UK towards EU fringes and beyond?

Tony Blair promised to place Britain at the heart of Europe, and failed. Gordon Brown resisted the adoption of the Euro currency and he has been a grumpy European all along, although he misleadingly calls it staying in the mainstream of Europe. David Cameron wants to put European integration in reverse.


With only pockets of resistance among elites, the media and the public, the United Kingdom is on a trajectory towards the fringes of European politics, possibly outside.


Consternation mingled with sadness is the main feeling of Europeans, who watch Britain losing friends and influence. A constructive UK would be a major asset for the European Union, but it does not seem to be on the cards.


In the end, democratic societies end up with the leaders and the outcomes they deserve. What we don’t know is if this is the beginning of the end, or the end of the beginning, for the United Kingdom in the European Union.


British and expat voters in Britain can support a better future by casting their votes for the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party or the Labour Party in the European elections 4 June 2009.



Ralf Grahn

Gordon Brown’s European mainstream

“So I stand here, proud to be British and proud to be European, representing a country that does not see itself as an island adrift from Europe, but as a country at the centre of Europe, not in Europe’s slip-stream but in Europe’s mainstream.”

Thus spoke UK prime minister Gordon Brown to the European Parliament on 24 March 2009.

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Europe’s mainstream?

Recent UK polls show very little recognition of a country where the population sees itself as in Europe’s mainstream or desiring to become part of it.

Even if Brown equated country and government, the statement is far from convincing.

***

The UK government (not least Brown himself) has fought an ongoing battle to thwart or limit treaty reform aimed at making the European Union more effective, democratic and solidary, and British government representatives miss few opportunities to hamper progress during daily Council work.

Currently the United Kingdom has opt-outs from two crucial areas of EU policy: the Schengen agreement abolishing border controls and the third stage of economic and monetary union (the euro).

Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the British opt-outs would be extended to two new areas: the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.

In each case the United Kingdom belongs to a fraction of EU member states outside the common framework (although only 16 have made it into the Eurozone as yet).

If Brown rejects the idea of his country being in the slip-stream of Europe, how about describing it as forming a counter-current to progress?


Ralf Grahn

Will UK Labour return EU Conservatives to power?

A few days ago we read the following headline on EurActiv: Will UK Tories return EU Socialists to power?

In a great show of sportsmanship Gordon Brown has now evened the odds: Will UK Labour return EU Conservatives to power?

As far as I know, Brown is now the third PES (Party of European Socialists) affiliated prime minister to endorse a new five year term for José Manuel Barroso at the head of the Commission.

***

What can I say?

I feel really sorry for the PES activists who spent time and energy debating the 2009 election manifesto.

Why should nearly 400 million Europeans vote if totally ignored ─ in advance ─ by an electoral college of 27?

Why should European taxpayers finance political parties at European level and their foundations to the tune of 18 million euros a year, if the choice of candidates for the top spot is as abundant as in North Korea?

Ralf Grahn

Euro banknotes and coins IIIb: UK and Constitution Article III-186

Does Article III-186 of the Constitutional Treaty differ from Article III-78 of the draft Constitution with regard to the authorisation and issue of legal tender in the euro area (eurozone)?

First, we compare the texts.

Then, we look at what our legal materials have to say, with a special focus on the United Kingdom. Has the UK succeeded in creating valuable options, or did the government prepare for future storms by throwing the steering wheel into the sea?


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Draft Constitution Article III-78 and Constitution Article III-186 texts compared

The IGC 2004 left the provision almost untouched. The Council of Ministers became the Council in the Constitutional Treaty, but this was a general choice of terminology.

The second paragraph was divided into two subparagraphs, making it somewhat easier to read, but the substance remained the same.

***

Although the results of the IGC 2004 were far from dramatic, we check if Article III-186 Constitution elicited any comments in our sample of legal materials.

Sweden

Outside the euro area, the Swedish government memorandum ‘Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (Utrikesdepartemetet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2004:52; December 2004) described the signed Constitutional Treaty.

Before turning to the proposed new powers for the euro area, the Swedish government mentioned the technical questions regarding euro coins in passing, as one of the areas where the eurogroup already decides on its own (page 239):


”Euroområdet

Genom det konstitutionella fördraget kommer beslutsfattandet i euroområdet att stärkas. Redan i dag finns ett antal frågor där euroländerna själva fattar beslut, bl.a. sanktioner i stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten, växelkurspolitik och tekniska frågor som rör euromynten. Genom det nya konstitutionella fördraget kommer euroländerna att kunna samordna sin ekonomiska politik på ett mer formellt sätt. Artikel III-194 i det konstitutionella fördraget fastställer att euroländerna ska utarbeta riktlinjerna för den ekonomiska politiken och se till att dessa överensstämmer med de riktlinjer som har antagits för hela unionen.”

***

On the whole, here on page 172, the Swedish draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss ─ Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (2 June 2005) reiterated the remarks made in the memorandum mentioned above.

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Finland

The government of eurozone Finland laid out the Constitutional Treaty in its ratification bill ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan perustuslaista tehdyn sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 67/2006 vp). Even if the measures concern a detail ─ the denominations and the technical specifications of euro coins ─ this extract from the government’s text gives the impression that consulting the European Parliament is an addition to the EP’s powers (page 183):

”III-186 artikla, jossa määrätään setelien ja metallirahojen liikkeelle laskemisesta, vastaa SEY 106 artiklaa sillä lisäyksellä, että neuvoston tulee kuulla myös Euroopan parlamenttia ennen kuin se päättää metallirahojen yksikköarvojen ja teknisten määritelmien yhdenmukaistamisesta.”

The weakening of the EP’s position has been noted elsewhere, as we have indicated earlier.


***

The same remarks appear in Swedish in ’Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen (RP 67/2006 rd), with the Finnish government’s comments on page 187:

”Artikel III-186, där det bestäms om utgivningen av sedlar och mynt, motsvarar artikel 106 i EG-fördraget med det tillägget att rådet skall höra även Europaparlamentet innan det beslutar om harmonisering av valörerna och de tekniska specifikationerna för mynt.”

Elsewhere, the description oft he EP’s role is explained more clearly.

***

Fischer

Klemens H. Fischer, in ‘Der Europäische Verfassungsvertrag‘ (Nomos, Stämpfli & Manz, 2005), only made the observations that „Artikel III-186 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel 106 EGV“ and „Artikel III-186 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel III-78 VVE“ (page 317).

***

United Kingdom

According to Article 4 of the Protocol (No 13, in the Constitutional Treaty) on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as regards economic and monetary union, the Constitution’s Article III-186 did not apply to the UK.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) ‘White Paper on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ (Cm 6309, September 2004) mentioned economic and monetary union (EMU) stating the existence of the protocol. The government then proceeded to say that it was, in principle, in favour of a successful single currency. If other member states proved the success and the British ‘economic tests’ were met, the government might propose joining. The promise of a referendum was the real clincher (page 28):

”Economic and Monetary Union

The UK’s Protocol makes clear that the UK is under no obligation to join the single currency.The Constitution does not change the terms of this Protocol. In principle the Government is in favour of UK membership of a successful single currency; in practice the economic tests must be met. If the five tests were passed, and the Government recommended joining EMU, it would be put to a vote in Parliament and then to a referendum of the British people.”


***

Five economic tests


The five economic tests, to precede any political decision, can be found on the web page ’Single Currency ─ Economic & Monetary Union (EMU)’ of BERR (Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform):

“1. Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent basis?
2. If problems emerge is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?
3. Would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in Britain?
4. What impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive position of the UK's financial services industry, particularly the City's wholesale markets?
5. Will joining the EMU promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs?”


The referendum promise is repeated by BERR even today, the proponents of direct democracy having dealt parliamentary sovereignty and government operability a fatal blow.

Given the toxic atmosphere, it is hard to imagine a financial and economic meltdown of such proportions that the United Kingdom could adopt the single currency on the existing premises, irrespective of the internal economic tests (largely met already).


But self-incapacitation has an external side, too. If Britain suffered and economic catastrophe, it would most likely flunk the (external) convergence criteria.

***

Convergence criteria

As a reminder, here are the four EMU convergence criteria at headline level:

Price stability
No excessive deficit

Interest rate convergence

Exchange-rate participation without devaluation



Since we are dealing with the Constitutional Treaty, we look at the corresponding version of the Protocol (No 11) on the convergence criteria (OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/339):

11. PROTOCOL ON THE CONVERGENCE CRITERIA


THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,

DESIRING to lay down the details of the convergence criteria which shall guide the Union in taking decisions referred to in Article III-198 of the Constitution to end the derogations of those Member States with a derogation,

HAVE AGREED upon the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe:

Article 1

The criterion on price stability referred to in Article III-198(1)(a) of the Constitution shall mean that the Member State concerned has a price performance that is sustainable and an average rate of inflation, observed over a period of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more than 1,5 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability. Inflation shall be measured by means of the consumer price index on a comparable basis, taking into account differences in national definitions.


Article 2

The criterion on the government budgetary position referred to in Article III-198(1)(b) of the Constitution shall mean that at the time of the examination the Member State concerned is not the subject of a European decision of the Council under Article III-184(6) of the Constitution that an excessive deficit exists.


Article 3

The criterion on participation in the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System referred to in Article III-198(1)(c) of the Constitution shall mean that the Member State concerned has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, the Member State shall not have devalued its currency's bilateral central rate against the euro on its own initiative for the same period.


Article 4
The criterion on the convergence of interest rates referred to in Article III-198(1)(d) of the Constitution shall mean that, observed over a period of one year before the examination, the Member State concerned has had an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability. Interest rates shall be measured on the basis of long-term government bonds or comparable securities, taking into account differences in national definitions. The statistical data to be used for the application of this Protocol shall be provided by the Commission.


Article 6

The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, the European Central Bank, and the Economic and Financial Committee referred to in Article III-192 of the Constitution, adopt appropriate provisions to lay down the details of the convergence criteria referred to in Article III-198 of the Constitution, which shall then replace this Protocol.




***

In short, when the United Kingdom signed the Constitutional Treaty, the UK government not only rejected entering the third stage of economic and monetary union (EMU) and adopting the euro currency immediately, but practically eliminated its chances of ever doing so, however pressing the need.

What difference does an additional referendum promise make, then chancellor Gordon Brown might have argued.

***

The next instalment turns to the IGC 2007 and the Lisbon Treaty.



Ralf Grahn

Lisbon Treaty: Double edge of UK ratification

The UK House of Lords resisted the temptation to postpone ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon and approved the government bill. This puts the number of ratifying member states at 19 out of 27.

See, for instance, the BBC report:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7461918.stm

Prime minister Gordon Brown can participate in the European Council discussions strengthened by the decision. UK ratification sends a signal to the seven member states, where the ratification process is still open. British anti-EU and pro-referendum campaigners will of course do their utmost to stir up emotions against the government and the European Union, both unpopular in the realm.

But the situation is far from a resounding victory for people who believe in the necessity of EU reform.

In its present form, the Treaty of Lisbon is legally dead. Ireland would have to change its opinion in a new referendum either to approve the Lisbon Treaty or to scrap the need for referendums. Neither looks likely, since the reasons for popular rejection have left the government clueless as to the potential remedies. There is no effective prescription for malaise, at least in the realm of treaties.

Ideas have been floated about soothing declarations, but the effect might be the opposite, hardening opposition. The Irish constitutional setting surrounding referendums simply makes the country ungovernable in certain respects, and without a real voice in European affairs.

This means that the United Kingdom retains the option to scrap the Lisbon Treaty at any given moment, but it has, at least temporarily, put a dampener on aspirations to build a more effective European Union. In spite of popular illusions of a looming European super-state, British governments have effectively managed to reduce the scope of reform at each stage during and since the European Convention.

As long as it remains on the inside track, Britain can more effectively defend a political union in name, but built on intergovernmental sand. On the outside or on an outer track, tenacious UK obstructionism might fail, strengthening French and German resolve to move ahead, possibly leading to a two-speed Europe, leaving the UK outside the core.

Crudely put: The British strategy is pissing in on the inside.

As long as soul-searching and salvage operations continue, the Treaty of Nice remains in force, hardly a catastrophe for Gordon Brown. The risk, from his point of view, is if the frustration of integrationist countries turns into decisive action to remedy the fatal flaws of the existing European Union, if necessary by creating a new one, more effective but with fewer members.

Until now, inertia and fudge have served British governments well, but to have the cake and eat it too, a vigilant watch is needed. The UK Parliament has handed Gordon Brown a passport to the inner circles.


Ralf Grahn

Gordon Brown on Global Europe

Until now, the only thing that has maintained Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s credentials as a European statesman, has been the Conservative Party’s complete lack of constructive EU policy.

Yesterday, Brown did much to cast off his crown as curmudgeon of the year among EU leaders. Speaking to a business audience Brown finally outlined a programme for Britain in Europe, laying the background for future success, coming out strongly in favour of British EU membership and pointing towards the needed economic reforms within the Union.

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What is needed for future success? Brown clearly placed himself in the economic reform camp:
“The countries and continents that will succeed in the new era of globalisation will be those that are open rather than closed, for free trade rather than protectionism, are flexible rather than rigid, and invest in high skills and the potential of their people.”
***
The future of the United Kingdom lies in the European Union, was the message of Brown:
“But what is clear is that at this time of global economic uncertainty, we should not be throwing into question -as some would - the stability of our relationship with Europe and even our future membership of the European Union --- risking trade, business and jobs. Indeed, I strongly believe that rather than retreating to the sidelines we must remain fully engaged in Europe so we can push forward the reforms that are essential for Europe's, and Britain's, economic future.
The EU is key to the success of business in the UK:
Europe accounts for nearly 60 per cent of our trade;
700,000 British companies have trading ties to Europe;
And 3.5 million British jobs depend upon Europe.
And even in the face of rapid globalisation, our trade with Europe continues to rise, meaning Europe is as important to the future of Britain than ever.”
***
Economic reform is key to the European Union’s future and relevance, according to Brown:
“At the heart of a more competitive Europe in the 21st century must be a long-term commitment to a more outward looking relationship with the rest of the world. This is what I mean in practice by 'global Europe' - a Europe that knows it must face outwards if it is to be open for business.”
***
A few comments:
Great Britain has a lot to give its continental European partners and the EU when it comes to a dynamic business climate, although the Nordic countries may have succeeded at least as well while excelling at public services and social security. Brown’s programme on economic stability, growth, competitiveness and jobs reads like a roadmap to a more prosperous future for European citizens.

On more foreign policy oriented themes, Brown made the case for European climate change and environmental policy and reforming international institutions.

So far, so good. But what did Gordon Brown leave uncovered, at least in this speech?

More than twenty years have passed since the European Community (formerly the EEC) began its transformation into a political union, with efforts to forge common foreign policy as well as new internal policies.

The future security and prosperity of EU citizens is going to depend on how successfully the European Union manages to pool the resources of its member states in the areas of common foreign, security and defence policies, including a common defence.

When are we going to hear this speech?


Ralf Grahn


Gordon Brown: Beyond The Reform Treaty: Business Priorities For A ‘Global Europe’; 14 January 2008;
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page14251.asp

Isolationist UK

Yesterday I wrote about the new core areas of European integration, with new member states steadily advancing into the growing Schengen area, the expanding Eurozone and the shared values of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as most of them being dual EU and NATO members.

The more striking contrasts between old and new members are gradually disappearing, and the core groups are growing.

***

The coin has a flip side. The old member states staying aloof from these areas of deeper integration are gradually marginalising themselves.

Rickety rules for unanimous decision making give ample scope for obstructionist tactics, but blocking decisions and hailing aborted deals as success stories is hardly a constructive line to take. It is hard to believe that isolationist policies are going to win friends and help to influence people within the European Union in the long run.

***

One example of the political price self-imposed marginalisation may entail, came when Valéry Giscard d’Estaing answered a question about the new President of the European Council on his blog. VGE emphasised that the person should be selected with care, and he went on to say that he or she should come from a country which belongs to the Schengen area and the Eurozone and adheres to the Charter.

Any British candidate (including Tony Blair) was eliminated 3 to 0.

Of course, VGE is not part of the European Council now, but I imagine that his line of reasoning strikes a note with many European leaders.

***

No wonder that the new Danish government wants to offer its people a chance to abolish the peculiar opt-outs of the country.

Not surprisingly the new Polish government wants to repair the damages caused by its predecessor.

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The United Kingdom has shown few such signs. These last months Great Britain seems to have drifted farther out into the Atlantic, without getting closer to the United States. The UK used the negative referendums on the Constitution for Europe for domestic purposes, having little to do with the reasons for failure in France and the Netherlands.

The UK launched new demands to generally weaken the treaty it had already signed in 2004 and to introduce non negotiable specific “red lines”. Once again, the European partners showed flexibility.

***

Prime Minister Gordon Brown has not visited the European institutions specifically, something Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy did instantly after being installed.

The present European Commission is fairly pro-business, pro-globalisation and pro-enlargement. As such it could be an important ally for Britain, but nurturing constructive alliances does not seem to top the British agenda.

Brown has said little about the European Union, except that it should have a more global view and stop reforming its institutions. By signing the Treaty of Lisbon but missing the ceremony, Brown managed to harvest scorn from both anti-EU and pro-EU quarters. This snub to Britain’s oldest ally can have done little to enhance Brown’s prestige among European leaders or further British interests.

There are few indications that Brown’s grumpiness has placated the rabid domestic EU detractors, egged on by an imaginative tabloid press. (Calling this crowd eurosceptic is a euphemism.)

Failing to communicate clearly, why Britain’s interests lie within Europe, is a long term legacy of successive British governments, but Gordon Brown has let the situation worsen.

The Tory opposition has done its utmost to make Gordon Brown look like a real statesman, painting itself into a corner on European affairs, should it win a majority with an obligation to pursue real British interests.


***

Perhaps we have to admit that Schengen, the euro and shared values are hopeless causes in Britain for domestic reasons, in spite of the negative consequences of being an outsider. There is one area, crucial for the future, where the United Kingdom could make a signal contribution, if it wanted to: defence.

The UK is a leading member of NATO and it has the best military capabilities among the EU countries. Here it is more difficult to see domestic reasons for the lack of progress. It rather looks like the umbilical cord tying Britain to the USA is the main reason for the failure to advance decisively to build a common European defence.

In the long run there seem to be few options to a common European defence (built on democratic accountability) in conjunction with the transatlantic ties offered by the intergovernmental NATO alliance. In these questions President Sarkozy seems to be somewhat closer to the truth.

As it is, Britain is decidedly an EU outsider, a leader of steadily shrinking groups of like-minded self-marginalising powers.

***

The regional parliament in Scotland has demanded a British referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. This is only an opinion, since ratification is to be decided by the UK Parliament. But it shows that the pressure is growing.

At the same time, Labour is sinking like a stone in opinion polls. This might lead to Brown’s choice of parliamentary ratification being defeated, by the parliament most keen to be seen as the hallmark of parliamentary sovereignty. Hardly anyone believes that a referendum on an EU Treaty (regardless of content) can be won in Britain.

If the ratification process fails in Britain, it is hard to believe that EU leaders, fed up with 35 years of British obstructionism, would embark on a new round of negotiations to bring the UK on board.

A more probable scenario would be that the rest of the European Union, or at least the more willing member states, would re-establish the EU and upgrade its capacity at the same time.

The end result might come as a blessing for secessionist opinion, but it is hard to see how British long term interests would be served by reverting to isolationist policies.

For Great Britain insularity, isolation and exclusion may soon be more than mere mindsets, unless Scotland and Wales decide on a change of Union, leaving England behind.


Ralf Grahn

Who is the best anti-European?

The Kosmopolit blog looked at the relative merits of Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy on blocking or undermining the European Union: The quiet, the loud and the hyperactive: Who is the best anti-European?

Yesterday the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was proclaimed in Strasbourg and today we are going to witness the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Lisbon.

We should be overjoyed, shouldn’t we? Why these doubting questions from Kosmopolit?

***

I posted a comment, which I am going to repeat here:

Who will be successful in blocking decisions?

Your question is sadly revealing of the mindset of national leaders (feudal lords) trying to insulate Europe against success in the world and to ensure that intergovernmentalism is enshrined instead of democratic accountability in foreign, security and defence policies.

The Treaty of Lisbon, to be signed later today, separately by Mr Brown, is no quantum leap for the security, prosperity and democratic rights of EU citizens.

The bickering leaders may be tired of institutional reform, but they have left the European project in a state of infirmity and disarray.

Europe is, in a way, the “old Continent”, but must it also be decrepit?

Let other politicians, think-tanks, researchers, journalists, NGOs and democratically inclined citizens of the European Union keep up the pressure, in spite of our weary leaders.

***

It is impossible to speak with one voice in the world, if one voice is all it takes in the European Council or Council to block decision-making and when the individual states safeguard their freedom to act independently on the international stage.

It is inconsistent to enshrine values of openness, transparency and democracy, when back-room dealing between state governments leave the European Parliament and the Union’s citizens as mere spectators.

Let it be said, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaty of Lisbon are improvements on the Nice Treaty, but they fall far short of the effective, democratic and solidary European Union the collective interests of its citizens call for.


Ralf Grahn


Source:

Kosmopolit: The quiet, the loud and the hyperactive: Who is the best anti-European? 13 December 2007; http://kosmopolit.wordpress.com

Gordon Brown on Europe

When Gordon Brown spoke about Britain’s unique place in the world and about advancing Britain’s national interest, he actually managed to mention the European Union in his five page speech:

“Through our membership of the European Union – which gives us and 26 other countries the unique opportunity to work together on economic, environmental and security challenges – and the Commonwealth, and through our commitment to NATO and the UN, we have the capacity to work together with all those who share our vision of the future. And I do not see these as partnerships in competition with each other but mutually reinforcing.”

Specifically Brown had a vision for the EU:

“I want to play my part in helping the European Union move away from its past preoccupation with inward looking institutional reform and I will work with others to propose a comprehensive agenda for a Global Europe – a Europe that is outward looking, open, internationalist, able to effectively respond both through internal reform and external action to the economic, security and environmental imperatives of globalisation.”

***

Daniel Korski, of the European Council on Foreign Relations, gave two cheers for the speech: one for making a positive case for how the EU can amplify Member State policies and a second one for focusing on an outward-looking attempt at addressing the world’s challenges.

Korski still missed an explicit case being made for the Lisbon Treaty’s new “bureaucratic arrangements” and for EU enlargement.

***

I wonder. Is this indicative of the level of engagement, clarity of vision and concreteness of proposals the ECFR is going to expect from the European Union and the national leaders?

In that case establishing the new think-tank was a waste of energy and money.

Gordon Brown almost overlooking the European Union may not have come as much of a surprise, but the ECFR, too?

Let us hope that more comprehensive European analyses and agendas are forthcoming.


Ralf Grahn


Sources:

Gordon Brown: Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech: PM outlines foreign policy priorities; 12 November 2007; http://www.number10.gov.uk

Daniel Korski: Two cheers for Gordon Brown’s speech; The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 13 November 2007; http://www.ecfr.eu

European Union of minds?

Politicians with severe symptoms of reform fatigue have hailed the Reform Treaty or Lisbon Treaty as a victory for the European Union, prepared themselves for parliamentary ratification in most member states and vowed to dedicate their efforts to more rewarding causes for a long time to come.

In Poland a new government promises to become a more constructive team player than its predecessor and a new Danish government is thinking about a referendum on abolishing opt-outs from the treaties. In France and in the Netherlands the main parties look set to choose parliamentary ratification, although there are pockets of resistance with roots in the no-camps of the 2005 referendum campaigns.

In contrast, British media, public opinion, the Conservatives and campaigners seem to continue in the vein of Groucho Marx: Please accept my resignation. I don’t want to belong to any club that will accept me as a member.

Even the UK government seems to laud what it managed to scrap of its 2004 signature, what it did not sign up to now and what sets Britain apart from the other members of the club. What is Britain’s role in Europe going to be? Even after Gordon Brown’s and David Miliband’s speeches we cannot be sure.

Is there going to be a meeting of minds any time soon?


Ralf Grahn