Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label foreign policy. Show all posts

Tuesday, 1 June 2010

EU statement on Gaza flotilla

Yesterday, 31 May 2010, the EU high representative Catherine Ashton issued a statement on behalf of the EU on the Israeli military operation against the flotilla heading for Gaza, but seized by the Israeli Defense Forces:


The EU deeply regrets the loss of life during the Israeli military operation in international waters against the Flotilla sailing to Gaza and offers its condolences to the families of the victims. The EU condemns the use of violence that has produced a high number of victims among the members of the flotilla and demands an immediate, full and impartial inquiry into the events and the circumstances surrounding them.

The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains a source of grave concern. The EU does not accept the continued policy of closure. It is unacceptable and politically counterproductive. We need to urgently achieve a durable solution to the situation in Gaza.

The EU underlines its call for an immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from Gaza.

The EU calls on Israel to urgently provide Member States with consular access to and information about their citizens.

The EU calls upon all parties and relevant actors to prevent a further escalation of tensions and underlines the need to continue the proximity talks with a view to the resumption of direct negotiations.



Open questions

The IDF has spread video footage of “pacifists” attacking Israeli commandos with cudgels and the like. The scenes are nasty and the consequences tragic, but who started the attack? Who gave Israel the authority to board and seize vessels on the high sea with military might? How would the state of Israel react to the attempted seizure of its own ships in international waters?

In my humble opinion, Ashton’s declaration leaves a number of additional questions open. These issues should be clarified as part of the ‘immediate, full and impartial inquiry into the events and the circumstances surrounding them’.

The EU regretted the loss of life, but did not deal with the legality of the military seizure of civilian (merchant) vessels, registered in NATO member states, in international waters.

The EU called the blockade of Gaza unacceptable and counterproductive, but it did not deal with the legality of the blockade on sea or land.

The EU did not question the legality of the seizure, transportation to Israel, detention and potential penalties of some 700 citizens from different countries.

The EU did not demand the immediate and unconditional release of the hijacked persons. (The EU only called for consular access and information, as each country would do if one of its citizens was caught in a foreign jurisdiction with a suitcase full of heroin.)



United Nations




The spiral of hate and violence is kept in motion by hotheads on various sides, but the United Nations offers an approximate view of reactions within the international community.



A note on the UN Security Council emergency meeting 31 May 2010 [update: new version published] presents available information about the boarding and offers an overview of UN positions as well as statements by state representatives.

As far as I could see, two countries condoned the sea blockade of Gaza: the United States (“delivery by sea was not appropriate”) and Israel (blockade and boarding legitimate).

Has Israel further undermined its long term security?




Ralf Grahn

Monday, 9 November 2009

Miliband out ─ D’Alema in? (Updated)

By the way of Jean Quatremer’s Coulisses de Bruxelles I noticed the latest ”sure bet” regarding the European Union’s next high representative for foreign affairs and security policy.



In Der Standard, Thomas Mayer writes that David Miliband has declined the offer to become the EU high representative: Brite Miliband sagt als EU-Außenminister ab (8 November 2009).


This may mean that the European leaders have a new situation to discuss this evening in Berlin, although fairly recent articles still tell us about lobbying for Tony Blair to become president of the European Council and of David Miliband’s chances of being appointed high representative.


Italy’s Massimo D’Alema is a candidate whose prospects look brighter.


Update 9 November 2009: According to Reuters Italia (and other news reports on the same authority), the leader of the S&D group in the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, has - through a spokesman - confirmed that David Miliband has taken himself out of the race for high representative; Massimo D'Alema is now the candidate backed by the socialists and social democrats.



Ralf Grahn



P.S. Read about the real EUSSR through the good, the better and the best Euroblogs on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu. Propose an interesting blog post or a whole new blog (click Contribute).

Tuesday, 27 October 2009

Tories on the wrong side of history?

Is the Conservative shadow cabinet, including party leader David Cameron, shadow foreign secretary William Hague, shadow defence secretary Liam Fox and shadow EU secretary Mark Francois behind the curve, on the wrong side of history and swimming against the tide of history?






Editorial writer and columnist Mary Dejevsky poses thought-provoking questions about British foreign policy fundamentals in “Britain, Europe and a history of lamentable mis-timing” (The Independent, 27 October 2009).



You can always use foreign secretary David Miliband’s speech yesterday, 26 October 2009, to compare with the article and the signals sent by the UK shadow cabinet, including on Europe.


Read and reflect.



Ralf Grahn

Monday, 26 October 2009

David Miliband: EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon

Today, David Miliband, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, spoke on EU foreign policy after Lisbon, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS):


“So the choice for Europe is simple. Get our act together and make the EU a leader on the world stage; or become spectators in a G2 world shaped by the US and China. But I think that the choice for the UK is also simply stated: we can lead a strong European foreign policy or – lost in hubris, nostalgia or xenophobia - watch our influence in the world wane.”


***

UK approach

Ahead of the Treaty of Lisbon, the UK (Labour) government informed Parliament and the public by publishing “The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference, July 2007” (Command paper 7174).


With regard to the common foreign and security policy, the UK government stated:


“The Reform Treaty will affirm that CFSP will remain an intergovernmental process, distinct from other policy areas. Unanimity in decision-making will remain the norm (i.e. the UK will hold a veto). CFSP provisions will also remain in the Treaty on European Union. The IGC Mandate contains a declaration confirming that the provisions on CFSP will not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formation and conduct of their foreign policy, or of their national representations in third countries and international organisations.”



The British government underlined its independence and veto powers with regard to the common security and defence policy, as well:


“The Reform Treaty will meet UK objectives on the development of a flexible, militarily robust and NATO-friendly ESDP. The Reform Treaty will also preserve the principle of unanimity (and therefore the UK veto) for ESDP policy decisions and for initiating missions, and will maintain the prerogatives of Member States for defence and security issues (in the same way as it does for foreign policy).”


The government’s presentation of the President of the European Council did not exactly spell out that the choice of Tony Blair would become the make or break issue for the European Union’s future in the world:


“The President will chair the European Council, drive forward its work, ensure its preparation and continuity on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council, and facilitate cohesion and consensus. The President will also have a role in the most highlevel aspects of the EU’s external relations.”


***


Comments


The government of the United Kingdom seems to have been quite happy for the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy to remain intergovernmental, primarily based on unanimous decisions, retained veto powers for every member state and minimal scrutiny by the directly elected European Parliament.

Miliband appears to reason that you first build a house of cards, but suddenly you need a traffic-stopping personality to counter the structural flaws.

Admittedly, Miliband’s approach is more constructive than that of the Conservative Party, which officially continues to reject the Treaty of Lisbon, democratically approved in 27 member states.



Ralf Grahn



P.S. (Update) Link to the IISS.

Wednesday, 21 October 2009

Global Europe blog

Are you interested in European foreign and security policy? In case you are, don’t miss the Global Europe blog, written by Ulrich Speck.

A daily Morning Brief brings you summaries of media reports and interesting events, with links to the sources. The style is clear and accessible.

Recommended reading.



Ralf Grahn

Thursday, 8 October 2009

European External Action Service (EEAS) - Preparatory work

The European External Action Service (EEAS) will work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the member states and it will comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the member states.

***

Establishment

The EEAS is one of the important Lisby Treaty reforms.

The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service will be established by a Council decision, on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.

***

Preparation

According to Lisbon Treaty Declaration (No 15) on Article 27 of the Treaty on European Union stated that as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon is signed, the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, the Commission and the Member States should begin preparatory work on the European External Action Service.


As usual, the Council has been less than zealous in informing the public on the preparatory work.

***


Benelux leak?



The only breach has been the memorandum of the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), which has found its way into the public domain, for instance Jamie Smyth’s blog post “The Benelux strikes back against Blair” (EUobserver, 6 October 2009).



Nicolas Gros-Verheyde presents the Benelux position on the EEAS in “L’avis du Benelux sur le futur service européen d’action extérieure” (Bruxelles2, 8 October 2009), with a link to the whole document and discussion about other aspects of the memo in other blog posts.




Patrice Cardot also presents the memorandum and comments on it in “Mise en oeuvre du traité de Lisbonne : le point de vue du Bénélux” (Regards citoyens, 8 October 2009). There is a link to the document.


I did not find the Benelux position paper on any official web site, so it has probably been leaked. Positive for the free flow of information, but lower marks for openness as a fundamental principle of policy making.


***


European Parliament

Grosso modo, the European Parliament is the only EU institution which has prepared its opinions about Lisbon Treaty implementation in public. A number of resolutions were prepared and voted last spring (and presented on this blog).

Yesterday’s Grahnlaw blog post ‘EU “diplomatic service”: All shock and horror?’ mentioned the Draft report on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service (Committee on Constitutional Affairs AFCO, 23 September 2009, rapporteur: Elmar Brok).



The Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) is preparing an opinion for AFCO: Draft opinion on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service (25 September 2009, rapporteur: Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck).



***


The Council and the Commission have done little to inform the public about preparatory work for the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. When the democratic approval has been attained in 27 EU member states, there are few excuses left for leaving the public in the dark.

Openness is the first test of the Lisbon Treaty.

Where are the documents?

Where are the candidates?



Ralf Grahn

New EU High Representative – the most important job

The most important job to fill, now that the democratic legitimacy of the Lisbon Treaty is assured in all 27 EU member states, is not the media sexy President of the European Council, despite attempts to inflate the job description way beyond that outlined in the amending treaty in order to justify the (s)election of Tony Blair.


The crucial post for the European Union is the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as Vice-President of the Commission, in charge of the external action of the union. He or she will chair the Foreign Affairs Council and lead the European External Action Service (EEAS).


This is also the assessment of Timothy Garton Ash, in “The US has lost its focus on Europe. It's up to us to get our act together” (The Guardian, 7 October 2009):


“… the personalities chosen as president – that is, chair – of the European council and as high representative for foreign and security policy will matter a lot; second, nobody [among US officials] understands that, for Europe's future role in the world, the latter is actually the more important job”.



Ralf Grahn

Thursday, 23 July 2009

For a nationalist Britain without allies

This is the Britain Europe, the United States and the rest of the world should expect, when the Conservative Party takes the reins of government in the United Kingdom, as set out by William Hague 21 July 2009:


“It is now widely understood that the financial and economic challenges to be faced by the government elected at the coming general election will be of extraordinary magnitude.

With the government's deficit as a proportion of national income running at its highest since the end of the Second World War there is no doubt that the principal legacy of the current government to its successors and to the next generation will be debt, and debt on a scale that will take many years to scale back.

Yet amidst all the attention rightly given to the massive economic challenges facing the next government, we must not neglect the need to focus at the same time on mounting external challenges which go beyond the economic sphere but which will be all the more difficult to deal with at a time when resources will necessarily be so constrained.

Any informed assessment of likely trends in world affairs over the next decade, on which our whole national future heavily depends, is a sobering one. While optimism, hope and faith in human nature must always be present in our approach to these issues we nevertheless have to recognise that the outlook in foreign affairs, just as much as in economic affairs, will require all the ability, energy and focus we can bring to it and that the pattern of events we might expect leads unmistakably and uncomfortably to a world environment in which it will be more difficult for this country and its traditional allies to achieve their foreign policy goals unless we improve the way we go about them.

Yet this country continues to possess great assets and advantages, among them a skilled and highly regarded diplomatic corps, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a bipartisan approach to certain aspects of foreign policy which has provided continuity and certainty over time, an exceptionally strong relationship with the United States of America, a major role in the affairs of the European Union, historic links with many nations outside North America and Europe, many of which are formalised in the Commonwealth, and the enormous but less tangible influence that comes from being a global trading nation and the home of one of the great languages of humanity. We also have the immense advantage of armed forces that are considered around the world to be among the finest it is possible to possess, although currently under grievous strain. The net result of such advantages is that Britain still carries far more clout in the world than its current share of the world population would suggest.

Such assets should always give us confidence and the fortifying knowledge that the foundations exist for building up British influence in selected areas if we chose to do so. At the same time, the advent of the kind of international co-operation at least discussed at recent summits of the G20, and of a new United States administration with a multilateral approach to foreign policy that provides other nations with a fresh opportunity to respond positively, both give some cause for optimism in international relations. It is not unreasonable at least to hope for advances in the Middle East Peace Process, for success in a new approach in Afghanistan, for a better era in US-Russia relations and for a more constructive response to the international community from the leadership of Iran, or a more determined effort by the international community to overcome Iranian intransigence, and while the prospect of any of these hopes coming to fruition survives it is vital for America's allies to work hard to bring that about for the good of all.

So as we survey the world's changing landscape there is no need for any of us to despair. Yet equally it would be a mistake to allow our current hopes to obscure the longer-term trends which, whatever the ups and downs of any given year, are likely to make it harder for a country such as Britain to pursue a chosen policy and to protect its interests and citizens. Looking a decade or two ahead, powerful forces of economics and demography elsewhere in the world will make it harder for us to maintain our influence. Conventional assumptions about what Britain and its main partners can readily achieve in world affairs will be eroded. And the likelihood of this happening is sufficiently great, and the challenge it will present sufficiently daunting, that it is vital we understand it and equip ourselves for it now. Simply put, Britain stands to lose a good deal of its ability to shape world affairs unless we decide we will not accept that and are prepared to do what is needed.

That there may be turbulent times ahead is a common thread running through most analyses of the next few decades. The recent report on national security by the IPPR, Shared Responsibilities, a national security strategy for the UK argued that "we have to learn to live in a more complex, less predictable environment, facing a broader spread of risks, with greater interdependence and reduced government power".

There are many specific reasons why the world looks likely to be a more dangerous rather than less dangerous place in the coming decades. For previous generations such increased danger usually occurred because of the rise of a single, dominant adversary. This is not the case in the first half of the twenty-first century, which looks likely to be characterised instead by growing political, economic and military uncertainty.

The first factor bringing such insecurity is the prevalence of state failure, the collapse of government in a country bringing vastly enhanced opportunities to develop terrorist networks, private armies, organised crime and links between all of them.

Indeed, so serious is this contagion that we may now need to speak of the emergence of what may come to be called failed or failing regions. This applies particularly to the Horn of Africa but could also apply to Afghanistan and Pakistan unless our efforts to turn the tide there succeed. This new phenomenon of failing regions will have serious consequences for our already struggling capability to reverse the decline of crumbling states, just as globalisation means that the threats within these regions cannot be easily contained.

A second factor, growing directly from the first, is the increasingly transnational dimension of terrorism. A terrorist today, for instance, may be a citizen of Somalia, who was educated in Yemen, has been trained in Pakistan and may be fighting in Afghanistan or attempting to commit a terrorist attack on the streets of Britain. This vastly complicates the task of identifying and stopping those who would attack us and requires unprecedented cooperation with our allies.

Third, and again related to the other two is the changing character of conflict from conventional to irregular warfare, exemplified by the Improvised Explosive Devices that have claimed most of the British lives lost in Afghanistan and Iraq - undermining traditional military power, redefining military victory and challenging the assumption that victory on the battlefield can be swiftly be followed by development and 'nation' building. As David Kilcullen has put it in The Accidental Guerrilla, "Given overwhelming US conventional superiority, and contrary to the pre-9/11 conventional wisdom...it turns out that adversaries do not give up the armed struggle under these conditions: rather, any smart enemy goes unconventional; and most enemies are likely to continue doing so, until we demonstrate the ability to prevail in irregular conflicts such as those we are currently engaged in."

These three factors feed on and are fed by the extent of chronic poverty within the developing world which means that, despite the economic success of many developing countries, roughly 1 billion people are not only being left behind but are falling further behind, described by Paul Collier in his landmark book The Bottom Billion as "a billion people stuck in a train that is slowly rolling downhill". Poverty is not, of course, either a justification or an explanation for terrorism. But it does help to make such countries havens for threats to our national security which may include not only terrorism, but illegal trafficking and pandemic disease.

Failed states and widespread poverty are problems growing today but are scarcely new in human history. But on top of these problems, worrying enough in themselves, come two central challenges which are immense in their scope and which the world has never had to face before. The first of these is the risk of irreversible climate change. In some cases this brings a threat to the very existence of nations, as is brought home if you listen to the new and eloquent President of the Maldives describe the predicament of a country no part of which is more than six feet above sea level. A study by the UN environment programme found that the war in Darfur, one of the horrific conflicts of our times, has been driven by climate change and environmental degradation. It is easy to see how shortages of water could lead to tension and even conflict between nations. Unless enough action is taken quickly enough this phenomenon looks set to cause wars, disease, starvation or the laying waste of entire regions. It is therefore in our national interest to move to a genuinely low-carbon economy and act with our international partners to reach agreement on a successor treaty to Kyoto to reduce global emissions, keep global temperature rises below 2 degrees Celsius and avoid catastrophic climate change.

The second new and potentially immensely destabilising force is the spread of nuclear science. Civil nuclear energy can bring immense benefits to humanity and indeed provide part of the answer to the challenge of climate change. But the global spread of nuclear technology and materials threatens a new age of nuclear insecurity involving a rash of new nuclear weapons states or even the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists, a risk which may grow in parallel to their possible possession of chemical or biological devices. And as in the case of climate change, decisions taken in the next year or two will be crucial in determining whether this colossal risk can be minimised. After that it may be too late, for the alarming features of these two central threats are not only that they are new, and not only that their consequences are unknowable, but also that they are almost certainly not reversible once they have happened.

The list of worrying factors is by no means exhaustive: one only has to think of the many risks involved in energy security to add a further dimension, but the overall trends are clear and worrying enough. This troubling scenario is bad enough in itself, but the outlook from London, and to varying degrees from other European capitals, is further compounded in its grimness when it is understood that the relative economic power of many Western nations is in decline.

Economic success makes a big difference to foreign policy influence and sometimes quite quickly so. The economic renaissance of Britain in the 1980s undoubtedly reinforced the influence of British ministers on world affairs, something which Tony Blair was happy to enjoy while his then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was busily ruining that very renaissance. One of the damaging effects of Gordon Brown's catastrophic stewardship of Britain's finances, and of additionally reducing Britain from second to twelfth place in the international league of competitiveness according to the World Economic Forum, is the diminishing of our economic power and by extension the effectiveness of our international role.

Such additional short-term decline is exasperating because it is so unnecessary, but on top of that the huge expansion of economies such as those of China and India means that in our working lifetimes the size of the European economies relative to the rest of the world looks set to shrink dramatically. The European Commission's own projections have shown Europe's share of the world economy declining from 18% now to 10% by 2050. And even the United States is not immune from the effect of economic problems.

This diminished economic weight will have a major impact on the ability of Western nations to achieve their foreign policy goals. For instance, we are used to the idea of calling for economic sanctions against nations whose human rights records we find unacceptable, South Africa under apartheid being the celebrated cause of the effect that sanctions can have. Now we apply them to recalcitrant regimes in Burma, Zimbabwe and Iran, and indeed we may be coming very close to the time when much tougher sanctions on Iran are needed in the light of her nuclear programme. Yet it is already clear that the power of such economic weapons is declining and it follows from this analysis that it will decline much further in the years to come.

What is more, much of the economic weight in the world is passing to countries which either do not fully share our concepts of democracy and human rights or for their own reasons are opposed to interventionist approaches to foreign policy. China, which I will discuss later, is an obvious case. In recent weeks the Western boycott of financial support for Zimbabwe, designed to isolate Mugabe and encourage a democratic transition has been undermined by China's decision to provide that country with a $1 billion credit line. China gave robust support to the Sri Lankan government in the recent war, and Western countries proved unable to pass a resolution in the UN Human Rights Council calling for an investigation into alleged human rights abuses in the conflict there. India, another rising power, and the world's most populous democracy, is nevertheless traditionally not inclined to support our Western inclination to promote human rights through economic pressure and sometimes military intervention. Nor are many of the other growing economic power centres in the world, whether in Brazil or the Gulf.

Not only is the world not converging around our own democratic norms - according to the Freedom House 2009 survey, global freedom suffered its third year of decline in 2008 - but newly powerful democratic nations do not necessarily share our view of how to conduct foreign policy. In Britain, "Liberal interventionism" has generated much debate but to varying degrees all of us have subscribed to it. The economic sanctions I have mentioned have all enjoyed consensus political support, as have the military interventions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, Iraq being a much more controversial case but nevertheless heavily supported at the time. We are all agreed that we would try to intervene if another Rwanda were predicted and would like to do more in Darfur. But in the years and decades to come, the rise of other nations will constrain our ability to act in this way.

A further constraint will come in the form of tightly controlled military budgets. The extreme pressures on our own defence budget obviously necessitate a strategic defence review, which an incoming Conservative government will certainly undertake. It is crucial that such a review is informed by the changing pattern of threats I have described rather than financial considerations alone. France is also busily engaged in reshaping its armed forces. But beyond Britain and France there is no sign of other European nations making a serious effort to develop greater military capabilities. Indeed it is our criticism of EU defence arrangements that they too often involve the "rehatting" or duplication of NATO structures - just calling something European does not mean it has actually enhanced Europe's ability to act.

Does this background of a decline in our relative economic base and severe constraints on our military capabilities mean that we simply accept a much diminished role in world affairs? The United Kingdom has engaged before in major, conscious acts of strategic shrinkage, such as the withdrawal from the East of Suez after 1968. But the Conservative Party's answer to whether further such shrinkage will be right for Britain's international role in the decade to come is no. True, as a nation we will have to accustom ourselves to there being more situations which we dislike but cannot directly change but it is our contention that Britain must seek to retain her influence wherever possible and in some places seek to extend it. We must not disconsolately cease to make the effort. Foreign policy is above all about the protection and promotion of our national interest, and even narrowly defined, the British national interest requires our continued fully active engagement in world affairs since all the threatening factors I have listed are a threat to the interests of this country. No other nation or group of nations are going to increase the protection they afford us, and the essential alliances we enjoy with the United States and European nations depend directly on us continuing to do a great deal for ourselves.

In its broadest sense, what we might call our "enlightened national interest" requires British global engagement too. Britain will be safer if our values are strongly upheld and widely respected in the world. Nor would Britain ever be happy as a nation if we partly or largely retired from trying to influence world events. The citizens of Britain have always been restless in trying to improve the wider world and global in our outlook. We have always been at the forefront of international charity, development aid, and the welcoming of refugees. Two hundred years ago it was the Royal Navy that helped to drive the slave trade from the high seas and our parliament led the way even then in challenging the excesses of colonial rule. It is not in our character to have a foreign policy without a conscience: to be idle or uninterested while others starve or murder each other in their millions is not for us.

That is why David Cameron and I have spoken in recent years of our approach to foreign affairs being based on "Liberal Conservatism" in that we believe in freedom, human rights and democracy and want to see more of these things in other nations. But Conservative, because we believe strongly in the continued relevance of the nation state and are sceptical of grand utopian schemes to re-make the world. As David Cameron said: "My instinct is to work patiently with the grain of human nature; with the flow of culture, tradition and history."

We are conscious that our international role is no isolated subject. In such a changed world, with such stark threats, how we react to them and how Britain uses its abilities is a crucial part of who we are as a country, how we regard ourselves, and what it will mean in the next generation to be British.

So if Britain is to continue to be globally engaged in a meaningful and influential sense, albeit with a more realistic sense of the possible on how rapidly nations can be built or democracy entrenched, how on earth are we going to do it? The answer to that will constitute our approach to foreign policy, and it must necessarily involve using our resources more effectively, increasing our knowledge of other countries and often strengthening relations with them and launching and sustaining certain initiatives over many years. In January 2007 in my speech at Chatham House I set out five themes for the foreign policy of the next Conservative government. Two and a half years on they remain valid against the background I have described but it is now time to update them.

The first of these themes is learning from past mistakes to improve the decision-making of British government itself. I have already mentioned the need for a strategic defence review, and it is consistent with what I have argued that this must be focused not on whether Britain should be able to project military force elsewhere in the world but how it will do so. It is not the purpose of this speech to pre-empt in any way that review. But I wish to make clear now, first that it will be a defence and national security review, covering all aspects of Britain's security and not just the Armed Forces; second that it will be guided by the requirements of foreign policy and not solely by financial constraints; and third that we will not shrink from adapting our future Armed Forces for this changed world.

Good decision-making also requires the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be in its rightful place at the centre of decision- making. It is our intention to take a close interest not only in its day-to-day decisions but in its future as a great institution, able to attract the finest talent and, while it cannot have a monopoly of knowledge or expertise to be at the centre of Britain's thinking about and development of relationships with other nations. In my view, the sofa-style decision-making of Labour's Downing Street has often prevented it from taking this role.

The recent badly handled announcement of the Iraq War Inquiry was a classic example of decisions made hurriedly in Downing Street which the Foreign Secretary was then left to defend, underlining the fact that in modern government the Foreign Office can only exercise its proper influence if there is a close political and personal relationship between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

A Conservative government will establish a real National Security Council as a Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by the Prime Minister or in his absence by the Foreign Secretary. This will bring together on a regular basis the work of the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office, the Department for International Development and Ministers responsible for other relevant matters such as Energy. We intend this not to be a new bureaucracy but a centre of decision-making and we understand that it will only work if it is treated as such, buttressed by cross-departmental teams supporting it and covering the whole range of national security issues, not only defence and foreign policy.

The attempt by the Brown government to create a National Security apparatus in response to our demand for one has been a pitiful failure, typical, even in this vital area, of the prevalence of short-term gimmicks over sustained effort in the current administration. The National Security Committee, announced with much fanfare in July 2007 met only three times in the twenty months that followed; the Prime Minister's National Security Forum has had no discernable impact at all; and since the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy was announced a year ago its members have not even been appointed. This chronic failure to institutionalise cross-departmental working is in our view a serious impediment to the successful execution of foreign and security policies, and it is an urgent priority to rectify it. The recent decision of the US administration to institute a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review should be examined as a possibility for this country too.

The second of our crucial themes is our commitment to the transatlantic alliance, which David Cameron and I have long argued should be "solid but not slavish" in its nature. In our view, the high points of Anglo-American co-operation in the last century have been when there was not only a close relationship between British and American leaders but also the readiness to conduct a vigorous debate between them. That indeed is how we have conducted ourselves: while being absolutely clear that whether it be in matters of intelligence, nuclear weapons, diplomacy or commerce, the close alliance with the United States is and will remain indispensable to the United Kingdom. We have also imparted a frank message when needed. In my first speech as Shadow Foreign Secretary, in Washington in February 2006, I argued that in standing up for the rule of law we must be careful not to employ methods that undermine it and that reports of prisoner abuse and of extraordinary rendition flights leading to the torture of suspects resulted in a loss of goodwill towards America as serious to us all as the sharpest of military defeats.

The Conservative Party fully supports the foreign policy initiatives so far undertaken by the Obama administration and we are ready to work with our counterparts in Washington from the opening moments of a new government in Britain. Central to that work, and the single most urgent priority in foreign policy if and when we come to government will be the American, British and wider NATO commitment in Afghanistan.

The Conservative Party supports the deployment of our armed forces in Afghanistan. Let me be clear that we are not in Afghanistan to conquer that country but to bring about a situation where Afghans can provide for their own security and livelihoods while not presenting a danger to the rest of the world. In consequence we believe our political objectives in Afghanistan should be tightly drawn and regularly reviewed, and that ever greater priority needs to be attached to the role of the Afghan forces. Currently only 10% of them are deployed in Helmand even though 40% of the fighting is there. Everyone knows that NATO forces cannot be in Afghanistan forever, but the acceleration of the training and building up of the Afghan army would mean time would work against the Taliban instead of in their favour.

Alongside our priority to bring success to Afghanistan will be the emphasis we give to working with our international allies and friends to help Pakistan transform itself into a stable, prosperous, and democratic state, capable of controlling terrorist threats inside and outside its borders, committing to a secure Afghanistan, and actively working to limit the extent of further nuclear proliferation. The multiplicity of British connections to Pakistan, through hundreds of thousands of families as well as Pakistan's leaders, gives Britain a particular role in supporting Pakistan's democratic future.

We will also seek to buttress American efforts to give new impetus to the Middle East Peace Process, emphasising the need for a freeze on all Israeli settlement activity and adherence to the Quartet Principles by all Palestinian leaders as essential prerequisites for successful negotiations. We will also continue the process I began on our own behalf two years ago of robust dialogue with Syria, working to edge her towards playing a constructive role in the region and closer to a lasting peace deal with Israel.

The third vital theme of Conservative Foreign Policy is the freshening and deepening of alliances outside Europe and North America, an approach which is vital to the maintenance of British influence in the world given the trends in world affairs I outlined earlier. On his visit to India in 2006 David Cameron said he believed it was time for Britain and India to forge a new special relationship, focusing particularly on fighting terrorism, protecting the environment and globalisation. He said, "For too long, politics in this country has been obsessed with Europe and America. Of course these relationships are, and will continue to be, vital. But serious and responsible leadership in the twenty-first century means engaging with far greater energy in parts of the world where Britain's strategic interests will increasingly lie."

India is also a leading member of the Commonwealth, an organisation which in our view has been neglected and undervalued under the Labour government in Britain. In last year's strategy document from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the only mention of the Commonwealth was in the title, "Foreign and Commonwealth Office". While we must be realistic about what such a diverse organisation can achieve, its extraordinary diversity nevertheless offers some strengths: it is a unique network of fifty-three countries spanning five continents and with thirty percent of the world's population. We believe the Commonwealth is a tool to be picked up and used more often, in particular, to tackle inter-faith dialogue and conflict prevention. A good example of how it could be used is to encourage it to take a leading role in addressing state failure, like co-ordinating a future rehabilitation package for its former member Zimbabwe.

Yet the Commonwealth is not the only group of countries where we can recreate historic connections on a new, modern basis. I have long-argued that Britain should embark on the elevation of its links with many of the countries of the Middle East and Gulf, not only diplomatically but in matters of culture, education, commerce and security, and that this should be done as a cross-party, cross-government initiative pursued consistently over many years. It is strategically vital to strengthen Britain's links with many friendly Muslim nations and not only in the Gulf, and not only for political reasons, since it is vital to make the most of opportunities to expand our trade and investment. It is this kind of all-round strengthening of our links with allies, as well as dealing with potential threats, that our co-ordinated national security is designed approach is designed to help us achieve.

Critics of a closer relationship with some Muslim states will say that they do not conform to all of our own democratic and liberal values, but it is a vital part of understanding the world we are facing in the coming decades that we will not be able to prescribe the form of government in all the countries with whom we need friendly relations. British leaders will rightly always argue that democracy and freedom are the soundest basis for national security and international peace for other countries as well as our own. Yet in foreign policy idealism must always be tempered with realism: even those countries like many of the Gulf States, which are making democratic reforms, will do so at varying paces and sometimes over an extended period.

Similarly, it is in our strategic national interest to have an effective and strong relationship with China. Relations with China are often characterised by tensions over human rights. Our approach has always been to be consistent in raising such issues and not to shrink from debating them with Chinese leaders. At the same time, however, if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons and the urgency of dealing with climate change are the greatest threats to the future of humanity, we must acknowledge that we cannot hope to solve these problems without working closely with China's leaders. A Conservative government will therefore promote sustained dialogue and close understanding with China and a relationship in which, even where there is sharp disagreement, neither side will walk away.

It is similarly not in Britain's national interest to be in permanent confrontation with Russia, but a sustained improvement in those relations will require a major effort on both sides. I make no criticism of the Labour government for its poor relations with Russia, for a wide range of issues ranging from the invasion of Georgia through the treatment of the British Council to the Litvinenko murder have made improved relations impossible in recent years. Britain must remain firm in its belief that countries such as the Ukraine and Georgia must be free to determine their futures. Nevertheless, the "reset button" pressed by Hillary Clinton provides the opportunity for improved relations between Moscow and other Western capitals. Again, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue very difficult to deal with without a working relationship with Russia. It is in Russia's national interest too for such issues to be dealt with, and to work more effectively with the US, Britain and other Western nations. With a Conservative government the door will be open to improved relations with Russia. We shall see if a door opens in return.

The fourth theme of Conservative foreign policy is one in which the cross-party consensus in Britain is very strong: the effective reform of global institutions to allow international co-operation in the face of the threats I have outlined to be enhanced.

This is clearly true in the economic area, where the focus of economic decision-making clearly needs to shift more to bodies such as the G20, and it is true of the United Nations, on which the Conservative Party share the view of the current government that the Security Council should be reformed to include permanent membership for Germany, Japan, Brazil, India and African representation. We have no illusions, however, about how difficult it will be to bring this about.

The European Union is also one of the institutions which must adapt to the changing distribution of world economic and political weight. This is not a speech about European policy: our belief that the European Union needs to focus on the issues of global competitiveness, global poverty and climate change is well known, as is our opposition to the greater centralisation of power in the EU, as embodied in the Lisbon Treaty. We see that Treaty as leading to institutional conflict within the EU, for instance, between the President and the High Representative on Foreign Policy, and a loss of democratic decision-making in nation states, a profound problem that the German Constitutional Court raised in its recent decision on the Lisbon Treaty. Institutional centralisation will not supply, and is even displacement activity for, what Europe really needs to develop in world affairs, which is the political will to use its collective weight effectively and a focus on practical results.

This is true of its relations with Russia, but also starkly true of the situation in the Balkans, where the EU is often failing to exert itself effectively even in relation to countries which many of us hope will one day be its members. There have been many positive developments, but some of the countries of the Western Balkans, most notably Bosnia-Herzegovina, are still tilting unsteadily between their past and their future. A lack of persistent international focus on the region until these countries are fully and irreversibly on the path to joining the EU and NATO could turn the successes of the last decade into the failure of this decade.

A Conservative government will work particularly to sharpen the European focus on the Balkans which we will see as a major test of what the EU can accomplish in foreign affairs. As Lord Ashdown put it last year in his article, Europe needs a wake-up call, Bosnia is on the edge again, "With an EU military force still here, an EU Special Representative with Executive Powers, a huge EU aid budget and a full-scale EU police mission, the EU has more leverage in Bosnia than in any other country. What will it say about the EU's pretensions if we will not act effectively to stop this bust-up happening?" Grand visions and ambitions are vain if the EU cannot demonstrate effectiveness in its common policies in its immediate neighbourhood.

It is vital too that the EU does not give up on enlargement. A European Union without the Western Balkans would forever have a disillusioned and disenchanted hole near its centre. And a Europe that turned its back on Turkey would have made an immense strategic error.

The effective reform of international institutions also includes the updating of international treaties, of which by far the most important is the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, due for a major review conference in April and May next year, quite possibly at the same time as our general election. In the last three years I have given two lectures here at the IISS on what needs to be done to strengthen this treaty and the powers of the International Atomic Energy Agency, proposals I have discussed with the new US administration and which are very much in line with President Obama's crucial speech in Prague in April.

This may well be the main opportunity to fend off the nightmare vision of the effective collapse of the Treaty and the rapid spread of nuclear weapons, a nightmare which would see the Middle East, the world's most unstable region, festooned with the world's most destructive devices. In my view the current British government have been slow to develop ideas and provide international leadership on the reform of the NPT, leaving it until the end of their third term and the approach of the review conference to push any determined initiative of their own. The future of this Treaty also requires the maximum possible effort to persuade or deter Iran from developing nuclear weapons capability.

Again we have long-argued for a new American opening to Iran that has indeed now been made, but also that it will need to be followed if unsuccessful by far tougher European economic measures to show Iran that there is a serious price to its defiance of the international community. Twenty years from now European sanctions may count for much less, but today they still matter and securing such a policy is one of the highest possible priorities for whoever is the British Foreign Secretary at the end of this year and early next.

The fifth and final theme of a Conservative approach to foreign affairs is that, faced with so many threats to our society and our security, it is essential for us in Britain to uphold our own highest values. I have accepted in this speech that our power to dictate to other countries how they should uphold democracy or human rights may actually diminish over time. In many ways this makes it all the more important for Britain to be among those countries that sets an example that can be inspiring to people across the world who are denied liberty or power over their own lives, just as it may encourage in the right direction those who have that power.

Two hundred years ago, in his most famous and shortest speech, my hero William Pitt The Younger said, "England has saved herself by her exertions and will I trust save Europe by her example". In the future we will have to recognise that if our exertions may not always have the desired effect, our example must never be absent. This means that a British government must always be an advocate for political freedom, human rights in their broadest not just legalistic sense, free trade, and democratic decision-making. We must always understand that terrorists who are motivated by contempt for our society will only be strengthened if we weaken the values that hold it together, a consideration of huge importance when we consider recent allegations of complicity in torture.

Our values also include playing a pre-eminent role in the eradication of poverty and the spread of prosperity to less fortunate nations. We fully support President Obama's vision of engagement in Africa which is measured by "more than just the dollars we spend" but "whether we are partners in building the capacity for transformational change". We have to work with African countries so that aid and investment are a force for economic growth and political stability rather than a permanent lifeline that just helps the needy scrape by. Our conscience and our common humanity dictate that we must help those at the mercy of disease, conflict and poverty. That is why David Cameron has reaffirmed our commitment to spending 0.7% of Gross National Income on aid by 2013.

However aid should not be the only driver of our policy towards Africa. We must focus on good governance and fostering the democratic institutions - the courts, civil society and police forces - that are the bedrock of more prosperous societies and the resolving of differences without resort to the gun. In this context development, along with effective diplomacy, is one of the tools of conflict prevention and needs to be used more effectively. We will be conscious that relatively small sums of money spent on conflict prevention can avert the need to spend vast sums on intervention or reconstruction aid, and is in alignment with our moral and well as national security duties.

An approach to foreign policy based on British values also means that the work of organisations such as the British Council will remain essential, and that the foreign language services of the BBC should always be promoted and defended. These organisations are not part of our implementing our foreign policy, but they are an important part of Britain's contribution to openness and understanding in world affairs.

These then are the foreign policy priorities that a new Conservative government would bring with it: a major change to our decision-making; the nourishing of the transatlantic alliance; the freshening and deepening of new relationships beyond America and Europe; a determination to assist the reform of international institutions and treaties; and the upholding of values and principles we hold dear here at home.

My argument today has been that it will become more difficult over time for Britain to exert on world affairs the influence which we are used to, but not impossibly difficult to do so if we make the changes and select the priorities of which I have spoken. To do so will be to act not only in our national interest but in the enlightened national interest to which I referred, for we have a responsibility to others as well as ourselves. Britain will not disengage from trying to shape global events. In trying to create and maintain a more peaceful world we will always be at the forefront. But we will so position and prepare ourselves that if the skies darken and new storms arise we will be ready for them.”


***

Comment

The Tories of David Cameron and William Hague have found it necessary to establish an “anti-federal” political group of nationalists in the European Parliament. No wonder, since a Conservative government in the United Kingdom will base its foreign policy on pure nationalism.

When Western influence is set to dwindle, Hague proposes splitting forces by acting alone in the world.

William Hague is not only against the Treaty of Lisbon, but in opposition to the aspirations of the existing Treaty of Nice. The European Union is good for endless expansion, but not much more.

With friends like these, Europe needs no enemies and the USA is left to sink or swim.



Ralf Grahn

Friday, 26 June 2009

European Conservatives: Prague declaration analysis (Part three)

What does the Prague declaration of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECRG) in the European Parliament tell us about the future policies of the new political group, built around the UK Conservative Party of David Cameron and William Hague (26 MEPs), the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) of the Kaczynski twins (15 MEPs) and the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Mirek Topolanek (formerly Vaclav Klaus) (9 MEPs), with a fluctuating number of individual representatives from other member states?




The ECRG has presented ten short principles. The part looked at the preamble. The second part presented the principles from 1 to 5, and this third part contains the remaining principles, one at a time, with subjective comments.



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NATO first

6. The overriding value of the transatlantic security relationship in a revitalised NATO, and support for young democracies across Europe.



Comment

The plethora of common interests between the United States and the European Union – values, trade, foreign, security and defence – are reduced and made subservient to the defence alliance NATO, although the US needs a coherent Europe to deal with in all mutual areas and as an ally in the world. Despite the importance of NATO, the US has more pressing global challenges to think about, and twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union it has a right to expect that the EU will be able to defend itself in most conceivable situations before long.

The ECRG says nothing about developing the foreign, security and defence policy, or the common defence, of the European Union. The most fundamental challenges for the EU are left unanswered (but the UK Conservatives’ European Election Manifesto was outright hostile towards the timid Lisbon Treaty reforms in the foreign policy area.)

My reading is that it is an error to do anything to keep the UK within the European Union based on its foreign policy influence or military capabilities, as long as Britain is opposed to using them for the common good.

Young democracies need support, from Morocco to Murmansk, but the crux of the matter is how we are going to achieve coherent and cohesive European Union action with regard to the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean or Russia. The sovereign integrity of each EU member state is a recipe for disaster.



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Immigration control

7. Effectively controlled immigration and an end to abuse of asylum procedures



Comment


Improved immigration control and asylum procedures seem to be in line with the EU’s aims under the Hague Programme and the future Stockholm Programme on justice and home affairs (area of freedom, security and justice).

Given the participating parties, it is surprising thing that the European Conservatives mention these policies in a document on the European Union. Great Britain has opted out of the Schengen area of free internal travel and external border control. Under the Lisbon Treaty Britain would opt out of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and together with Poland from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights containing the guiding values with regard to individuals.

The ECRG parties are hardly the ones most famous for promoting effective, but fair responses to the common challenges of migration and asylum.



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Public services

8. Efficient and modern public services and sensitivity to the needs of both rural and urban communities.


Comment

Who could oppose such gifted platitudes?

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Waste

9. An end to waste and excessive bureaucracy and a commitment to greater transparency and probity in the EU institutions and use of EU funds.


Comment

Who could oppose such gifted platitudes?



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Equality of member states

10. Respect and equitable treatment for all EU countries, new and old, large and small.



Comment

Who could oppose such gifted platitudes?



***


The European Conservatives are potential saboteurs in the evolving foreign, security and defence area. They are hardly credible as European reformers in the area of freedom, security and justice, either.

With almost nothing to give, it remains a mystery why they don’t act forcefully for their countries to withdraw from the European Union.



Ralf Grahn

Sunday, 29 March 2009

EU Council tasks: Foreign & security policy CFSP

Nationally elected ministers decide on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union in Brussels.

Currently the foreign ministers meet in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), but if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, they would convene in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), while the coordination of Council activities would take place in the General Affairs Council (GAC).

We take a closer look at the CFSP tasks of the Council in the light of the Lisbon Treaty.


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Conduct of foreign policy

Unanimity rule


External action is a wide concept, covering all areas including the ones managed by the Commission. The CFSP (including the CSDP) is narrower and intergovernmental (but the Foreign Affairs Council deals with all aspects of external relations).

Roughly, the Lisbon Treaty splits the provisions on external relations in two. After principles common to external relations in general, the CFSP and the CSDP provision are laid down in the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the rest of external relations are regulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (common commercial policy, cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid).

According to Article 24(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence (consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty, published OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115).

The CFSP is subject to specific rules and procedures. It is defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts is excluded, as is generally the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The intergovernmental character of the CFSP and the EU’s inability to “speak with one voice on the world scene” are enshrined in the basic unanimity rule, allowing even one dogged member state to paralyse the EU in key questions, despite the evocation of the principle of mutual political solidarity (paragraph 3).


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CFSP


Instead of dealing with the EU’s external action as a whole in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007) broke the unity by keeping the CFSP and CSDP provisions in the Treaty on European Union.

Because of the specific character of the CFSP, Article 26 TEU reiterates the leading role of the European Council and the tasks of the Council in an area where the Commission and the European Parliament are on the sidelines.

The Council’s tasks are laid down in the second paragraph:


Article 26(2) TEU


2. The Council shall frame the common foreign and security policy and take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council.

The Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.


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European External Action Service


If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, the European External Action Service (EEAS) will be established by a Council decision. This is one of the more demanding implementing tasks with regard to the Lisbon Treaty, requiring preparation and public discussion (naturally based on an open preparatory stage, so far sadly lacking):


Article 27(3) TEU

3. In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.


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Operational action


At the operational level, the Council (FAC) makes the decisions, according to Article 28(1) TEU:

Article 28 TEU
(ex Article 14 TEU)

1. Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.

If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to such a decision, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that decision and take the necessary decisions.


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Particular matters


In addition to the operational action mentioned above, the Council may adopt decisions on a common approach to particular CFSP matters. If the Council is able to agree, the member states are supposed to act in accordance with the adopted approach:


Article 29 TEU
(ex Article 15 TEU)

The Council shall adopt decisions which shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions.


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CFSP initiatives and proposals

Whereas the Commission has a near monopoly in making formal proposals within the current ‘Community pillar’, the intergovernmental and political character of the CFSP is illustrated by the right of each member state to submit initiatives or proposals to the Council (besides the right of the High Representative):


Article 30(1) TEU
(ex Article 22 TEU)

1. Any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission's support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals as appropriate.


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Qualified abstention

Article 31(1) TEU repeats that CFSP decisions are generally taken unanimously by the European Council and the Council. According to the general voting rules, abstention does not prevent a decision from being taken, but the second subparagraph of Article 31(1) adds that a member state can make a formal declaration to the effect that it is not obliged to apply the decision (qualified abstention). It is expected not to act against the decision. This is described as a spirit of mutual solidarity. If the minority is sizeable, no decision is taken:


Article 31 TEU
(ex Article 23 TEU)

1. Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.


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Qualified majority


The main rule for CFSP decisions is unanimity, but there are exceptions. According to Article 31(2) TEU qualified majority voting (QMV) applies to questions where the European Council has laid down the guiding principles or asked for a detailed proposal. It applies also to implementing decisions and to appointing special representatives.

Despite these limitations, the Lisbon Treaty contains an “emergency brake”. Even one member state can prevent a vote. This leads to a mediation effort by the High Representative, but if this fails, the matter may be delegated upwards to the European Council for a unanimous decision:


Article 31(2) TEU


2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:

— when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 22(1),

— when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,

— when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position,

— when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33.

If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.


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Expanding QMV in CFSP

There is a cautious opening towards wider use of qualified majority voting in the Council with regard to the common foreign and security policy, but only by unanimous decision by the European Council:


Article 31(3) TEU

3. The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2.


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Further limits

Qualified majority voting is excluded for matters with military implications and even a unanimous European Council is unable to extend QMV to these questions:


Article 31(4) TEU

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.


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Procedural questions

Procedural questions are the only ones where the Council (FAC) can advance by “normal” majority decisions:


Article 31(5) TEU

5. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.


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Consultation

The member states are supposed to consult each other in the European Council and the Council, leading to converging views and coordinated action:



Article 32 TEU, first subparagraph
(ex Article 16 TEU)

Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.


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Special Representative

The Council can appoint a special representative, on a proposal by the High Representative (Article 33 TEU).


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Personal data protection

The protection of personal data is one of the principles the European Union prides itself on, but in the area of the common foreign and security policy the member states’ governments do not want to be hampered by the rules laid down in Article 16 TFEU, including the movement of such data.

Therefore, in a treaty written by the member states, the Council adopts the rules in the CFSP area, without the need to co-legislate with the European Parliament:


Article 39 TEU

In accordance with Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by way of derogation from paragraph 2 thereof, the Council shall adopt a decision laying down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of this Chapter, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities.


***

CFSP expenditure

Article 41 TEU lays down basic rules on the allocation of CFSP expenses, with various Council decisions, including some instances where the Council can unanimously deviate from the main rules.


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Hobbled Giant

The Lisbon Treaty preserves the unanimity rule (liberum veto), with minor exceptions, and the intergovernmental character of the common foreign and security policy. These principles constitute the “clay feet” of the European Union in world affairs.

With these constraints, the Council (FAC) ─ guided by the European Council ─ requires intensive efforts to formulate working common policies. The foreign ministers meet frequently, including informal meetings (Gymnich), to agree on the CFSP, perhaps even effective implementation.

Despite its shortcomings, the Lisbon Treaty would improve the chances of more consistency and coherence in EU foreign affairs. In this respect, non-conclusive treaty reform and ratification difficulties cause competing powers much joy.





Ralf Grahn

Tuesday, 10 March 2009

Swedish non-alignment and EU?

Fellow blogger The European Citizen discussed ’Neutrality and Europe’ in a blog post 9 March 2009, primarily from an Irish perspective:

http://theeuropeancitizen.blogspot.com/2009/03/neutrality-and-europe.html

The post concluded that the existence of the internal market and membership of the EU has changed the political context for neutral European states. This doesn't automatically mean that military integration should be adopted, but a range of options should be discussed.

***

I have nothing to object to the conclusion that rational discussion is needed in the countries outside the security policy mainstream of the European Union.

What caught my eye was a detail, the opening sentence where The European Citizen described Ireland, Sweden and Austria as both neutral and EU member states, and asked but can you really be both.

In a comment on an earlier blog post, I had noted that Finland has narrowed down its definition to “military non-alignment”, because the country sees itself as politically aligned through EU membership, including the CFSP and the CSDP.

I also commented that I was unsure of how Sweden defines itself nowadays, although it continued to use both “non-alignment” and “neutrality” when Finland had ceased to utilise these defining terms.

For this comment off the cuff, I did not take the trouble to research the Swedish position. But when Swedish neutrality cropped up in the new post, I decided to take a look.


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Sweden

Traditional Swedish non-alignment aiming at neutrality in war seems to be in a flux. In the Foreign Policy Declaration of the Government of Sweden 18 February 2009 (Regeringens deklaration vid 2009 års utrikespolitiska debatt i Riksdagen onsdagen den 18 februari 2009), Foreign Minister Carl Bildt mentioned neither non-alignment nor neutrality.

Bildt mentioned the successful foreign, security and defence policies of the European Union and the good cooperation between Sweden and NATO in crisis management. He went on to declare that the Government is going to present a position paper on NATO relations during the spring.

Bildt mentioned Swedish security policy as firm, but in addition he mentioned the proposals for improved Nordic defence cooperation made by Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Swedish Government will consider them in a positive spirit and it promises a Bill on defence policy this spring.


***

In other words, by deliberate omission Sweden is neither “non-aligned” nor “neutral”, but two Government papers will further define NATO relations and (Nordic) defence policy.

I don’t expect any sudden shifts, but Swedish foreign, security and defence policy is changing, although at glacier-like speed.


Ralf Grahn

Thursday, 26 June 2008

EU: How many humiliations?

Our interlocutor, the Tap Blog, has made a first venture into the world after the imagined European Union collapse. Their vision is a Europe of Nations, in ‘The World Needs Europe’s Nations, Not The EU’ (26 June 2008):

http://the-tap.blogspot.com/2008/06/world-needs-europes-nations-not-eu.html

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It sounds nice and cosy, but how on earth are the European nation states going to prosper on their own in a harsh world, when they fail to get their act together under the current (and proposed) veto-enabling rules?

Russia has been picking of the EU countries at will, to the extent that it seems to be sorry for their present state of disarray. On the other hand, the EU’s possibilities to negotiate have been blocked by repeated national vetoes.

For a realistic assessment of the EU countries’ predicament, read the summary on EU–Russia relations by Robert Amsterdam ‘A Broken Europe Can’t Negotiate with Moscow’ (25 June 2008):

http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/06/a_broken_europe_cant_negotiate.htm

For a realist assessment of the challenges for Europe, I repeat my recommendation to read the blog by James Rogers, Global Power Europe:

http://www.globalpowereurope.eu/

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Squabbling with each other and vetoing away their future, the EU member states are in for a lot of humiliations on the international scene.

Most of the time, they can, of course, cobble together a statement deploring the situation …

The Lisbon Treaty would improve the internal efficiency of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy, but the real world effectiveness of its policies would still be hostage to the ‘liberum veto’.

In other words, the proposed improvements are too little, too late.

The European leaders will the good outcomes, but they refuse the means to achieve them.

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But to propose a Europe of Nations – cosy as it sounds – is taking the wrong turn altogether, as long as there is no convincing explanation of how these proud nations would do better completely on their own or with an added dose of intergovernmental inefficiency.

The Tap Blog, in my humble opinion, suffers from one fundamental flaw. Its object of worship is the nation state.

My yardstick is the interest of the EU citizen. From two main angles: security and prosperity.

We already have our nations, and they are not going to disappear. But we need the team effort called the European Union, indeed a much improved EU, not only willing, but able to defend our common interests.

How many humiliations have to be endured before we get what we need?


Ralf Grahn

Sunday, 27 January 2008

EU Treaty of Lisbon: CFSP financial provisions

Why do the unsettled times between Royal prerogatives and Parliamentary appropriations described in the Diary of Samuel Pepys (1633 – 1703) come to my mind, when I look at the financial provisions for the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common security and defence policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU)?

If nothing more is sought than soothing foreign policy statements, if there is unanimity, the costs are negligible. But since the early days of European Political Cooperation (EPC) the member states have gradually started to think that they could actually have an impact in world affairs, given the means.

The Lisbon Treaty is a step in that direction, with enhanced coordination and more flexible allocation of resources. The governments and the Council remain key players, with only a light touch of democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament concerning both contents and finances.

When the Union budget is used for CFSP ends the European Parliament is only consulted. If the member states use their own resources, the EP can be side-stepped.

***

The intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007) deemed it opportune to present its reforms like this (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/31 and 32):

46) Articles 27 A to 27 E, on enhanced cooperation, shall be replaced by Article 10 in accordance with point 22 above.

47) Article 28 shall be amended as follows:

(a) paragraph 1 shall be deleted and the remaining paragraphs shall be renumbered accordingly; throughout the Article the words "budget of the European Communities" shall be replaced by "Union budget";

(b) in paragraph 2, renumbered 1, the words "which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this Title entail" shall be replaced by "to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise";

(c) in paragraph 3, renumbered 2, the words "the implementation of those provisions" in the first subparagraph shall be replaced by "the implementation of this Chapter";

(d) the following new paragraph 3 shall be added and paragraph 4 deleted:

"3. The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1) and Article 28 B. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.

Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1) and Article 28 B which are not charged to the Union budget shall be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States' contributions.

The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, decisions establishing:

(a) the procedures for setting up and financing the start-up fund, in particular the amounts allocated to the fund;

(b) the procedures for administering the start-up fund;

(c) the financial control procedures.

When the task planned in accordance with Article 28 A(1) and Article 28 B cannot be charged to the Union budget, the Council shall authorise the High Representative to use the fund. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit.".

***

We start our work by going to the existing Article 28 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which we find in the latest consolidated version of the Treaty (OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/23):

Article 28

1. Articles 189, 190, 196 to 199, 203, 204, 206 to 209, 213 to 219, 255 and 290 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas
referred to in this title.

2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this title
entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities.

3. Operating expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also
be charged to the budget of the European Communities, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the budget of the European Communities, it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the
Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having
military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

4. The budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Community shall
apply to the expenditure charged to the budget of the European Communities.

***

What is Article 28 TEU going to look like, if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force? Merging the existing text with the amendments drafted by the IGC 2007 should lead us to a new, consolidated Article 28 TEU:

Article 28

1. Administrative expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise for the institutions shall be charged to the Union budget.

2. Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also
be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union budget, it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article 23(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

3. The Council shall adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1) and Article 28 B. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.

Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1) and Article 28 B which are not charged to the Union budget shall be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States' contributions.

The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, decisions establishing:

(a) the procedures for setting up and financing the start-up fund, in particular the amounts allocated to the fund;

(b) the procedures for administering the start-up fund;

(c) the financial control procedures.

When the task planned in accordance with Article 28 A(1) and Article 28 B cannot be charged to the Union budget, the Council shall authorise the High Representative to use the fund. The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit.

***

The Convention, led by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, looked for more flexibility and rapidity by proposing the following Article III-215 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/70):

SECTION 2

Financial provisions

Article III-215

1. Administrative expenditure which the provisions referred to in this Chapter entail for the institutions shall be charged to the Union budget.

2. Operating expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council of Ministers decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union's budget it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council of Ministers decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council of Ministers have made a formal declaration under Article III-201(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

3. The Council of Ministers shall adopt a European decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for tasks as referred to in Article I-40(1). It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.

Preparatory activities for tasks as referred to in Article I-40(1) which are not charged to the Union budget shall be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States' contributions.

The Council of Ministers shall adopt by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs European decisions establishing:

(a) the procedures for setting up and financing the start-up fund, in particular the amounts allocated to the fund and the procedures for reimbursement;

(b) the procedures for administering the start-up fund;

(c) the financial control procedures.

When it is planning a task as referred to in Article I-40(1) which cannot be charged to the Union's budget, the Council of Ministers shall authorise the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs to use the fund. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall report to the Council of Ministers on the implementation of this remit.

***

In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe the member states took on board the proposal of the Convention with minor changes in Article III-313 (OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/141 and 142):

SECTION 3

FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

Article III-313

1. Administrative expenditure which the implementation of this Chapter entails for the institutions shall be charged to the Union budget.

2. Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications and cases where the Council decides otherwise.

In cases where expenditure is not charged to the Union budget it shall be charged to the Member States in accordance with the gross national product scale, unless the Council decides otherwise. As for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications, Member States whose representatives in the Council have made a formal declaration under Article III-300(1), second subparagraph, shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing thereof.

3. The Council shall adopt a European decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article I-41(1) and Article III-309. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.

Preparatory activities for the tasks referred to in Article I-41(1) and Article III-309 which are not charged to the Union budget shall be financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States' contributions.

The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, European decisions establishing:

(a) the procedures for setting up and financing the start-up fund, in particular the amounts allocated to the fund;

(b) the procedures for administering the start-up fund;

(c) the financial control procedures.

When the task planned in accordance with Article I-41(1) and Article III-309 cannot be charged to the Union budget, the Council shall authorise the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs to use the fund. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall report to the Council on the implementation of this remit.

***

The similarities between the draft Constitutional Treaty, the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty are obvious in this Article.

The financial provisions in Article 28 TEU concern ‘this Chapter’, i.e. the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including the common security and defence policy (CSDP).

Administrative expenditure is charged to the Union budget.

Non-military operating expenses are charged to the Union budget, if the Council does not unanimously decide otherwise.

Expenditure with military or defence implications is charged to the member states, if the Council does not unanimously decide otherwise. As a rule, a gross national product scale is used for the contributions of the member states, but the Council can unanimously decide otherwise.

The reference to the formal declaration in Article 23(1), second subparagraph, points to the existing TEU. Following the original numbering of the Reform Treaty TEU (as I have done throughout), the corresponding provision is Article 15b(1) TEU, second subparagraph:

“Article 15b(1)

Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.”

In other words, an abstaining member state makes a formal declaration, lets the other members proceed, but is not bound by the decision with military or defence implications, including the operating expenditure.

Rapid access to CFSP resources is the novelty in the Lisbon Treaty, as proposed by the Convention and incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty, especially preparatory activities for CSDP operations referred to in Article 28a(1) and Article 28b.

The Council decides on the procedures for rapid access to funds from the Union budget for urgent needs. The European Parliament is only consulted.

If the preparatory activities can not be charged to the Union budget, they shall be covered by a start-up fund made up of member states’ contribution. The Council makes the decisions needed by qualified majority, on a proposal from the High Representative. The Council authorises the use of the fund and monitors its use. – There is no mention of scrutiny by the European Parliament.

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The provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP) are next in line.


Ralf Grahn