union or the adoption of the euro currency without a referendum.
2) A United Kingdom Sovereignty Act to make clear that ultimate authority stays with the Westminster Parliament.
3) A law requiring parliamentary approval of every use of the enabling clause (passerelle) moving from unanimity to qualified majority voting (as already is the case).



There follows a treatment of the three treaty changes further limiting UK participation Cameron required from the EU member states; the first two already covered by opt-outs:

1) Criminal law and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2) The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
3) Redomestication of some social and employment law.



At each stage, Grant tries to evaluate the chances of and scope for the success of Cameron’s limiting agenda. Then follows an evaluation of the Conservatives’ leverage with regard to the European leaders and the EU institutions.


Grant’s advice is not to waste all efforts on “victories” regarding treaty change, but preferably concentrate on a limited number of targets.


Instead, Cameron should keep his powder dry for other important issues:

• The long term budget, including the common agricultural policy, from 2014.
• The interests of the City of London (evoking the so called Luxembourg compromise; actually a 1966 agreement to disagree).


Grant thinks that the Conservatives could increase their chances of “success” if they show that they make a positive contribution to some parts of the European agenda:

• The new Lisbon agenda (EU 2020) for growth and jobs.
• Climate change and energy, including energy efficiency
• European defence cooperation.


In Grant’s view, the best strategy for David Cameron and William Hague to get the better of their anti-EU MPs and voters would be to seek only modest changes to the treaties, but to try and persuade other governments to grant them ‘victories’ in areas like social policy, the EU budget and financial regulation.



Comment

It is interesting to see how much of the basic national assumptions the Centre for European Reform and more moderate Conservatives share. By way of caricature, one could describe their European Union as the economic pillar of the Council of Europe, with a few intergovernmental frills thrown in.

Federalism is – repeatedly – described as a spent force, which explains why democratic government and added real powers in for instance foreign policy are not even discussed. The text on the Lisbon Treaty judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht mentions and closes the discussion about legitimate EU level government based on the citizens of the union.

Grant’s well written essay is a valuable inventory of British viewpoints and a carefully drawn map of potentially contentious UK issues with the EU member states and institutions.

A new Conservative government would be a curmudgeon in the European Union, but the CER hopes that it would wisely choose to be a constructive one, of sorts.




Ralf Grahn



P.S. In the tradition of balanced BBC coverage, Gavin Hewitt’s Europe endeavours to make the European Union explicable to people in Britain and British views understood by other Europeans. This important blog is listed among the nearly 500 great euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, our common “village well” for fact, opinion and gossip on European affairs.

European elections: UK Conservative Party

Barely in time for the 4 June 2009 vote, the UK Conservative Party has launched its campaign for the European elections ─ with David Cameron calling for a national election.

Incidentally, the Tories have also published a European Election Manifesto.



The Conservatives call for a modern European Union with pledges such as keeping Britain outside the euro, repatriating social and employment legislation and forming an anti-federalist political group in the European Parliament.


***

Neo-cons’ stooge

On Conservative Home, Sally McNamara of the US Heritage Foundation, writes a blog post: Cameron should take on the European issue now.



McNamara praises the Conservatives for promising a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon (ratified by the United Kingdom) and for the promise to leave the EPP-ED group in the European Parliament.

Her further wish-list contains the renegotiation of Britain’s relationship with the European Union, as a major issue of British political life, and crucial to the defense of Britain’s long-term interests.

Writing for a British public, McNamara is more tactful than when blogging on The Foundry at Heritage. She does not spell out that the crux of the defence of Britain’s long term interests lies in securing US leadership in the world.

In other words, the United Kingdom with a Conservative government is the neo-cons’ fifth column within the European Union.


Ralf Grahn

Heritage Foundation saving Europe!?

With friends like these ...

Adversarial to the hilt and exaggerating the importance of the Lisbon Treaty beyond belief, Sally McNamara of the Heritage Foundation sees a slightly improved European Union as a danger for US hegemony in the world instead of as a better ally.

Her recipe to save Europe “from itself” is the most disingenuous piece of advice I have seen in a long time.

One can only gape with amazement at the contorted reasoning on the Heritage Foundation’s blog The Foundry, where McNamara calls on William Hague and the UK Conservative Party to undermine Europe in order to “save” it: A Lisbon Treaty Retrospective? (Posted May 13th, 2009 at 11.41am)



On the Lisbon Treaty:

“It also threatens the transatlantic relationship, and underscores the EU’s ambitions to become a global power and challenge American leadership on the world stage. If the Conservative’s make good on their pledge to take the Treaty to the British public, it will almost certainly be rejected and hopefully save Europe from itself.”

***


European helpers


First, we have to realise that there are some in the USA prepared to support and finance such crap. But their paranoid world view needs European helpers, even if the various unanimity rules make the European Union an easy prey.

Enter the UK Conservative Party. William Hague has promised a referendum on the ratified Treaty of Lisbon, if it has not entered into force when the Tories form the government. With or without a referendum, Hague has promised a renegotiation of Britain’s membership in the European Union. In less than a month, after the European elections, the Tories are going to establish an anti-integrationist political group in the European Parliament, with more or less savoury elements of the nationalist right.

After recruiting bunches of ultra-nationalists and assorted extremists, Libertas.eu is pouring almost unlimited resources into an election campaign built on a rejection of the Lisbon Treaty. What Declan Ganley calls taking the European Union back for the people, would in practice mean taking the EU back to the Treaty of Nice.

Wittingly or unwittingly, who stands to gain from the actions of Hague and Ganley?


Ralf Grahn

Heritage Foundation: Dividing USA and EU

Yesterday evening the Irish blog Semper Idem drew my attention to one of the more astounding positions I have seen on the EU Treaty of Lisbon: The Heritage on the Lisbon Treaty (13 May 2009).


On the Heritage Foundation’s blog The Foundry, Sally McNamara presents her view on the relations between the United States and Europe: A Lisbon Treaty Retrospective? (Posted May 13th, 2009 at 11.41am)



The last paragraph is worth reading on both shores of the Atlantic:

“The Lisbon Treaty is an affront to democracy that lacks any semblance of popular support or legitimacy. It also threatens the transatlantic relationship, and underscores the EU’s ambitions to become a global power and challenge American leadership on the world stage. If the Conservative’s make good on their pledge to take the Treaty to the British public, it will almost certainly be rejected and hopefully save Europe from itself.”

***

Legitimacy of Lisbon Treaty

First, we look at the legitimacy and popular support of the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Treaty of Lisbon was agreed by the democratically legitimate national governments of all 27 EU member states. It has been approved, according to their constitutional requirements, by the national parliaments in 26 of these member states.

The Lisbon Treaty does not alter the fundamental basis of the European Union.

Lisbon remains an international treaty and the European Union is still an organisation based on an international treaty between states.

Objectively, there was little cause to subject either the Constitutional or the Lisbon Treaty, of incremental reform, to a referendum.

It is absurd to contend that the Lisbon Treaty lacks legitimacy, where it has been approved.

Some national leaders had stupidly promised national referendums on the previous Constitutional Treaty, but these were settled during the parliamentary ratification processes concerning the slightly watered-down Treaty of Lisbon. The legitimacy point is moot.

The exception is Ireland, where a constitutional interpretation requires a referendum. A majority of the Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty, hoping for at “better deal”.

The No side never presented a credible formula for the better deal, but the second referendum in Ireland will be based on the “better deal” the Irish government has secured (although the finer details have not been published).

Popular support for the Lisbon Treaty as for many government measures is far from overwhelming, but we live under the rules of representative democracy. Governments are even expected to “do the right thing” for the long term, despite short term unpopularity.

The Lisbon Treaty is a complicated document, resembling a technical manual more than a rousing political document. It is hard to understand for ordinary voters, and much of the vocal opposition seems to be based on misunderstanding or misrepresentation of its contents and implications. The less educated were more prone to vote No in Ireland.

Lacking “any semblance of popular support” is a wild exaggeration, but the political atmosphere in one major member state, the United Kingdom, can be described as Eurotoxic. Still, even there both Houses of Parliament approved the Lisbon Treaty and the ratification procedure has been formally concluded. Under the rules of representative democracy, the decision is legitimate.

If we want to discuss lack of democratic legitimacy, we have to move to the European level.

The Lisbon Treaty fails to bring about an effective and democratically legitimate government at EU level, but that is hardly what McNamara is complaining about.

Following the Golden Rule, she should advocate the Articles of Confederation for the United States, if she wants Europe to preserve the Treaty of Nice.

I find it astounding when someone extols the virtues of the US Constitution, but wants to deny Europeans even a pale shadow.


Ralf Grahn

Heritage Foundation: Lisbon Treaty risks US leadership

I want to thank Semper Idem for bringing it to my attention: The Heritage on the Lisbon Treaty.


Sally McNamara of the Heritage Foundation tells the whole world why the UK Conservatives should scrap the EU Treaty of Lisbon.

Europe should be saved from challenging US leadership on the world stage.

I can hardly wait for the explanations from the EU disintegrator William Hague and the talented Mr Declan Ganley.


Ralf Grahn


P.S. While waiting, you can always read European elections: The Libertas Collection.