In a quick post, we drew our readers’ attention to the Commission’s Communication Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 (Brussels, 29.4.2009 COM(2009) 206 final).
Later we added a comment to guide readers to the blog post Commission Report on How Regulation 1/2003 Works, by the EU Law Blog, which offers a neat explanation of the issues as well as links to the original Regulation, the Commission Report and the Staff Working Paper.
***
Staff Working Document
The accompanying Commission staff working document SEC(2009) 574 has now been posted more officially on the Eur-Lex pages as well (at 29 April 2009).
We add the exact references for the 97 page detailed document:
Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 {COM(2009) 206 final}; Brussels, 29.4.2009 SEC(2009) 574 final.
***
Regulation 1/2003
Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty was originally published in the Official Journal 4.1.2003 L 1/1.
This text with EEA relevance has since been amended. The latest consolidated version of Regulation 1/2003 is of 16 October 2006.
Ralf Grahn
Showing posts with label EU Law Blog. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EU Law Blog. Show all posts
Monday, 4 May 2009
Saturday, 28 June 2008
Lisbon Treaty: Reasons for ratification
Bartolus of the excellent EU Law Blog commented on the European Council conclusions after the Irish ’no’ vote:
‘As you can see from the “conclusions”, the result was well, err, inconclusive.’
Go to the post ‘Lisbon Treaty and European Council’ (21 June 2008), with the conclusions:
http://eulaw.typepad.com/eulawblog/2008/06/lisbon-treaty-and-european-council.html
‘Students, academics, practitioners and anyone else who may be interested’ in the European Union is often left to find out the thinking behind and assessments of Council outcomes from independent sources.
Carl Fredrik Bergström, from Sieps (the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies), wrote his assessment before the European Council meeting (16 June 2008), but ‘Vad händer med Lissabonfördraget efter irländarnas nej?’ (What happens to the Lisbon Treaty after the Irish no?) sheds some light on post-referendum reasoning:
http://www.sieps.se/publ/utredningar/bilagor/Vad_hander_med_Lissabonfordraget_efter_Irlands_nej.pdf
Bergström notes the formal stipulation of Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union and the possible conclusion to scrap the Treaty of Lisbon. However, such a conclusion would probably be too hasty, on two counts.
First, all the EU member states’ governments have seen the great need for amendments and they all support the amendments agreed in the Treaty of Lisbon. The problems do not disappear even if the Irish vote ‘no’.
Second, 800,000 Irish ‘no’ voters do not prove that the solutions agreed between the governments are bad or unwanted. On the contrary, the Lisbon Treaty can probably count on the support of national parliaments representing almost 500 million citizens.
It is reasonable to expect the remaining national parliaments to continue their ratification processes. Bergström then distinguishes between the situation where Ireland alone has rejected the Lisbon Treaty (and others move ahead, in one way or another) or if others join them (domino effect).
Bergström offers a preliminary outline of alternative solutions, in three batches:
1) Amendments without a new treaty.
2) Amendments or ‘adaptations’ in the connection of the next enlargement. New Irish position needed.
3) Later amendments (including those with deferred implementation according to the Lisbon Treaty). New Irish position needed.
Bergström’s batches sketch alternatives and outline thinking. A detailed analysis of different alternatives is offered by professor Steve Peers (Statewatch), mentioned in the 27 June 2008 post ‘Lisbon Treaty: Legal analysis of ratification, implementation and impact of non-ratification’:
http://grahnlaw.blogspot.com/2008/06/lisbon-treaty-legal-analysis-of.html
***
The needs for EU reform have disappeared nowhere. States unwilling or unable to keep pace should actively search for solutions within their comfort zone and let the rest accomplish real EU reform.
Ralf Grahn
‘As you can see from the “conclusions”, the result was well, err, inconclusive.’
Go to the post ‘Lisbon Treaty and European Council’ (21 June 2008), with the conclusions:
http://eulaw.typepad.com/eulawblog/2008/06/lisbon-treaty-and-european-council.html
‘Students, academics, practitioners and anyone else who may be interested’ in the European Union is often left to find out the thinking behind and assessments of Council outcomes from independent sources.
Carl Fredrik Bergström, from Sieps (the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies), wrote his assessment before the European Council meeting (16 June 2008), but ‘Vad händer med Lissabonfördraget efter irländarnas nej?’ (What happens to the Lisbon Treaty after the Irish no?) sheds some light on post-referendum reasoning:
http://www.sieps.se/publ/utredningar/bilagor/Vad_hander_med_Lissabonfordraget_efter_Irlands_nej.pdf
Bergström notes the formal stipulation of Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union and the possible conclusion to scrap the Treaty of Lisbon. However, such a conclusion would probably be too hasty, on two counts.
First, all the EU member states’ governments have seen the great need for amendments and they all support the amendments agreed in the Treaty of Lisbon. The problems do not disappear even if the Irish vote ‘no’.
Second, 800,000 Irish ‘no’ voters do not prove that the solutions agreed between the governments are bad or unwanted. On the contrary, the Lisbon Treaty can probably count on the support of national parliaments representing almost 500 million citizens.
It is reasonable to expect the remaining national parliaments to continue their ratification processes. Bergström then distinguishes between the situation where Ireland alone has rejected the Lisbon Treaty (and others move ahead, in one way or another) or if others join them (domino effect).
Bergström offers a preliminary outline of alternative solutions, in three batches:
1) Amendments without a new treaty.
2) Amendments or ‘adaptations’ in the connection of the next enlargement. New Irish position needed.
3) Later amendments (including those with deferred implementation according to the Lisbon Treaty). New Irish position needed.
Bergström’s batches sketch alternatives and outline thinking. A detailed analysis of different alternatives is offered by professor Steve Peers (Statewatch), mentioned in the 27 June 2008 post ‘Lisbon Treaty: Legal analysis of ratification, implementation and impact of non-ratification’:
http://grahnlaw.blogspot.com/2008/06/lisbon-treaty-legal-analysis-of.html
***
The needs for EU reform have disappeared nowhere. States unwilling or unable to keep pace should actively search for solutions within their comfort zone and let the rest accomplish real EU reform.
Ralf Grahn
Tuesday, 18 December 2007
EU Treaty of Lisbon published
Thanks to the EU Law Blog I noticed that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union had been published sooner than I had thought, on 14 December (2007/C 303/1) along with the explanations.
Official publication of The Lisbon Treaty too, was swifter than anticipated. On 17 December (2007/C 306/01) we find the headline: Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007.
The Treaty has been partitioned into quite a few files. My basic computer skills were not up to downloading the whole thing at a go, and if you are no better, some patience may be called for.
Sadly, the published version is no consolidation. You are going to find just the amendments.
Ralf Grahn
Source:
EU Law Blog: Lisbon Treaty and Charter Published; December 17, 2007; http://eulaw.typepad.com
Official publication of The Lisbon Treaty too, was swifter than anticipated. On 17 December (2007/C 306/01) we find the headline: Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007.
The Treaty has been partitioned into quite a few files. My basic computer skills were not up to downloading the whole thing at a go, and if you are no better, some patience may be called for.
Sadly, the published version is no consolidation. You are going to find just the amendments.
Ralf Grahn
Source:
EU Law Blog: Lisbon Treaty and Charter Published; December 17, 2007; http://eulaw.typepad.com
Monday, 4 June 2007
Generosity and stealth
Thanks to the generosity of the EU Law Blog, a worthwhile acquaintance in its own right, I found EUlawblogger, who has written on EU treaty change. (I have added both blogs to my links.)
Yesterday, I presented and commented on EUlawblogger’s “Picking the cherries”, which is well woth reading even if you don’t share all the views.
Today, I am going to point out “The Constitutional Treaty: Open Europe, please tell the truth”, 8 May 2007, where EUlawblogger analysed the shortcomings of “The New Treaty: What will it mean and do we need a referendum?”, by Open Europe.
Please, read and compare.
Incidentally, I covered the same ‘research report’ in “Spoilsports” on 27 May 2007, on a more general level, wondering at the (untold) assumptions that could explain such vilification: is it really an ethical position to be member of a union only to maximise one’s chances to fly solo, to obstruct progress and to sabotage decision-making? Or is the purpose of Open Europe to beat a retreat behind the moat and to restart an era of “splendid isolation”?
Back to EUlawblogger, who wrote: there is no justification for trying to bring back the vast bulk of the Constitutional Treaty by stealth, and it would be preferable to focus instead on going forward with only those provisions of the Constitutional Treaty which connect the EU more closely to its citizens.
By stealth? I find the perspective and the choice of words odd. The negotiations on a ‘simplified treaty’ are going to be closely watched all over Europe, in spite of their secretive, inter-governmental character (whereas the Convention was a lot more open to citizens). The end-result, at least, is going to be in the public domain, open to public debate and parliamentary scrutiny.
Officially, the UK government has been tight-lipped, but at the same time the “red lines” floated more or less point to wholesale scrapping of a treaty signed by 27 member states, ratified by 18 of them and supported by two more.
Wouldn’t it have been more to the point to scrutinise the ‘good faith’ of the British government? Perhaps the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18 Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force, could have been a more meaningful point of reference on the obligations of a ‘civilised nation’(?).
Who, if any, seems to act by stealth? How do these actions connect the EU more closely to its citizens?
Part II of the Constitutional Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, is dedicated to rights, freedoms and principles aimed at putting the citizens of the Union at the centre of European integration. How would scrapping the Charter connect the European Union more closely to its citizens?
How does a Union paralysed by vetoes serve the interests of its citizens?
A ‘Global Europe’ for the 21st Century enhances both the security and the prosperity of its citizens.
Ralf Grahn
Yesterday, I presented and commented on EUlawblogger’s “Picking the cherries”, which is well woth reading even if you don’t share all the views.
Today, I am going to point out “The Constitutional Treaty: Open Europe, please tell the truth”, 8 May 2007, where EUlawblogger analysed the shortcomings of “The New Treaty: What will it mean and do we need a referendum?”, by Open Europe.
Please, read and compare.
Incidentally, I covered the same ‘research report’ in “Spoilsports” on 27 May 2007, on a more general level, wondering at the (untold) assumptions that could explain such vilification: is it really an ethical position to be member of a union only to maximise one’s chances to fly solo, to obstruct progress and to sabotage decision-making? Or is the purpose of Open Europe to beat a retreat behind the moat and to restart an era of “splendid isolation”?
Back to EUlawblogger, who wrote: there is no justification for trying to bring back the vast bulk of the Constitutional Treaty by stealth, and it would be preferable to focus instead on going forward with only those provisions of the Constitutional Treaty which connect the EU more closely to its citizens.
By stealth? I find the perspective and the choice of words odd. The negotiations on a ‘simplified treaty’ are going to be closely watched all over Europe, in spite of their secretive, inter-governmental character (whereas the Convention was a lot more open to citizens). The end-result, at least, is going to be in the public domain, open to public debate and parliamentary scrutiny.
Officially, the UK government has been tight-lipped, but at the same time the “red lines” floated more or less point to wholesale scrapping of a treaty signed by 27 member states, ratified by 18 of them and supported by two more.
Wouldn’t it have been more to the point to scrutinise the ‘good faith’ of the British government? Perhaps the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18 Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force, could have been a more meaningful point of reference on the obligations of a ‘civilised nation’(?).
Who, if any, seems to act by stealth? How do these actions connect the EU more closely to its citizens?
Part II of the Constitutional Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, is dedicated to rights, freedoms and principles aimed at putting the citizens of the Union at the centre of European integration. How would scrapping the Charter connect the European Union more closely to its citizens?
How does a Union paralysed by vetoes serve the interests of its citizens?
A ‘Global Europe’ for the 21st Century enhances both the security and the prosperity of its citizens.
Ralf Grahn
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