Future of Europe: introducing deepening EMU

In the blog entry Future of Europe to meet European Council about the winds of change from the European Parliament, the European Commission and president Emmanuel Macron, we saw the:

White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025; Brussels, 1.3.2017 COM(2017) 2025 final

The White Paper promised to deliver further food for thought and debate through five thematic papers, among which (page 18):

The European Commission will contribute to that discussion in the months ahead with a series of reflection papers on the following topics:

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• deepening the Economic and Monetary Union, on the basis of the Five Presidents' Report of June 2015;

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Five President’s Report

Published in June 2015, the 23-page Five President’s Report, officially Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, was authored by the president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker “in close cooperation with” the president of the European Council and the euro summit Donald Tusk, the president of the Eurogroup Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the president of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi and the president of the European Parliament Martin Schulz.  

EMU Reflection paper

Two years later came the update in the form of:

Reflection paper on the deepening of the economic and monetary union; Brussels, 31.5.2017 COM(2017) 291 final (34 pages)

Alternatively, access the White Paper and the reflection papers through the Commission web page White paper on the future of Europe and the way forward.

Introductory notes  

In Finnish I looked at the deepening of the economic and monetary union (EMU) and the Five Presidents’ Report in the blog post Euroopan tulevaisuus: talous- ja rahaliiton syventäminen and at the EMU reflection paper in the entry Pohdinta-asiakirja talous- ja rahaliiton syventämiseksi.

The Swedish blog post Norden i EU-utkanten? described how scattered the Nordic countries are with regard to the defence alliance NATO and the European Union. Iceland and Norway remain outside the EU, and even the EU members Denmark and Sweden continue on the periphery, showing no signs of adopting the euro, while  leaving Finland the sole Nordic participant in the euro area, the core group of 19 countries with a total population of 341 million.

In Vitboken om EU:s framtid i Norden I tried to find signs of activity regarding the future of Europe, by the governments or parliaments of the Nordic EU members Denmark, Finland and Sweden, concerning the White Paper from the European Commission. (The article Diskussionsunderlaget om EU:s sociala dimension i Norden moved from the general level to explore the reception of the reflection paper on the social dimension by these three countries. There are also a number of earlier blog posts in Finnish, Swedish or  English about the social market economy, the European social pillar and the EU social dimension. Most of them can be found through the entry Future of Europe: social dimension.)  

(The English entries A symbolic opportunity for the European Council and Future of Europe to meet European Council visited the summit level and general EU reform issues in an attempt to lay the groundwork for more specific questions, such as the individual reflection papers, with the creation of a credible EMU next in turn.)   

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Twitter reflects at least parts of the multilingual pan-European public debate about the future of the European Union under the hashtag #FutureOfEurope, while the Commission web page for the priority A deeper and fairer economic and monetary union offers a more specific tag #deepeningEMU, covering the policy areas: economic union, financial union, fiscal union, political union (and the European Pillar of Social Rights).

Ralf Grahn

ECB’s Trichet on economic governance in EMU

The EU heads of state or government have stowed away the discussions about improving European Union and eurozone economic governance into the finance minister task force chaired by Herman Van Rompuy. The task force is expected to report in October.

For the sake of transparency and informed public debate, it is therefore important that these crucial matters are debated elsewhere as well. One welcome intervention was made by the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, at the hearing of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 21 June 2010.



EMU responsibility


According to Trichet, policy makers have to understand the requirements of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU):

A single market of 500 million citizens and an Economic and Monetary Union of 330 million citizens – which are among the largest and most advanced economies in the world and which are built on solid foundations in terms of human and social capital – cannot and should not be measured according to the strengths or weaknesses of their individual components alone. Particularly as regards Economic and Monetary Union, policy-makers need to internalise what it means to be part of a monetary union, in words and in deeds.

Quantum leap for economic governance needed


Economic governance must be radically improved. Benefits and responsibilities of EMU go together. Solidarity runs both ways:

The ECB believes that a true quantum leap is needed in the framework for surveillance and adjustment of fiscal policies, as well as broader macroeconomic policies concerned with Europe’s competitiveness.

“ La solidarité de fait” that Robert Schuman called for 60 years ago is reflected in the degree of economic integration and interdependence already achieved in Monetary Union. But solidarity is a two-way street. The benefits and protection that are derived from membership of Monetary Union bring with them responsibilities and obligations. This is the fundamental contract which forms the basis for our currency. We now have to turn it into a more effective structure for fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance and adjustment.

Budget surveillance

Trichet outlined the strengthening of budgetary surveillance, including prevention, correction, a wider range of quasi-automatic sanctions and formal Commission proposals:

First, it is of the essence that the surveillance of budgetary policies be strengthened. I am pleased to note that the European Council confirmed this assessment at its meeting last Thursday.

At the level of the EU27, and in particular within the euro area, we must have effective instruments to prevent – and, where necessary, correct – excessive deficits and debt levels. A more stringent implementation of rules and procedures is essential, among other things by increasing the automaticity and speed of procedural steps. The initiation of sanctions also needs to be quasi-automatic.

Fiscal surveillance must be more direct and effective. It must also be based on more independent monitoring and assessment. We may need a differentiated approach to surveillance depending on the fiscal performance of countries. The Commission should have greater responsibility by making proposals, which can only be modified with unanimity in the Council, rather than mere recommendations under the Stability and Growth Pact.

In the event of non-compliance, sanctions need to be applied much earlier and to be broader in scope. They should not only address excessive debt ratios, but also apply when countries are not making sufficient progress towards medium-term budgetary objectives. A wider spectrum of financial sanctions needs to be considered, along with non-financial and procedural sanctions, such as more stringent reporting requirements or even a limitation or suspension of voting rights.

Competitiveness


Broader economic reforms and surveillance of macroeconomic policies are needed to enhance competitiveness and prevent imbalances:

The second area may appear more novel, both at the level of the European Union and at the level of the euro area, but the ECB has in fact been stressing it in the Eurogroup since at least 2005: the surveillance of policies to maintain Europe’s internal and external competitiveness – policies to raise productivity, to enhance people’s skills and to improve firms’ competitiveness. These policies go well beyond the tradable sector. They must also encompass the non-tradable sector, including the public sector, since it too is decisive for the competitiveness of an economy as a whole.

Conscious management of wages and costs in order to maintain a healthy position for the economy within a competitive environment – this should be the core focus of such broader macroeconomic surveillance. The reason why competitiveness should be the main focus is not that countries should pursue export-oriented policies or boost international market share. The reason is that within a monetary union, the relative competitiveness of economies captures very well the sustainability of price and cost developments.

I am pleased that last Thursday’s European Council confirmed the need for an effective surveillance framework in this area. Experience has shown that persistent divergence in this regard is detrimental both for Member States and for Monetary Union as a whole.

As with fiscal surveillance, this framework needs to allow for targeted and differentiated surveillance and follow-up measures. For countries that experience significant losses of competitiveness, surveillance should become increasingly deep and detailed. More ad hoc reporting and dedicated country missions, policy recommendations, compliance requirements, public peer pressure and gradual financial steps to encourage compliance could all be part of that process.

For this to work, we need a transparent and effective trigger mechanism to determine the intensity of vulnerabilities and surveillance. This should be based on close monitoring and reporting by both the Commission and the ECB. Experts are currently developing ways to best capture the complexity of the issue, as well as procedures by which indicators could be used in a surveillance and adjustment framework.

If we can put in place effective surveillance and adjustment frameworks for both fiscal and competitiveness policies – and if we can ensure through appropriate regulation that our financial system serves the real economy and not the other way around – our European Union and our Economic and Monetary Union will exit this crisis much stronger than before and will be very well placed in the global economy.

Wise public spending and growth oriented reforms are needed, but the Economic and Monetary Union is far from over, if our political leaders grasp the nettle.




Ralf Grahn

Iceland & EU: Monetary union only?

In two days (Saturday 25 April 2009) Iceland is going to vote on a new parliament, after the meltdown of the country’s financial sector and economy.

For a look at the background, you can read Iceland’s EU questions unanswered ahead of vote on EUbusiness (23 April 2009).



A few months ago, several reports indicated that the Icelandic population would be ready to change their status as part of the European Economic Area (EEA) into membership of the European Union. Later news items and blog posts have told us that many voters would want to adopt the euro currency, fewer would be prepared to start negotiations on EU membership, and even fewer imagine they would accept the accession terms.

Only the social democratic party (estimated to gain 31 per cent of the vote) is committed to EU membership.

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Monetary union?

This situation has left me wondering if the voters in Iceland have secret knowledge, or if they are unwittingly optimistic about adopting a foreign currency.

Right at the start of the Treaty on European Union the Preamble states:

RESOLVED to achieve the strengthening and the convergence of their economies and to establish an economic and monetary union including, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, a single and stable currency,
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EMU


The economic and monetary union (EMU) includes the common currency. Iceland is not a protectorate or an enclave, but a sovereign state. Could it dispense with economic union, meaning coordination of economic policies, the stability and growth pact and all the rest, and just go straight for the euro currency?

To my knowledge, there is no such indication in the treaties, but I am doubtful because of the existing exceptions, according to Wikipedia Montenegro, Kosovo, Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, the Vatican).



Or are the Icelanders thinking about adopting the euro unilaterally, without asking anyone?

I have to admit that I am mystified.


Ralf Grahn

Fact Sheets on the European Union 2009

The EU Bookshop has published the 2009 update of the Fact Sheets of the European Union (although the manuscript was finished in August 2008).

The 12th edition contains 165 fact sheets (subjects) aimed at the general public. The Fact Sheets (521 pages) are available as a freely downloadable pdf document (hefty 9.22 MB) or as a print publication with an accompanying CD-ROM (price 40 €):



http://bookshop.europa.eu/eubookshop/download.action?fileName=BAAA08001ENC_002.pdf&eubphfUid=10061951&catalogNbr=BA-AA-08-001-EN-C

If I understood correctly, the printed text (pdf) is available in six languages (English, French, German, Italian, Polish, Spanish) but the CD-ROM in 21 languages.


Since the Fact Sheets originate in the European Parliament, the EP’s role is usually described in each case in addition to the general information.

The Fact Sheets are handy when you need an overview of an unfamiliar area of EU policy. This is how they are described by the publisher:


The aim of these fact sheets is to provide those new to the subject with an overview of the process of European integration and the European Parliament’s role in this development.

New fact sheets on topical issues and the developments of the last few years have recently appeared online, for example: the institutional reforms undertaken in preparation for the accession of Bulgaria and Romania; the new financial perspective; gender equality; asylum, and immigration policy; management of external borders; judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters; sports policy; the Lisbon strategy; the European neighbourhood policy (ENP); the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) and central Asia.

With access to around 165 fact sheets, readers will find that this is one of the best sources of information about the Union’s institutions and policies.
The content of these fact sheets covers six main areas: how the EU works, citizens’ Europe, the internal market, common policies, economic and monetary union and the EU’s external relations.

In order to speak with one voice, the EU has developed several policies and measures that all Member States endeavour to apply. These ‘common policies’ concern the entire Union and are designed to achieve common objectives.

Economic and monetary union

Economic and monetary union (EMU) is the result of a long process aimed at harmonising the economic and monetary policies of the European Union Member States and introducing a single currency: the euro. So far, 16 Member States have adopted the euro, which is used on a daily basis by over half the EU’s population.


The EU’s external relations

The EU’s economic, commercial and financial weight makes it a leading player on the international scene. It has signed a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements with most countries and regions of the world. The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is one of the instruments of the European Union’s external relations.


How the European Union works

The European Union (EU) has its own legislature and executive and an independent judiciary, which are supported and complemented by an additional set of institutions and bodies. The EU’s rules and decision-making procedures are laid down in the Treaties. In order to achieve its objectives, the Union has its own budget.


Citizens’ Europe

For EU citizens, the right to travel, live and work throughout the Union can easily be taken for granted. However, in order for them to be able to enjoy this right fully, an effective system to protect fundamental rights within the EU needs to be put in place and maintained.


The internal market

Following the dismantling of previous barriers, goods, services and capital move as freely throughout Europe as inside a Member State. The removal of obstacles and the opening up of national markets means that more companies can compete with one another.

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The Fact Sheets are convenient for anyone who needs quick information, for a school or university assignment, but especially ahead of the European elections the MEP candidates and their campaign groups should have them available as reference tools for various occasions.



Ralf Grahn

Euro banknotes and coins IIIb: UK and Constitution Article III-186

Does Article III-186 of the Constitutional Treaty differ from Article III-78 of the draft Constitution with regard to the authorisation and issue of legal tender in the euro area (eurozone)?

First, we compare the texts.

Then, we look at what our legal materials have to say, with a special focus on the United Kingdom. Has the UK succeeded in creating valuable options, or did the government prepare for future storms by throwing the steering wheel into the sea?


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Draft Constitution Article III-78 and Constitution Article III-186 texts compared

The IGC 2004 left the provision almost untouched. The Council of Ministers became the Council in the Constitutional Treaty, but this was a general choice of terminology.

The second paragraph was divided into two subparagraphs, making it somewhat easier to read, but the substance remained the same.

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Although the results of the IGC 2004 were far from dramatic, we check if Article III-186 Constitution elicited any comments in our sample of legal materials.

Sweden

Outside the euro area, the Swedish government memorandum ‘Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (Utrikesdepartemetet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2004:52; December 2004) described the signed Constitutional Treaty.

Before turning to the proposed new powers for the euro area, the Swedish government mentioned the technical questions regarding euro coins in passing, as one of the areas where the eurogroup already decides on its own (page 239):


”Euroområdet

Genom det konstitutionella fördraget kommer beslutsfattandet i euroområdet att stärkas. Redan i dag finns ett antal frågor där euroländerna själva fattar beslut, bl.a. sanktioner i stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten, växelkurspolitik och tekniska frågor som rör euromynten. Genom det nya konstitutionella fördraget kommer euroländerna att kunna samordna sin ekonomiska politik på ett mer formellt sätt. Artikel III-194 i det konstitutionella fördraget fastställer att euroländerna ska utarbeta riktlinjerna för den ekonomiska politiken och se till att dessa överensstämmer med de riktlinjer som har antagits för hela unionen.”

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On the whole, here on page 172, the Swedish draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss ─ Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (2 June 2005) reiterated the remarks made in the memorandum mentioned above.

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Finland

The government of eurozone Finland laid out the Constitutional Treaty in its ratification bill ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan perustuslaista tehdyn sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 67/2006 vp). Even if the measures concern a detail ─ the denominations and the technical specifications of euro coins ─ this extract from the government’s text gives the impression that consulting the European Parliament is an addition to the EP’s powers (page 183):

”III-186 artikla, jossa määrätään setelien ja metallirahojen liikkeelle laskemisesta, vastaa SEY 106 artiklaa sillä lisäyksellä, että neuvoston tulee kuulla myös Euroopan parlamenttia ennen kuin se päättää metallirahojen yksikköarvojen ja teknisten määritelmien yhdenmukaistamisesta.”

The weakening of the EP’s position has been noted elsewhere, as we have indicated earlier.


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The same remarks appear in Swedish in ’Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen (RP 67/2006 rd), with the Finnish government’s comments on page 187:

”Artikel III-186, där det bestäms om utgivningen av sedlar och mynt, motsvarar artikel 106 i EG-fördraget med det tillägget att rådet skall höra även Europaparlamentet innan det beslutar om harmonisering av valörerna och de tekniska specifikationerna för mynt.”

Elsewhere, the description oft he EP’s role is explained more clearly.

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Fischer

Klemens H. Fischer, in ‘Der Europäische Verfassungsvertrag‘ (Nomos, Stämpfli & Manz, 2005), only made the observations that „Artikel III-186 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel 106 EGV“ and „Artikel III-186 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel III-78 VVE“ (page 317).

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United Kingdom

According to Article 4 of the Protocol (No 13, in the Constitutional Treaty) on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as regards economic and monetary union, the Constitution’s Article III-186 did not apply to the UK.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) ‘White Paper on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ (Cm 6309, September 2004) mentioned economic and monetary union (EMU) stating the existence of the protocol. The government then proceeded to say that it was, in principle, in favour of a successful single currency. If other member states proved the success and the British ‘economic tests’ were met, the government might propose joining. The promise of a referendum was the real clincher (page 28):

”Economic and Monetary Union

The UK’s Protocol makes clear that the UK is under no obligation to join the single currency.The Constitution does not change the terms of this Protocol. In principle the Government is in favour of UK membership of a successful single currency; in practice the economic tests must be met. If the five tests were passed, and the Government recommended joining EMU, it would be put to a vote in Parliament and then to a referendum of the British people.”


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Five economic tests


The five economic tests, to precede any political decision, can be found on the web page ’Single Currency ─ Economic & Monetary Union (EMU)’ of BERR (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform):

“1. Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent basis?
2. If problems emerge is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?
3. Would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in Britain?
4. What impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive position of the UK's financial services industry, particularly the City's wholesale markets?
5. Will joining the EMU promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs?”


The referendum promise is repeated by BERR even today, the proponents of direct democracy having dealt parliamentary sovereignty and government operability a fatal blow.

Given the toxic atmosphere, it is hard to imagine a financial and economic meltdown of such proportions that the United Kingdom could adopt the single currency on the existing premises, irrespective of the internal economic tests (largely met already).


But self-incapacitation has an external side, too. If Britain suffered and economic catastrophe, it would most likely flunk the (external) convergence criteria.

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Convergence criteria

As a reminder, here are the four EMU convergence criteria at headline level:

Price stability
No excessive deficit

Interest rate convergence

Exchange-rate participation without devaluation



Since we are dealing with the Constitutional Treaty, we look at the corresponding version of the Protocol (No 11) on the convergence criteria (OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/339):

11. PROTOCOL ON THE CONVERGENCE CRITERIA


THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

DESIRING to lay down the details of the convergence criteria which shall guide the Union in taking decisions referred to in Article III-198 of the Constitution to end the derogations of those Member States with a derogation,

HAVE AGREED upon the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe:

Article 1

The criterion on price stability referred to in Article III-198(1)(a) of the Constitution shall mean that the Member State concerned has a price performance that is sustainable and an average rate of inflation, observed over a period of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more than 1,5 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability. Inflation shall be measured by means of the consumer price index on a comparable basis, taking into account differences in national definitions.


Article 2

The criterion on the government budgetary position referred to in Article III-198(1)(b) of the Constitution shall mean that at the time of the examination the Member State concerned is not the subject of a European decision of the Council under Article III-184(6) of the Constitution that an excessive deficit exists.


Article 3

The criterion on participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System referred to in Article III-198(1)(c) of the Constitution shall mean that the Member State concerned has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, the Member State shall not have devalued its currency's bilateral central rate against the euro on its own initiative for the same period.


Article 4
The criterion on the convergence of interest rates referred to in Article III-198(1)(d) of the Constitution shall mean that, observed over a period of one year before the examination, the Member State concerned has had an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability. Interest rates shall be measured on the basis of long-term government bonds or comparable securities, taking into account differences in national definitions. The statistical data to be used for the application of this Protocol shall be provided by the Commission.


Article 6

The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, the European Central Bank, and the Economic and Financial Committee referred to in Article III-192 of the Constitution, adopt appropriate provisions to lay down the details of the convergence criteria referred to in Article III-198 of the Constitution, which shall then replace this Protocol.




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In short, when the United Kingdom signed the Constitutional Treaty, the UK government not only rejected entering the third stage of economic and monetary union (EMU) and adopting the euro currency immediately, but practically eliminated its chances of ever doing so, however pressing the need.

What difference does an additional referendum promise make, then chancellor Gordon Brown might have argued.

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The next instalment turns to the IGC 2007 and the Lisbon Treaty.



Ralf Grahn

EU: Monetary policy Ie

More legal materials on economic and monetary union (EMU), especially monetary policy, for students of history, politics, economics and law, as well as for interested EU citizens.

There are a few declarations relevant to the EC Treaty chapter on monetary policy. The declarations are politically (not legally) binding, and they have been annexed to the final acts of the intergovernmental conferences leading to the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice, respectively.

The European Central Bank (ECB) has a convenient web page on offer:

http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/1341/96687/html/index.en.html

If you are interested in a broader view of the declarations:

The latest consolidated version of the treaties (OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E) does not contain the joint declarations or the unilateral declarations by one or more member states, but the Constitutional Treaty offers a fair approximation of the declarations seen as relevant today (OJ 16.12.2004 C 310).

The collected and updated declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon are another approximative source of declarations still seen as relevant. The original Lisbon Treaty (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306) and the consolidated version (OJ 9.5.2008 C 115) differ as to the numbering of Articles.

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Declaration on Article 111 (ex Article 109) of the Treaty establishing the European Community OJ 29.7.1992 C 191/99 explained that the use of the term ‘formal agreements’ is not intended to create a new category of international agreement within the meaning of Community law.

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Declaration on Article 111 (ex Article 109), 174 (ex Article 130r) and 181 (ex Article 130y) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ 29.7.1992 C 191/100, where the intergovernmental conference considered that the provisions did not affect the principles resulting from the judgment handed down in the AETR case.

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Declaration on disputes between the ECB and the EMI and their servants, OJ 29.7.1992 C 191/108, where the intergovernmental conference invited the institutions to adapt the relevant rules to let the Court of First Instance hear this class of actions.

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Declaration on the quality of the drafting of Community legislation, OJ 10.11.1997 C 340/139, on common guidelines for improving the quality of the drafting of Community legislation and on the acceleration of codification of legislative texts.

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Declaration on the provisions relating to transparency, access to documents and the fight against fraud, OJ 10.11.1997 C 340/140, placed the Treaty establishing the European Community as the model to be followed by the institutions when they acted within the context of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.

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Declaration on Article 111 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ 10.3.2001 C 80/78, where the intergovernmental conference agreed that procedures shall be such as to enable all the Member States in the euro area to be fully involved in each stage of preparing the position of the Community at international level as regards issues of particular relevance to economic and monetary union.

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At treaty level, legally binding and worth mentioning again, we have the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB (original OJ 29.7.1992 C 191/68)

In the consolidated version of the treaties, the 53 Articles of Protocol (No 18) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB repeat and elaborate on the treaty provisions; located in OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/256─280.

The European Central Bank offers a web page with various versions, proposals and amendments:


http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/1341/1343/html/index.en.html

In the latest consolidated version of the treaties in force, the Statute is located in Protocol (No 18) in OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/256.

Not in force:

In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, we find the statute in Protocol (No 4), OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/225.

In the original Lisbon Treaty, look for Protocols to be annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, IGC Protocol No 1 amending the Protocols annexed to the Treaty on European Union, to the Treaty establishing the European Community and/or to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/163 (horizontal amendments) and from page 170 (specific amendments).

Protocol (No 4) on the statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank is presented in the consolidated version of the Treaty of Lisbon, OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/230.




Ralf Grahn