Yesterday’s Grahnlaw blog post dealt with Charles Grant’s view through the CER’s rose-tinted spectacles at the UK Conservatives’ aims in Europe: Britain: A constructive EU curmudgeon? (5 January 2010).
This British “best case scenario” envisioned a Tory government selective about the repatriation fights to pick with the EU member states, mindful of national budget and financial sector interests to pursue, and ready to contribute constructively to some parts of the European agenda.
European engagement in UK terms is setting the bar at basement level in comparison to the European Union as a whole.
Moderation and constructive approach have to be compared to other British opinions in order to appear.
On 1 January 2010 Open Europe Blog published a post with the headline: 2010: A Better Year For Europe?. In essence, it was only an advert for an article on Conservative Home:
Lorraine Mullally: The Conservatives must do better than Labour at representing Britain’s interests in Europe (31 December 2009)
What Mullally labels as needed “radical reform” translates into a call for party leader David Cameron and the Conservative Party to stop and to reverse the process of European integration, at least with regard to Britain.
The comments section brims with distrust of Cameron’s resolve, threats of defection to UKIP, proposals for unilateral revocation of the Lisbon Treaty, calls for various referendums on the European Union, denouncements of the undemocratic nature of the EU, complete disbelief in the possibility to reform the EU etc.
Well, there is one commentator with positive views on the European Union. He is from Ireland.
The best way to describe the mentality of the Conservative activists is by misquoting Douglas Jerrold: The best thing I know between the European Union and England is – the sea.
Not much constructive participation for European integration to expect from that quarter, I would think.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Ideas on Europe is an experiment by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies UACES to entice academics down from their ivory towers to engage in informed analysis, comment, dialogue and debate on all things European in the “real”, i.e. virtual world of ordinary mortals. This potentially important multi-user blog is listed among the nearly 500 great euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, our common “village well” for fact, opinion and gossip on European affairs.
Showing posts with label Conservative Party. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conservative Party. Show all posts
Wednesday, 6 January 2010
Tuesday, 5 January 2010
Britain: A constructive EU curmudgeon?
In the Grahnlaw blog posts Denouncing the EU Lisbon Treaty – UK Tories and the long grass (1 January 2010) and British and Irish opt-outs from EU JHA law (3 January 2010) we turned to one of the recurring themes of this blog: the (future) relationship between the United Kingdom and Europe.
In the comments section of a blog post on Nosemonkey’s EUtopia about the benefits of EU level regulation, the expert participant DOCM drew my attention to what he called the outstanding analysis of Charles Grant of the CER of the path ahead after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, based on Cameron’s major speech (comment 24).
Time to refresh or reframe my prejudices by taking a look at an outside contribution, I thought:
Charles Grant: Cameron’s Europe: Can the Conservatives achieve their EU objectives? (Centre for European Reform essays, December 2009; 40 pages)
Grant discusses in detail the three domestic laws the Conservative Party leader David Cameron promised to introduce in his 4th November 2009 speech:
1) Amending the European Communities Act 1972 to prohibit the transfer of power to the European Union or the adoption of the euro currency without a referendum.
2) A United Kingdom Sovereignty Act to make clear that ultimate authority stays with the Westminster Parliament.
3) A law requiring parliamentary approval of every use of the enabling clause (passerelle) moving from unanimity to qualified majority voting (as already is the case).
There follows a treatment of the three treaty changes further limiting UK participation Cameron required from the EU member states; the first two already covered by opt-outs:
1) Criminal law and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2) The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
3) Redomestication of some social and employment law.
At each stage, Grant tries to evaluate the chances of and scope for the success of Cameron’s limiting agenda. Then follows an evaluation of the Conservatives’ leverage with regard to the European leaders and the EU institutions.
Grant’s advice is not to waste all efforts on “victories” regarding treaty change, but preferably concentrate on a limited number of targets.
Instead, Cameron should keep his powder dry for other important issues:
• The long term budget, including the common agricultural policy, from 2014.
• The interests of the City of London (evoking the so called Luxembourg compromise; actually a 1966 agreement to disagree).
Grant thinks that the Conservatives could increase their chances of “success” if they show that they make a positive contribution to some parts of the European agenda:
• The new Lisbon agenda (EU 2020) for growth and jobs.
• Climate change and energy, including energy efficiency
• European defence cooperation.
In Grant’s view, the best strategy for David Cameron and William Hague to get the better of their anti-EU MPs and voters would be to seek only modest changes to the treaties, but to try and persuade other governments to grant them ‘victories’ in areas like social policy, the EU budget and financial regulation.
Comment
It is interesting to see how much of the basic national assumptions the Centre for European Reform and more moderate Conservatives share. By way of caricature, one could describe their European Union as the economic pillar of the Council of Europe, with a few intergovernmental frills thrown in.
Federalism is – repeatedly – described as a spent force, which explains why democratic government and added real powers in for instance foreign policy are not even discussed. The text on the Lisbon Treaty judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht mentions and closes the discussion about legitimate EU level government based on the citizens of the union.
Grant’s well written essay is a valuable inventory of British viewpoints and a carefully drawn map of potentially contentious UK issues with the EU member states and institutions.
A new Conservative government would be a curmudgeon in the European Union, but the CER hopes that it would wisely choose to be a constructive one, of sorts.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. In the tradition of balanced BBC coverage, Gavin Hewitt’s Europe endeavours to make the European Union explicable to people in Britain and British views understood by other Europeans. This important blog is listed among the nearly 500 great euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, our common “village well” for fact, opinion and gossip on European affairs.
In the comments section of a blog post on Nosemonkey’s EUtopia about the benefits of EU level regulation, the expert participant DOCM drew my attention to what he called the outstanding analysis of Charles Grant of the CER of the path ahead after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, based on Cameron’s major speech (comment 24).
Time to refresh or reframe my prejudices by taking a look at an outside contribution, I thought:
Charles Grant: Cameron’s Europe: Can the Conservatives achieve their EU objectives? (Centre for European Reform essays, December 2009; 40 pages)
Grant discusses in detail the three domestic laws the Conservative Party leader David Cameron promised to introduce in his 4th November 2009 speech:
1) Amending the European Communities Act 1972 to prohibit the transfer of power to the European Union or the adoption of the euro currency without a referendum.
2) A United Kingdom Sovereignty Act to make clear that ultimate authority stays with the Westminster Parliament.
3) A law requiring parliamentary approval of every use of the enabling clause (passerelle) moving from unanimity to qualified majority voting (as already is the case).
There follows a treatment of the three treaty changes further limiting UK participation Cameron required from the EU member states; the first two already covered by opt-outs:
1) Criminal law and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
2) The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
3) Redomestication of some social and employment law.
At each stage, Grant tries to evaluate the chances of and scope for the success of Cameron’s limiting agenda. Then follows an evaluation of the Conservatives’ leverage with regard to the European leaders and the EU institutions.
Grant’s advice is not to waste all efforts on “victories” regarding treaty change, but preferably concentrate on a limited number of targets.
Instead, Cameron should keep his powder dry for other important issues:
• The long term budget, including the common agricultural policy, from 2014.
• The interests of the City of London (evoking the so called Luxembourg compromise; actually a 1966 agreement to disagree).
Grant thinks that the Conservatives could increase their chances of “success” if they show that they make a positive contribution to some parts of the European agenda:
• The new Lisbon agenda (EU 2020) for growth and jobs.
• Climate change and energy, including energy efficiency
• European defence cooperation.
In Grant’s view, the best strategy for David Cameron and William Hague to get the better of their anti-EU MPs and voters would be to seek only modest changes to the treaties, but to try and persuade other governments to grant them ‘victories’ in areas like social policy, the EU budget and financial regulation.
Comment
It is interesting to see how much of the basic national assumptions the Centre for European Reform and more moderate Conservatives share. By way of caricature, one could describe their European Union as the economic pillar of the Council of Europe, with a few intergovernmental frills thrown in.
Federalism is – repeatedly – described as a spent force, which explains why democratic government and added real powers in for instance foreign policy are not even discussed. The text on the Lisbon Treaty judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht mentions and closes the discussion about legitimate EU level government based on the citizens of the union.
Grant’s well written essay is a valuable inventory of British viewpoints and a carefully drawn map of potentially contentious UK issues with the EU member states and institutions.
A new Conservative government would be a curmudgeon in the European Union, but the CER hopes that it would wisely choose to be a constructive one, of sorts.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. In the tradition of balanced BBC coverage, Gavin Hewitt’s Europe endeavours to make the European Union explicable to people in Britain and British views understood by other Europeans. This important blog is listed among the nearly 500 great euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, our common “village well” for fact, opinion and gossip on European affairs.
Friday, 1 January 2010
Denouncing the EU Lisbon Treaty ─ UK Tories and the long grass
In the blog post Gerald Warner and the Song of Songs of unsophistication (20 October 2009), I rejected Warner’s Telegraph column view that Britain could revoke the Lisbon Treaty and return to the ‘status quo ante’ after the amending treaty has entered into force.
Among news from Statewatch, I just noticed an analysis by Professor Steve Peers: Can the Treaty of Lisbon be denounced after it enters into force? (3 November 2009; 3 pages)
After stating that the Lisbon Treaty contains no express provision permitting it to be denounced by a member state after it has entered into force, Professor Peers presented Article 56 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regarding treaties which lack a provision regarding termination. He then concluded (page 2):
UK Conservative Party
In my blog post, I said that I was eagerly waiting for David Cameron and William Hague to present their “we won’t let matters rest there” vision on Europe, but that my sincere hope was that they have more sophisticated advisors than Warner.
On 4 November 2009 Tory leader David Cameron showed that he had – at least in part – taken sounder advice than offered by The Telegraph. He acknowledged that the Lisbon Treaty was becoming part of the law of the European Union, and that the Conservative campaign for a referendum on the reform treaty was therefore over.
But, in addition to domestic dams against further EU reform, Cameron promised to renegotiate the return of powers from the European Union concerning social and employment legislation, as well as even more effective opt-outs concerning criminal justice and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Depending on the details, the criminal justice and citizens’ rights might be amenable to political declarations as pacificatory measures in areas where the United Kingdom already is a semi-detached member state.
On the other hand, social and employment law is an issue of substance, even if EU level regulation is patchy. The general view in the European Union is that these are essential flanking policies to the internal market, and the long term trend is to improve the lot of workers and employees.
Proposals to repatriate powers in order to lower standards would be seen as unfair competition, and stiff resistance can be expected from many member states.
At the end of the next parliamentary term, the Tory government would probably have little to show its anti-EU cadres and voters, reintroducing the perpetual question about an In or Out referendum on EU membership.
But perhaps it is enough to have kicked the EU issue into the long grass for one term in office.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read Diner’s room (in French) and other great euroblogs listed on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, our common “village well” for fact, opinion and gossip on European affairs.
Among news from Statewatch, I just noticed an analysis by Professor Steve Peers: Can the Treaty of Lisbon be denounced after it enters into force? (3 November 2009; 3 pages)
After stating that the Lisbon Treaty contains no express provision permitting it to be denounced by a member state after it has entered into force, Professor Peers presented Article 56 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties regarding treaties which lack a provision regarding termination. He then concluded (page 2):
Moreover, since the Treaty of Lisbon inserts a new clause into the EU Treaty expressly permitting a Member State to withdraw from the EU as a whole, this suggests by ‘a contrario’ reasoning that the parties to the Lisbon Treaty did not intend to create a right for Member States to denounce the Lisbon Treaty.
UK Conservative Party
In my blog post, I said that I was eagerly waiting for David Cameron and William Hague to present their “we won’t let matters rest there” vision on Europe, but that my sincere hope was that they have more sophisticated advisors than Warner.
On 4 November 2009 Tory leader David Cameron showed that he had – at least in part – taken sounder advice than offered by The Telegraph. He acknowledged that the Lisbon Treaty was becoming part of the law of the European Union, and that the Conservative campaign for a referendum on the reform treaty was therefore over.
But, in addition to domestic dams against further EU reform, Cameron promised to renegotiate the return of powers from the European Union concerning social and employment legislation, as well as even more effective opt-outs concerning criminal justice and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Depending on the details, the criminal justice and citizens’ rights might be amenable to political declarations as pacificatory measures in areas where the United Kingdom already is a semi-detached member state.
On the other hand, social and employment law is an issue of substance, even if EU level regulation is patchy. The general view in the European Union is that these are essential flanking policies to the internal market, and the long term trend is to improve the lot of workers and employees.
Proposals to repatriate powers in order to lower standards would be seen as unfair competition, and stiff resistance can be expected from many member states.
At the end of the next parliamentary term, the Tory government would probably have little to show its anti-EU cadres and voters, reintroducing the perpetual question about an In or Out referendum on EU membership.
But perhaps it is enough to have kicked the EU issue into the long grass for one term in office.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read Diner’s room (in French) and other great euroblogs listed on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu, our common “village well” for fact, opinion and gossip on European affairs.
Tuesday, 24 November 2009
BBC on ECR Group leader Michal Kaminski ─ Britain in EU
In Britain, the decision of the Conservative Party to leave the mainstream group of the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament in order to set up the anti-integrationist European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group continues to cause debate because of the Tories’ choice of political bedfellows.
BBC News has taken a closer look at the chairman of the ECR group, Polish MEP Michal Kaminski: Digging up the truth about Michal Kaminski (23 November 2009).
Kaminski has strenuously denied allegations that he is a homophobe, an anti-Semite or a neo-Nazi.
At national level Kaminski represents the Law and Justice Party (PiS), established by Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski.
The third main component of the ECR group is the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS), established by Vaclav Klaus.
***
War crimes, moral conservatism, Catholic fundamentalism and homophobia offer a heady mix for public debate in 21st century Europe.
Political influence in European Union affairs is another matter, but at least as important.
The ECR group is anti-integrationist, although it describes it as opposition to EU federalism. This sets it against the European mainstream, represented by the EPP, the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and the Greens, all of which see the EU as a common project and strive to make it work better.
The ECR group does not describe itself as nationalist, but that is the effect of its emphasis on the sovereign integrity of the nation state, when the European Union has been established to achieve effective sovereignty by pooling, i.e. joining forces.
The ECR group does not support the European consensus view of a highly competitive social market economy; its formula of minimal regulation, lower taxation and small government embodies a vision built on free market fundamentalism.
These fundamental contrarian choices have left the European Conservatives and Reformists politically isolated in the European Parliament (and more widely in EU affairs). The ECR group has only one committee chairman among 20 in the European Parliament.
There are few indications that the ECR group will make hay in the nominations for the next EU Commission, or the assignment of portfolios.
“Freely cooperating, sovereign nation states” may still bring the ECR (UK Conservatives) a revival of fortunes, if the Tories win the general election about half a year from now. Veto powers and obstruction in the most intergovernmental EU institution, the Council, with a long tradition of consensus seeking – advancing according to the convoy principle – can give a new UK government an amount of negative influence: the power to stop, to slow down and to water down proposals.
But David Cameron and William Hague have promised more than that: In part, they want to prevent future integration by domestic legislation, partly they want to put integration into reverse gear, by repatriating powers during the next Parliament. The formula goes some way to appease anti-EU opinion at home, but it is hardly a recipe for coalition building with other member state governments within the European Union.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Do you find EUSSR myths fascinating? Are we EU citizens worth a better European Union? Read some or all of the 481 Euroblogs aggregated on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu. On most of the blogs you can comment and discuss our common European future.
BBC News has taken a closer look at the chairman of the ECR group, Polish MEP Michal Kaminski: Digging up the truth about Michal Kaminski (23 November 2009).
Kaminski has strenuously denied allegations that he is a homophobe, an anti-Semite or a neo-Nazi.
At national level Kaminski represents the Law and Justice Party (PiS), established by Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski.
The third main component of the ECR group is the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS), established by Vaclav Klaus.
***
War crimes, moral conservatism, Catholic fundamentalism and homophobia offer a heady mix for public debate in 21st century Europe.
Political influence in European Union affairs is another matter, but at least as important.
The ECR group is anti-integrationist, although it describes it as opposition to EU federalism. This sets it against the European mainstream, represented by the EPP, the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and the Greens, all of which see the EU as a common project and strive to make it work better.
The ECR group does not describe itself as nationalist, but that is the effect of its emphasis on the sovereign integrity of the nation state, when the European Union has been established to achieve effective sovereignty by pooling, i.e. joining forces.
The ECR group does not support the European consensus view of a highly competitive social market economy; its formula of minimal regulation, lower taxation and small government embodies a vision built on free market fundamentalism.
These fundamental contrarian choices have left the European Conservatives and Reformists politically isolated in the European Parliament (and more widely in EU affairs). The ECR group has only one committee chairman among 20 in the European Parliament.
There are few indications that the ECR group will make hay in the nominations for the next EU Commission, or the assignment of portfolios.
“Freely cooperating, sovereign nation states” may still bring the ECR (UK Conservatives) a revival of fortunes, if the Tories win the general election about half a year from now. Veto powers and obstruction in the most intergovernmental EU institution, the Council, with a long tradition of consensus seeking – advancing according to the convoy principle – can give a new UK government an amount of negative influence: the power to stop, to slow down and to water down proposals.
But David Cameron and William Hague have promised more than that: In part, they want to prevent future integration by domestic legislation, partly they want to put integration into reverse gear, by repatriating powers during the next Parliament. The formula goes some way to appease anti-EU opinion at home, but it is hardly a recipe for coalition building with other member state governments within the European Union.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Do you find EUSSR myths fascinating? Are we EU citizens worth a better European Union? Read some or all of the 481 Euroblogs aggregated on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu. On most of the blogs you can comment and discuss our common European future.
Saturday, 7 November 2009
EU: Did Britain join a free market or a political project?
On the FT Brussels blog, Tony Barber wrote a post on the mutual incomprehension between Britain and much of the rest of the European Union: Europe not in the mood to thank Cameron for his EU speech (5 November 2009). ─ The comments are worth reading, too.
A political project
The proposal was the 9 May 1950 Schuman declaration on a first step in the federation of Europe.
The following engagement was the 18 April 1951 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris), which set out the resolve of the founding members to lay the bases of institutions capable of giving direction to their future common destiny.
The attempt to build a European Defence Community and a European (Political) Community failed at the altar, but the marriage took place through the 1957 Treaties of Rome, which put in place two new communities, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom).
The EEC treaty and all the subsequent treaties remind of us of the determination to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.
After trying and failing to subvert the EEC through EFTA, Britain was admitted to the European communities in 1973 (and the membership was confirmed by its only national referendum, in 1975).
The main reason to join, for the UK political class as well as Her Majesty’s subjects, was to gain access to the fledgling common market, but already then more than a free trade area. The political nature of the project was evident, although some still persist in claiming that they were duped.
De Gaulle’s sinister predictions about British incompatibility with a united Europe came true; they were as stubbornly nationalist as he.
The basic contradiction is that European integration is meant to be a one way street, leading to ever closer union, whereas Britain has obstructed and limited and promises to reverse the direction.
In the European Parliament, when William Hague and others establish an anti-integrationist political group, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), with other right wingers hailing national sovereignty above all, they go against the basic aim of European integration.
However mildly David Cameron phrases his intention to roll back the present state of the European Union, he rejects the main objectives of the European project.
If the Conservative Party fails to understand the principal aim of European integration, and if the Tories continue to mislead the British public, the UK is in the wrong club.
Asking for comprehension from European partners about English delusions is truly “pathetic”.
Article 50 TEU offers the opportunity to nurse false beliefs outside the European Union. For the sake of Europe: Better off out.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Get to know the real EUSSR through the good, the better and the best Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
A political project
The proposal was the 9 May 1950 Schuman declaration on a first step in the federation of Europe.
The following engagement was the 18 April 1951 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris), which set out the resolve of the founding members to lay the bases of institutions capable of giving direction to their future common destiny.
The attempt to build a European Defence Community and a European (Political) Community failed at the altar, but the marriage took place through the 1957 Treaties of Rome, which put in place two new communities, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom).
The EEC treaty and all the subsequent treaties remind of us of the determination to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.
After trying and failing to subvert the EEC through EFTA, Britain was admitted to the European communities in 1973 (and the membership was confirmed by its only national referendum, in 1975).
The main reason to join, for the UK political class as well as Her Majesty’s subjects, was to gain access to the fledgling common market, but already then more than a free trade area. The political nature of the project was evident, although some still persist in claiming that they were duped.
De Gaulle’s sinister predictions about British incompatibility with a united Europe came true; they were as stubbornly nationalist as he.
The basic contradiction is that European integration is meant to be a one way street, leading to ever closer union, whereas Britain has obstructed and limited and promises to reverse the direction.
In the European Parliament, when William Hague and others establish an anti-integrationist political group, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), with other right wingers hailing national sovereignty above all, they go against the basic aim of European integration.
However mildly David Cameron phrases his intention to roll back the present state of the European Union, he rejects the main objectives of the European project.
If the Conservative Party fails to understand the principal aim of European integration, and if the Tories continue to mislead the British public, the UK is in the wrong club.
Asking for comprehension from European partners about English delusions is truly “pathetic”.
Article 50 TEU offers the opportunity to nurse false beliefs outside the European Union. For the sake of Europe: Better off out.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Get to know the real EUSSR through the good, the better and the best Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Thursday, 5 November 2009
Britain and EU: European reactions to Cameron
After looking at British reports and reactions on David Cameron’s Conservative policy shift on Europe, it is time to view what European observers have to say on the prospects of a Tory government responsible for European Union affairs. Here are some first reactions.
Euroblogs
« Conservateurs britanniques : que de la gueule ! » is the headline of Jean Quatremer on Coulisses de Bruxelles (4 November 2009). David Cameron courts europhobes, knowing that nothing will change for his country. Britain prefers to block from the inside.
The European Citizen (Conor Slowey) sees the Conservative Party: the Ghost of Referenda to come (4 November 2009). The blog post notes the Conservatives’ fear of human rights. It concludes:
In a lighter vein, Jason O’Mahony offers us the imaginary scenario of a UK In or Out referendum in 2013: E-Day: The British EU Referendum May 2013 (4 November 2009).
***
EU partners
Despite Britain’s importance, its EU history and the prospective Tory government are exasperating for European politicians. In an interview for The Guardian, France’s Europe minister Pierre Lellouche called the Tory repatriation plans pathetic, and he said that it is sad to see Britain cutting itself out from the rest; in France: ‘Autistic Tories have castrated UK in Europe’ (4 November 2009).
The leading German Christian Democrat MEP Elmar Brok, under the headline Bid to repatriate powers is a Tory pipe dream (The Independent, 5 November 2009).
***
The Tories have spent all their European goodwill capital long before taking office. If elected, they are free to posture at home, but their chances of success and influence in the European Union look slim.
On the other hand, Britain’s continued EU membership is drag on European integration.
Does it have to go on like this?
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Get to know the real EUSSR through the good, the better and the best Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Euroblogs
« Conservateurs britanniques : que de la gueule ! » is the headline of Jean Quatremer on Coulisses de Bruxelles (4 November 2009). David Cameron courts europhobes, knowing that nothing will change for his country. Britain prefers to block from the inside.
The European Citizen (Conor Slowey) sees the Conservative Party: the Ghost of Referenda to come (4 November 2009). The blog post notes the Conservatives’ fear of human rights. It concludes:
“This is a Tory party that has shed almost all association or common thought with continental Christian Democracy, has dropped its tradition of pragmatism and is suspicious and hostile towards the judiciary. I can only describe the Tory party as dangerously constitutionally illiterate.”
In a lighter vein, Jason O’Mahony offers us the imaginary scenario of a UK In or Out referendum in 2013: E-Day: The British EU Referendum May 2013 (4 November 2009).
***
EU partners
Despite Britain’s importance, its EU history and the prospective Tory government are exasperating for European politicians. In an interview for The Guardian, France’s Europe minister Pierre Lellouche called the Tory repatriation plans pathetic, and he said that it is sad to see Britain cutting itself out from the rest; in France: ‘Autistic Tories have castrated UK in Europe’ (4 November 2009).
The leading German Christian Democrat MEP Elmar Brok, under the headline Bid to repatriate powers is a Tory pipe dream (The Independent, 5 November 2009).
***
The Tories have spent all their European goodwill capital long before taking office. If elected, they are free to posture at home, but their chances of success and influence in the European Union look slim.
On the other hand, Britain’s continued EU membership is drag on European integration.
Does it have to go on like this?
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Get to know the real EUSSR through the good, the better and the best Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Britain and EU: Cameron ditching the referendum
Yesterday Tory leader David Cameron ditched the doable, credible, deliverable referendum on UK membership in the European Union, the undoable referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the plebiscites he described as made-up and phoney.
If the Conservative Party forms the next government, it will be introduce national legislation to prevent the emergence of a democratic European Union. The government will initiate negotiations to repatriate EU powers, real or imaginary, to Britain. The government is in no haste, asking to be judged at the end of the next parliamentary term, i.e. five years.
After David Cameron’s speech, the anti-EU crowd has no hope of withdrawal through the Conservative Party. The United Kingdom has no intention of leaving the European Union, and Cameron has left the secessionists simmering on the back burner.
The member states and the citizens of the European Union are saddled with the prospects of continued British membership.
***
British press
Let us take a look at reports and reactions in the British press.
Nicolas Watt in The Guardian offers a summary of Cameron’s main points, in David Cameron ditches referendum and backs away from EU ‘bust-up’ (4 November 2009).
The Sun sports a letter by Cameron, where he explains his policy shift with pompous phrases on sovereign and independent nation.
In Mail Online, Edward Heathcoat Amory asks, Concessions? How can Cameron possibly win any at all? (5 November 2009). He sees the risk of a series of rows, in Brussels and in Westminster, running arguments over the EU throughout the next Parliament.
Cameron defies Eurosceptics by backing down from EU confrontation, say Francis Elliott and David Charter in Times Online (5 November 2009). They note that Cameron seems to have averted a backbench revolt.
In the Financial Times, Jean Eaglesham concluded that David Cameron successfully faced down hardline Tory Eurosceptics yesterday, setting out a very limited programme of European reform without provoking a significant backlash from his party.
On the contrary, in The Mirror, Jason Beattie sees that the Tories were plunged into turmoil yesterday over David Cameron’s new policies on Europe; in Flustered Cam’s new EU pledge (5 November 2009).
Patrick Wintour reports in The Guardian that Daniel Hannan quits as Tory spokesman over Cameron’s U-turn (5 November 2009).
Letters to The Telegraph reveal that many readers want a referendum on Britain’s relationship with Europe; under the headline No referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is possible, but the people demand a vote on rule from Brussels (5 November 2009).
The Independent’s leading article Fork-tongued Tories (5 November 2009) says that Cameron risks taking his party’s corrosive division over Europe into government – not just through the next Parliament, but beyond.
***
Cameron must have calculated that a 20-point lead in the polls is enough to win the general election, despite the improved prospects for UKIP and the BNP.
Some of the promises can be enacted domestically and the ones requiring unanimous EU agreement can drag on for five years of “patient” negotiations.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read the good, the better and the best Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
If the Conservative Party forms the next government, it will be introduce national legislation to prevent the emergence of a democratic European Union. The government will initiate negotiations to repatriate EU powers, real or imaginary, to Britain. The government is in no haste, asking to be judged at the end of the next parliamentary term, i.e. five years.
After David Cameron’s speech, the anti-EU crowd has no hope of withdrawal through the Conservative Party. The United Kingdom has no intention of leaving the European Union, and Cameron has left the secessionists simmering on the back burner.
The member states and the citizens of the European Union are saddled with the prospects of continued British membership.
***
British press
Let us take a look at reports and reactions in the British press.
Nicolas Watt in The Guardian offers a summary of Cameron’s main points, in David Cameron ditches referendum and backs away from EU ‘bust-up’ (4 November 2009).
The Sun sports a letter by Cameron, where he explains his policy shift with pompous phrases on sovereign and independent nation.
In Mail Online, Edward Heathcoat Amory asks, Concessions? How can Cameron possibly win any at all? (5 November 2009). He sees the risk of a series of rows, in Brussels and in Westminster, running arguments over the EU throughout the next Parliament.
Cameron defies Eurosceptics by backing down from EU confrontation, say Francis Elliott and David Charter in Times Online (5 November 2009). They note that Cameron seems to have averted a backbench revolt.
In the Financial Times, Jean Eaglesham concluded that David Cameron successfully faced down hardline Tory Eurosceptics yesterday, setting out a very limited programme of European reform without provoking a significant backlash from his party.
On the contrary, in The Mirror, Jason Beattie sees that the Tories were plunged into turmoil yesterday over David Cameron’s new policies on Europe; in Flustered Cam’s new EU pledge (5 November 2009).
Patrick Wintour reports in The Guardian that Daniel Hannan quits as Tory spokesman over Cameron’s U-turn (5 November 2009).
Letters to The Telegraph reveal that many readers want a referendum on Britain’s relationship with Europe; under the headline No referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is possible, but the people demand a vote on rule from Brussels (5 November 2009).
The Independent’s leading article Fork-tongued Tories (5 November 2009) says that Cameron risks taking his party’s corrosive division over Europe into government – not just through the next Parliament, but beyond.
***
Cameron must have calculated that a 20-point lead in the polls is enough to win the general election, despite the improved prospects for UKIP and the BNP.
Some of the promises can be enacted domestically and the ones requiring unanimous EU agreement can drag on for five years of “patient” negotiations.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read the good, the better and the best Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Wednesday, 4 November 2009
Britain and EU: What did Cameron say?
Tory party leader David Cameron’s speech on EU policy is going to cause much debate in Britain and become one of the major stumbling blocks in relations between the member states, so it may be best to post the whole text here for later reference:
David Cameron: A Europe policy that people can believe in
David Cameron, Wednesday, November 4 2009
Yesterday in Prague, the Czech Constitutional Court rejected the one remaining challenge to the Lisbon Treaty, and the President of the Czech Republic signed it.
The Lisbon Treaty has now been ratified by every one of the twenty seven member states of the European Union, and our campaign for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is therefore over.
Why? Because it is no longer a Treaty: it is being incorporated into the law of the European Union.
Next week, the new posts that the Lisbon Treaty creates – a President and a Foreign Minister – will be filled.
We cannot hold a referendum and magically make those posts – or the Lisbon Treaty itself – disappear, any more than we could hold a referendum to stop the sun rising in the morning.
I know, from the many public meetings I’ve held around the country, from the huge number of letters and emails that I receive, how much the people of this country will resent the fact that we cannot now have the referendum we were promised.
The decision to promise, and then deny, a referendum was taken by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.
The betrayal was backed and matched by the Liberal Democrats.
And I believe it ranks alongside the expenses scandal as one of the reasons that trust in politics has broken down.
Of course I wanted a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.
I’ve argued for it, campaigned for it, put it front and centre in our European election campaign.
We have voted for it in Parliament.
I’ve challenged the Prime Minister about his broken promise at every opportunity.
And if the Treaty had not been ratified by every European government when we came to the election, we would have held a referendum on it.
But now it has been ratified.
And I always said that if this happened, I would set out immediately how a Conservative Government would respond.
So today, I want to speak directly to the British people.
I want to explain what a new Conservative government will do to protect Britain’s interests in Europe and salvage something from the mess that Labour will have left us.
And I want to speak to our European partners too, to set out clearly what they can expect from a Conservative government in Britain.
NEVER AGAIN
First, we will make sure that this never happens again.
Never again should it be possible for a British government to transfer power to the EU without the say of the British people.
If we win the next election, we will amend the European Communities Act 1972 to prohibit, by law, the transfer of power to the EU without a referendum.
And that will cover not just any future treaties like Lisbon, but any future attempt to take Britain into the euro.
We will give the British people a referendum lock to which only they should hold the key – a commitment very similar to that in Ireland.
This is a major constitutional development.
But I believe it is now the only way to reassure the British people that powers cannot be given away without their explicit approval in a referendum.
It is not politicians’ power to give away – it belongs to the people.
So at the General Election, we will challenge the other political parties to accept the referendum lock and pledge never to reverse it.
NO MADE-UP REFERENDUM
I recognise there are some who, now that we cannot have a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, want a referendum on something else...anything else.
But I just don’t think it’s right to concoct some new pretext for a referendum simply to have one for the sake of it.
That wouldn’t survive serious scrutiny.
I don’t think a made-up referendum will get Britain anywhere.
For instance, what about a referendum asking for a mandate for our negotiating aims in Europe?
We would have just asked for that mandate in an election and received it.
Would we really want to turn round straight after an election, with the public finances in the state they are in and the economy as fragile as it is and ask the same question all over again?
A made-up referendum might make people feel better for five minutes but my job is to put together a plan that lasts five years, and I don’t think a phoney referendum should play any part in that.
Let me repeat: a Conservative government will guarantee a referendum if there is any attempt to transfer further powers from Britain to the EU.
But if we wasted everyone’s time and taxpayers’ money on a referendum that has no practical effect, I don’t think the British people would thank us for it.
SOVEREIGNTY
In any case, there is more we can do than simply promise a referendum lock on any future handover of power.
Take the sovereignty of our laws.
Because we have no written constitution, unlike many other EU countries, we have no explicit legal guarantee that the last word on our laws stays in Britain.
There is therefore a danger that, over time, our courts might come to regard ultimate authority as resting with the EU.
So as well as making sure that further power cannot be handed to the EU without a referendum, we will also introduce a new law, in the form of a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill, to make it clear that ultimate authority stays in this country, in our Parliament.
This is not about Westminster striking down individual items of EU legislation.
It is about an assurance that the final word on our laws is here in Britain.
It would simply put Britain on a par with Germany, where the German Constitutional Court has consistently upheld - including most recently on the Lisbon treaty - that ultimate authority lies with the bodies established by the German Constitution.
But people will rightly say that the Lisbon Treaty does not just transfer powers to Brussels today.
It allows further powers to be transferred in the future, because it contains a mechanism to abolish vetoes and transfer power without the need for a new Treaty.
We do not believe that any of these so-called ratchet clauses should be used to hand over more powers from Britain to the EU.
Furthermore, we would change the law so that any use of a ratchet clause by a future government would require full approval by Parliament.
These changes: the referendum lock, the Sovereignty Bill, stopping the use of ratchet clauses, all these changes can be put in place by our own Parliament.
They do not require the approval of our European partners - merely the sanction of the British people at the ballot box, which we will seek at the forthcoming General Election.
They will put in place real protection for our democracy – protections other countries have but which are missing here in Britain.
They would increase accountability, and they would ensure that the breach of trust committed by this Labour Government could never happen again.
Those two words – never again – will be on our leaflets, in our Manifesto: we will make sure that the British people remember who it was that broke their promise – Labour, and who it is that will stop this happening again – the Conservatives.
BRITISH GUARANTEES
But these measures are all about preventing problems in the future.
They don’t deal with the problems we are facing today, which will now be made worse by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.
In essence, these problems boil down to the steady and unaccountable intrusion of the European Union into almost every aspect of our lives.
A Conservative Government will address some of these problems by negotiating three specific guarantees with our European partners guarantees over powers that we believe should reside with Britain, not the EU.
First, social and employment legislation.
Of course, Britain used to have an opt-out from the Social Chapter: but Labour foolishly gave this up.
And today, too much EU legislation in this area is damaging both our economy and our public services.
So we will want to negotiate the return of Britain’s opt-out from social and employment legislation in those areas which have proved most damaging to our economy and public services for example the aspects of the Working Time Directive which are causing real problems in the NHS and the Fire Service.
The second British guarantee we will negotiate is over the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
We must be absolutely sure that this cannot be used by EU judges to re-interpret EU law affecting the UK.
Tony Blair claimed that his Government obtained an opt-out from the Charter.
But what he got – as the Government have now admitted - was simply a clarification of how it works in Britain.
We will want a complete opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The third area where we will negotiate for a return of powers is criminal justice.
We must be sure that the measures included in the Lisbon Treaty will not bring creeping control over our criminal justice system by EU judges.
We will want to prevent EU judges gaining steadily greater control over our criminal justice system by negotiating an arrangement which would protect it.
That will mean limiting the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction over criminal law to its pre-Lisbon level, and ensuring that only British authorities can initiate criminal investigations in Britain.
I recognise, of course, that taking back power in these areas, or negotiating arrangements that suit the UK, is not something we can do unilaterally.
It means changing the rules of an institution of which we are a member – changing rules that Britain has signed up to.
If we want to make changes, we will need to do that through negotiation with our European partners, and we will need the agreement of all twenty seven member states.
I also recognise that these are highly complex areas, where we need to think through the practical details with great care.
William Hague is now leading detailed work to examine precisely what we will need to change, and, if we win the next election, his work will draw on the specialised legal advice which the Government has available to it, as well as the expertise of officials from the Foreign Office and other relevant departments.
But success in these negotiations will establish an extremely important principle: that European integration is not a one way street and that powers can be returned from the EU to its member countries, a principle that was envisaged in the Laeken Declaration nearly a decade ago.
Let me be clear. Our guarantees are essential, realistic and deliverable.
Essential, because we have identified the areas of the Lisbon Treaty that cause the deepest concern, and the ones with greatest potential to interfere with our democracy.
Realistic, because we will propose that these British guarantees are added as protocols to a future accession treaty - like the recently concluded Irish guarantees.
And deliverable, because we have chosen areas where the return of powers from the EU to Britain protects our distinctive national interests without harming the interests of our European partners.
THE NEXT PARLIAMENT
So, yes, I believe we will be able to negotiate the return of the powers I have set out.
But no, we will not rush into some massive Euro-bust-up.
We will take our time, negotiate firmly, patiently and respectfully, and aim to achieve the return of the powers I have set out over the lifetime of a parliament.
I know some people will want me to go further, and faster. To them let me say this:
If we win the election, we will inherit the worst public finances of any incoming government for fifty years.
We will have a generational challenge to get Britain to live within her means, to secure economic recovery and to deliver this country from the appalling mess left by this Labour Government.
That has to come before anything else.
THE LONGER TERM
These steps: a referendum lock to prevent this ever happening again, and the return of a specific set of powers. I believe these things can stop Britain’s relationship with the EU from heading in the wrong direction.
Clearly we will be asked the question: what if you cannot get these guarantees and what if Europe continues to head in the wrong, centralising direction? Let me answer that question in advance.
Well, if that were to happen, then of course we can return to this subject in a manifesto for the parliament after the next one.
Let me be clear: this is not something we want to happen. Nor is it something we expect to happen.
But if those circumstances were to occur, we would not rule out a referendum on a wider package of guarantees to protect our democratic decision-making, while remaining, of course, a member of the European Union.
But that would be a judgement for the future, not for this election or for the next Parliament.
What I have set out today settles our policy for the next parliament.
CONCLUSION
I just want to conclude by saying something clearly to our European partners.
My purpose in committing any government I lead to these measures is not to frustrate or to sabotage the operation of the European Union.
It is to put Britain’s role in the EU on a more positive footing.
As we commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, we should remember that the European Union has done much to reconcile the painful division of Europe and to spread democracy and the rule of law across our continent.
But it should not rest on those achievements.
Today, European countries need to work together to combat global climate change, to fight global poverty, to boost global economic growth.
If I am elected Prime Minister, the British Government I lead will be an active member of the European Union.
On energy security, on climate change, on growth, on global poverty, we will look forward to working with our European partners to make progress on those issues.
We will press to keep the doors of the European Union open to new member states, especially to entrench stability in the Western Balkans where so much European blood has flowed, and also to Turkey.
We will stand for open markets, and a strong transatlantic relationship; an EU that looks out to the world, and that builds strong and open relations with rising powers like China and India.
We will want to see a tough financial settlement in the forthcoming negotiations on the EU budget, ensuring that Britain does not pay more than its fair share.
We will pay particular attention to the area of financial regulation, where we will be vigilant and tenacious in defending the competitiveness of the City of London.
Like every other Member State, we will fight our corner to advance our national interests.
But our guiding principles will be these: we believe Britain’s interests are best served by membership of a European Union that is an association of its member states, we will never allow Britain to slide into a federal Europe and that means we will watch closely how the Lisbon Treaty works out in practice.
We will put in place a referendum lock, so never again can a British government transfer powers to the EU without the people giving their consent in a referendum.
We will enact a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill, making clear that ultimate authority rests with our Parliament.
And we will negotiate for a specific set of British guarantees that are realistic, deliverable – and essential.
That is our programme for Government.
That is the mandate we will seek at the next election.
In this area – Britain’s relationship with Europe – what people want from their politicians is some straight talk and plain speaking.
They were told we were joining a Common Market and it turned out to be a European Union.
They were told they would have a say over the European constitution but that promise was broken.
People are fed up with the endless lies and spin, they just want to know what we can achieve and how.
That is what I will deliver.
I said we would leave the federalist group in the European Parliament and we did.
I said we would have a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty and if it hadn’t been ratified we would have had that referendum.
But I did not promise a referendum come what may because once the Lisbon Treaty is the law, there’s nothing anyone can do about it and I’m not going to treat people like fools and offer a referendum that has no effect.
What I am promising today is doable, credible, deliverable.
That’s what this is all about.
Giving the British people a policy on Europe that they can actually believe in.
***
I wonder if Cameron’s outline will satisfy the Conservative grass roots and at the reception the proposals will get from the EU member states and institutions.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read informed Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
David Cameron: A Europe policy that people can believe in
David Cameron, Wednesday, November 4 2009
Yesterday in Prague, the Czech Constitutional Court rejected the one remaining challenge to the Lisbon Treaty, and the President of the Czech Republic signed it.
The Lisbon Treaty has now been ratified by every one of the twenty seven member states of the European Union, and our campaign for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is therefore over.
Why? Because it is no longer a Treaty: it is being incorporated into the law of the European Union.
Next week, the new posts that the Lisbon Treaty creates – a President and a Foreign Minister – will be filled.
We cannot hold a referendum and magically make those posts – or the Lisbon Treaty itself – disappear, any more than we could hold a referendum to stop the sun rising in the morning.
I know, from the many public meetings I’ve held around the country, from the huge number of letters and emails that I receive, how much the people of this country will resent the fact that we cannot now have the referendum we were promised.
The decision to promise, and then deny, a referendum was taken by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown.
The betrayal was backed and matched by the Liberal Democrats.
And I believe it ranks alongside the expenses scandal as one of the reasons that trust in politics has broken down.
Of course I wanted a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.
I’ve argued for it, campaigned for it, put it front and centre in our European election campaign.
We have voted for it in Parliament.
I’ve challenged the Prime Minister about his broken promise at every opportunity.
And if the Treaty had not been ratified by every European government when we came to the election, we would have held a referendum on it.
But now it has been ratified.
And I always said that if this happened, I would set out immediately how a Conservative Government would respond.
So today, I want to speak directly to the British people.
I want to explain what a new Conservative government will do to protect Britain’s interests in Europe and salvage something from the mess that Labour will have left us.
And I want to speak to our European partners too, to set out clearly what they can expect from a Conservative government in Britain.
NEVER AGAIN
First, we will make sure that this never happens again.
Never again should it be possible for a British government to transfer power to the EU without the say of the British people.
If we win the next election, we will amend the European Communities Act 1972 to prohibit, by law, the transfer of power to the EU without a referendum.
And that will cover not just any future treaties like Lisbon, but any future attempt to take Britain into the euro.
We will give the British people a referendum lock to which only they should hold the key – a commitment very similar to that in Ireland.
This is a major constitutional development.
But I believe it is now the only way to reassure the British people that powers cannot be given away without their explicit approval in a referendum.
It is not politicians’ power to give away – it belongs to the people.
So at the General Election, we will challenge the other political parties to accept the referendum lock and pledge never to reverse it.
NO MADE-UP REFERENDUM
I recognise there are some who, now that we cannot have a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, want a referendum on something else...anything else.
But I just don’t think it’s right to concoct some new pretext for a referendum simply to have one for the sake of it.
That wouldn’t survive serious scrutiny.
I don’t think a made-up referendum will get Britain anywhere.
For instance, what about a referendum asking for a mandate for our negotiating aims in Europe?
We would have just asked for that mandate in an election and received it.
Would we really want to turn round straight after an election, with the public finances in the state they are in and the economy as fragile as it is and ask the same question all over again?
A made-up referendum might make people feel better for five minutes but my job is to put together a plan that lasts five years, and I don’t think a phoney referendum should play any part in that.
Let me repeat: a Conservative government will guarantee a referendum if there is any attempt to transfer further powers from Britain to the EU.
But if we wasted everyone’s time and taxpayers’ money on a referendum that has no practical effect, I don’t think the British people would thank us for it.
SOVEREIGNTY
In any case, there is more we can do than simply promise a referendum lock on any future handover of power.
Take the sovereignty of our laws.
Because we have no written constitution, unlike many other EU countries, we have no explicit legal guarantee that the last word on our laws stays in Britain.
There is therefore a danger that, over time, our courts might come to regard ultimate authority as resting with the EU.
So as well as making sure that further power cannot be handed to the EU without a referendum, we will also introduce a new law, in the form of a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill, to make it clear that ultimate authority stays in this country, in our Parliament.
This is not about Westminster striking down individual items of EU legislation.
It is about an assurance that the final word on our laws is here in Britain.
It would simply put Britain on a par with Germany, where the German Constitutional Court has consistently upheld - including most recently on the Lisbon treaty - that ultimate authority lies with the bodies established by the German Constitution.
But people will rightly say that the Lisbon Treaty does not just transfer powers to Brussels today.
It allows further powers to be transferred in the future, because it contains a mechanism to abolish vetoes and transfer power without the need for a new Treaty.
We do not believe that any of these so-called ratchet clauses should be used to hand over more powers from Britain to the EU.
Furthermore, we would change the law so that any use of a ratchet clause by a future government would require full approval by Parliament.
These changes: the referendum lock, the Sovereignty Bill, stopping the use of ratchet clauses, all these changes can be put in place by our own Parliament.
They do not require the approval of our European partners - merely the sanction of the British people at the ballot box, which we will seek at the forthcoming General Election.
They will put in place real protection for our democracy – protections other countries have but which are missing here in Britain.
They would increase accountability, and they would ensure that the breach of trust committed by this Labour Government could never happen again.
Those two words – never again – will be on our leaflets, in our Manifesto: we will make sure that the British people remember who it was that broke their promise – Labour, and who it is that will stop this happening again – the Conservatives.
BRITISH GUARANTEES
But these measures are all about preventing problems in the future.
They don’t deal with the problems we are facing today, which will now be made worse by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.
In essence, these problems boil down to the steady and unaccountable intrusion of the European Union into almost every aspect of our lives.
A Conservative Government will address some of these problems by negotiating three specific guarantees with our European partners guarantees over powers that we believe should reside with Britain, not the EU.
First, social and employment legislation.
Of course, Britain used to have an opt-out from the Social Chapter: but Labour foolishly gave this up.
And today, too much EU legislation in this area is damaging both our economy and our public services.
So we will want to negotiate the return of Britain’s opt-out from social and employment legislation in those areas which have proved most damaging to our economy and public services for example the aspects of the Working Time Directive which are causing real problems in the NHS and the Fire Service.
The second British guarantee we will negotiate is over the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
We must be absolutely sure that this cannot be used by EU judges to re-interpret EU law affecting the UK.
Tony Blair claimed that his Government obtained an opt-out from the Charter.
But what he got – as the Government have now admitted - was simply a clarification of how it works in Britain.
We will want a complete opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The third area where we will negotiate for a return of powers is criminal justice.
We must be sure that the measures included in the Lisbon Treaty will not bring creeping control over our criminal justice system by EU judges.
We will want to prevent EU judges gaining steadily greater control over our criminal justice system by negotiating an arrangement which would protect it.
That will mean limiting the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction over criminal law to its pre-Lisbon level, and ensuring that only British authorities can initiate criminal investigations in Britain.
I recognise, of course, that taking back power in these areas, or negotiating arrangements that suit the UK, is not something we can do unilaterally.
It means changing the rules of an institution of which we are a member – changing rules that Britain has signed up to.
If we want to make changes, we will need to do that through negotiation with our European partners, and we will need the agreement of all twenty seven member states.
I also recognise that these are highly complex areas, where we need to think through the practical details with great care.
William Hague is now leading detailed work to examine precisely what we will need to change, and, if we win the next election, his work will draw on the specialised legal advice which the Government has available to it, as well as the expertise of officials from the Foreign Office and other relevant departments.
But success in these negotiations will establish an extremely important principle: that European integration is not a one way street and that powers can be returned from the EU to its member countries, a principle that was envisaged in the Laeken Declaration nearly a decade ago.
Let me be clear. Our guarantees are essential, realistic and deliverable.
Essential, because we have identified the areas of the Lisbon Treaty that cause the deepest concern, and the ones with greatest potential to interfere with our democracy.
Realistic, because we will propose that these British guarantees are added as protocols to a future accession treaty - like the recently concluded Irish guarantees.
And deliverable, because we have chosen areas where the return of powers from the EU to Britain protects our distinctive national interests without harming the interests of our European partners.
THE NEXT PARLIAMENT
So, yes, I believe we will be able to negotiate the return of the powers I have set out.
But no, we will not rush into some massive Euro-bust-up.
We will take our time, negotiate firmly, patiently and respectfully, and aim to achieve the return of the powers I have set out over the lifetime of a parliament.
I know some people will want me to go further, and faster. To them let me say this:
If we win the election, we will inherit the worst public finances of any incoming government for fifty years.
We will have a generational challenge to get Britain to live within her means, to secure economic recovery and to deliver this country from the appalling mess left by this Labour Government.
That has to come before anything else.
THE LONGER TERM
These steps: a referendum lock to prevent this ever happening again, and the return of a specific set of powers. I believe these things can stop Britain’s relationship with the EU from heading in the wrong direction.
Clearly we will be asked the question: what if you cannot get these guarantees and what if Europe continues to head in the wrong, centralising direction? Let me answer that question in advance.
Well, if that were to happen, then of course we can return to this subject in a manifesto for the parliament after the next one.
Let me be clear: this is not something we want to happen. Nor is it something we expect to happen.
But if those circumstances were to occur, we would not rule out a referendum on a wider package of guarantees to protect our democratic decision-making, while remaining, of course, a member of the European Union.
But that would be a judgement for the future, not for this election or for the next Parliament.
What I have set out today settles our policy for the next parliament.
CONCLUSION
I just want to conclude by saying something clearly to our European partners.
My purpose in committing any government I lead to these measures is not to frustrate or to sabotage the operation of the European Union.
It is to put Britain’s role in the EU on a more positive footing.
As we commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, we should remember that the European Union has done much to reconcile the painful division of Europe and to spread democracy and the rule of law across our continent.
But it should not rest on those achievements.
Today, European countries need to work together to combat global climate change, to fight global poverty, to boost global economic growth.
If I am elected Prime Minister, the British Government I lead will be an active member of the European Union.
On energy security, on climate change, on growth, on global poverty, we will look forward to working with our European partners to make progress on those issues.
We will press to keep the doors of the European Union open to new member states, especially to entrench stability in the Western Balkans where so much European blood has flowed, and also to Turkey.
We will stand for open markets, and a strong transatlantic relationship; an EU that looks out to the world, and that builds strong and open relations with rising powers like China and India.
We will want to see a tough financial settlement in the forthcoming negotiations on the EU budget, ensuring that Britain does not pay more than its fair share.
We will pay particular attention to the area of financial regulation, where we will be vigilant and tenacious in defending the competitiveness of the City of London.
Like every other Member State, we will fight our corner to advance our national interests.
But our guiding principles will be these: we believe Britain’s interests are best served by membership of a European Union that is an association of its member states, we will never allow Britain to slide into a federal Europe and that means we will watch closely how the Lisbon Treaty works out in practice.
We will put in place a referendum lock, so never again can a British government transfer powers to the EU without the people giving their consent in a referendum.
We will enact a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill, making clear that ultimate authority rests with our Parliament.
And we will negotiate for a specific set of British guarantees that are realistic, deliverable – and essential.
That is our programme for Government.
That is the mandate we will seek at the next election.
In this area – Britain’s relationship with Europe – what people want from their politicians is some straight talk and plain speaking.
They were told we were joining a Common Market and it turned out to be a European Union.
They were told they would have a say over the European constitution but that promise was broken.
People are fed up with the endless lies and spin, they just want to know what we can achieve and how.
That is what I will deliver.
I said we would leave the federalist group in the European Parliament and we did.
I said we would have a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty and if it hadn’t been ratified we would have had that referendum.
But I did not promise a referendum come what may because once the Lisbon Treaty is the law, there’s nothing anyone can do about it and I’m not going to treat people like fools and offer a referendum that has no effect.
What I am promising today is doable, credible, deliverable.
That’s what this is all about.
Giving the British people a policy on Europe that they can actually believe in.
***
I wonder if Cameron’s outline will satisfy the Conservative grass roots and at the reception the proposals will get from the EU member states and institutions.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read informed Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Britain and EU: Cameron’s exit route
What happens if the probable next Conservative government fails to charm the other EU member states into treaty changes further diminishing the United Kingdom’s patchy contribution to the European project?
What happens if the other EU member states decide to grin and bear it, if Britain turns to political blackmail in order to opt out of additional policy areas?
Sooner or later the Tory leaders would have to report back that they have failed. What could they do?
Would they have any alternative but to decide on the UK’s relation with the European Union (with or without a referendum)?
Is this the reason why some brainy anti-Europeans have remained relatively calm, leading David Cameron down the garden path towards an inevitable referendum on withdrawal?
Exit route
A referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is clearly nonsense, and has been for some time, but the Lisbon Treaty clearly says that the European Union is based on voluntary cooperation, by laying down the modalities for secession. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union tells us that the exit route is free:
***
No EUSSR
The European Union is no dictatorship, but a voluntary union of states (but with some democratic elements). No occupying forces, secret police or Gulag camps keep the countries or their citizens subdued.
If Britain, or any other member state, wants to leave, the treaty shows where to find the door. Staying or leaving is a British decision, to be taken under British rules.
Like any organisation, the European Union needs constructive and contributing members. Given Britain’s membership history and future prospects, it might be better if the UK left, for the others to get on with the work.
Does David Cameron really want a painful marathon, when he could head for the exit door today?
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read interesting Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
What happens if the other EU member states decide to grin and bear it, if Britain turns to political blackmail in order to opt out of additional policy areas?
Sooner or later the Tory leaders would have to report back that they have failed. What could they do?
Would they have any alternative but to decide on the UK’s relation with the European Union (with or without a referendum)?
Is this the reason why some brainy anti-Europeans have remained relatively calm, leading David Cameron down the garden path towards an inevitable referendum on withdrawal?
Exit route
A referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is clearly nonsense, and has been for some time, but the Lisbon Treaty clearly says that the European Union is based on voluntary cooperation, by laying down the modalities for secession. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union tells us that the exit route is free:
Article 50 TEU
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
***
No EUSSR
The European Union is no dictatorship, but a voluntary union of states (but with some democratic elements). No occupying forces, secret police or Gulag camps keep the countries or their citizens subdued.
If Britain, or any other member state, wants to leave, the treaty shows where to find the door. Staying or leaving is a British decision, to be taken under British rules.
Like any organisation, the European Union needs constructive and contributing members. Given Britain’s membership history and future prospects, it might be better if the UK left, for the others to get on with the work.
Does David Cameron really want a painful marathon, when he could head for the exit door today?
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read interesting Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Britain and EU: Cameron’s goodwill capital
Outside the United Kingdom, the Lisbon Treaty is seen in a positive light, as testified by the national governments and parliaments.
Before entering the government, the Tories have exasperated their European partners by leaving the mainstream Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament, establishing the anti-integrationist European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, by inciting president Vaclav Klaus to hold out on his Lisbon Treaty signature against the democratic approval by 27 national parliaments, by astounding the EU member states through declaring the possible nomination of Tony Blair as president of the European Council to be a hostile act, by transferring the new Europarty – the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) and its think tank (foundation) – in the hands of outspoken anti-EU MEPs, and by campaigning for further British “red lines” and opt-outs, with no consideration for contributing responsibly to the common project.
There are three main options to continue towards the outer edges of the European Union, or beyond: an amicable settlement, political extortion or exit.
Amicably: Further repatriation of EU powers to Britain has to find unanimous agreement between 27 member states, but what is the balance of the Tories’ goodwill capital to draw on?
Extortion: If a coming Conservative government opts for confrontation, are the 26 other EU member states really going to capitulate to political blackmail?
Exit: The Lisbon Treaty outlines the modalities.
Let us first look at the UK Conservative (British) situation as seen by outsiders, with the Lisbon Treaty factually ratified by all member states.
***
Transatlantic relations
The signals from the US-EU summit underline the importance of a European Union willing and able to act as one in the world.
AFP: Obama welcomes ‘strengthened’ EU (4 November 2009)
EUbusiness: Obama welcomes ‘strengthened’ EU (3 November 2009)
The Telegraph: Barack Obama praises EU’s Lisbon treaty agreement (3 November 2009)
Alla Dessa Dagar, Carl Bildt: En ny dag i Vita Huset (4 November 2009)
***
EU member states
A few news items convey the message that the member states of the European Union see the Lisbon Treaty as an important step forwards, even if that is abundantly clear from 27 ratifications.
European Voice, Toby Vogel: EU leaders hail treaty’s passage (3 November 2009)
EUbusiness: Swedish PM hails ‘very important’ EU treaty signing (3 November 2009)
EUbusiness: Sarkozy welcomes ‘great news’ for EU treaty (3 November 2009)
EUbusiness: EU under Lisbon treaty will be ‘more democratic’: Merkel (3 November 2009)
Czech Happenings: Most Czech politicians hail Klaus’s decision to sign Lisbon (3 November 2009)
Le Figaro: Les Tchèques signent le traité de Lisbonne (3 November 2009)
Renascença : « Tratado da Lisboa abre um novo ciclo », diz Sócrates (3 November 2009)
***
Euroblogs
The feeling among knowledgeable Eurobloggers seems to be that David Cameron is about to outline a policy, which will satisfy nobody and may lead nowhere.
Some argue that it might be better to arrange a clear In or Out referendum.
Coulisses de Bruxelles, Jean Quatremer: Les conservateurs britanniques vont-ils oser sortir de l’Union ? (3 November 2009)
The European Citizen, Conor Slowey: The Lisbon Treaty ratified: only months of speculation left! (3 November 2009)
Jason O’Mahony: The Big Tory EuroCon (4 November 2009)
Jon Worth: Some questions for David Cameron today (4 November 2009)
Verfassungsblog, Max Steinbeis: Lissabon: This is not over yet… [in German] (4 November 2009)
Erkan’s Field Diary, Erkan Saka: Lisbon era starts in Europe while Merkel makes her historic US address (4 November 2009)
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Educate yourself: Read interesting Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Before entering the government, the Tories have exasperated their European partners by leaving the mainstream Group of the European People’s Party (EPP) in the European Parliament, establishing the anti-integrationist European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, by inciting president Vaclav Klaus to hold out on his Lisbon Treaty signature against the democratic approval by 27 national parliaments, by astounding the EU member states through declaring the possible nomination of Tony Blair as president of the European Council to be a hostile act, by transferring the new Europarty – the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) and its think tank (foundation) – in the hands of outspoken anti-EU MEPs, and by campaigning for further British “red lines” and opt-outs, with no consideration for contributing responsibly to the common project.
There are three main options to continue towards the outer edges of the European Union, or beyond: an amicable settlement, political extortion or exit.
Amicably: Further repatriation of EU powers to Britain has to find unanimous agreement between 27 member states, but what is the balance of the Tories’ goodwill capital to draw on?
Extortion: If a coming Conservative government opts for confrontation, are the 26 other EU member states really going to capitulate to political blackmail?
Exit: The Lisbon Treaty outlines the modalities.
Let us first look at the UK Conservative (British) situation as seen by outsiders, with the Lisbon Treaty factually ratified by all member states.
***
Transatlantic relations
The signals from the US-EU summit underline the importance of a European Union willing and able to act as one in the world.
AFP: Obama welcomes ‘strengthened’ EU (4 November 2009)
EUbusiness: Obama welcomes ‘strengthened’ EU (3 November 2009)
The Telegraph: Barack Obama praises EU’s Lisbon treaty agreement (3 November 2009)
Alla Dessa Dagar, Carl Bildt: En ny dag i Vita Huset (4 November 2009)
***
EU member states
A few news items convey the message that the member states of the European Union see the Lisbon Treaty as an important step forwards, even if that is abundantly clear from 27 ratifications.
European Voice, Toby Vogel: EU leaders hail treaty’s passage (3 November 2009)
EUbusiness: Swedish PM hails ‘very important’ EU treaty signing (3 November 2009)
EUbusiness: Sarkozy welcomes ‘great news’ for EU treaty (3 November 2009)
EUbusiness: EU under Lisbon treaty will be ‘more democratic’: Merkel (3 November 2009)
Czech Happenings: Most Czech politicians hail Klaus’s decision to sign Lisbon (3 November 2009)
Le Figaro: Les Tchèques signent le traité de Lisbonne (3 November 2009)
Renascença : « Tratado da Lisboa abre um novo ciclo », diz Sócrates (3 November 2009)
***
Euroblogs
The feeling among knowledgeable Eurobloggers seems to be that David Cameron is about to outline a policy, which will satisfy nobody and may lead nowhere.
Some argue that it might be better to arrange a clear In or Out referendum.
Coulisses de Bruxelles, Jean Quatremer: Les conservateurs britanniques vont-ils oser sortir de l’Union ? (3 November 2009)
The European Citizen, Conor Slowey: The Lisbon Treaty ratified: only months of speculation left! (3 November 2009)
Jason O’Mahony: The Big Tory EuroCon (4 November 2009)
Jon Worth: Some questions for David Cameron today (4 November 2009)
Verfassungsblog, Max Steinbeis: Lissabon: This is not over yet… [in German] (4 November 2009)
Erkan’s Field Diary, Erkan Saka: Lisbon era starts in Europe while Merkel makes her historic US address (4 November 2009)
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Educate yourself: Read interesting Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Britain and EU: Crunch time for Cameron
Next we will get a cast-iron guarantee of prolonged institutional wrangling for the Conservative Party, Britain and the European Union, when David Cameron abandons his previous pledge to arrange a UK referendum on the EU’s Lisbon Treaty.
Later today, Tory leader David Cameron will present his party’s new policy on Europe, after his “fifth column”, Czech president Vaclav Klaus signed the ratification instrument of the Lisbon Treaty, democratically approved by the people of Ireland and 26 national parliaments. After the 27th and final ratification, the reform treaty is now set to enter into force from 1 December 2009.
British discussion
David Cameron and William Hague have been preparing the ground for shredding the referendum promise, because they have finally conceded that a plebiscite on the Lisbon Treaty has lost its meaning. This has not gone down well with the anti-EU press or with secessionist opinion, inside and outside the Conservative Party, because they have not promised a plebiscite on UK membership. The Tory government is in trouble long before it takes office.
The political parties accuse each other of broken promises, crusading media stir up anti-European emotion and the comments columns are filled with outcries against treachery.
For an outsider, it feels like a return to the dark ages of witch-hunts and pogroms to follow the EU discussion in Britain. Public opinion seems nearly totally disconnected from the European Union and European solidarity, indeed any sense of belonging or responsibility.
Whatever the Tory leadership says: prognosis pessima.
The Telegraph, Benedict Brogan: Doesn’t anyone get angry in the Tory party any more? (2 November 2009)
The Guardian, Nicholas Watt & Patrick Wintour: David Cameron to shed ‘cast iron’ pledge on Lisbon Treaty (3 November 2009)
The Guardian, Barry Legg: Cameron’s EU treaty treachery (3 November 2009)
The Telegraph, Rosa Prince: Grassroots Tories’ fury at David Cameron over Lisbon referendum (3 November 2009)
The Irish Times, Mark Hennessy: Cameron referendum musings return to haunt him (4 November 2009)
The Sun, Tom Newton-Dunn: Britain betrayed as hated EU treaty becomes law (4 November 2009)
Mail Online, David Davis: A referendum Mr Cameron COULD give the people (4 November 2009)
The Independent, Nigel Morris & Michael Savage: Czechs leave Cameron stranded over Lisbon treaty (4 November 2009)
Times Online, Francis Elliott & Philip Webster: Tories under pressure to hold referendum on EU reform after Lisbon backtrack (4 November 2009)
Times Online, editorial: Lisbon and After (4 November 2009)
Sky News, Jon Craig: David Cameron Denies Lisbon Treaty Sell-Out (4 November 2009)
***
Always Look on the Bright Side of Life
The public atmosphere in England is toxic enough to require a brighter end note, such as Nosemonkey’s “Liveblogging the Lisbon apocalypse” (3 November 2009).
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read interesting Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Later today, Tory leader David Cameron will present his party’s new policy on Europe, after his “fifth column”, Czech president Vaclav Klaus signed the ratification instrument of the Lisbon Treaty, democratically approved by the people of Ireland and 26 national parliaments. After the 27th and final ratification, the reform treaty is now set to enter into force from 1 December 2009.
British discussion
David Cameron and William Hague have been preparing the ground for shredding the referendum promise, because they have finally conceded that a plebiscite on the Lisbon Treaty has lost its meaning. This has not gone down well with the anti-EU press or with secessionist opinion, inside and outside the Conservative Party, because they have not promised a plebiscite on UK membership. The Tory government is in trouble long before it takes office.
The political parties accuse each other of broken promises, crusading media stir up anti-European emotion and the comments columns are filled with outcries against treachery.
For an outsider, it feels like a return to the dark ages of witch-hunts and pogroms to follow the EU discussion in Britain. Public opinion seems nearly totally disconnected from the European Union and European solidarity, indeed any sense of belonging or responsibility.
Whatever the Tory leadership says: prognosis pessima.
The Telegraph, Benedict Brogan: Doesn’t anyone get angry in the Tory party any more? (2 November 2009)
The Guardian, Nicholas Watt & Patrick Wintour: David Cameron to shed ‘cast iron’ pledge on Lisbon Treaty (3 November 2009)
The Guardian, Barry Legg: Cameron’s EU treaty treachery (3 November 2009)
The Telegraph, Rosa Prince: Grassroots Tories’ fury at David Cameron over Lisbon referendum (3 November 2009)
The Irish Times, Mark Hennessy: Cameron referendum musings return to haunt him (4 November 2009)
The Sun, Tom Newton-Dunn: Britain betrayed as hated EU treaty becomes law (4 November 2009)
Mail Online, David Davis: A referendum Mr Cameron COULD give the people (4 November 2009)
The Independent, Nigel Morris & Michael Savage: Czechs leave Cameron stranded over Lisbon treaty (4 November 2009)
Times Online, Francis Elliott & Philip Webster: Tories under pressure to hold referendum on EU reform after Lisbon backtrack (4 November 2009)
Times Online, editorial: Lisbon and After (4 November 2009)
Sky News, Jon Craig: David Cameron Denies Lisbon Treaty Sell-Out (4 November 2009)
***
Always Look on the Bright Side of Life
The public atmosphere in England is toxic enough to require a brighter end note, such as Nosemonkey’s “Liveblogging the Lisbon apocalypse” (3 November 2009).
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Read interesting Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Tuesday, 3 November 2009
Lisbon Treaty into force 1 December 2009?
Czech Happenings report that president Vaclav Klaus has signed the Lisbon Treaty this afternoon, after it was passed by the Czech Constitutional Court earlier today.
Acting prime minister Jan Fischer has said that he is prepared to countersign the Lisbon Treaty, so that it can enter into force from December.
***
Forward
It now looks as if the last ratification instrument will be deposited with the Italian government in Rome during November. If so, the Lisbon Treaty enters into force on the first day of the following month, i.e. 1 December 2009.
The Swedish presidency of the EU Council has promised to start formal consultation with regard to the president of the European Council and the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy on the day following Klaus’ signature, in other words tomorrow.
The leaders of the EU member states will probably meet at an extra European Council next week.
At the same time they need to discuss the nominations for the Commission with president-elect José Manuel Barroso, in order to set the stage for the hearings by the European Parliament, which must approve the new Commission as a body, before it can be formally appointed.
The old Commission and high representative Javier Solana should have been allowed to quit on 31 October, but they will probably have to continue until the end of the year.
In Britain, the Conservative Party leadership’s promise to arrange a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, as long as it has not entered into force – even if dependent only on the whim of a solitary man against the democratic will of 27 national parliaments – now adorns the scrap heap of history (save for the technical details).
According to news reports, Tory leader David Cameron is expected to announce the new party line tomorrow. It is going to be a difficult moment between the remaining shreds of Tory political realism with regard to Britain’s European partners and the anti-EU hardliners among the Conservative Party’s MPs and members as well as the British electorate.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Follow interesting Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Acting prime minister Jan Fischer has said that he is prepared to countersign the Lisbon Treaty, so that it can enter into force from December.
***
Forward
It now looks as if the last ratification instrument will be deposited with the Italian government in Rome during November. If so, the Lisbon Treaty enters into force on the first day of the following month, i.e. 1 December 2009.
The Swedish presidency of the EU Council has promised to start formal consultation with regard to the president of the European Council and the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy on the day following Klaus’ signature, in other words tomorrow.
The leaders of the EU member states will probably meet at an extra European Council next week.
At the same time they need to discuss the nominations for the Commission with president-elect José Manuel Barroso, in order to set the stage for the hearings by the European Parliament, which must approve the new Commission as a body, before it can be formally appointed.
The old Commission and high representative Javier Solana should have been allowed to quit on 31 October, but they will probably have to continue until the end of the year.
In Britain, the Conservative Party leadership’s promise to arrange a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, as long as it has not entered into force – even if dependent only on the whim of a solitary man against the democratic will of 27 national parliaments – now adorns the scrap heap of history (save for the technical details).
According to news reports, Tory leader David Cameron is expected to announce the new party line tomorrow. It is going to be a difficult moment between the remaining shreds of Tory political realism with regard to Britain’s European partners and the anti-EU hardliners among the Conservative Party’s MPs and members as well as the British electorate.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. Follow interesting Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu.
Monday, 2 November 2009
Conservative Europarty hijacked?
The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament joins 54 members, which is well above the needed 25, but only three countries have substantial delegations: the UK Conservatives (25 MEPs), the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS; 15) and the Czech Civic Democrats (ODS; 9). In addition, there are five solitary MEPs from five member states, which brings the number of countries represented to eight. This leaves the ECR with a slender margin above the minimum of seven countries.
The anti-integrationists have now set things in motion to start working as a political party at European level (Europarty) and to establish a foundation (think tank): Founding of the “Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR)” asbl/vzw (30 October 2009).
According to the ECR press release, the directorships have been transferred to the following MEP's: Mr. Jan Zahradil (President), Mr. Adam Bielan (Vice-President), and Mr. Dan Hannan (Secretary-General).
***
Hijacked?
In New Europe, Andy Carling reports that the transferral may have been more dramatic than a casual reader of the above press release would suspect: “A Right Wing Coup ─ Tory Euro-skeptics power grab endangers ECR Group and UK Election chances” (25 October 2009).
***
On Conservative Home, Tim Montgomerie has presented a blueprint for Tory policy, when the Lisbon Treaty is finally ratified by the last member state, the Czech Republic: “The Tories will NOT hold a referendum on Lisbon but seek a 'manifesto mandate' to renegotiate Britain's relationship with the EU” (1 November 2009).
As we are waiting for David Cameron and William Hague to detail their official “we won’t let matters rest there” formula, the news concerning the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) has added to the number of question marks concerning the UK Conservative Party’s policies on Europe.
How far from the mainstream and influence are they poised to move?
Ralf Grahn
The anti-integrationists have now set things in motion to start working as a political party at European level (Europarty) and to establish a foundation (think tank): Founding of the “Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR)” asbl/vzw (30 October 2009).
According to the ECR press release, the directorships have been transferred to the following MEP's: Mr. Jan Zahradil (President), Mr. Adam Bielan (Vice-President), and Mr. Dan Hannan (Secretary-General).
***
Hijacked?
In New Europe, Andy Carling reports that the transferral may have been more dramatic than a casual reader of the above press release would suspect: “A Right Wing Coup ─ Tory Euro-skeptics power grab endangers ECR Group and UK Election chances” (25 October 2009).
***
On Conservative Home, Tim Montgomerie has presented a blueprint for Tory policy, when the Lisbon Treaty is finally ratified by the last member state, the Czech Republic: “The Tories will NOT hold a referendum on Lisbon but seek a 'manifesto mandate' to renegotiate Britain's relationship with the EU” (1 November 2009).
As we are waiting for David Cameron and William Hague to detail their official “we won’t let matters rest there” formula, the news concerning the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) has added to the number of question marks concerning the UK Conservative Party’s policies on Europe.
How far from the mainstream and influence are they poised to move?
Ralf Grahn
Tuesday, 6 October 2009
Tory EU options
What is the UK Conservative Party going to do about Europe, except lobby against Tony Blair? The party conference in Manchester has thus far spread more confusion than light on Britain’s future relationship with or in the European Union, while the democratic approval of the Lisbon Treaty by all 27 EU member states has made the party line of a Lisbon Treaty referendum increasingly unrealistic.
***
Bruno Waterfield
In The Telegraph, Bruno Waterfield pierces the Conservative leadership’s veil of subterfuge on the Lisbon Treaty in ”The Tories must be more open on Europe” (5 October 2009). The time for hiding behind the ratification of the amending treaty is over:
“In reality, the Poles and Czechs have already ratified. The only thing that hasn’t happened is that their presidents have not signed an “instrument of ratification” to be deposited in Rome.
This is a formality. Nobody expects either president to defy both chambers of his country’s parliament by refusing to sign until a British general election. It is fantasy politics at best or dishonesty at worst to declare otherwise.”
***
Daniel Hannan
On the other hand, Daniel Hannan who is seen as a Conservative hardliner (and withdrawalist?) on Europe, caught his supporters by surprise with his sudden mellifluous expression of trust in David Cameron’s leadership towards a referendum on Europe, in “Euro-row? What Euro-row?” (The Telegraph, 5 October 2009).
Better than a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is:
“… to push for a wider repatriation of powers from Brussels to Westminster – not just the rights surrendered at Lisbon, but those surrendered at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice.”
According to Hannan, opt-outs concerning only Britain would be easier for other member states to accept, because they would not change the institutional structure for everyone else. Such a deal would be put to the British people in a referendum, and Hannan is hopeful that it will happen under the next Conservative government.
***
Stanley Crossick
In “British Conservatives: gazing in a rear-view mirror” (Blogactiv, 5 October 2009) Stanley Crossick notes that in an opinion poll only 3 per cent of Conservative Party members said that Britain should play a full part in building an ever closer union. (This happens to be the main purpose of European integration since the 1957 EEC Treaty.)
According to Crossick, securing opt-outs from existing policy areas is out of the question, as David Cameron and William Hague must surely know. This leaves Britain with three options:
“• To hold a referendum on whether the UK should leave the EU.
• To play a blocking role – eg on the budget – and try to force concessions.
• To ‘grin and bear it’.
The first choice is the only rational and honest one. The referendum would have to precede the negotiation of the terms of the withdrawal.
The second choice would destroy the UK’s reputation and would be irresponsible.
The third is the only feasible choice.
The paradox is that none of the major challenges facing the UK can be resolved solely at domestic level – economic recession, climate change, energy security, immigration, terrorism, international crime…
***
Comment
Bruno Waterfield is right about requiring an open, realistic and honest EU policy from the Conservative leadership.
Daniel Hannan’s “conversion” has sown confusion among his hard-line secessionist supporters, but it has probably decapitated a potential rebellion in Manchester.
From a European standpoint, Hannan’s indirect admission of the legitimacy of the aspirations of Britain’s EU partners is a welcome step.
As Crossick states, an In or Out referendum is the only rational and honest choice.
Destroying the UK’s reputation and irresponsibility seem to be minor concerns in the British EU debate. Left on the inside, Britain would continue to play a blocking role, to the detriment of the other member states.
‘To grin and bear it’ hardly depicts a constructive role. It could easily descend into Britain playing its multiple veto cards and resorting to extortion tactics. Would it be a wise choice for the other EU member states to keep an even more obstructionist Britain on board?
The Conservative Party, the British public, the member states of the European Union and EU citizens have a right to expect a clear EU policy from the Manchester conference, but only a constructive UK would be worth having in the European Union.
Ralf Grahn
***
Bruno Waterfield
In The Telegraph, Bruno Waterfield pierces the Conservative leadership’s veil of subterfuge on the Lisbon Treaty in ”The Tories must be more open on Europe” (5 October 2009). The time for hiding behind the ratification of the amending treaty is over:
“In reality, the Poles and Czechs have already ratified. The only thing that hasn’t happened is that their presidents have not signed an “instrument of ratification” to be deposited in Rome.
This is a formality. Nobody expects either president to defy both chambers of his country’s parliament by refusing to sign until a British general election. It is fantasy politics at best or dishonesty at worst to declare otherwise.”
***
Daniel Hannan
On the other hand, Daniel Hannan who is seen as a Conservative hardliner (and withdrawalist?) on Europe, caught his supporters by surprise with his sudden mellifluous expression of trust in David Cameron’s leadership towards a referendum on Europe, in “Euro-row? What Euro-row?” (The Telegraph, 5 October 2009).
Better than a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty is:
“… to push for a wider repatriation of powers from Brussels to Westminster – not just the rights surrendered at Lisbon, but those surrendered at Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice.”
According to Hannan, opt-outs concerning only Britain would be easier for other member states to accept, because they would not change the institutional structure for everyone else. Such a deal would be put to the British people in a referendum, and Hannan is hopeful that it will happen under the next Conservative government.
***
Stanley Crossick
In “British Conservatives: gazing in a rear-view mirror” (Blogactiv, 5 October 2009) Stanley Crossick notes that in an opinion poll only 3 per cent of Conservative Party members said that Britain should play a full part in building an ever closer union. (This happens to be the main purpose of European integration since the 1957 EEC Treaty.)
According to Crossick, securing opt-outs from existing policy areas is out of the question, as David Cameron and William Hague must surely know. This leaves Britain with three options:
“• To hold a referendum on whether the UK should leave the EU.
• To play a blocking role – eg on the budget – and try to force concessions.
• To ‘grin and bear it’.
The first choice is the only rational and honest one. The referendum would have to precede the negotiation of the terms of the withdrawal.
The second choice would destroy the UK’s reputation and would be irresponsible.
The third is the only feasible choice.
The paradox is that none of the major challenges facing the UK can be resolved solely at domestic level – economic recession, climate change, energy security, immigration, terrorism, international crime…
***
Comment
Bruno Waterfield is right about requiring an open, realistic and honest EU policy from the Conservative leadership.
Daniel Hannan’s “conversion” has sown confusion among his hard-line secessionist supporters, but it has probably decapitated a potential rebellion in Manchester.
From a European standpoint, Hannan’s indirect admission of the legitimacy of the aspirations of Britain’s EU partners is a welcome step.
As Crossick states, an In or Out referendum is the only rational and honest choice.
Destroying the UK’s reputation and irresponsibility seem to be minor concerns in the British EU debate. Left on the inside, Britain would continue to play a blocking role, to the detriment of the other member states.
‘To grin and bear it’ hardly depicts a constructive role. It could easily descend into Britain playing its multiple veto cards and resorting to extortion tactics. Would it be a wise choice for the other EU member states to keep an even more obstructionist Britain on board?
The Conservative Party, the British public, the member states of the European Union and EU citizens have a right to expect a clear EU policy from the Manchester conference, but only a constructive UK would be worth having in the European Union.
Ralf Grahn
Monday, 5 October 2009
UK’s EU referendum & Conservative Party
This week’s Conservative Party Conference is a challenge for party leader David Cameron and shadow foreign secretary William Hague, who try to postpone any meaningful announcement on a Tory policy on Europe.
The promised referendum on the Lisbon Treaty hangs on a thinning thread. After the Irish referendum, the amending treaty has been approved in all 27 member states. Despite the undoubted democratic legitimacy of the treaty, two presidential signatures are still needed for formal ratification.
Disregard for the democratic decisions of the member states of the European Union can hardly claim the moral high ground, and it will win no friends in the European capitals.
If the Treaty of Lisbon is finally ratified, as it should be, the Tory leadership has promised not to let matters rest.
Is the Manchester conference going to let the party leadership escape without saying more than previously?
Initiating negotiations for British opt-outs from the EU’s employment and social policies (and the Lisbon Treaty reforms) may be unrealistic, and would probably be resisted by the other member states, without satisfying increasingly secessionist opinion among the Tory MPs and grassroots.
***
The European Citizen blog wonders “Does time heal all policy wounds?” (4 October 2009). The Tories’ European policy can easily be identified as Euroskeptic, but it is harder to see the actual goal of the policy. Cameron has to make a choice. He will be dogged by the issue if he can’t deliver.
***
The Next Left blog of the Fabian Society looks at anti-EU opinion among top UK Conservative blogs in ”Tory blogosphere would get Britain out of EU” (4 October 2009). Many Conservative high profile voices see a battle over the Lisbon Treaty as just one skirmish in a wider war on UK withdrawal.
***
David Cameron and William Hague must establish a real EU policy, because the European Union is not going away.
Hiding behind a Lisbon referendum is no substitute for a real policy.
It is questionable if enough top-down pressure can be applied to keep the party conference patiently waiting.
Even if the Conservative party leadership manages to leave Manchester unscathed, it will at best be a short reprieve.
The UK Conservative Party cannot in good faith ask for the keys to government without a credible policy on the European Union.
Ralf Grahn
The promised referendum on the Lisbon Treaty hangs on a thinning thread. After the Irish referendum, the amending treaty has been approved in all 27 member states. Despite the undoubted democratic legitimacy of the treaty, two presidential signatures are still needed for formal ratification.
Disregard for the democratic decisions of the member states of the European Union can hardly claim the moral high ground, and it will win no friends in the European capitals.
If the Treaty of Lisbon is finally ratified, as it should be, the Tory leadership has promised not to let matters rest.
Is the Manchester conference going to let the party leadership escape without saying more than previously?
Initiating negotiations for British opt-outs from the EU’s employment and social policies (and the Lisbon Treaty reforms) may be unrealistic, and would probably be resisted by the other member states, without satisfying increasingly secessionist opinion among the Tory MPs and grassroots.
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The European Citizen blog wonders “Does time heal all policy wounds?” (4 October 2009). The Tories’ European policy can easily be identified as Euroskeptic, but it is harder to see the actual goal of the policy. Cameron has to make a choice. He will be dogged by the issue if he can’t deliver.
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The Next Left blog of the Fabian Society looks at anti-EU opinion among top UK Conservative blogs in ”Tory blogosphere would get Britain out of EU” (4 October 2009). Many Conservative high profile voices see a battle over the Lisbon Treaty as just one skirmish in a wider war on UK withdrawal.
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David Cameron and William Hague must establish a real EU policy, because the European Union is not going away.
Hiding behind a Lisbon referendum is no substitute for a real policy.
It is questionable if enough top-down pressure can be applied to keep the party conference patiently waiting.
Even if the Conservative party leadership manages to leave Manchester unscathed, it will at best be a short reprieve.
The UK Conservative Party cannot in good faith ask for the keys to government without a credible policy on the European Union.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 23 July 2009
For a nationalist Britain without allies
This is the Britain Europe, the United States and the rest of the world should expect, when the Conservative Party takes the reins of government in the United Kingdom, as set out by William Hague 21 July 2009:
“It is now widely understood that the financial and economic challenges to be faced by the government elected at the coming general election will be of extraordinary magnitude.
With the government's deficit as a proportion of national income running at its highest since the end of the Second World War there is no doubt that the principal legacy of the current government to its successors and to the next generation will be debt, and debt on a scale that will take many years to scale back.
Yet amidst all the attention rightly given to the massive economic challenges facing the next government, we must not neglect the need to focus at the same time on mounting external challenges which go beyond the economic sphere but which will be all the more difficult to deal with at a time when resources will necessarily be so constrained.
Any informed assessment of likely trends in world affairs over the next decade, on which our whole national future heavily depends, is a sobering one. While optimism, hope and faith in human nature must always be present in our approach to these issues we nevertheless have to recognise that the outlook in foreign affairs, just as much as in economic affairs, will require all the ability, energy and focus we can bring to it and that the pattern of events we might expect leads unmistakably and uncomfortably to a world environment in which it will be more difficult for this country and its traditional allies to achieve their foreign policy goals unless we improve the way we go about them.
Yet this country continues to possess great assets and advantages, among them a skilled and highly regarded diplomatic corps, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a bipartisan approach to certain aspects of foreign policy which has provided continuity and certainty over time, an exceptionally strong relationship with the United States of America, a major role in the affairs of the European Union, historic links with many nations outside North America and Europe, many of which are formalised in the Commonwealth, and the enormous but less tangible influence that comes from being a global trading nation and the home of one of the great languages of humanity. We also have the immense advantage of armed forces that are considered around the world to be among the finest it is possible to possess, although currently under grievous strain. The net result of such advantages is that Britain still carries far more clout in the world than its current share of the world population would suggest.
Such assets should always give us confidence and the fortifying knowledge that the foundations exist for building up British influence in selected areas if we chose to do so. At the same time, the advent of the kind of international co-operation at least discussed at recent summits of the G20, and of a new United States administration with a multilateral approach to foreign policy that provides other nations with a fresh opportunity to respond positively, both give some cause for optimism in international relations. It is not unreasonable at least to hope for advances in the Middle East Peace Process, for success in a new approach in Afghanistan, for a better era in US-Russia relations and for a more constructive response to the international community from the leadership of Iran, or a more determined effort by the international community to overcome Iranian intransigence, and while the prospect of any of these hopes coming to fruition survives it is vital for America's allies to work hard to bring that about for the good of all.
So as we survey the world's changing landscape there is no need for any of us to despair. Yet equally it would be a mistake to allow our current hopes to obscure the longer-term trends which, whatever the ups and downs of any given year, are likely to make it harder for a country such as Britain to pursue a chosen policy and to protect its interests and citizens. Looking a decade or two ahead, powerful forces of economics and demography elsewhere in the world will make it harder for us to maintain our influence. Conventional assumptions about what Britain and its main partners can readily achieve in world affairs will be eroded. And the likelihood of this happening is sufficiently great, and the challenge it will present sufficiently daunting, that it is vital we understand it and equip ourselves for it now. Simply put, Britain stands to lose a good deal of its ability to shape world affairs unless we decide we will not accept that and are prepared to do what is needed.
That there may be turbulent times ahead is a common thread running through most analyses of the next few decades. The recent report on national security by the IPPR, Shared Responsibilities, a national security strategy for the UK argued that "we have to learn to live in a more complex, less predictable environment, facing a broader spread of risks, with greater interdependence and reduced government power".
There are many specific reasons why the world looks likely to be a more dangerous rather than less dangerous place in the coming decades. For previous generations such increased danger usually occurred because of the rise of a single, dominant adversary. This is not the case in the first half of the twenty-first century, which looks likely to be characterised instead by growing political, economic and military uncertainty.
The first factor bringing such insecurity is the prevalence of state failure, the collapse of government in a country bringing vastly enhanced opportunities to develop terrorist networks, private armies, organised crime and links between all of them.
Indeed, so serious is this contagion that we may now need to speak of the emergence of what may come to be called failed or failing regions. This applies particularly to the Horn of Africa but could also apply to Afghanistan and Pakistan unless our efforts to turn the tide there succeed. This new phenomenon of failing regions will have serious consequences for our already struggling capability to reverse the decline of crumbling states, just as globalisation means that the threats within these regions cannot be easily contained.
A second factor, growing directly from the first, is the increasingly transnational dimension of terrorism. A terrorist today, for instance, may be a citizen of Somalia, who was educated in Yemen, has been trained in Pakistan and may be fighting in Afghanistan or attempting to commit a terrorist attack on the streets of Britain. This vastly complicates the task of identifying and stopping those who would attack us and requires unprecedented cooperation with our allies.
Third, and again related to the other two is the changing character of conflict from conventional to irregular warfare, exemplified by the Improvised Explosive Devices that have claimed most of the British lives lost in Afghanistan and Iraq - undermining traditional military power, redefining military victory and challenging the assumption that victory on the battlefield can be swiftly be followed by development and 'nation' building. As David Kilcullen has put it in The Accidental Guerrilla, "Given overwhelming US conventional superiority, and contrary to the pre-9/11 conventional wisdom...it turns out that adversaries do not give up the armed struggle under these conditions: rather, any smart enemy goes unconventional; and most enemies are likely to continue doing so, until we demonstrate the ability to prevail in irregular conflicts such as those we are currently engaged in."
These three factors feed on and are fed by the extent of chronic poverty within the developing world which means that, despite the economic success of many developing countries, roughly 1 billion people are not only being left behind but are falling further behind, described by Paul Collier in his landmark book The Bottom Billion as "a billion people stuck in a train that is slowly rolling downhill". Poverty is not, of course, either a justification or an explanation for terrorism. But it does help to make such countries havens for threats to our national security which may include not only terrorism, but illegal trafficking and pandemic disease.
Failed states and widespread poverty are problems growing today but are scarcely new in human history. But on top of these problems, worrying enough in themselves, come two central challenges which are immense in their scope and which the world has never had to face before. The first of these is the risk of irreversible climate change. In some cases this brings a threat to the very existence of nations, as is brought home if you listen to the new and eloquent President of the Maldives describe the predicament of a country no part of which is more than six feet above sea level. A study by the UN environment programme found that the war in Darfur, one of the horrific conflicts of our times, has been driven by climate change and environmental degradation. It is easy to see how shortages of water could lead to tension and even conflict between nations. Unless enough action is taken quickly enough this phenomenon looks set to cause wars, disease, starvation or the laying waste of entire regions. It is therefore in our national interest to move to a genuinely low-carbon economy and act with our international partners to reach agreement on a successor treaty to Kyoto to reduce global emissions, keep global temperature rises below 2 degrees Celsius and avoid catastrophic climate change.
The second new and potentially immensely destabilising force is the spread of nuclear science. Civil nuclear energy can bring immense benefits to humanity and indeed provide part of the answer to the challenge of climate change. But the global spread of nuclear technology and materials threatens a new age of nuclear insecurity involving a rash of new nuclear weapons states or even the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists, a risk which may grow in parallel to their possible possession of chemical or biological devices. And as in the case of climate change, decisions taken in the next year or two will be crucial in determining whether this colossal risk can be minimised. After that it may be too late, for the alarming features of these two central threats are not only that they are new, and not only that their consequences are unknowable, but also that they are almost certainly not reversible once they have happened.
The list of worrying factors is by no means exhaustive: one only has to think of the many risks involved in energy security to add a further dimension, but the overall trends are clear and worrying enough. This troubling scenario is bad enough in itself, but the outlook from London, and to varying degrees from other European capitals, is further compounded in its grimness when it is understood that the relative economic power of many Western nations is in decline.
Economic success makes a big difference to foreign policy influence and sometimes quite quickly so. The economic renaissance of Britain in the 1980s undoubtedly reinforced the influence of British ministers on world affairs, something which Tony Blair was happy to enjoy while his then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was busily ruining that very renaissance. One of the damaging effects of Gordon Brown's catastrophic stewardship of Britain's finances, and of additionally reducing Britain from second to twelfth place in the international league of competitiveness according to the World Economic Forum, is the diminishing of our economic power and by extension the effectiveness of our international role.
Such additional short-term decline is exasperating because it is so unnecessary, but on top of that the huge expansion of economies such as those of China and India means that in our working lifetimes the size of the European economies relative to the rest of the world looks set to shrink dramatically. The European Commission's own projections have shown Europe's share of the world economy declining from 18% now to 10% by 2050. And even the United States is not immune from the effect of economic problems.
This diminished economic weight will have a major impact on the ability of Western nations to achieve their foreign policy goals. For instance, we are used to the idea of calling for economic sanctions against nations whose human rights records we find unacceptable, South Africa under apartheid being the celebrated cause of the effect that sanctions can have. Now we apply them to recalcitrant regimes in Burma, Zimbabwe and Iran, and indeed we may be coming very close to the time when much tougher sanctions on Iran are needed in the light of her nuclear programme. Yet it is already clear that the power of such economic weapons is declining and it follows from this analysis that it will decline much further in the years to come.
What is more, much of the economic weight in the world is passing to countries which either do not fully share our concepts of democracy and human rights or for their own reasons are opposed to interventionist approaches to foreign policy. China, which I will discuss later, is an obvious case. In recent weeks the Western boycott of financial support for Zimbabwe, designed to isolate Mugabe and encourage a democratic transition has been undermined by China's decision to provide that country with a $1 billion credit line. China gave robust support to the Sri Lankan government in the recent war, and Western countries proved unable to pass a resolution in the UN Human Rights Council calling for an investigation into alleged human rights abuses in the conflict there. India, another rising power, and the world's most populous democracy, is nevertheless traditionally not inclined to support our Western inclination to promote human rights through economic pressure and sometimes military intervention. Nor are many of the other growing economic power centres in the world, whether in Brazil or the Gulf.
Not only is the world not converging around our own democratic norms - according to the Freedom House 2009 survey, global freedom suffered its third year of decline in 2008 - but newly powerful democratic nations do not necessarily share our view of how to conduct foreign policy. In Britain, "Liberal interventionism" has generated much debate but to varying degrees all of us have subscribed to it. The economic sanctions I have mentioned have all enjoyed consensus political support, as have the military interventions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, Iraq being a much more controversial case but nevertheless heavily supported at the time. We are all agreed that we would try to intervene if another Rwanda were predicted and would like to do more in Darfur. But in the years and decades to come, the rise of other nations will constrain our ability to act in this way.
A further constraint will come in the form of tightly controlled military budgets. The extreme pressures on our own defence budget obviously necessitate a strategic defence review, which an incoming Conservative government will certainly undertake. It is crucial that such a review is informed by the changing pattern of threats I have described rather than financial considerations alone. France is also busily engaged in reshaping its armed forces. But beyond Britain and France there is no sign of other European nations making a serious effort to develop greater military capabilities. Indeed it is our criticism of EU defence arrangements that they too often involve the "rehatting" or duplication of NATO structures - just calling something European does not mean it has actually enhanced Europe's ability to act.
Does this background of a decline in our relative economic base and severe constraints on our military capabilities mean that we simply accept a much diminished role in world affairs? The United Kingdom has engaged before in major, conscious acts of strategic shrinkage, such as the withdrawal from the East of Suez after 1968. But the Conservative Party's answer to whether further such shrinkage will be right for Britain's international role in the decade to come is no. True, as a nation we will have to accustom ourselves to there being more situations which we dislike but cannot directly change but it is our contention that Britain must seek to retain her influence wherever possible and in some places seek to extend it. We must not disconsolately cease to make the effort. Foreign policy is above all about the protection and promotion of our national interest, and even narrowly defined, the British national interest requires our continued fully active engagement in world affairs since all the threatening factors I have listed are a threat to the interests of this country. No other nation or group of nations are going to increase the protection they afford us, and the essential alliances we enjoy with the United States and European nations depend directly on us continuing to do a great deal for ourselves.
In its broadest sense, what we might call our "enlightened national interest" requires British global engagement too. Britain will be safer if our values are strongly upheld and widely respected in the world. Nor would Britain ever be happy as a nation if we partly or largely retired from trying to influence world events. The citizens of Britain have always been restless in trying to improve the wider world and global in our outlook. We have always been at the forefront of international charity, development aid, and the welcoming of refugees. Two hundred years ago it was the Royal Navy that helped to drive the slave trade from the high seas and our parliament led the way even then in challenging the excesses of colonial rule. It is not in our character to have a foreign policy without a conscience: to be idle or uninterested while others starve or murder each other in their millions is not for us.
That is why David Cameron and I have spoken in recent years of our approach to foreign affairs being based on "Liberal Conservatism" in that we believe in freedom, human rights and democracy and want to see more of these things in other nations. But Conservative, because we believe strongly in the continued relevance of the nation state and are sceptical of grand utopian schemes to re-make the world. As David Cameron said: "My instinct is to work patiently with the grain of human nature; with the flow of culture, tradition and history."
We are conscious that our international role is no isolated subject. In such a changed world, with such stark threats, how we react to them and how Britain uses its abilities is a crucial part of who we are as a country, how we regard ourselves, and what it will mean in the next generation to be British.
So if Britain is to continue to be globally engaged in a meaningful and influential sense, albeit with a more realistic sense of the possible on how rapidly nations can be built or democracy entrenched, how on earth are we going to do it? The answer to that will constitute our approach to foreign policy, and it must necessarily involve using our resources more effectively, increasing our knowledge of other countries and often strengthening relations with them and launching and sustaining certain initiatives over many years. In January 2007 in my speech at Chatham House I set out five themes for the foreign policy of the next Conservative government. Two and a half years on they remain valid against the background I have described but it is now time to update them.
The first of these themes is learning from past mistakes to improve the decision-making of British government itself. I have already mentioned the need for a strategic defence review, and it is consistent with what I have argued that this must be focused not on whether Britain should be able to project military force elsewhere in the world but how it will do so. It is not the purpose of this speech to pre-empt in any way that review. But I wish to make clear now, first that it will be a defence and national security review, covering all aspects of Britain's security and not just the Armed Forces; second that it will be guided by the requirements of foreign policy and not solely by financial constraints; and third that we will not shrink from adapting our future Armed Forces for this changed world.
Good decision-making also requires the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be in its rightful place at the centre of decision- making. It is our intention to take a close interest not only in its day-to-day decisions but in its future as a great institution, able to attract the finest talent and, while it cannot have a monopoly of knowledge or expertise to be at the centre of Britain's thinking about and development of relationships with other nations. In my view, the sofa-style decision-making of Labour's Downing Street has often prevented it from taking this role.
The recent badly handled announcement of the Iraq War Inquiry was a classic example of decisions made hurriedly in Downing Street which the Foreign Secretary was then left to defend, underlining the fact that in modern government the Foreign Office can only exercise its proper influence if there is a close political and personal relationship between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.
A Conservative government will establish a real National Security Council as a Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister or in his absence by the Foreign Secretary. This will bring together on a regular basis the work of the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Department for International Development and Ministers responsible for other relevant matters such as Energy. We intend this not to be a new bureaucracy but a centre of decision-making and we understand that it will only work if it is treated as such, buttressed by cross-departmental teams supporting it and covering the whole range of national security issues, not only defence and foreign policy.
The attempt by the Brown government to create a National Security apparatus in response to our demand for one has been a pitiful failure, typical, even in this vital area, of the prevalence of short-term gimmicks over sustained effort in the current administration. The National Security Committee, announced with much fanfare in July 2007 met only three times in the twenty months that followed; the Prime Minister's National Security Forum has had no discernable impact at all; and since the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy was announced a year ago its members have not even been appointed. This chronic failure to institutionalise cross-departmental working is in our view a serious impediment to the successful execution of foreign and security policies, and it is an urgent priority to rectify it. The recent decision of the US administration to institute a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review should be examined as a possibility for this country too.
The second of our crucial themes is our commitment to the transatlantic alliance, which David Cameron and I have long argued should be "solid but not slavish" in its nature. In our view, the high points of Anglo-American co-operation in the last century have been when there was not only a close relationship between British and American leaders but also the readiness to conduct a vigorous debate between them. That indeed is how we have conducted ourselves: while being absolutely clear that whether it be in matters of intelligence, nuclear weapons, diplomacy or commerce, the close alliance with the United States is and will remain indispensable to the United Kingdom. We have also imparted a frank message when needed. In my first speech as Shadow Foreign Secretary, in Washington in February 2006, I argued that in standing up for the rule of law we must be careful not to employ methods that undermine it and that reports of prisoner abuse and of extraordinary rendition flights leading to the torture of suspects resulted in a loss of goodwill towards America as serious to us all as the sharpest of military defeats.
The Conservative Party fully supports the foreign policy initiatives so far undertaken by the Obama administration and we are ready to work with our counterparts in Washington from the opening moments of a new government in Britain. Central to that work, and the single most urgent priority in foreign policy if and when we come to government will be the American, British and wider NATO commitment in Afghanistan.
The Conservative Party supports the deployment of our armed forces in Afghanistan. Let me be clear that we are not in Afghanistan to conquer that country but to bring about a situation where Afghans can provide for their own security and livelihoods while not presenting a danger to the rest of the world. In consequence we believe our political objectives in Afghanistan should be tightly drawn and regularly reviewed, and that ever greater priority needs to be attached to the role of the Afghan forces. Currently only 10% of them are deployed in Helmand even though 40% of the fighting is there. Everyone knows that NATO forces cannot be in Afghanistan forever, but the acceleration of the training and building up of the Afghan army would mean time would work against the Taliban instead of in their favour.
Alongside our priority to bring success to Afghanistan will be the emphasis we give to working with our international allies and friends to help Pakistan transform itself into a stable, prosperous, and democratic state, capable of controlling terrorist threats inside and outside its borders, committing to a secure Afghanistan, and actively working to limit the extent of further nuclear proliferation. The multiplicity of British connections to Pakistan, through hundreds of thousands of families as well as Pakistan's leaders, gives Britain a particular role in supporting Pakistan's democratic future.
We will also seek to buttress American efforts to give new impetus to the Middle East Peace Process, emphasising the need for a freeze on all Israeli settlement activity and adherence to the Quartet Principles by all Palestinian leaders as essential prerequisites for successful negotiations. We will also continue the process I began on our own behalf two years ago of robust dialogue with Syria, working to edge her towards playing a constructive role in the region and closer to a lasting peace deal with Israel.
The third vital theme of Conservative Foreign Policy is the freshening and deepening of alliances outside Europe and North America, an approach which is vital to the maintenance of British influence in the world given the trends in world affairs I outlined earlier. On his visit to India in 2006 David Cameron said he believed it was time for Britain and India to forge a new special relationship, focusing particularly on fighting terrorism, protecting the environment and globalisation. He said, "For too long, politics in this country has been obsessed with Europe and America. Of course these relationships are, and will continue to be, vital. But serious and responsible leadership in the twenty-first century means engaging with far greater energy in parts of the world where Britain's strategic interests will increasingly lie."
India is also a leading member of the Commonwealth, an organisation which in our view has been neglected and undervalued under the Labour government in Britain. In last year's strategy document from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the only mention of the Commonwealth was in the title, "Foreign and Commonwealth Office". While we must be realistic about what such a diverse organisation can achieve, its extraordinary diversity nevertheless offers some strengths: it is a unique network of fifty-three countries spanning five continents and with thirty percent of the world's population. We believe the Commonwealth is a tool to be picked up and used more often, in particular, to tackle inter-faith dialogue and conflict prevention. A good example of how it could be used is to encourage it to take a leading role in addressing state failure, like co-ordinating a future rehabilitation package for its former member Zimbabwe.
Yet the Commonwealth is not the only group of countries where we can recreate historic connections on a new, modern basis. I have long-argued that Britain should embark on the elevation of its links with many of the countries of the Middle East and Gulf, not only diplomatically but in matters of culture, education, commerce and security, and that this should be done as a cross-party, cross-government initiative pursued consistently over many years. It is strategically vital to strengthen Britain's links with many friendly Muslim nations and not only in the Gulf, and not only for political reasons, since it is vital to make the most of opportunities to expand our trade and investment. It is this kind of all-round strengthening of our links with allies, as well as dealing with potential threats, that our co-ordinated national security is designed approach is designed to help us achieve.
Critics of a closer relationship with some Muslim states will say that they do not conform to all of our own democratic and liberal values, but it is a vital part of understanding the world we are facing in the coming decades that we will not be able to prescribe the form of government in all the countries with whom we need friendly relations. British leaders will rightly always argue that democracy and freedom are the soundest basis for national security and international peace for other countries as well as our own. Yet in foreign policy idealism must always be tempered with realism: even those countries like many of the Gulf States, which are making democratic reforms, will do so at varying paces and sometimes over an extended period.
Similarly, it is in our strategic national interest to have an effective and strong relationship with China. Relations with China are often characterised by tensions over human rights. Our approach has always been to be consistent in raising such issues and not to shrink from debating them with Chinese leaders. At the same time, however, if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons and the urgency of dealing with climate change are the greatest threats to the future of humanity, we must acknowledge that we cannot hope to solve these problems without working closely with China's leaders. A Conservative government will therefore promote sustained dialogue and close understanding with China and a relationship in which, even where there is sharp disagreement, neither side will walk away.
It is similarly not in Britain's national interest to be in permanent confrontation with Russia, but a sustained improvement in those relations will require a major effort on both sides. I make no criticism of the Labour government for its poor relations with Russia, for a wide range of issues ranging from the invasion of Georgia through the treatment of the British Council to the Litvinenko murder have made improved relations impossible in recent years. Britain must remain firm in its belief that countries such as the Ukraine and Georgia must be free to determine their futures. Nevertheless, the "reset button" pressed by Hillary Clinton provides the opportunity for improved relations between Moscow and other Western capitals. Again, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue very difficult to deal with without a working relationship with Russia. It is in Russia's national interest too for such issues to be dealt with, and to work more effectively with the US, Britain and other Western nations. With a Conservative government the door will be open to improved relations with Russia. We shall see if a door opens in return.
The fourth theme of Conservative foreign policy is one in which the cross-party consensus in Britain is very strong: the effective reform of global institutions to allow international co-operation in the face of the threats I have outlined to be enhanced.
This is clearly true in the economic area, where the focus of economic decision-making clearly needs to shift more to bodies such as the G20, and it is true of the United Nations, on which the Conservative Party share the view of the current government that the Security Council should be reformed to include permanent membership for Germany, Japan, Brazil, India and African representation. We have no illusions, however, about how difficult it will be to bring this about.
The European Union is also one of the institutions which must adapt to the changing distribution of world economic and political weight. This is not a speech about European policy: our belief that the European Union needs to focus on the issues of global competitiveness, global poverty and climate change is well known, as is our opposition to the greater centralisation of power in the EU, as embodied in the Lisbon Treaty. We see that Treaty as leading to institutional conflict within the EU, for instance, between the President and the High Representative on Foreign Policy, and a loss of democratic decision-making in nation states, a profound problem that the German Constitutional Court raised in its recent decision on the Lisbon Treaty. Institutional centralisation will not supply, and is even displacement activity for, what Europe really needs to develop in world affairs, which is the political will to use its collective weight effectively and a focus on practical results.
This is true of its relations with Russia, but also starkly true of the situation in the Balkans, where the EU is often failing to exert itself effectively even in relation to countries which many of us hope will one day be its members. There have been many positive developments, but some of the countries of the Western Balkans, most notably Bosnia-Herzegovina, are still tilting unsteadily between their past and their future. A lack of persistent international focus on the region until these countries are fully and irreversibly on the path to joining the EU and NATO could turn the successes of the last decade into the failure of this decade.
A Conservative government will work particularly to sharpen the European focus on the Balkans which we will see as a major test of what the EU can accomplish in foreign affairs. As Lord Ashdown put it last year in his article, Europe needs a wake-up call, Bosnia is on the edge again, "With an EU military force still here, an EU Special Representative with Executive Powers, a huge EU aid budget and a full-scale EU police mission, the EU has more leverage in Bosnia than in any other country. What will it say about the EU's pretensions if we will not act effectively to stop this bust-up happening?" Grand visions and ambitions are vain if the EU cannot demonstrate effectiveness in its common policies in its immediate neighbourhood.
It is vital too that the EU does not give up on enlargement. A European Union without the Western Balkans would forever have a disillusioned and disenchanted hole near its centre. And a Europe that turned its back on Turkey would have made an immense strategic error.
The effective reform of international institutions also includes the updating of international treaties, of which by far the most important is the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, due for a major review conference in April and May next year, quite possibly at the same time as our general election. In the last three years I have given two lectures here at the IISS on what needs to be done to strengthen this treaty and the powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency, proposals I have discussed with the new US administration and which are very much in line with President Obama's crucial speech in Prague in April.
This may well be the main opportunity to fend off the nightmare vision of the effective collapse of the Treaty and the rapid spread of nuclear weapons, a nightmare which would see the Middle East, the world's most unstable region, festooned with the world's most destructive devices. In my view the current British government have been slow to develop ideas and provide international leadership on the reform of the NPT, leaving it until the end of their third term and the approach of the review conference to push any determined initiative of their own. The future of this Treaty also requires the maximum possible effort to persuade or deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons capability.
Again we have long-argued for a new American opening to Iran that has indeed now been made, but also that it will need to be followed if unsuccessful by far tougher European economic measures to show Iran that there is a serious price to its defiance of the international community. Twenty years from now European sanctions may count for much less, but today they still matter and securing such a policy is one of the highest possible priorities for whoever is the British Foreign Secretary at the end of this year and early next.
The fifth and final theme of a Conservative approach to foreign affairs is that, faced with so many threats to our society and our security, it is essential for us in Britain to uphold our own highest values. I have accepted in this speech that our power to dictate to other countries how they should uphold democracy or human rights may actually diminish over time. In many ways this makes it all the more important for Britain to be among those countries that sets an example that can be inspiring to people across the world who are denied liberty or power over their own lives, just as it may encourage in the right direction those who have that power.
Two hundred years ago, in his most famous and shortest speech, my hero William Pitt The Younger said, "England has saved herself by her exertions and will I trust save Europe by her example". In the future we will have to recognise that if our exertions may not always have the desired effect, our example must never be absent. This means that a British government must always be an advocate for political freedom, human rights in their broadest not just legalistic sense, free trade, and democratic decision-making. We must always understand that terrorists who are motivated by contempt for our society will only be strengthened if we weaken the values that hold it together, a consideration of huge importance when we consider recent allegations of complicity in torture.
Our values also include playing a pre-eminent role in the eradication of poverty and the spread of prosperity to less fortunate nations. We fully support President Obama's vision of engagement in Africa which is measured by "more than just the dollars we spend" but "whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change". We have to work with African countries so that aid and investment are a force for economic growth and political stability rather than a permanent lifeline that just helps the needy scrape by. Our conscience and our common humanity dictate that we must help those at the mercy of disease, conflict and poverty. That is why David Cameron has reaffirmed our commitment to spending 0.7% of Gross National Income on aid by 2013.
However aid should not be the only driver of our policy towards Africa. We must focus on good governance and fostering the democratic institutions - the courts, civil society and police forces - that are the bedrock of more prosperous societies and the resolving of differences without resort to the gun. In this context development, along with effective diplomacy, is one of the tools of conflict prevention and needs to be used more effectively. We will be conscious that relatively small sums of money spent on conflict prevention can avert the need to spend vast sums on intervention or reconstruction aid, and is in alignment with our moral and well as national security duties.
An approach to foreign policy based on British values also means that the work of organisations such as the British Council will remain essential, and that the foreign language services of the BBC should always be promoted and defended. These organisations are not part of our implementing our foreign policy, but they are an important part of Britain's contribution to openness and understanding in world affairs.
These then are the foreign policy priorities that a new Conservative government would bring with it: a major change to our decision-making; the nourishing of the transatlantic alliance; the freshening and deepening of new relationships beyond America and Europe; a determination to assist the reform of international institutions and treaties; and the upholding of values and principles we hold dear here at home.
My argument today has been that it will become more difficult over time for Britain to exert on world affairs the influence which we are used to, but not impossibly difficult to do so if we make the changes and select the priorities of which I have spoken. To do so will be to act not only in our national interest but in the enlightened national interest to which I referred, for we have a responsibility to others as well as ourselves. Britain will not disengage from trying to shape global events. In trying to create and maintain a more peaceful world we will always be at the forefront. But we will so position and prepare ourselves that if the skies darken and new storms arise we will be ready for them.”
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Comment
The Tories of David Cameron and William Hague have found it necessary to establish an “anti-federal” political group of nationalists in the European Parliament. No wonder, since a Conservative government in the United Kingdom will base its foreign policy on pure nationalism.
When Western influence is set to dwindle, Hague proposes splitting forces by acting alone in the world.
William Hague is not only against the Treaty of Lisbon, but in opposition to the aspirations of the existing Treaty of Nice. The European Union is good for endless expansion, but not much more.
With friends like these, Europe needs no enemies and the USA is left to sink or swim.
Ralf Grahn
“It is now widely understood that the financial and economic challenges to be faced by the government elected at the coming general election will be of extraordinary magnitude.
With the government's deficit as a proportion of national income running at its highest since the end of the Second World War there is no doubt that the principal legacy of the current government to its successors and to the next generation will be debt, and debt on a scale that will take many years to scale back.
Yet amidst all the attention rightly given to the massive economic challenges facing the next government, we must not neglect the need to focus at the same time on mounting external challenges which go beyond the economic sphere but which will be all the more difficult to deal with at a time when resources will necessarily be so constrained.
Any informed assessment of likely trends in world affairs over the next decade, on which our whole national future heavily depends, is a sobering one. While optimism, hope and faith in human nature must always be present in our approach to these issues we nevertheless have to recognise that the outlook in foreign affairs, just as much as in economic affairs, will require all the ability, energy and focus we can bring to it and that the pattern of events we might expect leads unmistakably and uncomfortably to a world environment in which it will be more difficult for this country and its traditional allies to achieve their foreign policy goals unless we improve the way we go about them.
Yet this country continues to possess great assets and advantages, among them a skilled and highly regarded diplomatic corps, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a bipartisan approach to certain aspects of foreign policy which has provided continuity and certainty over time, an exceptionally strong relationship with the United States of America, a major role in the affairs of the European Union, historic links with many nations outside North America and Europe, many of which are formalised in the Commonwealth, and the enormous but less tangible influence that comes from being a global trading nation and the home of one of the great languages of humanity. We also have the immense advantage of armed forces that are considered around the world to be among the finest it is possible to possess, although currently under grievous strain. The net result of such advantages is that Britain still carries far more clout in the world than its current share of the world population would suggest.
Such assets should always give us confidence and the fortifying knowledge that the foundations exist for building up British influence in selected areas if we chose to do so. At the same time, the advent of the kind of international co-operation at least discussed at recent summits of the G20, and of a new United States administration with a multilateral approach to foreign policy that provides other nations with a fresh opportunity to respond positively, both give some cause for optimism in international relations. It is not unreasonable at least to hope for advances in the Middle East Peace Process, for success in a new approach in Afghanistan, for a better era in US-Russia relations and for a more constructive response to the international community from the leadership of Iran, or a more determined effort by the international community to overcome Iranian intransigence, and while the prospect of any of these hopes coming to fruition survives it is vital for America's allies to work hard to bring that about for the good of all.
So as we survey the world's changing landscape there is no need for any of us to despair. Yet equally it would be a mistake to allow our current hopes to obscure the longer-term trends which, whatever the ups and downs of any given year, are likely to make it harder for a country such as Britain to pursue a chosen policy and to protect its interests and citizens. Looking a decade or two ahead, powerful forces of economics and demography elsewhere in the world will make it harder for us to maintain our influence. Conventional assumptions about what Britain and its main partners can readily achieve in world affairs will be eroded. And the likelihood of this happening is sufficiently great, and the challenge it will present sufficiently daunting, that it is vital we understand it and equip ourselves for it now. Simply put, Britain stands to lose a good deal of its ability to shape world affairs unless we decide we will not accept that and are prepared to do what is needed.
That there may be turbulent times ahead is a common thread running through most analyses of the next few decades. The recent report on national security by the IPPR, Shared Responsibilities, a national security strategy for the UK argued that "we have to learn to live in a more complex, less predictable environment, facing a broader spread of risks, with greater interdependence and reduced government power".
There are many specific reasons why the world looks likely to be a more dangerous rather than less dangerous place in the coming decades. For previous generations such increased danger usually occurred because of the rise of a single, dominant adversary. This is not the case in the first half of the twenty-first century, which looks likely to be characterised instead by growing political, economic and military uncertainty.
The first factor bringing such insecurity is the prevalence of state failure, the collapse of government in a country bringing vastly enhanced opportunities to develop terrorist networks, private armies, organised crime and links between all of them.
Indeed, so serious is this contagion that we may now need to speak of the emergence of what may come to be called failed or failing regions. This applies particularly to the Horn of Africa but could also apply to Afghanistan and Pakistan unless our efforts to turn the tide there succeed. This new phenomenon of failing regions will have serious consequences for our already struggling capability to reverse the decline of crumbling states, just as globalisation means that the threats within these regions cannot be easily contained.
A second factor, growing directly from the first, is the increasingly transnational dimension of terrorism. A terrorist today, for instance, may be a citizen of Somalia, who was educated in Yemen, has been trained in Pakistan and may be fighting in Afghanistan or attempting to commit a terrorist attack on the streets of Britain. This vastly complicates the task of identifying and stopping those who would attack us and requires unprecedented cooperation with our allies.
Third, and again related to the other two is the changing character of conflict from conventional to irregular warfare, exemplified by the Improvised Explosive Devices that have claimed most of the British lives lost in Afghanistan and Iraq - undermining traditional military power, redefining military victory and challenging the assumption that victory on the battlefield can be swiftly be followed by development and 'nation' building. As David Kilcullen has put it in The Accidental Guerrilla, "Given overwhelming US conventional superiority, and contrary to the pre-9/11 conventional wisdom...it turns out that adversaries do not give up the armed struggle under these conditions: rather, any smart enemy goes unconventional; and most enemies are likely to continue doing so, until we demonstrate the ability to prevail in irregular conflicts such as those we are currently engaged in."
These three factors feed on and are fed by the extent of chronic poverty within the developing world which means that, despite the economic success of many developing countries, roughly 1 billion people are not only being left behind but are falling further behind, described by Paul Collier in his landmark book The Bottom Billion as "a billion people stuck in a train that is slowly rolling downhill". Poverty is not, of course, either a justification or an explanation for terrorism. But it does help to make such countries havens for threats to our national security which may include not only terrorism, but illegal trafficking and pandemic disease.
Failed states and widespread poverty are problems growing today but are scarcely new in human history. But on top of these problems, worrying enough in themselves, come two central challenges which are immense in their scope and which the world has never had to face before. The first of these is the risk of irreversible climate change. In some cases this brings a threat to the very existence of nations, as is brought home if you listen to the new and eloquent President of the Maldives describe the predicament of a country no part of which is more than six feet above sea level. A study by the UN environment programme found that the war in Darfur, one of the horrific conflicts of our times, has been driven by climate change and environmental degradation. It is easy to see how shortages of water could lead to tension and even conflict between nations. Unless enough action is taken quickly enough this phenomenon looks set to cause wars, disease, starvation or the laying waste of entire regions. It is therefore in our national interest to move to a genuinely low-carbon economy and act with our international partners to reach agreement on a successor treaty to Kyoto to reduce global emissions, keep global temperature rises below 2 degrees Celsius and avoid catastrophic climate change.
The second new and potentially immensely destabilising force is the spread of nuclear science. Civil nuclear energy can bring immense benefits to humanity and indeed provide part of the answer to the challenge of climate change. But the global spread of nuclear technology and materials threatens a new age of nuclear insecurity involving a rash of new nuclear weapons states or even the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists, a risk which may grow in parallel to their possible possession of chemical or biological devices. And as in the case of climate change, decisions taken in the next year or two will be crucial in determining whether this colossal risk can be minimised. After that it may be too late, for the alarming features of these two central threats are not only that they are new, and not only that their consequences are unknowable, but also that they are almost certainly not reversible once they have happened.
The list of worrying factors is by no means exhaustive: one only has to think of the many risks involved in energy security to add a further dimension, but the overall trends are clear and worrying enough. This troubling scenario is bad enough in itself, but the outlook from London, and to varying degrees from other European capitals, is further compounded in its grimness when it is understood that the relative economic power of many Western nations is in decline.
Economic success makes a big difference to foreign policy influence and sometimes quite quickly so. The economic renaissance of Britain in the 1980s undoubtedly reinforced the influence of British ministers on world affairs, something which Tony Blair was happy to enjoy while his then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was busily ruining that very renaissance. One of the damaging effects of Gordon Brown's catastrophic stewardship of Britain's finances, and of additionally reducing Britain from second to twelfth place in the international league of competitiveness according to the World Economic Forum, is the diminishing of our economic power and by extension the effectiveness of our international role.
Such additional short-term decline is exasperating because it is so unnecessary, but on top of that the huge expansion of economies such as those of China and India means that in our working lifetimes the size of the European economies relative to the rest of the world looks set to shrink dramatically. The European Commission's own projections have shown Europe's share of the world economy declining from 18% now to 10% by 2050. And even the United States is not immune from the effect of economic problems.
This diminished economic weight will have a major impact on the ability of Western nations to achieve their foreign policy goals. For instance, we are used to the idea of calling for economic sanctions against nations whose human rights records we find unacceptable, South Africa under apartheid being the celebrated cause of the effect that sanctions can have. Now we apply them to recalcitrant regimes in Burma, Zimbabwe and Iran, and indeed we may be coming very close to the time when much tougher sanctions on Iran are needed in the light of her nuclear programme. Yet it is already clear that the power of such economic weapons is declining and it follows from this analysis that it will decline much further in the years to come.
What is more, much of the economic weight in the world is passing to countries which either do not fully share our concepts of democracy and human rights or for their own reasons are opposed to interventionist approaches to foreign policy. China, which I will discuss later, is an obvious case. In recent weeks the Western boycott of financial support for Zimbabwe, designed to isolate Mugabe and encourage a democratic transition has been undermined by China's decision to provide that country with a $1 billion credit line. China gave robust support to the Sri Lankan government in the recent war, and Western countries proved unable to pass a resolution in the UN Human Rights Council calling for an investigation into alleged human rights abuses in the conflict there. India, another rising power, and the world's most populous democracy, is nevertheless traditionally not inclined to support our Western inclination to promote human rights through economic pressure and sometimes military intervention. Nor are many of the other growing economic power centres in the world, whether in Brazil or the Gulf.
Not only is the world not converging around our own democratic norms - according to the Freedom House 2009 survey, global freedom suffered its third year of decline in 2008 - but newly powerful democratic nations do not necessarily share our view of how to conduct foreign policy. In Britain, "Liberal interventionism" has generated much debate but to varying degrees all of us have subscribed to it. The economic sanctions I have mentioned have all enjoyed consensus political support, as have the military interventions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, Iraq being a much more controversial case but nevertheless heavily supported at the time. We are all agreed that we would try to intervene if another Rwanda were predicted and would like to do more in Darfur. But in the years and decades to come, the rise of other nations will constrain our ability to act in this way.
A further constraint will come in the form of tightly controlled military budgets. The extreme pressures on our own defence budget obviously necessitate a strategic defence review, which an incoming Conservative government will certainly undertake. It is crucial that such a review is informed by the changing pattern of threats I have described rather than financial considerations alone. France is also busily engaged in reshaping its armed forces. But beyond Britain and France there is no sign of other European nations making a serious effort to develop greater military capabilities. Indeed it is our criticism of EU defence arrangements that they too often involve the "rehatting" or duplication of NATO structures - just calling something European does not mean it has actually enhanced Europe's ability to act.
Does this background of a decline in our relative economic base and severe constraints on our military capabilities mean that we simply accept a much diminished role in world affairs? The United Kingdom has engaged before in major, conscious acts of strategic shrinkage, such as the withdrawal from the East of Suez after 1968. But the Conservative Party's answer to whether further such shrinkage will be right for Britain's international role in the decade to come is no. True, as a nation we will have to accustom ourselves to there being more situations which we dislike but cannot directly change but it is our contention that Britain must seek to retain her influence wherever possible and in some places seek to extend it. We must not disconsolately cease to make the effort. Foreign policy is above all about the protection and promotion of our national interest, and even narrowly defined, the British national interest requires our continued fully active engagement in world affairs since all the threatening factors I have listed are a threat to the interests of this country. No other nation or group of nations are going to increase the protection they afford us, and the essential alliances we enjoy with the United States and European nations depend directly on us continuing to do a great deal for ourselves.
In its broadest sense, what we might call our "enlightened national interest" requires British global engagement too. Britain will be safer if our values are strongly upheld and widely respected in the world. Nor would Britain ever be happy as a nation if we partly or largely retired from trying to influence world events. The citizens of Britain have always been restless in trying to improve the wider world and global in our outlook. We have always been at the forefront of international charity, development aid, and the welcoming of refugees. Two hundred years ago it was the Royal Navy that helped to drive the slave trade from the high seas and our parliament led the way even then in challenging the excesses of colonial rule. It is not in our character to have a foreign policy without a conscience: to be idle or uninterested while others starve or murder each other in their millions is not for us.
That is why David Cameron and I have spoken in recent years of our approach to foreign affairs being based on "Liberal Conservatism" in that we believe in freedom, human rights and democracy and want to see more of these things in other nations. But Conservative, because we believe strongly in the continued relevance of the nation state and are sceptical of grand utopian schemes to re-make the world. As David Cameron said: "My instinct is to work patiently with the grain of human nature; with the flow of culture, tradition and history."
We are conscious that our international role is no isolated subject. In such a changed world, with such stark threats, how we react to them and how Britain uses its abilities is a crucial part of who we are as a country, how we regard ourselves, and what it will mean in the next generation to be British.
So if Britain is to continue to be globally engaged in a meaningful and influential sense, albeit with a more realistic sense of the possible on how rapidly nations can be built or democracy entrenched, how on earth are we going to do it? The answer to that will constitute our approach to foreign policy, and it must necessarily involve using our resources more effectively, increasing our knowledge of other countries and often strengthening relations with them and launching and sustaining certain initiatives over many years. In January 2007 in my speech at Chatham House I set out five themes for the foreign policy of the next Conservative government. Two and a half years on they remain valid against the background I have described but it is now time to update them.
The first of these themes is learning from past mistakes to improve the decision-making of British government itself. I have already mentioned the need for a strategic defence review, and it is consistent with what I have argued that this must be focused not on whether Britain should be able to project military force elsewhere in the world but how it will do so. It is not the purpose of this speech to pre-empt in any way that review. But I wish to make clear now, first that it will be a defence and national security review, covering all aspects of Britain's security and not just the Armed Forces; second that it will be guided by the requirements of foreign policy and not solely by financial constraints; and third that we will not shrink from adapting our future Armed Forces for this changed world.
Good decision-making also requires the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be in its rightful place at the centre of decision- making. It is our intention to take a close interest not only in its day-to-day decisions but in its future as a great institution, able to attract the finest talent and, while it cannot have a monopoly of knowledge or expertise to be at the centre of Britain's thinking about and development of relationships with other nations. In my view, the sofa-style decision-making of Labour's Downing Street has often prevented it from taking this role.
The recent badly handled announcement of the Iraq War Inquiry was a classic example of decisions made hurriedly in Downing Street which the Foreign Secretary was then left to defend, underlining the fact that in modern government the Foreign Office can only exercise its proper influence if there is a close political and personal relationship between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.
A Conservative government will establish a real National Security Council as a Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister or in his absence by the Foreign Secretary. This will bring together on a regular basis the work of the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Department for International Development and Ministers responsible for other relevant matters such as Energy. We intend this not to be a new bureaucracy but a centre of decision-making and we understand that it will only work if it is treated as such, buttressed by cross-departmental teams supporting it and covering the whole range of national security issues, not only defence and foreign policy.
The attempt by the Brown government to create a National Security apparatus in response to our demand for one has been a pitiful failure, typical, even in this vital area, of the prevalence of short-term gimmicks over sustained effort in the current administration. The National Security Committee, announced with much fanfare in July 2007 met only three times in the twenty months that followed; the Prime Minister's National Security Forum has had no discernable impact at all; and since the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy was announced a year ago its members have not even been appointed. This chronic failure to institutionalise cross-departmental working is in our view a serious impediment to the successful execution of foreign and security policies, and it is an urgent priority to rectify it. The recent decision of the US administration to institute a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review should be examined as a possibility for this country too.
The second of our crucial themes is our commitment to the transatlantic alliance, which David Cameron and I have long argued should be "solid but not slavish" in its nature. In our view, the high points of Anglo-American co-operation in the last century have been when there was not only a close relationship between British and American leaders but also the readiness to conduct a vigorous debate between them. That indeed is how we have conducted ourselves: while being absolutely clear that whether it be in matters of intelligence, nuclear weapons, diplomacy or commerce, the close alliance with the United States is and will remain indispensable to the United Kingdom. We have also imparted a frank message when needed. In my first speech as Shadow Foreign Secretary, in Washington in February 2006, I argued that in standing up for the rule of law we must be careful not to employ methods that undermine it and that reports of prisoner abuse and of extraordinary rendition flights leading to the torture of suspects resulted in a loss of goodwill towards America as serious to us all as the sharpest of military defeats.
The Conservative Party fully supports the foreign policy initiatives so far undertaken by the Obama administration and we are ready to work with our counterparts in Washington from the opening moments of a new government in Britain. Central to that work, and the single most urgent priority in foreign policy if and when we come to government will be the American, British and wider NATO commitment in Afghanistan.
The Conservative Party supports the deployment of our armed forces in Afghanistan. Let me be clear that we are not in Afghanistan to conquer that country but to bring about a situation where Afghans can provide for their own security and livelihoods while not presenting a danger to the rest of the world. In consequence we believe our political objectives in Afghanistan should be tightly drawn and regularly reviewed, and that ever greater priority needs to be attached to the role of the Afghan forces. Currently only 10% of them are deployed in Helmand even though 40% of the fighting is there. Everyone knows that NATO forces cannot be in Afghanistan forever, but the acceleration of the training and building up of the Afghan army would mean time would work against the Taliban instead of in their favour.
Alongside our priority to bring success to Afghanistan will be the emphasis we give to working with our international allies and friends to help Pakistan transform itself into a stable, prosperous, and democratic state, capable of controlling terrorist threats inside and outside its borders, committing to a secure Afghanistan, and actively working to limit the extent of further nuclear proliferation. The multiplicity of British connections to Pakistan, through hundreds of thousands of families as well as Pakistan's leaders, gives Britain a particular role in supporting Pakistan's democratic future.
We will also seek to buttress American efforts to give new impetus to the Middle East Peace Process, emphasising the need for a freeze on all Israeli settlement activity and adherence to the Quartet Principles by all Palestinian leaders as essential prerequisites for successful negotiations. We will also continue the process I began on our own behalf two years ago of robust dialogue with Syria, working to edge her towards playing a constructive role in the region and closer to a lasting peace deal with Israel.
The third vital theme of Conservative Foreign Policy is the freshening and deepening of alliances outside Europe and North America, an approach which is vital to the maintenance of British influence in the world given the trends in world affairs I outlined earlier. On his visit to India in 2006 David Cameron said he believed it was time for Britain and India to forge a new special relationship, focusing particularly on fighting terrorism, protecting the environment and globalisation. He said, "For too long, politics in this country has been obsessed with Europe and America. Of course these relationships are, and will continue to be, vital. But serious and responsible leadership in the twenty-first century means engaging with far greater energy in parts of the world where Britain's strategic interests will increasingly lie."
India is also a leading member of the Commonwealth, an organisation which in our view has been neglected and undervalued under the Labour government in Britain. In last year's strategy document from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the only mention of the Commonwealth was in the title, "Foreign and Commonwealth Office". While we must be realistic about what such a diverse organisation can achieve, its extraordinary diversity nevertheless offers some strengths: it is a unique network of fifty-three countries spanning five continents and with thirty percent of the world's population. We believe the Commonwealth is a tool to be picked up and used more often, in particular, to tackle inter-faith dialogue and conflict prevention. A good example of how it could be used is to encourage it to take a leading role in addressing state failure, like co-ordinating a future rehabilitation package for its former member Zimbabwe.
Yet the Commonwealth is not the only group of countries where we can recreate historic connections on a new, modern basis. I have long-argued that Britain should embark on the elevation of its links with many of the countries of the Middle East and Gulf, not only diplomatically but in matters of culture, education, commerce and security, and that this should be done as a cross-party, cross-government initiative pursued consistently over many years. It is strategically vital to strengthen Britain's links with many friendly Muslim nations and not only in the Gulf, and not only for political reasons, since it is vital to make the most of opportunities to expand our trade and investment. It is this kind of all-round strengthening of our links with allies, as well as dealing with potential threats, that our co-ordinated national security is designed approach is designed to help us achieve.
Critics of a closer relationship with some Muslim states will say that they do not conform to all of our own democratic and liberal values, but it is a vital part of understanding the world we are facing in the coming decades that we will not be able to prescribe the form of government in all the countries with whom we need friendly relations. British leaders will rightly always argue that democracy and freedom are the soundest basis for national security and international peace for other countries as well as our own. Yet in foreign policy idealism must always be tempered with realism: even those countries like many of the Gulf States, which are making democratic reforms, will do so at varying paces and sometimes over an extended period.
Similarly, it is in our strategic national interest to have an effective and strong relationship with China. Relations with China are often characterised by tensions over human rights. Our approach has always been to be consistent in raising such issues and not to shrink from debating them with Chinese leaders. At the same time, however, if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons and the urgency of dealing with climate change are the greatest threats to the future of humanity, we must acknowledge that we cannot hope to solve these problems without working closely with China's leaders. A Conservative government will therefore promote sustained dialogue and close understanding with China and a relationship in which, even where there is sharp disagreement, neither side will walk away.
It is similarly not in Britain's national interest to be in permanent confrontation with Russia, but a sustained improvement in those relations will require a major effort on both sides. I make no criticism of the Labour government for its poor relations with Russia, for a wide range of issues ranging from the invasion of Georgia through the treatment of the British Council to the Litvinenko murder have made improved relations impossible in recent years. Britain must remain firm in its belief that countries such as the Ukraine and Georgia must be free to determine their futures. Nevertheless, the "reset button" pressed by Hillary Clinton provides the opportunity for improved relations between Moscow and other Western capitals. Again, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue very difficult to deal with without a working relationship with Russia. It is in Russia's national interest too for such issues to be dealt with, and to work more effectively with the US, Britain and other Western nations. With a Conservative government the door will be open to improved relations with Russia. We shall see if a door opens in return.
The fourth theme of Conservative foreign policy is one in which the cross-party consensus in Britain is very strong: the effective reform of global institutions to allow international co-operation in the face of the threats I have outlined to be enhanced.
This is clearly true in the economic area, where the focus of economic decision-making clearly needs to shift more to bodies such as the G20, and it is true of the United Nations, on which the Conservative Party share the view of the current government that the Security Council should be reformed to include permanent membership for Germany, Japan, Brazil, India and African representation. We have no illusions, however, about how difficult it will be to bring this about.
The European Union is also one of the institutions which must adapt to the changing distribution of world economic and political weight. This is not a speech about European policy: our belief that the European Union needs to focus on the issues of global competitiveness, global poverty and climate change is well known, as is our opposition to the greater centralisation of power in the EU, as embodied in the Lisbon Treaty. We see that Treaty as leading to institutional conflict within the EU, for instance, between the President and the High Representative on Foreign Policy, and a loss of democratic decision-making in nation states, a profound problem that the German Constitutional Court raised in its recent decision on the Lisbon Treaty. Institutional centralisation will not supply, and is even displacement activity for, what Europe really needs to develop in world affairs, which is the political will to use its collective weight effectively and a focus on practical results.
This is true of its relations with Russia, but also starkly true of the situation in the Balkans, where the EU is often failing to exert itself effectively even in relation to countries which many of us hope will one day be its members. There have been many positive developments, but some of the countries of the Western Balkans, most notably Bosnia-Herzegovina, are still tilting unsteadily between their past and their future. A lack of persistent international focus on the region until these countries are fully and irreversibly on the path to joining the EU and NATO could turn the successes of the last decade into the failure of this decade.
A Conservative government will work particularly to sharpen the European focus on the Balkans which we will see as a major test of what the EU can accomplish in foreign affairs. As Lord Ashdown put it last year in his article, Europe needs a wake-up call, Bosnia is on the edge again, "With an EU military force still here, an EU Special Representative with Executive Powers, a huge EU aid budget and a full-scale EU police mission, the EU has more leverage in Bosnia than in any other country. What will it say about the EU's pretensions if we will not act effectively to stop this bust-up happening?" Grand visions and ambitions are vain if the EU cannot demonstrate effectiveness in its common policies in its immediate neighbourhood.
It is vital too that the EU does not give up on enlargement. A European Union without the Western Balkans would forever have a disillusioned and disenchanted hole near its centre. And a Europe that turned its back on Turkey would have made an immense strategic error.
The effective reform of international institutions also includes the updating of international treaties, of which by far the most important is the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, due for a major review conference in April and May next year, quite possibly at the same time as our general election. In the last three years I have given two lectures here at the IISS on what needs to be done to strengthen this treaty and the powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency, proposals I have discussed with the new US administration and which are very much in line with President Obama's crucial speech in Prague in April.
This may well be the main opportunity to fend off the nightmare vision of the effective collapse of the Treaty and the rapid spread of nuclear weapons, a nightmare which would see the Middle East, the world's most unstable region, festooned with the world's most destructive devices. In my view the current British government have been slow to develop ideas and provide international leadership on the reform of the NPT, leaving it until the end of their third term and the approach of the review conference to push any determined initiative of their own. The future of this Treaty also requires the maximum possible effort to persuade or deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons capability.
Again we have long-argued for a new American opening to Iran that has indeed now been made, but also that it will need to be followed if unsuccessful by far tougher European economic measures to show Iran that there is a serious price to its defiance of the international community. Twenty years from now European sanctions may count for much less, but today they still matter and securing such a policy is one of the highest possible priorities for whoever is the British Foreign Secretary at the end of this year and early next.
The fifth and final theme of a Conservative approach to foreign affairs is that, faced with so many threats to our society and our security, it is essential for us in Britain to uphold our own highest values. I have accepted in this speech that our power to dictate to other countries how they should uphold democracy or human rights may actually diminish over time. In many ways this makes it all the more important for Britain to be among those countries that sets an example that can be inspiring to people across the world who are denied liberty or power over their own lives, just as it may encourage in the right direction those who have that power.
Two hundred years ago, in his most famous and shortest speech, my hero William Pitt The Younger said, "England has saved herself by her exertions and will I trust save Europe by her example". In the future we will have to recognise that if our exertions may not always have the desired effect, our example must never be absent. This means that a British government must always be an advocate for political freedom, human rights in their broadest not just legalistic sense, free trade, and democratic decision-making. We must always understand that terrorists who are motivated by contempt for our society will only be strengthened if we weaken the values that hold it together, a consideration of huge importance when we consider recent allegations of complicity in torture.
Our values also include playing a pre-eminent role in the eradication of poverty and the spread of prosperity to less fortunate nations. We fully support President Obama's vision of engagement in Africa which is measured by "more than just the dollars we spend" but "whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change". We have to work with African countries so that aid and investment are a force for economic growth and political stability rather than a permanent lifeline that just helps the needy scrape by. Our conscience and our common humanity dictate that we must help those at the mercy of disease, conflict and poverty. That is why David Cameron has reaffirmed our commitment to spending 0.7% of Gross National Income on aid by 2013.
However aid should not be the only driver of our policy towards Africa. We must focus on good governance and fostering the democratic institutions - the courts, civil society and police forces - that are the bedrock of more prosperous societies and the resolving of differences without resort to the gun. In this context development, along with effective diplomacy, is one of the tools of conflict prevention and needs to be used more effectively. We will be conscious that relatively small sums of money spent on conflict prevention can avert the need to spend vast sums on intervention or reconstruction aid, and is in alignment with our moral and well as national security duties.
An approach to foreign policy based on British values also means that the work of organisations such as the British Council will remain essential, and that the foreign language services of the BBC should always be promoted and defended. These organisations are not part of our implementing our foreign policy, but they are an important part of Britain's contribution to openness and understanding in world affairs.
These then are the foreign policy priorities that a new Conservative government would bring with it: a major change to our decision-making; the nourishing of the transatlantic alliance; the freshening and deepening of new relationships beyond America and Europe; a determination to assist the reform of international institutions and treaties; and the upholding of values and principles we hold dear here at home.
My argument today has been that it will become more difficult over time for Britain to exert on world affairs the influence which we are used to, but not impossibly difficult to do so if we make the changes and select the priorities of which I have spoken. To do so will be to act not only in our national interest but in the enlightened national interest to which I referred, for we have a responsibility to others as well as ourselves. Britain will not disengage from trying to shape global events. In trying to create and maintain a more peaceful world we will always be at the forefront. But we will so position and prepare ourselves that if the skies darken and new storms arise we will be ready for them.”
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Comment
The Tories of David Cameron and William Hague have found it necessary to establish an “anti-federal” political group of nationalists in the European Parliament. No wonder, since a Conservative government in the United Kingdom will base its foreign policy on pure nationalism.
When Western influence is set to dwindle, Hague proposes splitting forces by acting alone in the world.
William Hague is not only against the Treaty of Lisbon, but in opposition to the aspirations of the existing Treaty of Nice. The European Union is good for endless expansion, but not much more.
With friends like these, Europe needs no enemies and the USA is left to sink or swim.
Ralf Grahn
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