The launch of Libertas has led to increased volumes of distortion about the EU’s Treaty of Lisbon.
How unelected were the elites who wrote the Lisbon Treaty?
The draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was written by the European Convention. In addition to the Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen appointed by the European Council (national leaders) there were:
• 15 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (one from each Member State),
• 13 representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the candidate States (1 per candidate State),
• 30 representatives of the national parliaments of the Member States (two from each Member State),
• 26 representatives of the national parliaments of the candidate States (two from each candidate State),
• 16 members of the European Parliament,
• 2 representatives of the European Commission.
Out of 105 delegates, 38 represented the national governments, 56 the national parliaments and 16 the directly elected European Parliament.
The only ones who remotely resembled unelected Brussels bureaucrats were two who represented the European Commission, which is nominated by the heads of state or government and approved by the European Parliament.
***
During the intergovernmental conference 2003─2004 the national governments of the EU member states watered down the Convention’s proposal to reach agreement on the Constitutional Treaty.
Where were the supranational bureaucrats?
***
The bleaker Treaty of Lisbon resulted from a new round of negotiations between the governments of the member states.
Where were the “unaccountable” Brussels bureaucrats, who by the way are held to account by the member states’ governments in the Council and by the European Parliament?
***
How truthful and accountable is Libertas?
Ralf Grahn
Showing posts with label constitutional treaty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label constitutional treaty. Show all posts
Monday, 16 March 2009
Friday, 8 June 2007
The spectre of Charles de Gaulle
No, it was not that the United Kingdom left itself behind on the European Coal and Steel Community and the Rome Treaties (EEC and Euratom). It was the pragmatism of Jean Monnet to launch European integration again, after the failure of the European Defence Community and European Political Community that Eulawblogger meant. See “What Monnet did: a further response to the Grahnlaw blog” on:
http://eulawblogger.blogspot.com
Raising the spectre of Charles de Gaulle, was a real masterstroke.
How can I talk about ‘disruptive behaviour’ looking at the present: a well-meaning, but timid British government trying to wriggle itself out of a quandary, a Polish government ‘willing to die’ for the over-representation it somehow wrestled during the chaotic Nice summit, or the general unenthusiasm of the Czech government?
Pretty silly stuff, I have to admit, when we look back at Charles de Gaulle’s view of himself, of France and of Europe. A coalition of Gaullists and Communists shot down the EDC and the EPC. The efforts to downgrade the Commission, the empty chair, the Luxembourg ‘compromise’ effectively reinstating a general veto power, the Fouchet plans to emasculate the Communities, the two vetoes against British membership, were the hallmarks of a certain idea of Europe, but far from European in spirit: self-aggrandisement that has left a lasting legacy.
In those days one unadulterated nationalist was able to wreak havoc on a Europe of six. Today, the European institutions, which have to serve 27 members and almost 500 million citizens, are all the more fragile, because one man can still damage the Union, but the actors have multiplied.
This basic weakness would in no way evaporate if the Constitutional Treaty entered into force; still less if important pieces are left outside the new ‘simplified treaty’.
At a more practical level, there seems to be some movement on EU treaty reform.
The latest news that I have seen are all dated yesterday, 7 June 2007:
International Herald Tribune: Sarkozy says he and Blair agree on reforming the EU
Euobserver.com: MEPs for votes swap suggested to Poland in EU treaty debate
EurActiv: Parliament pushes for ‘Treaty plus’
Pragmatism and cherries in the air. I still hope that substantial treaty reform wins the day.
Ralf Grahn
http://eulawblogger.blogspot.com
Raising the spectre of Charles de Gaulle, was a real masterstroke.
How can I talk about ‘disruptive behaviour’ looking at the present: a well-meaning, but timid British government trying to wriggle itself out of a quandary, a Polish government ‘willing to die’ for the over-representation it somehow wrestled during the chaotic Nice summit, or the general unenthusiasm of the Czech government?
Pretty silly stuff, I have to admit, when we look back at Charles de Gaulle’s view of himself, of France and of Europe. A coalition of Gaullists and Communists shot down the EDC and the EPC. The efforts to downgrade the Commission, the empty chair, the Luxembourg ‘compromise’ effectively reinstating a general veto power, the Fouchet plans to emasculate the Communities, the two vetoes against British membership, were the hallmarks of a certain idea of Europe, but far from European in spirit: self-aggrandisement that has left a lasting legacy.
In those days one unadulterated nationalist was able to wreak havoc on a Europe of six. Today, the European institutions, which have to serve 27 members and almost 500 million citizens, are all the more fragile, because one man can still damage the Union, but the actors have multiplied.
This basic weakness would in no way evaporate if the Constitutional Treaty entered into force; still less if important pieces are left outside the new ‘simplified treaty’.
At a more practical level, there seems to be some movement on EU treaty reform.
The latest news that I have seen are all dated yesterday, 7 June 2007:
International Herald Tribune: Sarkozy says he and Blair agree on reforming the EU
Euobserver.com: MEPs for votes swap suggested to Poland in EU treaty debate
EurActiv: Parliament pushes for ‘Treaty plus’
Pragmatism and cherries in the air. I still hope that substantial treaty reform wins the day.
Ralf Grahn
Squandering political capital
Eulawblogger asked “Is there an obligation to ratify the Constitutional Treaty in international law”, on 5 June 2007. The answer, quite correctly, was No, and it can be read on:
http://eulawblogger.blogspot.com
I noticed later that, for some reason, my comment did not appear on the Eulawblog, so I’ll post a new one here, on my own blog.
Eulawblogger’s answer is correct, legally or legalistically, however you want.
But, I did not assert that a national parliament is legally bound to ratify an international treaty entered into by its government.
I just wanted to invite readers to assess a pattern of behaviour from an ethical and political standpoint:
A government has signed up to a European treaty with 26 others. It later uses the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands to try to roll back major substantial provisions, which seem to have almost no connection with the ratification difficulties in these countries.
Going back on your word, either as an individual or as a government, is bound to affect your trustworthiness.
I thought (and still think) that acting in ‘good faith’ as a ‘civilised nation’ and using the law of treaties as moral guidance are more relevant measures of conduct than an unexplained reversal. (I chose the cautious words ‘could have been a more meaningful point of reference’ after checking Brownlie.)
One can, of course, try to understand the political climate in Britain, and the arduous task of trying to educate a tabloid-reading electorate, but political capital can be squandered in Europe as well as at home.
Perhaps ‘fixated upon the UK’s position’ has something to do with the general perception that Great Britain (again) is something less than a team player in the European Union; and sometimes you have to concentrate on the main stumbling blocks.
Disruptive behaviour should be judged according to the same principles, whoever the actor is.
Ralf Grahn
http://eulawblogger.blogspot.com
I noticed later that, for some reason, my comment did not appear on the Eulawblog, so I’ll post a new one here, on my own blog.
Eulawblogger’s answer is correct, legally or legalistically, however you want.
But, I did not assert that a national parliament is legally bound to ratify an international treaty entered into by its government.
I just wanted to invite readers to assess a pattern of behaviour from an ethical and political standpoint:
A government has signed up to a European treaty with 26 others. It later uses the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands to try to roll back major substantial provisions, which seem to have almost no connection with the ratification difficulties in these countries.
Going back on your word, either as an individual or as a government, is bound to affect your trustworthiness.
I thought (and still think) that acting in ‘good faith’ as a ‘civilised nation’ and using the law of treaties as moral guidance are more relevant measures of conduct than an unexplained reversal. (I chose the cautious words ‘could have been a more meaningful point of reference’ after checking Brownlie.)
One can, of course, try to understand the political climate in Britain, and the arduous task of trying to educate a tabloid-reading electorate, but political capital can be squandered in Europe as well as at home.
Perhaps ‘fixated upon the UK’s position’ has something to do with the general perception that Great Britain (again) is something less than a team player in the European Union; and sometimes you have to concentrate on the main stumbling blocks.
Disruptive behaviour should be judged according to the same principles, whoever the actor is.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 7 June 2007
New treaty with substance
The French president’s office has distributed an interview, where Mr Sarkozy said that France holds the keys to leaving the European crisis behind. Now there needs to be agreement on the contents of the new treaty. It cannot be a Constitution, which the French did not want. It should have substance: a stable president of the European Council, a European foreign minister, greater scope for majority votes and a reference to the fundamental rights.
Today, the European Parliament gave a resounding Yes to the substance of the Constitutional Treaty, when it voted on its Plan B, as in Barón Crespo and Brok.
Ralf Grahn
Today, the European Parliament gave a resounding Yes to the substance of the Constitutional Treaty, when it voted on its Plan B, as in Barón Crespo and Brok.
Ralf Grahn
Realistic treaty assessment
With a slimmed-down treaty [as outlined above], the EU would become somewhat more efficient and democratic, but it is questionable whether it would really prepare the Union for the future, Sebastian Kurpas and Stefano Micossi of the Centre for European Policy Studies concluded (CEPS Policy brief No. 130, May 2007: Will the European Council end the institutional deadlock in the EU? The Narrow Trail to an Agreement).
I am going to report how the member states have positioned themselves, according to the Policy brief.
The authors noted that any solution will have to respect a fundamental constraint: whatever new treaty emerges from the negotiations, the French, Dutch and British governments demand it to be of such nature that it will not require them to hold a new referendum.
In its opposition to meaningful institutional change, the United Kingdom will be able to enlist the support of Poland and the Czech Republic, certainly as regards opposition to constitutional symbols in the new treaty. However, Poland’s main interest is to prevent the double majority voting system in the Council as it is outlined in the Constitutional Treaty, to preserve at least some of the disproportionate weight relative to its population that it currently enjoys under the rules agreed during the Nice inter-governmental conference, Kurpas and Micossi remarked.
On the other hand, any deal must pay due recognition to the fact that 18 member states have ratified the Constitutional Treaty. The bulk of provisions in Part I must be saved, as any other solution would inevitably unravel the delicate balancing of the interests of the member states that made agreement possible in the last inter-governmental conference, Kurpas and Micossi wrote.
In a crisis scenario, the majority of the members that want a stronger union may eventually decide to proceed without permission of those that do not want to proceed. Anyway, the enlarged European Union will increasingly depend on mechanisms for flexible integration. These mechanisms should be used as a constructive tool to overcome tensions between countries that want to go ahead faster and those that prefer not to participate, said the authors.
Even if a compromise far beyond a lowest common denominator is found, important issues will remain on the table: particularly the conditions for future treaty reforms, which are of central importance in order to avoid institutional inflexibility, and the lack of transparency in a Union of 27 member states, Kurpas and Micossi reminded.
The Policy brief dealt with more detailed questions under discussion, but those interested enough are best served by reading the brief in its entirety.
Somewhat more efficient and democratic, but unfit for the future; that is a realistic assessment of the outcome of possible EU treaty reform. Our best hope?
Ralf Grahn
I am going to report how the member states have positioned themselves, according to the Policy brief.
The authors noted that any solution will have to respect a fundamental constraint: whatever new treaty emerges from the negotiations, the French, Dutch and British governments demand it to be of such nature that it will not require them to hold a new referendum.
In its opposition to meaningful institutional change, the United Kingdom will be able to enlist the support of Poland and the Czech Republic, certainly as regards opposition to constitutional symbols in the new treaty. However, Poland’s main interest is to prevent the double majority voting system in the Council as it is outlined in the Constitutional Treaty, to preserve at least some of the disproportionate weight relative to its population that it currently enjoys under the rules agreed during the Nice inter-governmental conference, Kurpas and Micossi remarked.
On the other hand, any deal must pay due recognition to the fact that 18 member states have ratified the Constitutional Treaty. The bulk of provisions in Part I must be saved, as any other solution would inevitably unravel the delicate balancing of the interests of the member states that made agreement possible in the last inter-governmental conference, Kurpas and Micossi wrote.
In a crisis scenario, the majority of the members that want a stronger union may eventually decide to proceed without permission of those that do not want to proceed. Anyway, the enlarged European Union will increasingly depend on mechanisms for flexible integration. These mechanisms should be used as a constructive tool to overcome tensions between countries that want to go ahead faster and those that prefer not to participate, said the authors.
Even if a compromise far beyond a lowest common denominator is found, important issues will remain on the table: particularly the conditions for future treaty reforms, which are of central importance in order to avoid institutional inflexibility, and the lack of transparency in a Union of 27 member states, Kurpas and Micossi reminded.
The Policy brief dealt with more detailed questions under discussion, but those interested enough are best served by reading the brief in its entirety.
Somewhat more efficient and democratic, but unfit for the future; that is a realistic assessment of the outcome of possible EU treaty reform. Our best hope?
Ralf Grahn
Wednesday, 6 June 2007
European level democracy
We, the citizens of the European Union, should learn to appreciate that there are questions that are best solved on a European level, and that there are directly elected representatives in the European Parliament who debate and vote on issues of common concern.
Before we ignore or criticise them, we should perhaps look at what they say and do. (Their multi-lingual news services are excellent, their reports and decisions can be accessed, and with the help of interpreters we can follow their plenary sessions live on the web.)
Today, the European Parliament debated the Union’s constitutional process based on a report by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. The rapporteurs were Enrique Barón Crespo and Elmar Brok, who represent the two largest political groups in the European Parliament.
What do they propose that the European Parliament votes on tomorrow?
That the European Parliament
1. Reaffirms its endorsement of the content of the Constitutional Treaty, the aim of which is, as a decisive step, to formally give the European Union its inherent political dimension, and strengthens the efficiency of its action, enhances democratic control over its decision-making procedures, improves transparency and strengthens the rights of European Union citizens while representing a compromise, and which meets the needs of the European Union in its current stage;
2. Emphasises that two-thirds of the Member States have already ratified the Constitutional Treaty and that four others have clearly expressed their commitment to the provisions it contains, as demonstrated by the recent meeting held in Madrid at the initiative of the governments of Spain and Luxembourg;
3. Notes the concerns expressed by the people of France and of the Netherlands and the debate which has taken place in both of those countries;
4. Notes that concerns have been raised in some other Member States too, but that the governments concerned have expressed their support for finding a satisfactory solution that preserves the key reforms contained in the Constitutional Treaty;
5. Reminds the political responsibility of those Member States who have signed but not ratified the Constitutional Treaty;
6. Reaffirms its commitment to achieving a settlement of the ongoing constitutional process of the European Union that is based on the content of the Constitutional Treaty, possibly under a different presentation, but takes into account the difficulties that have arisen in some Member States;
7. Supports, in light of this, the efforts of the German Presidency to obtain from the European Council of June 2007 a commitment to calling an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), and the definition of a roadmap containing a procedure, a clear mandate and the objective of reaching an agreement before the end of this year;
8. Recalls the need to guarantee the decision-making capacity of the European Union, the effectiveness of its policies, and their full democratic legitimacy, towards which the Constitutional Treaty makes undeniable progress in terms of scrutiny, legislative and budgetary procedures, as well as the need to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the role of the European Union in the world in order to allow it to influence the definition and the implementation of the responses to the pressing challenges which humanity is facing;
9. Insists on the preservation of all basic principles as contained in Part I of the Constitutional Treaty, including the double nature of the European Union as a union of States and of citizens, the primacy of the European law, the new typology of acts and procedures, the hierarchy of norms, and the legal personality of the European Union and stresses that the Constitutional Treaty also conveys other important improvements in matters such as the consolidation of the existing treaties and the merging of pillars, the express recognition of the values on which the European Union is based and of the legally binding force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as in enhancing the participation of citizens in the political life of the European Union, clarification of the respective competencies of the European Union and of the Member States, respect for the principle of subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments;
10. Stresses that any proposal for modification of the Constitutional Treaty needs to secure the same level of support as was obtained at an earlier date by the provision it seeks to replace;
11. States that it will reject any outcome of the negotiations which, if compared with the Constitutional Treaty, would lead to a diminution of the protection of the rights of citizens (insists, in particular, on maintaining the Charter of Fundamental Rights, especially its legally binding force) as well as to less democracy, transparency and efficiency in the functioning of the Union;
12. Recognises, in this context, the need to take into account major issues that have been raised during the reflection period, and to clarify others that have already been addressed in the Constitutional Treaty, such as:
– sustainable development, in particular the struggle against climate change,
– European solidarity in the field of energy,
– a coherent migration policy,
– the European Social Model in the context of demographic change and globalisation,
– terrorism,
– the dialogue between civilisations,
– effective common mechanisms for the coordination of economic policies in the euro-zone, while safeguarding the role of the European Central Bank in monetary policy in accordance with the Treaties,
– the Union's criteria and procedures for enlargement;
13. Believes that, in view of the success of the Convention method in preparing the draft Treaty, it is necessary to retain, in any solution to the constitutional process, the basic principles of parliamentary participation, association of civil society and full transparency;
14. Recalls that Parliament, as the only institution of the European Union directly elected by the citizens, must be fully involved in the IGC at all levels, and to a greater extent than during the 2003-2004 IGC;
15. Calls, furthermore, for the setting up, in parallel with the active participation of the representatives of the European Parliament in the IGC, of an interinstitutional conference inspired by the model followed during the elaboration of the Treaty of Maastricht, in order to keep the European Parliament informed and bring an important contribution to building a cross-party and transnational consensus in the IGC;
16. Reiterates its commitment to the Convention mechanism should the Heads of State or Government decide to embark on a substantial revision of the existing texts;
17. Calls on the Commission to fully play its role in the upcoming negotiations and to prepare proposals for modernising the Constitutional Treaty with respect to the topics set out in paragraph 12;
18. Emphasises the importance of dialogue between national parliaments and their respective governments through the IGC and expresses its willingness to maintain close contact with the national parliaments during the forthcoming negotiation phase, as well as with the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, with the European Social Partners, with religious communities and with civil society;
19. Calls for the conclusion of the ratification process of the new Treaty by the end of 2008, in order to allow the next Parliament, which will be elected in 2009, to start its mandate under the provisions of the new Treaty;
20. Demands that all Member States coordinate their ratification procedures, in order to allow for the ratification process to be completed simultaneously;
21. Emphasises that everything possible must be done to avoid the creation of a two-tier Europe;
22. Intends to deliver an opinion on the convening of the IGC in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, in light of the criteria set out in this resolution;
23. Instructs its President to forward this Resolution to the members of the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the national parliaments of the Member States, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee.
Although the citizens of Europe have elected some flag-waving nationalists, most of who belong to an odd collection of splinter groups, there seems to be a broad consensus on a European project at the service of its citizens.
Therefore, the EP is expected to vote for institutional reform which safeguards the main achievements of the Constitutional Treaty, and for a new treaty which guarantees the rights of Europe’s citizens.
In comparison, demands for changes to the substance of the Constitutional Treaty floated by the British, Polish and Czech governments look less convincing from an all-EU perspective with its citizens at the centre.
Ralf Grahn
Before we ignore or criticise them, we should perhaps look at what they say and do. (Their multi-lingual news services are excellent, their reports and decisions can be accessed, and with the help of interpreters we can follow their plenary sessions live on the web.)
Today, the European Parliament debated the Union’s constitutional process based on a report by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. The rapporteurs were Enrique Barón Crespo and Elmar Brok, who represent the two largest political groups in the European Parliament.
What do they propose that the European Parliament votes on tomorrow?
That the European Parliament
1. Reaffirms its endorsement of the content of the Constitutional Treaty, the aim of which is, as a decisive step, to formally give the European Union its inherent political dimension, and strengthens the efficiency of its action, enhances democratic control over its decision-making procedures, improves transparency and strengthens the rights of European Union citizens while representing a compromise, and which meets the needs of the European Union in its current stage;
2. Emphasises that two-thirds of the Member States have already ratified the Constitutional Treaty and that four others have clearly expressed their commitment to the provisions it contains, as demonstrated by the recent meeting held in Madrid at the initiative of the governments of Spain and Luxembourg;
3. Notes the concerns expressed by the people of France and of the Netherlands and the debate which has taken place in both of those countries;
4. Notes that concerns have been raised in some other Member States too, but that the governments concerned have expressed their support for finding a satisfactory solution that preserves the key reforms contained in the Constitutional Treaty;
5. Reminds the political responsibility of those Member States who have signed but not ratified the Constitutional Treaty;
6. Reaffirms its commitment to achieving a settlement of the ongoing constitutional process of the European Union that is based on the content of the Constitutional Treaty, possibly under a different presentation, but takes into account the difficulties that have arisen in some Member States;
7. Supports, in light of this, the efforts of the German Presidency to obtain from the European Council of June 2007 a commitment to calling an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), and the definition of a roadmap containing a procedure, a clear mandate and the objective of reaching an agreement before the end of this year;
8. Recalls the need to guarantee the decision-making capacity of the European Union, the effectiveness of its policies, and their full democratic legitimacy, towards which the Constitutional Treaty makes undeniable progress in terms of scrutiny, legislative and budgetary procedures, as well as the need to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the role of the European Union in the world in order to allow it to influence the definition and the implementation of the responses to the pressing challenges which humanity is facing;
9. Insists on the preservation of all basic principles as contained in Part I of the Constitutional Treaty, including the double nature of the European Union as a union of States and of citizens, the primacy of the European law, the new typology of acts and procedures, the hierarchy of norms, and the legal personality of the European Union and stresses that the Constitutional Treaty also conveys other important improvements in matters such as the consolidation of the existing treaties and the merging of pillars, the express recognition of the values on which the European Union is based and of the legally binding force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as in enhancing the participation of citizens in the political life of the European Union, clarification of the respective competencies of the European Union and of the Member States, respect for the principle of subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments;
10. Stresses that any proposal for modification of the Constitutional Treaty needs to secure the same level of support as was obtained at an earlier date by the provision it seeks to replace;
11. States that it will reject any outcome of the negotiations which, if compared with the Constitutional Treaty, would lead to a diminution of the protection of the rights of citizens (insists, in particular, on maintaining the Charter of Fundamental Rights, especially its legally binding force) as well as to less democracy, transparency and efficiency in the functioning of the Union;
12. Recognises, in this context, the need to take into account major issues that have been raised during the reflection period, and to clarify others that have already been addressed in the Constitutional Treaty, such as:
– sustainable development, in particular the struggle against climate change,
– European solidarity in the field of energy,
– a coherent migration policy,
– the European Social Model in the context of demographic change and globalisation,
– terrorism,
– the dialogue between civilisations,
– effective common mechanisms for the coordination of economic policies in the euro-zone, while safeguarding the role of the European Central Bank in monetary policy in accordance with the Treaties,
– the Union's criteria and procedures for enlargement;
13. Believes that, in view of the success of the Convention method in preparing the draft Treaty, it is necessary to retain, in any solution to the constitutional process, the basic principles of parliamentary participation, association of civil society and full transparency;
14. Recalls that Parliament, as the only institution of the European Union directly elected by the citizens, must be fully involved in the IGC at all levels, and to a greater extent than during the 2003-2004 IGC;
15. Calls, furthermore, for the setting up, in parallel with the active participation of the representatives of the European Parliament in the IGC, of an interinstitutional conference inspired by the model followed during the elaboration of the Treaty of Maastricht, in order to keep the European Parliament informed and bring an important contribution to building a cross-party and transnational consensus in the IGC;
16. Reiterates its commitment to the Convention mechanism should the Heads of State or Government decide to embark on a substantial revision of the existing texts;
17. Calls on the Commission to fully play its role in the upcoming negotiations and to prepare proposals for modernising the Constitutional Treaty with respect to the topics set out in paragraph 12;
18. Emphasises the importance of dialogue between national parliaments and their respective governments through the IGC and expresses its willingness to maintain close contact with the national parliaments during the forthcoming negotiation phase, as well as with the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, with the European Social Partners, with religious communities and with civil society;
19. Calls for the conclusion of the ratification process of the new Treaty by the end of 2008, in order to allow the next Parliament, which will be elected in 2009, to start its mandate under the provisions of the new Treaty;
20. Demands that all Member States coordinate their ratification procedures, in order to allow for the ratification process to be completed simultaneously;
21. Emphasises that everything possible must be done to avoid the creation of a two-tier Europe;
22. Intends to deliver an opinion on the convening of the IGC in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, in light of the criteria set out in this resolution;
23. Instructs its President to forward this Resolution to the members of the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the national parliaments of the Member States, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee.
Although the citizens of Europe have elected some flag-waving nationalists, most of who belong to an odd collection of splinter groups, there seems to be a broad consensus on a European project at the service of its citizens.
Therefore, the EP is expected to vote for institutional reform which safeguards the main achievements of the Constitutional Treaty, and for a new treaty which guarantees the rights of Europe’s citizens.
In comparison, demands for changes to the substance of the Constitutional Treaty floated by the British, Polish and Czech governments look less convincing from an all-EU perspective with its citizens at the centre.
Ralf Grahn
What did Monnet do?
EUlawblogger’s “Response to the Grahnlaw blog” was an interesting and fair presentation of his or her reasons. They enrich the discussion on EU treaty reform, even if we do not have shared views on everything.
I think that my previous post “Two basic approaches” already shed some light on our underlying assumptions about the “Whys” of European integration.
Thus, only a few minor points.
My conclusions about EUlawblogger’s preference for inter-governmental wrangling came from wording on the IGC and the “failure” of the Convention method. Happily, neither of us is a fan of secretive Treaty amendment.
I was intrigued by the question: What did Monnet do in the same situation?
Perhaps I should have caught the drift better, but what I did remember was the following: Jean Monnet nurtured close relations with the USA and the UK. He would have wanted to see Great Britain within the European Coal and Steel Community, and later the European Economic Community. Since the UK governments were not ready to participate, the six willing states became founders of the communities.
(To be sure, I then checked Jean Monnet: Mémoires 2. Livre de Poche, 1976, page 671. Monnet remembers how he had travelled to London in 1950 to try to persuade the British to join the negotiations on the Schuman plan, and now, in 1957, he tried to rally Britain to join the talks which would lead to the Rome treaties.)
Am I to infer that the willing and able have to advance, even if a valuable European player lacks the inclination?
Why did my blog only mention the UK?
“The UK is standing out as the most difficult member state with its long list of parts of the constitution it wants revised”, wrote Simon Taylor on EuropeanVoice.com on 31 May 2007. This perception has been fairly common, both before and after that.
Blog posts are usually more like snippets of information than treatises. Topicality is one reason to choose a specific theme at a certain time.
One would not have to go very far back to find my views on president Sarkozy’s economic reforms, for instance. I reported on Prodi’s and Balkenende’s speeches in the European Parliament on grahnlaw.
Formerly, on other fora, I have covered the challenges of globalisation, the French referendum, the German coalition government’s programme, the WTO Doha round, Gordon Brown’s views on CAP reform, and the EU’s failed Lisbon strategy, to name a few.
Political union aside, many would find quite a lot of similarities between (broadly) British views and mine.
I am not going to make binding promises concerning when to discuss the Polish and Czech governments, but I do see that they seem to lack some of the European spirit I would welcome everywhere.
Ralf Grahn
I think that my previous post “Two basic approaches” already shed some light on our underlying assumptions about the “Whys” of European integration.
Thus, only a few minor points.
My conclusions about EUlawblogger’s preference for inter-governmental wrangling came from wording on the IGC and the “failure” of the Convention method. Happily, neither of us is a fan of secretive Treaty amendment.
I was intrigued by the question: What did Monnet do in the same situation?
Perhaps I should have caught the drift better, but what I did remember was the following: Jean Monnet nurtured close relations with the USA and the UK. He would have wanted to see Great Britain within the European Coal and Steel Community, and later the European Economic Community. Since the UK governments were not ready to participate, the six willing states became founders of the communities.
(To be sure, I then checked Jean Monnet: Mémoires 2. Livre de Poche, 1976, page 671. Monnet remembers how he had travelled to London in 1950 to try to persuade the British to join the negotiations on the Schuman plan, and now, in 1957, he tried to rally Britain to join the talks which would lead to the Rome treaties.)
Am I to infer that the willing and able have to advance, even if a valuable European player lacks the inclination?
Why did my blog only mention the UK?
“The UK is standing out as the most difficult member state with its long list of parts of the constitution it wants revised”, wrote Simon Taylor on EuropeanVoice.com on 31 May 2007. This perception has been fairly common, both before and after that.
Blog posts are usually more like snippets of information than treatises. Topicality is one reason to choose a specific theme at a certain time.
One would not have to go very far back to find my views on president Sarkozy’s economic reforms, for instance. I reported on Prodi’s and Balkenende’s speeches in the European Parliament on grahnlaw.
Formerly, on other fora, I have covered the challenges of globalisation, the French referendum, the German coalition government’s programme, the WTO Doha round, Gordon Brown’s views on CAP reform, and the EU’s failed Lisbon strategy, to name a few.
Political union aside, many would find quite a lot of similarities between (broadly) British views and mine.
I am not going to make binding promises concerning when to discuss the Polish and Czech governments, but I do see that they seem to lack some of the European spirit I would welcome everywhere.
Ralf Grahn
Two basic approaches
Basically, you can approach the European Union from two different angles. You can try to ponder what the Union could do for its citizens: external and internal security as well as enhancing prosperity. Or you can reason from a domestic perspective.
A sincere form of ‘special relationship’ would be to emulate the United States of America. The main purposes of that Union were succinctly put in the Federalist, number XXIII:
"The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived."
"The principal purposes to be answered by the union are these – the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries."
These core purposes are cross-border in character, and in my view in the 21st century even the greater European states are not able to tackle these problems effectively on their own, or even through inter-governmental co-operation.
Hugo Brady and Charles Grant of the Centre of European Reform singled out two areas where EU institutions and procedures work poorly: foreign policy, and justice and home affairs.
The Constitutional Treaty, agreed by all EU member states, and the new Treaty proposed on 4 June 2007 by the Action committee for European democracy, fall far short of ensuring effective common action by the European Union. But they would mean some progress towards more coherent decision-making, although key areas would still be hampered by unanimous decision-making = national vetoes.
Scaling down the new treaty would, in my opinion, harm the interests of Europe’s citizens.
Then there’s the domestic perspective – thoughtful or less so.
As an example of the thoughtful kind, I would recommend EUlawblogger’s writing; the latest posts are “The quasi-Constitutional Treaty: state of play”, 31 May 2007, and now “Proposal for a quasi-Constitutional Treaty”, 5 June 2007.
My perception is that EUlawblogger is an independent spirit and constructive thinker, but that his or her perspective starts from domestic concerns and limitations.
Europe-wide problems and challenges look different if your priority is to tend to national sensitivities. But there’s no denying it, national preoccupations flavour the so called European discussion rather strongly. As such, we should at least be aware of them.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. I just noticed that EUlawblogger has responded to my previous posts in “Response to the Grahnlaw blog”, which I am going to read shortly. Perhaps even an answer is called for. – I have chosen to use the name EUlawblogger in order to make it easier for readers to distinguish between EULAWBLOG and EU Law Blog. No offence meant.
A sincere form of ‘special relationship’ would be to emulate the United States of America. The main purposes of that Union were succinctly put in the Federalist, number XXIII:
"The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived."
"The principal purposes to be answered by the union are these – the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries."
These core purposes are cross-border in character, and in my view in the 21st century even the greater European states are not able to tackle these problems effectively on their own, or even through inter-governmental co-operation.
Hugo Brady and Charles Grant of the Centre of European Reform singled out two areas where EU institutions and procedures work poorly: foreign policy, and justice and home affairs.
The Constitutional Treaty, agreed by all EU member states, and the new Treaty proposed on 4 June 2007 by the Action committee for European democracy, fall far short of ensuring effective common action by the European Union. But they would mean some progress towards more coherent decision-making, although key areas would still be hampered by unanimous decision-making = national vetoes.
Scaling down the new treaty would, in my opinion, harm the interests of Europe’s citizens.
Then there’s the domestic perspective – thoughtful or less so.
As an example of the thoughtful kind, I would recommend EUlawblogger’s writing; the latest posts are “The quasi-Constitutional Treaty: state of play”, 31 May 2007, and now “Proposal for a quasi-Constitutional Treaty”, 5 June 2007.
My perception is that EUlawblogger is an independent spirit and constructive thinker, but that his or her perspective starts from domestic concerns and limitations.
Europe-wide problems and challenges look different if your priority is to tend to national sensitivities. But there’s no denying it, national preoccupations flavour the so called European discussion rather strongly. As such, we should at least be aware of them.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. I just noticed that EUlawblogger has responded to my previous posts in “Response to the Grahnlaw blog”, which I am going to read shortly. Perhaps even an answer is called for. – I have chosen to use the name EUlawblogger in order to make it easier for readers to distinguish between EULAWBLOG and EU Law Blog. No offence meant.
Tuesday, 5 June 2007
New treaty proposal
“High-level group writes new-look EU treaty”, Honor Mahony reported on EUobserver, which has links to the relevant documents.
The Action committee for European democracy – a group of notable European politicians led by Giuliano Amato – published “A New Treaty and Supplementary Protocols” on 4 June 2007.
The New treaty, which consists of 71 articles organised in XI Titles, would replace the text of the present Treaty on European Union, as amended by the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. The Action committee has tried to show that a new Treaty can be concise, accessible and readable.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights would be given legally binding force through a single clause, but would be published separately.
Part III of the Constitutional treaty would be replaced with amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Community.
The adaptation of the EC Treaty would be dealt with in two supplementary protocols: a Protocol on the Functioning of the Union and a Protocol on the Development of the Union’s Policies in Order to Meet the Challenges of the XXIst Century.
After consolidation there would be only two treaties and the Charter.
In its statement “The way forward for the European Union” the Action committee believes that a balance can be reached without reducing the ambitions for the reforms that the Union badly needs to the benefit of its citizens and without ignoring the objections raised. Therefore, the European Council on 21/22 June 2007 should adopt a clear and stringent mandate to enable an inter-governmental conference to be successfully concluded before the end of 2007, with a view to ratifying the new Treaty in all Member States before the European Parliament elections in 2009.
Institutional reforms are not an alternative to more effective results. On the contrary, they are the foundation on which better policies depend and have to be built. The Action committee invites the inter-governmental conference to assess whether new challenges, such as climate change and energy policy, should be addressed in the new Treaty.
The Action committee does a considerable service to the European public. First, it looks at the Union its citizens have a right to expect. Second, it does not bow too deep to intransigent deserters. Third, it makes its contribution public knowledge. Fourth, it broadens the discussion.
Ralf Grahn
The Action committee for European democracy – a group of notable European politicians led by Giuliano Amato – published “A New Treaty and Supplementary Protocols” on 4 June 2007.
The New treaty, which consists of 71 articles organised in XI Titles, would replace the text of the present Treaty on European Union, as amended by the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. The Action committee has tried to show that a new Treaty can be concise, accessible and readable.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights would be given legally binding force through a single clause, but would be published separately.
Part III of the Constitutional treaty would be replaced with amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Community.
The adaptation of the EC Treaty would be dealt with in two supplementary protocols: a Protocol on the Functioning of the Union and a Protocol on the Development of the Union’s Policies in Order to Meet the Challenges of the XXIst Century.
After consolidation there would be only two treaties and the Charter.
In its statement “The way forward for the European Union” the Action committee believes that a balance can be reached without reducing the ambitions for the reforms that the Union badly needs to the benefit of its citizens and without ignoring the objections raised. Therefore, the European Council on 21/22 June 2007 should adopt a clear and stringent mandate to enable an inter-governmental conference to be successfully concluded before the end of 2007, with a view to ratifying the new Treaty in all Member States before the European Parliament elections in 2009.
Institutional reforms are not an alternative to more effective results. On the contrary, they are the foundation on which better policies depend and have to be built. The Action committee invites the inter-governmental conference to assess whether new challenges, such as climate change and energy policy, should be addressed in the new Treaty.
The Action committee does a considerable service to the European public. First, it looks at the Union its citizens have a right to expect. Second, it does not bow too deep to intransigent deserters. Third, it makes its contribution public knowledge. Fourth, it broadens the discussion.
Ralf Grahn
Constitution Plus
Among all the talk about scaling down the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union, it is refreshing to go back to “Constitution Plus, renegotiating the treaty”, written by the Liberal MEP Andrew Duff and published by the Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) in February 2007.
Duff sees two fundamentally different approaches to solving the problem of Europe’s stalled constitution.
One option is to chop up the original 2004 text in order to devise a ‘mini treaty’ – with or without a promise of later, more radical reform.
The other option is to continue the good but uncompleted work of the original Convention. Duff favours this approach, and he proposes both presentational and substantive adjustments to the 2004 text.
In Duff’s view, an improved treaty and better marketing could lead to eventual success.
A settlement is needed if Europe is to acquire desirable internal cohesion and external strength. Globalisation does not wait for Europe to sort out its domestic difficulties.
Duff singles out five topics as unfinished business, which needs to be concluded:
· economic governance
· the social model
· climate security
· enlargement
· the financial system.
Easing future revision: The threat of the ‘liberum veto’ will continue to paralyse the constitutional evolution of the Union unless the up-coming inter-governmental conference is bold enough to introduce a greater element of flexibility.
In Duff’s opinion the Charter of Fundamental Rights would gain visibility and greater detachment from the functional clauses of the treaty by being published separately as an Annex, without affecting its legal standing. He proposes a more flexible revision procedure for the Charter.
Since Part III of the Constitutional Treaty, more or less, takes over the policies of the present EC Treaty, it needs to be up-dated and rationalised. Duff proposes:
up-dating economic governance,
strengthening the autonomy of the euro area,
modernising labour and social welfare policies,
greening the constitution,
retouching the objectives of the common agricultural policy,
adding a separate article for the common fisheries policy,
revamping energy policy,
introducing the Copenhagen criteria for membership,
creating an associate membership,
fleshing out neighbourhood policy and
reforming the financial system.
Both the Convention and the following inter-governmental conference spent most of their energy on institutional questions. Some progress was made, but Europe is still hemmed in by the ‘liberum veto’ at different stages. Duff’s proposals are modest, but would bring some flexibility.
Most of the policies of the European Community received scant attention, and a general up-dating exercise would be welcome.
An example: Obesity is a serious health-problem in Europe in 2007, but the present treaty and the proposed constitution read as if famine would still be the order of the day.
Duff gives directions for some changes which could be addressed by the coming inter-governmental conference.
Are our leaders going to catch the ball or to drop it? Your opinions are welcome.
Ralf Grahn
Duff sees two fundamentally different approaches to solving the problem of Europe’s stalled constitution.
One option is to chop up the original 2004 text in order to devise a ‘mini treaty’ – with or without a promise of later, more radical reform.
The other option is to continue the good but uncompleted work of the original Convention. Duff favours this approach, and he proposes both presentational and substantive adjustments to the 2004 text.
In Duff’s view, an improved treaty and better marketing could lead to eventual success.
A settlement is needed if Europe is to acquire desirable internal cohesion and external strength. Globalisation does not wait for Europe to sort out its domestic difficulties.
Duff singles out five topics as unfinished business, which needs to be concluded:
· economic governance
· the social model
· climate security
· enlargement
· the financial system.
Easing future revision: The threat of the ‘liberum veto’ will continue to paralyse the constitutional evolution of the Union unless the up-coming inter-governmental conference is bold enough to introduce a greater element of flexibility.
In Duff’s opinion the Charter of Fundamental Rights would gain visibility and greater detachment from the functional clauses of the treaty by being published separately as an Annex, without affecting its legal standing. He proposes a more flexible revision procedure for the Charter.
Since Part III of the Constitutional Treaty, more or less, takes over the policies of the present EC Treaty, it needs to be up-dated and rationalised. Duff proposes:
up-dating economic governance,
strengthening the autonomy of the euro area,
modernising labour and social welfare policies,
greening the constitution,
retouching the objectives of the common agricultural policy,
adding a separate article for the common fisheries policy,
revamping energy policy,
introducing the Copenhagen criteria for membership,
creating an associate membership,
fleshing out neighbourhood policy and
reforming the financial system.
Both the Convention and the following inter-governmental conference spent most of their energy on institutional questions. Some progress was made, but Europe is still hemmed in by the ‘liberum veto’ at different stages. Duff’s proposals are modest, but would bring some flexibility.
Most of the policies of the European Community received scant attention, and a general up-dating exercise would be welcome.
An example: Obesity is a serious health-problem in Europe in 2007, but the present treaty and the proposed constitution read as if famine would still be the order of the day.
Duff gives directions for some changes which could be addressed by the coming inter-governmental conference.
Are our leaders going to catch the ball or to drop it? Your opinions are welcome.
Ralf Grahn
European spirit
The missing aspect in the debate on the Constitutional Treaty is the European spirit, which is pragmatic as well as idealistic.
One of the lessons to learn is to remember the citizens as Europeans.
These reminders come from Santiago Petschen in “Crisis constitucional, Declaración de Berlín y espíritu europeo (ARI), published on the Real Instituto Elcano website.
Something to think about as national leaders in Europe are called to rise to our common challenges.
Ralf Grahn
One of the lessons to learn is to remember the citizens as Europeans.
These reminders come from Santiago Petschen in “Crisis constitucional, Declaración de Berlín y espíritu europeo (ARI), published on the Real Instituto Elcano website.
Something to think about as national leaders in Europe are called to rise to our common challenges.
Ralf Grahn
Monday, 4 June 2007
Generosity and stealth
Thanks to the generosity of the EU Law Blog, a worthwhile acquaintance in its own right, I found EUlawblogger, who has written on EU treaty change. (I have added both blogs to my links.)
Yesterday, I presented and commented on EUlawblogger’s “Picking the cherries”, which is well woth reading even if you don’t share all the views.
Today, I am going to point out “The Constitutional Treaty: Open Europe, please tell the truth”, 8 May 2007, where EUlawblogger analysed the shortcomings of “The New Treaty: What will it mean and do we need a referendum?”, by Open Europe.
Please, read and compare.
Incidentally, I covered the same ‘research report’ in “Spoilsports” on 27 May 2007, on a more general level, wondering at the (untold) assumptions that could explain such vilification: is it really an ethical position to be member of a union only to maximise one’s chances to fly solo, to obstruct progress and to sabotage decision-making? Or is the purpose of Open Europe to beat a retreat behind the moat and to restart an era of “splendid isolation”?
Back to EUlawblogger, who wrote: there is no justification for trying to bring back the vast bulk of the Constitutional Treaty by stealth, and it would be preferable to focus instead on going forward with only those provisions of the Constitutional Treaty which connect the EU more closely to its citizens.
By stealth? I find the perspective and the choice of words odd. The negotiations on a ‘simplified treaty’ are going to be closely watched all over Europe, in spite of their secretive, inter-governmental character (whereas the Convention was a lot more open to citizens). The end-result, at least, is going to be in the public domain, open to public debate and parliamentary scrutiny.
Officially, the UK government has been tight-lipped, but at the same time the “red lines” floated more or less point to wholesale scrapping of a treaty signed by 27 member states, ratified by 18 of them and supported by two more.
Wouldn’t it have been more to the point to scrutinise the ‘good faith’ of the British government? Perhaps the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18 Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force, could have been a more meaningful point of reference on the obligations of a ‘civilised nation’(?).
Who, if any, seems to act by stealth? How do these actions connect the EU more closely to its citizens?
Part II of the Constitutional Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, is dedicated to rights, freedoms and principles aimed at putting the citizens of the Union at the centre of European integration. How would scrapping the Charter connect the European Union more closely to its citizens?
How does a Union paralysed by vetoes serve the interests of its citizens?
A ‘Global Europe’ for the 21st Century enhances both the security and the prosperity of its citizens.
Ralf Grahn
Yesterday, I presented and commented on EUlawblogger’s “Picking the cherries”, which is well woth reading even if you don’t share all the views.
Today, I am going to point out “The Constitutional Treaty: Open Europe, please tell the truth”, 8 May 2007, where EUlawblogger analysed the shortcomings of “The New Treaty: What will it mean and do we need a referendum?”, by Open Europe.
Please, read and compare.
Incidentally, I covered the same ‘research report’ in “Spoilsports” on 27 May 2007, on a more general level, wondering at the (untold) assumptions that could explain such vilification: is it really an ethical position to be member of a union only to maximise one’s chances to fly solo, to obstruct progress and to sabotage decision-making? Or is the purpose of Open Europe to beat a retreat behind the moat and to restart an era of “splendid isolation”?
Back to EUlawblogger, who wrote: there is no justification for trying to bring back the vast bulk of the Constitutional Treaty by stealth, and it would be preferable to focus instead on going forward with only those provisions of the Constitutional Treaty which connect the EU more closely to its citizens.
By stealth? I find the perspective and the choice of words odd. The negotiations on a ‘simplified treaty’ are going to be closely watched all over Europe, in spite of their secretive, inter-governmental character (whereas the Convention was a lot more open to citizens). The end-result, at least, is going to be in the public domain, open to public debate and parliamentary scrutiny.
Officially, the UK government has been tight-lipped, but at the same time the “red lines” floated more or less point to wholesale scrapping of a treaty signed by 27 member states, ratified by 18 of them and supported by two more.
Wouldn’t it have been more to the point to scrutinise the ‘good faith’ of the British government? Perhaps the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18 Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force, could have been a more meaningful point of reference on the obligations of a ‘civilised nation’(?).
Who, if any, seems to act by stealth? How do these actions connect the EU more closely to its citizens?
Part II of the Constitutional Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, is dedicated to rights, freedoms and principles aimed at putting the citizens of the Union at the centre of European integration. How would scrapping the Charter connect the European Union more closely to its citizens?
How does a Union paralysed by vetoes serve the interests of its citizens?
A ‘Global Europe’ for the 21st Century enhances both the security and the prosperity of its citizens.
Ralf Grahn
Sunday, 3 June 2007
Cherry-picking
EUlawblogger wrote thoughtfully on the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in “Picking the cherries” on 1 May 2007. Bringing back parts of the Constitutional Treaty cannot be seen as ignoring the public will. The Constitutional Treaty contained some useful provisions to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the EU and to ensure more effective functioning of the political institutions, as well as to enhance the effectiveness of the Court of Justice, including the removal of unjustified restrictions on its jurisdiction over the area of ‘freedom, security and justice’. It also contained some useful provisions on human rights, although unfortunately the provisions, scope and effect of the EU’s Charter of Rights have been widely misunderstood.
Still, EUlawblogger wanted to focus on the provisions which would most reconnect the EU with its population, such as the provisions on subsidiarity and transparency, which should be strengthened, and avoiding as much as possible new powers or extensions of qualified majority voting regarding substantive EU powers. Extensions of QMV relating to the institutional functioning of the EU would not impose any further on national policies.
Roughly, EUlawblogger favoured provisions strengthening the Court of Justice and the European Parliament, but not a slimmer Commission, a President of the European Council or the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Interestingly, EUlawblogger found that any reasonable compromise was threatened by the intransigence of pro-Constitution states, not the ones reneging on their signature. Is this stance unbiased?
Pragmatism, including inter-governmental wrangling behind closed doors, looked more enticing to him or her than the transparent work of the Convention.
Although EUlawblogger is no abolitionist, the approach is fairly minimalist, in my view, and one or a few revisionist governments are unduly allowed to outweigh a clear majority.
The Treaty of Nice should have been the last of its kind. The Convention was a clear improvement and the subsequent inter-governmental conference only a moderate failure. The real calamity was leaving the European Union hostage to national vetoes, when Europe needs coherence in a less secure world.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is broader in scope as well as more systematic and up-to-date than the ECHR. It does not confer new powers on the EU, but it can be seen as the most visible example of a Union which was going to place its citizens at the centre of its actions. Leaving the Charter out of the Treaty sends the wrong (or perhaps realist?) signal the population and it should give cause to wide-spread concern.
Ralf Grahn
Still, EUlawblogger wanted to focus on the provisions which would most reconnect the EU with its population, such as the provisions on subsidiarity and transparency, which should be strengthened, and avoiding as much as possible new powers or extensions of qualified majority voting regarding substantive EU powers. Extensions of QMV relating to the institutional functioning of the EU would not impose any further on national policies.
Roughly, EUlawblogger favoured provisions strengthening the Court of Justice and the European Parliament, but not a slimmer Commission, a President of the European Council or the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Interestingly, EUlawblogger found that any reasonable compromise was threatened by the intransigence of pro-Constitution states, not the ones reneging on their signature. Is this stance unbiased?
Pragmatism, including inter-governmental wrangling behind closed doors, looked more enticing to him or her than the transparent work of the Convention.
Although EUlawblogger is no abolitionist, the approach is fairly minimalist, in my view, and one or a few revisionist governments are unduly allowed to outweigh a clear majority.
The Treaty of Nice should have been the last of its kind. The Convention was a clear improvement and the subsequent inter-governmental conference only a moderate failure. The real calamity was leaving the European Union hostage to national vetoes, when Europe needs coherence in a less secure world.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is broader in scope as well as more systematic and up-to-date than the ECHR. It does not confer new powers on the EU, but it can be seen as the most visible example of a Union which was going to place its citizens at the centre of its actions. Leaving the Charter out of the Treaty sends the wrong (or perhaps realist?) signal the population and it should give cause to wide-spread concern.
Ralf Grahn
Friday, 25 May 2007
Next EU Treaty?
It is not going to be a constitution, but neither is it going to be a mini treaty. A simplified treaty seems to be the formula for an emerging consensus for the next treaty revision.
How little or how much is the European Union going to get? How much should it get?
Institutional changes already agreed upon are widely seen as necessary to give a Union with 27 member states some coherence in the world:
Less vetoes and more qualified majority voting.
A foreign minister for the Union.
A stable presidency for the Council.
A Union with legal personality within one pillar.
The citizens of the Union should at least preserve the improvements introduced by the Constitutional Treaty, including scrutiny by the European Parliament.
Even if it may be tempting to strive for a slimmer version than the Constitutional Treaty, the world has moved on since the revision process started in Nice in 2001. Should the Union be given the tools to tackle increasingly serious cross-border problems?
How about the environment and climate change, energy, immigration and terrorism?
Should countries willing and able to move ahead give themselves the means to advance, and let the recalcitrant few opt in at a later stage if they begin to see the advantages of more effective common action?
Ralf Grahn
How little or how much is the European Union going to get? How much should it get?
Institutional changes already agreed upon are widely seen as necessary to give a Union with 27 member states some coherence in the world:
Less vetoes and more qualified majority voting.
A foreign minister for the Union.
A stable presidency for the Council.
A Union with legal personality within one pillar.
The citizens of the Union should at least preserve the improvements introduced by the Constitutional Treaty, including scrutiny by the European Parliament.
Even if it may be tempting to strive for a slimmer version than the Constitutional Treaty, the world has moved on since the revision process started in Nice in 2001. Should the Union be given the tools to tackle increasingly serious cross-border problems?
How about the environment and climate change, energy, immigration and terrorism?
Should countries willing and able to move ahead give themselves the means to advance, and let the recalcitrant few opt in at a later stage if they begin to see the advantages of more effective common action?
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 24 May 2007
Treaty in, Turkey out
There is no discourse on Europe and it is impossible, anyway, goes the standard argument of those who regret that the European Union exists.
There are national languages and national newspapers, but for anyone interested in Europe there is at least reporting on common themes, as a quick and selective online look on President Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to Brussels shows.
Sarkozy – Wunderheiler für die gelähmte EU? Neue Zürcher Zeitung 24 May 2007
Henri Bresson et Philippe Ridet: Bruxelles attend les choix de M. Sarkozy sur la Turquie. Le Monde 24 May 2007
Alain Bockel et Ariane Bonzon: Turquie, le retour des vieux démons. Le Monde 24 May 2007
A Bruxelles, le gouvernement français laisse planer le doute sur ses intentions à l’égard de la Turquie. Le Monde 21 May 2007
Hannelore Crolly: Sarkozy will EU-Verfassung retten. Die Welt 24 May 2007
Katrin Bennhold: Sarkozy trip to Brussels gives a push to EU goals. International Herald Tribune 23 May 2007
Jean Quatremer: A Bruxelles, Sarkozy séduit avec son projet de mini-traité. Libération 24 May 2007
Charles Jaigu: Sarkozy donne la priorité au nouveau traité européen. Le Figaro 24 May 2007
Alexandrine Bouilhet: l’idée d’un texte institutionnel “simplifié” fait son chemin en Europe. Le Figaro 24 May 2007
M. Barroso estime qu’un “consensus” se forme autour du traité simplifié du president français. Le Monde 23 May 2007
Philippe Ricard: Les milieux européens attendant des assurances. Le Monde 23 May 2007
Sarkozy rejects Turkish EU place. BBC News 23 May 2007
Honor Mahony: Sarkozy to push for Turkey debate. EU Observer 24 May 2007
The list could be continued in different languages, but the main point is that it is possible to follow and to participate in the debate on Europe. All it takes is a bit of interest.
Ralf Grahn
There are national languages and national newspapers, but for anyone interested in Europe there is at least reporting on common themes, as a quick and selective online look on President Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to Brussels shows.
Sarkozy – Wunderheiler für die gelähmte EU? Neue Zürcher Zeitung 24 May 2007
Henri Bresson et Philippe Ridet: Bruxelles attend les choix de M. Sarkozy sur la Turquie. Le Monde 24 May 2007
Alain Bockel et Ariane Bonzon: Turquie, le retour des vieux démons. Le Monde 24 May 2007
A Bruxelles, le gouvernement français laisse planer le doute sur ses intentions à l’égard de la Turquie. Le Monde 21 May 2007
Hannelore Crolly: Sarkozy will EU-Verfassung retten. Die Welt 24 May 2007
Katrin Bennhold: Sarkozy trip to Brussels gives a push to EU goals. International Herald Tribune 23 May 2007
Jean Quatremer: A Bruxelles, Sarkozy séduit avec son projet de mini-traité. Libération 24 May 2007
Charles Jaigu: Sarkozy donne la priorité au nouveau traité européen. Le Figaro 24 May 2007
Alexandrine Bouilhet: l’idée d’un texte institutionnel “simplifié” fait son chemin en Europe. Le Figaro 24 May 2007
M. Barroso estime qu’un “consensus” se forme autour du traité simplifié du president français. Le Monde 23 May 2007
Philippe Ricard: Les milieux européens attendant des assurances. Le Monde 23 May 2007
Sarkozy rejects Turkish EU place. BBC News 23 May 2007
Honor Mahony: Sarkozy to push for Turkey debate. EU Observer 24 May 2007
The list could be continued in different languages, but the main point is that it is possible to follow and to participate in the debate on Europe. All it takes is a bit of interest.
Ralf Grahn
Wednesday, 23 May 2007
Two visions for Europe
Tuesday and Wednesday the European Parliament was presented with two different, but perhaps converging, visions on the way forward for the European Union.
Tuesday’s speaker took the high road.
The Prime Minister of Italy, Romano Prodi, spoke for the 18 countries which have approved the Constitution.
He stressed that it is to achieve results that the EU needs stronger and more effective common institutions. Italy could not accept radical changes to the Constitutional Treaty of 2004. The only true realism is to build a Europe able to keep up with challenges.
Key points to be preserved were the strengthening of foreign policy and common security by means of a European Foreign Minister, a stable Presidency of the Council, the extension of qualified majority voting, the abolition of the three-pillar structure, and the Union’s legal personality.
If the resulting agreement is unconvincing, a vanguard of countries could advance towards a more integrated union, always keeping the door open to those countries willing to join later.
Wednesday’s guest speaker took the low road.
Jan Peter Balkenende, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, spoke for one of the two countries where a national referendum in 2005 caused a constitutional crisis for the European Union. He noted that enlargement and deepening had advanced rapidly and that the citizens of the Netherlands needed time to adjust.
Calling the new treaty a constitution may have given voters the feeling of loss of say. EU intervention and regulation may have contributed to the negative reception of the treaty.
Mr Balkenende said that the last two years had seen improvements in how the European Union handled affairs, and he thought that it would be possible to find a solution for Europe, based on common ground and a constructive attitude.
The Prime Minister laid his foundations for an agreement: Treaty reform as one more step, not a Constitution. The democratic functioning of the EU, including subsidiarity and a voice for national parliaments. A more effective Union, able to tackle climate change, immigration and terrorism. Clear criteria for further enlargement.
Time will tell if the high road and the low road will join on common ground.
Ralf Grahn
Tuesday’s speaker took the high road.
The Prime Minister of Italy, Romano Prodi, spoke for the 18 countries which have approved the Constitution.
He stressed that it is to achieve results that the EU needs stronger and more effective common institutions. Italy could not accept radical changes to the Constitutional Treaty of 2004. The only true realism is to build a Europe able to keep up with challenges.
Key points to be preserved were the strengthening of foreign policy and common security by means of a European Foreign Minister, a stable Presidency of the Council, the extension of qualified majority voting, the abolition of the three-pillar structure, and the Union’s legal personality.
If the resulting agreement is unconvincing, a vanguard of countries could advance towards a more integrated union, always keeping the door open to those countries willing to join later.
Wednesday’s guest speaker took the low road.
Jan Peter Balkenende, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, spoke for one of the two countries where a national referendum in 2005 caused a constitutional crisis for the European Union. He noted that enlargement and deepening had advanced rapidly and that the citizens of the Netherlands needed time to adjust.
Calling the new treaty a constitution may have given voters the feeling of loss of say. EU intervention and regulation may have contributed to the negative reception of the treaty.
Mr Balkenende said that the last two years had seen improvements in how the European Union handled affairs, and he thought that it would be possible to find a solution for Europe, based on common ground and a constructive attitude.
The Prime Minister laid his foundations for an agreement: Treaty reform as one more step, not a Constitution. The democratic functioning of the EU, including subsidiarity and a voice for national parliaments. A more effective Union, able to tackle climate change, immigration and terrorism. Clear criteria for further enlargement.
Time will tell if the high road and the low road will join on common ground.
Ralf Grahn
Save the Charter, says EP
The Constitutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament wants an Intergovernmental Conference to convene soon to reach a settlement on institutional reforms for the European Union.
According to a press release from the EP, the committee said that it would reject any outcome which, if compared to the Constitutional Treaty, would lead to a diminution of the protection of the rights of citizens or to less democracy, transparency and efficiency in the functioning of the Union.
The committee called for the preservation of the basic principles of Part I of the Constitutional Treaty in the future agreement on the institutional reforms.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights, whose inclusion in the new treaty is still being debated by governments, is one of the reforms the committee deems indispensable.
In addition, the report lists the recognition of the Union’s values, the clarification of respective competencies at national and EU level, the respect of subsidiarity and an increased involvement of citizens in the EU’s political life among the crucial achievements of the draft Constitution to be upheld.
The plenary is going to debate and vote on the report on 5 and 6 June 2007.
The citizens of the Union have at least some friends in high places, namely in the European Parliament, but it is hard to know how much of a consolation that is going to be, when the governments of the member states start wrangling in earnest behind closed doors, each according to its perceived national interest.
Ralf Grahn
According to a press release from the EP, the committee said that it would reject any outcome which, if compared to the Constitutional Treaty, would lead to a diminution of the protection of the rights of citizens or to less democracy, transparency and efficiency in the functioning of the Union.
The committee called for the preservation of the basic principles of Part I of the Constitutional Treaty in the future agreement on the institutional reforms.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights, whose inclusion in the new treaty is still being debated by governments, is one of the reforms the committee deems indispensable.
In addition, the report lists the recognition of the Union’s values, the clarification of respective competencies at national and EU level, the respect of subsidiarity and an increased involvement of citizens in the EU’s political life among the crucial achievements of the draft Constitution to be upheld.
The plenary is going to debate and vote on the report on 5 and 6 June 2007.
The citizens of the Union have at least some friends in high places, namely in the European Parliament, but it is hard to know how much of a consolation that is going to be, when the governments of the member states start wrangling in earnest behind closed doors, each according to its perceived national interest.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 17 May 2007
Chucking out the Charter?
European leaders try to reach agreement on a restricted treaty revision, which would improve the decision making of the European Union.
We seem to be heading towards a more minimalist text than the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, already agreed between all the 27 member states.
Most reports on the ongoing discussions the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union is going to be chucked out of the new treaty.
But why on earth do the rights of individual Europeans have to be among the first victims, as now looks highly probable?
The United Kingdom, once again, as well as some other governments even expend prestige and energy in order to restrict the freedoms and rights of their own and other European citizens. How can this be sold to reflecting parts of the public?
Ralf Grahn
We seem to be heading towards a more minimalist text than the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, already agreed between all the 27 member states.
Most reports on the ongoing discussions the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union is going to be chucked out of the new treaty.
But why on earth do the rights of individual Europeans have to be among the first victims, as now looks highly probable?
The United Kingdom, once again, as well as some other governments even expend prestige and energy in order to restrict the freedoms and rights of their own and other European citizens. How can this be sold to reflecting parts of the public?
Ralf Grahn
Wednesday, 25 April 2007
Constitutions: of brevity and verbosity
Is it A Tale of Two Cities or The Elements of Style, one might wonder. Anyway, the word-count shows huge differences between the two sides of the Atlantic.
It takes the outward size of my EU passport and 58 pages to house a Preface, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States of America and two hundred years worth of Amendments to the Constitution of the USA. Well, I have to admit that my passport is slightly slimmer with only 42 pages.
What the Member States of the European Union managed to sign on 29 October 2004, as an agreement on a Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, is in printed form a hefty book with 448 Articles and about 272 pages of protocols, annexes and declarations, 482 pages in all.
The modernised Treaty would show less of the split between the European Community and the European Union, formally collecting the existing Treaties under the EU hat, and the new Treaty would be easier to read and to navigate than the existing ones. Heavy reading, still.
After the unfortunate referendums in France and the Netherlands the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (the European Council) may choose to chop large parts of the Constitutional Treaty in order to save a few essential reforms to enable a Union of 27 members to function.
The result would be even more multi-layered than today, a harder read, because the existing Treaties would still be there.
What does the relative brevity of the US Constitution show in comparison with the verbosity of the EU Treaties, existing or future?
Well, two centuries may have led to new perceptions of style, but perhaps the main difference is the attitude towards the enumerated powers of the Union.
The powers of the US Congress and the President are succinctly mentioned in the US Constitution, whereas the European Union is given clearly less powers, hedged with substantial and procedural caveats.
Less is more.
Ralf Grahn
It takes the outward size of my EU passport and 58 pages to house a Preface, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States of America and two hundred years worth of Amendments to the Constitution of the USA. Well, I have to admit that my passport is slightly slimmer with only 42 pages.
What the Member States of the European Union managed to sign on 29 October 2004, as an agreement on a Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, is in printed form a hefty book with 448 Articles and about 272 pages of protocols, annexes and declarations, 482 pages in all.
The modernised Treaty would show less of the split between the European Community and the European Union, formally collecting the existing Treaties under the EU hat, and the new Treaty would be easier to read and to navigate than the existing ones. Heavy reading, still.
After the unfortunate referendums in France and the Netherlands the Heads of State or Government of the Member States (the European Council) may choose to chop large parts of the Constitutional Treaty in order to save a few essential reforms to enable a Union of 27 members to function.
The result would be even more multi-layered than today, a harder read, because the existing Treaties would still be there.
What does the relative brevity of the US Constitution show in comparison with the verbosity of the EU Treaties, existing or future?
Well, two centuries may have led to new perceptions of style, but perhaps the main difference is the attitude towards the enumerated powers of the Union.
The powers of the US Congress and the President are succinctly mentioned in the US Constitution, whereas the European Union is given clearly less powers, hedged with substantial and procedural caveats.
Less is more.
Ralf Grahn
Tuesday, 24 April 2007
Constitutions – USA versus Europe
As the concepts Union, Convention and Constitution show, the makers of the new Treaty for the European Union have more than glanced at the United States of America and US constitutional history. This can be seen as a sincere form of flattery. At the same time it begs factual comparison.
The several States (former Colonies), thirteen in number, joined in arms to prevent their return under British rule. The Declaration of Independence (1776) was soon followed by the first Constitution in common, the Articles of Confederation of 1777. However, ratifying the Articles took four years.
These freedom loving States had managed to form a loose Confederation. A Congress, comprising representatives of sovereign States, was the only political body holding them together and leading the efforts to conduct a taxing war. Financing for Washington’s army and other expenditure could be raised only by requisitions from the States; in effect, by begging.
When, in spite of the inherent weaknesses of the Confederation, the War of Independence was concluded successfully, the Continental Congress lost most of its meagre powers. The several States started to drift from each other. Local and more or less direct democracy was the order of the day. The Confederation had accrued huge foreign debts, but had no means to service them. Internal strife, troubles and currencies of decreasing value added to the gloom.
Was this what the men of the Colonies had fought and died for? Was it possible to find a way to guarantee internal and external security? How could the conditions for trade be improved and the opportunities of a vast continent be harnessed?
These were some of the questions confronting the representatives of the States, when they met in Philadelphia. They rose to the challenge by writing a republican, federal Constitution during four months in 1787. After intense debate the Convention managed to forge a compromise, which was unique for its time. All power emanated from the people, but several checks were put in place to secure deliberation over passion. The legislative power, the executive and the judiciary were separated, but forced to interact by way of checks and balances. Central government, the Union, was given crucial powers, but the individual States preserved extensive tasks.
The American Constitution was short, clear and easy to read. Congress had the power to lay and collect taxes, to pay debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the federal powers enumerated in the Constitution.
The Constitution opened up the eventuality of constitutional change, on fairly rigorous conditions: ratification by three fourths of the States.
After the first ten Amendments, the Bill of Rights, changes to the Constitution have been few and far between.
With hindsight, it may be astonishing to find that the ”divinely inspired” Constitution – the oldest one in force in the world – was not received by an overjoyed people. Instead, the battle between federalist proponents and anti-federalist opponents of the Constitution raged in every ratifying State.
In the end all thirteen States ratified the new Constitution. The United States of America had taken a crucial step towards becoming a prime object for admiration, envy and hate.
In one decade these colonial “bumpkins” had managed to amalgamate their European heritage from Antiquity to the philosophers of the Enlightenment with their own experiences as largely self-ruling colonial settlements into a federal structure based on republican and democratic values and the rule of law, including basic human rights.
Two centuries of European history, in contrast, experienced almost incessant wars, from Napoleon to the end of World War II; in Central and Eastern Europe democracy and human rights did not start to blossom before the 1990’s, after the fall of the Berlin wall.
Fifty years have passed since the signing of the Rome Treaties, which led to the European Economic Community and Euratom. There have been treaty revisions, from the EEC to the European Community and to the European Union. The EU has seen two treaty revisions realised and a third one agreed on, but the legal basis of the European Union owes as much to the Articles of Confederation as to the US Constitution, even in the form signed by all the Member States in 2004, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.
Should the Constitutional Treaty be ratified and enter into force, further amendments would be well nigh impossible: still dependent on ratification by every Member State (27 today) and consequently hostage to the veto power of any Member (or additionally its voters, if submitted to a referendum).
The European Union may have a larger population than the United States, but the EU is and is going to stay a giant on clay feet for the foreseeable future.
Ralf Grahn
The several States (former Colonies), thirteen in number, joined in arms to prevent their return under British rule. The Declaration of Independence (1776) was soon followed by the first Constitution in common, the Articles of Confederation of 1777. However, ratifying the Articles took four years.
These freedom loving States had managed to form a loose Confederation. A Congress, comprising representatives of sovereign States, was the only political body holding them together and leading the efforts to conduct a taxing war. Financing for Washington’s army and other expenditure could be raised only by requisitions from the States; in effect, by begging.
When, in spite of the inherent weaknesses of the Confederation, the War of Independence was concluded successfully, the Continental Congress lost most of its meagre powers. The several States started to drift from each other. Local and more or less direct democracy was the order of the day. The Confederation had accrued huge foreign debts, but had no means to service them. Internal strife, troubles and currencies of decreasing value added to the gloom.
Was this what the men of the Colonies had fought and died for? Was it possible to find a way to guarantee internal and external security? How could the conditions for trade be improved and the opportunities of a vast continent be harnessed?
These were some of the questions confronting the representatives of the States, when they met in Philadelphia. They rose to the challenge by writing a republican, federal Constitution during four months in 1787. After intense debate the Convention managed to forge a compromise, which was unique for its time. All power emanated from the people, but several checks were put in place to secure deliberation over passion. The legislative power, the executive and the judiciary were separated, but forced to interact by way of checks and balances. Central government, the Union, was given crucial powers, but the individual States preserved extensive tasks.
The American Constitution was short, clear and easy to read. Congress had the power to lay and collect taxes, to pay debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the federal powers enumerated in the Constitution.
The Constitution opened up the eventuality of constitutional change, on fairly rigorous conditions: ratification by three fourths of the States.
After the first ten Amendments, the Bill of Rights, changes to the Constitution have been few and far between.
With hindsight, it may be astonishing to find that the ”divinely inspired” Constitution – the oldest one in force in the world – was not received by an overjoyed people. Instead, the battle between federalist proponents and anti-federalist opponents of the Constitution raged in every ratifying State.
In the end all thirteen States ratified the new Constitution. The United States of America had taken a crucial step towards becoming a prime object for admiration, envy and hate.
In one decade these colonial “bumpkins” had managed to amalgamate their European heritage from Antiquity to the philosophers of the Enlightenment with their own experiences as largely self-ruling colonial settlements into a federal structure based on republican and democratic values and the rule of law, including basic human rights.
Two centuries of European history, in contrast, experienced almost incessant wars, from Napoleon to the end of World War II; in Central and Eastern Europe democracy and human rights did not start to blossom before the 1990’s, after the fall of the Berlin wall.
Fifty years have passed since the signing of the Rome Treaties, which led to the European Economic Community and Euratom. There have been treaty revisions, from the EEC to the European Community and to the European Union. The EU has seen two treaty revisions realised and a third one agreed on, but the legal basis of the European Union owes as much to the Articles of Confederation as to the US Constitution, even in the form signed by all the Member States in 2004, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.
Should the Constitutional Treaty be ratified and enter into force, further amendments would be well nigh impossible: still dependent on ratification by every Member State (27 today) and consequently hostage to the veto power of any Member (or additionally its voters, if submitted to a referendum).
The European Union may have a larger population than the United States, but the EU is and is going to stay a giant on clay feet for the foreseeable future.
Ralf Grahn
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