We are facing global and European level challenges: Kosovo, Georgia and the financial meltdown. Our security and prosperity is at stake.
Are national level responses the right answer?
Ralf Grahn
Sunday, 5 October 2008
EU: Excessive government deficits Ic
The Elysée summit of the European G8 members confirmed what these posts on EMU economic governance have been waiting for: The ‘exceptional and temporary’ government deficits above the reference value indicated by Article 104 TEC are just waiting to happen. The catchword now is ‘flexibility’.
Still, we turn to the current treaty level rules concerning excessive government deficits within the context of economic and monetary union (EMU). The protocol contains the reference values, waiting to be sidelined for the time being.
***
Protocol on excessive deficit procedure
Protocol (No. 20) on the excessive deficit procedure (1992), as published in the latest consolidated version of the treaties, OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/293─294:
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
DESIRING to lay down the details of the excessive deficit procedure referred to in Article 104 of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
HAVE AGREED upon the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Article 1
The reference values referred to in Article 104(2) of this Treaty are:
— 3 % for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product at market prices;
— 60 % for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices.
Article 2
In Article 104 of this Treaty and in this Protocol:
— government means general government, that is central government, regional or local government and social security funds, to the exclusion of commercial operations, as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts;
— deficit means net borrowing as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts;
— investment means gross fixed capital formation as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts;
— debt means total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated between and within the sectors of general government as defined in the first indent.
Article 3
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the excessive deficit procedure, the governments of the Member States shall be responsible under this procedure for the deficits of general government as defined in the first indent of Article 2. The Member States shall ensure that national procedures in the budgetary area enable them to meet their obligations in this area deriving from this Treaty. The Member States shall report their planned and actual deficits and the levels of their debt promptly and regularly to the Commission.
Article 4
The statistical data to be used for the application of this Protocol shall be provided by the Commission.
***
Anchors are the reference values: Government deficit 3 percent of GDP and government debt 60 percent of GDP.
It is important to see that the deficits and debt levels refer to all levels of government, including social security funds.
The upcoming Eurogroup, ECOFIN and European Council meetings can be expected to tally the ‘exceptional and temporary’ deficits above previous levels.
How much beef is there still in the Stability and Growth Pact, already revised?
Ralf Grahn
Still, we turn to the current treaty level rules concerning excessive government deficits within the context of economic and monetary union (EMU). The protocol contains the reference values, waiting to be sidelined for the time being.
***
Protocol on excessive deficit procedure
Protocol (No. 20) on the excessive deficit procedure (1992), as published in the latest consolidated version of the treaties, OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/293─294:
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
DESIRING to lay down the details of the excessive deficit procedure referred to in Article 104 of the Treaty establishing the European Community,
HAVE AGREED upon the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Article 1
The reference values referred to in Article 104(2) of this Treaty are:
— 3 % for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product at market prices;
— 60 % for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices.
Article 2
In Article 104 of this Treaty and in this Protocol:
— government means general government, that is central government, regional or local government and social security funds, to the exclusion of commercial operations, as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts;
— deficit means net borrowing as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts;
— investment means gross fixed capital formation as defined in the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts;
— debt means total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated between and within the sectors of general government as defined in the first indent.
Article 3
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the excessive deficit procedure, the governments of the Member States shall be responsible under this procedure for the deficits of general government as defined in the first indent of Article 2. The Member States shall ensure that national procedures in the budgetary area enable them to meet their obligations in this area deriving from this Treaty. The Member States shall report their planned and actual deficits and the levels of their debt promptly and regularly to the Commission.
Article 4
The statistical data to be used for the application of this Protocol shall be provided by the Commission.
***
Anchors are the reference values: Government deficit 3 percent of GDP and government debt 60 percent of GDP.
It is important to see that the deficits and debt levels refer to all levels of government, including social security funds.
The upcoming Eurogroup, ECOFIN and European Council meetings can be expected to tally the ‘exceptional and temporary’ deficits above previous levels.
How much beef is there still in the Stability and Growth Pact, already revised?
Ralf Grahn
EU: Excessive government deficits Ib
Carrot and stick: Economic policy coordination is the persuasive part of economic union, and the procedures concerning excessive government deficits represent the dissuasive arm.
We look at the existing EC (EU) treaty rules concerning excessive government deficits.
***
It takes some time to wade through all fourteen paragraphs of Article 104 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC). Cf. OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/84─86:
Part Three – Community policies
Title VII – Economic and monetary policy
Chapter 1 – Economic policy
Article 104 TEC
1. Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits.
2. The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States with a view to identifying gross errors. In particular it shall examine compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two criteria:
(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless:
— either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value,
— or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value;
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
The reference values are specified in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to this Treaty.
3. If a Member State does not fulfil the requirements under one or both of these criteria, the Commission shall prepare a report. The report of the Commission shall also take into account whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and take into account all other relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of the Member State.
The Commission may also prepare a report if, notwithstanding the fulfilment of the requirements under the criteria, it is of the opinion that there is a risk of an excessive deficit in a Member State.
4. The Committee provided for in Article 114 shall formulate an opinion on the report of the Commission.
5. If the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, the Commission shall address an opinion to the Council.
6. The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation from the Commission, and having considered any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make, decide after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists.
7. Where the existence of an excessive deficit is decided according to paragraph 6, the Council shall make recommendations to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, these recommendations shall not be made public.
8. Where it establishes that there has been no effective action in response to its recommendations within the period laid down, the Council may make its recommendations public.
9. If a Member State persists in failing to put into practice the recommendations of the Council, the Council may decide to give notice to the Member State to take, within a specified time limit, measures for the deficit reduction which is judged necessary by the Council in order to remedy the situation.
In such a case, the Council may request the Member State concerned to submit reports in accordance with a specific timetable in order to examine the adjustment efforts of that Member State.
10. The rights to bring actions provided for in Articles 226 and 227 may not be exercised within the framework of paragraphs 1 to 9 of this Article.
11. As long as a Member State fails to comply with a decision taken in accordance with paragraph 9, the Council may decide to apply or, as the case may be, intensify one or more of the following measures:
— to require the Member State concerned to publish additional information, to be specified by the Council, before issuing bonds and securities,
— to invite the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy towards the Member State concerned,
— to require the Member State concerned to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of an appropriate size with the Community until the excessive deficit has, in the view of the Council, been corrected,
— to impose fines of an appropriate size.
The President of the Council shall inform the European Parliament of the decisions taken.
12. The Council shall abrogate some or all of its decisions referred to in paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 to the extent that the excessive deficit in the Member State concerned has, in the view of the Council, been corrected. If the Council has previously made public recommendations, it shall, as soon as the decision under paragraph 8 has been abrogated, make a public statement that an excessive deficit in the Member State concerned no longer exists.
13. When taking the decisions referred to in paragraphs 7 to 9, 11 and 12, the Council shall act on a recommendation from the Commission by a majority of two thirds of the votes of its members weighted in accordance with Article 205(2), excluding the votes of the representative of the Member State concerned.
14. Further provisions relating to the implementation of the procedure described in this Article are set out in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to this Treaty.
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB, adopt the appropriate provisions which shall then replace the said Protocol.
Subject to the other provisions of this paragraph, the Council shall, before 1 January 1994, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, lay down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provisions of the said Protocol.
***
The next post is going to look at other current treaty level provisions concerning excessive government deficits.
Ralf Grahn
We look at the existing EC (EU) treaty rules concerning excessive government deficits.
***
It takes some time to wade through all fourteen paragraphs of Article 104 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC). Cf. OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/84─86:
Part Three – Community policies
Title VII – Economic and monetary policy
Chapter 1 – Economic policy
Article 104 TEC
1. Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits.
2. The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States with a view to identifying gross errors. In particular it shall examine compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two criteria:
(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless:
— either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference value,
— or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value;
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
The reference values are specified in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to this Treaty.
3. If a Member State does not fulfil the requirements under one or both of these criteria, the Commission shall prepare a report. The report of the Commission shall also take into account whether the government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and take into account all other relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of the Member State.
The Commission may also prepare a report if, notwithstanding the fulfilment of the requirements under the criteria, it is of the opinion that there is a risk of an excessive deficit in a Member State.
4. The Committee provided for in Article 114 shall formulate an opinion on the report of the Commission.
5. If the Commission considers that an excessive deficit in a Member State exists or may occur, the Commission shall address an opinion to the Council.
6. The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation from the Commission, and having considered any observations which the Member State concerned may wish to make, decide after an overall assessment whether an excessive deficit exists.
7. Where the existence of an excessive deficit is decided according to paragraph 6, the Council shall make recommendations to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, these recommendations shall not be made public.
8. Where it establishes that there has been no effective action in response to its recommendations within the period laid down, the Council may make its recommendations public.
9. If a Member State persists in failing to put into practice the recommendations of the Council, the Council may decide to give notice to the Member State to take, within a specified time limit, measures for the deficit reduction which is judged necessary by the Council in order to remedy the situation.
In such a case, the Council may request the Member State concerned to submit reports in accordance with a specific timetable in order to examine the adjustment efforts of that Member State.
10. The rights to bring actions provided for in Articles 226 and 227 may not be exercised within the framework of paragraphs 1 to 9 of this Article.
11. As long as a Member State fails to comply with a decision taken in accordance with paragraph 9, the Council may decide to apply or, as the case may be, intensify one or more of the following measures:
— to require the Member State concerned to publish additional information, to be specified by the Council, before issuing bonds and securities,
— to invite the European Investment Bank to reconsider its lending policy towards the Member State concerned,
— to require the Member State concerned to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of an appropriate size with the Community until the excessive deficit has, in the view of the Council, been corrected,
— to impose fines of an appropriate size.
The President of the Council shall inform the European Parliament of the decisions taken.
12. The Council shall abrogate some or all of its decisions referred to in paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 to the extent that the excessive deficit in the Member State concerned has, in the view of the Council, been corrected. If the Council has previously made public recommendations, it shall, as soon as the decision under paragraph 8 has been abrogated, make a public statement that an excessive deficit in the Member State concerned no longer exists.
13. When taking the decisions referred to in paragraphs 7 to 9, 11 and 12, the Council shall act on a recommendation from the Commission by a majority of two thirds of the votes of its members weighted in accordance with Article 205(2), excluding the votes of the representative of the Member State concerned.
14. Further provisions relating to the implementation of the procedure described in this Article are set out in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to this Treaty.
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB, adopt the appropriate provisions which shall then replace the said Protocol.
Subject to the other provisions of this paragraph, the Council shall, before 1 January 1994, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, lay down detailed rules and definitions for the application of the provisions of the said Protocol.
***
The next post is going to look at other current treaty level provisions concerning excessive government deficits.
Ralf Grahn
EU: Excessive government deficits Ia
We look at the European Community (European Union): How much union is there in the economic union?
***
As a prelude, Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) reminds us that ‘The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union … ‘.
***
Article 4 TEC presents the guiding principles for the economic and monetary union (EMU), in the latest consolidated version of the treaties, Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) 29.12.2006 C 321 E/45─46):
Article 4 TEC
1. For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Member States and the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.
2. Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable and the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the introduction of a single currency, the ecu, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in the Community, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.
3. These activities of the Member States and the Community shall entail compliance with the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.
***
For the purposes of this series of post we draw attention especially to close coordination of member states’ economic policies, stable prices and sound public finances.
***
We remember the introductory Article 98 TEC on the conduct of member states’ economic policies. According to Article 99 TEC these economic policies are a matter of common concern, and the member states have undertaken to coordinate their economic policies.
***
Then we have the more detailed treaty provisions on excessive government deficits. The main steps of the procedures are choreographed in Article 104 TEC (ex Article 104c).
***
Perhaps it is easier to get an overview, if we start by presenting a bare outline of Article 104 TEC:
(1) Avoidance of excessive government deficits.
(2) Monitoring of budgetary discipline based on reference values and other circumstances: 1) deficit / GDP and 2) debt / GDP.
(3) Commission report on unfulfilment.
(4) Article 114 Committee (Monetary and Financial Committee) opinion.
(5) Commission opinion to the Council.
(6) Council decision, by qualified majority, on existence of excessive deficit.
(7) Council recommendations to the member state.
(8) Making Council recommendations public.
(9) Council notice if member state persists.
(10) Paragraphs 1 to 9 non-justiciable.
(11) Council measures against persisting member state.
(12) Abrogating measures when situation corrected.
(13) Two thirds majority for Council decisions on recommendations, publishing, notice, measures and abrogation.
(14) Implementation in Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, replacing provisions and detailed rules.
Article 104 TEC follows in the next post.
Ralf Grahn
***
As a prelude, Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) reminds us that ‘The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union … ‘.
***
Article 4 TEC presents the guiding principles for the economic and monetary union (EMU), in the latest consolidated version of the treaties, Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) 29.12.2006 C 321 E/45─46):
Article 4 TEC
1. For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Member States and the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.
2. Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable and the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the introduction of a single currency, the ecu, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in the Community, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.
3. These activities of the Member States and the Community shall entail compliance with the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.
***
For the purposes of this series of post we draw attention especially to close coordination of member states’ economic policies, stable prices and sound public finances.
***
We remember the introductory Article 98 TEC on the conduct of member states’ economic policies. According to Article 99 TEC these economic policies are a matter of common concern, and the member states have undertaken to coordinate their economic policies.
***
Then we have the more detailed treaty provisions on excessive government deficits. The main steps of the procedures are choreographed in Article 104 TEC (ex Article 104c).
***
Perhaps it is easier to get an overview, if we start by presenting a bare outline of Article 104 TEC:
(1) Avoidance of excessive government deficits.
(2) Monitoring of budgetary discipline based on reference values and other circumstances: 1) deficit / GDP and 2) debt / GDP.
(3) Commission report on unfulfilment.
(4) Article 114 Committee (Monetary and Financial Committee) opinion.
(5) Commission opinion to the Council.
(6) Council decision, by qualified majority, on existence of excessive deficit.
(7) Council recommendations to the member state.
(8) Making Council recommendations public.
(9) Council notice if member state persists.
(10) Paragraphs 1 to 9 non-justiciable.
(11) Council measures against persisting member state.
(12) Abrogating measures when situation corrected.
(13) Two thirds majority for Council decisions on recommendations, publishing, notice, measures and abrogation.
(14) Implementation in Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, replacing provisions and detailed rules.
Article 104 TEC follows in the next post.
Ralf Grahn
EU: No-bailout rule VI
The previous post mentioned a few UK references to Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). We now turn to legislative materials from Sweden and Finland as well as some commentaries in book form, to see if the basically unchanged ‘no-bailout’ clause has elicited comments. If not, students of the matter would be advised to turn to materials on the Treaty of Maastricht and to specialist literature.
***
Lissabonfördraget
The consultation paper ’Lissabonfördraget’ was the first official Swedish description of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, and it is available at:
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/49/81/107aa077.pdf
It was followed by the Swedish government’s draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss – Lissabonfördraget’, published 29 May 2008:
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/5676/a/106277
The draft bill was given a green light by the Council on Legislation (Lagrådet):
http://www.lagradet.se/yttranden/Lissabonfordraget.pdf
The latest official government view, and now my standard reference for Sweden, is the ratification bill, with the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) expected to decide on approval in late autumn, probably November (Regeringens proposition 2007/08:168 Lissabonfördraget; 3 July 2008):
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/84/02/8c96cf3e.pdf
Economic and monetary policy (23.2 Ekonomisk och monetary politik) is discussed on pages 180 to 185. The Swedish government explains procedural questions, including Article 102 TFEU (ToL). The rare cooperation procedure is abolished and replaced partly by the ordinary legislative procedure (multilateral surveillance) and partly by consulting the European Parliament (prohibitions on overdraft facilities and privileged access, and the ‘no bail-out’ clause) (on page 184):
Ӏndring av beslutsprocedurerna
Proceduren för samarbetsförfarandet finns i artikel 252 i EG-fördraget. Amsterdamfördraget minskade avsevärt tillämpningsområdet för samarbetsförfarandet, vilket för närvarande endast tillämpas på den ekonomiska och monetära politiken (artiklarna 99.5, 102.2, 103.2 och 106.2 i EG-fördraget). Genom Lissabonfördraget upphävs det s.k. samarbetsförfarandet i nuvarande artikel 252 i EG-fördraget (jfr avsnitt 16.2 om förfaranden för antagande av akter och andra bestämmelser). Beslutsförfarandena i de artiklar där samarbetsförfarandet idag tillämpas ändras därför enligt följande.
För att säkerställa en fastare samordning av den ekonomiska politiken ska rådet i dag på grundval av rapporter från kommissionen övervaka den ekonomiska utvecklingen i varje medlemsstat och inom unionen samt den ekonomiska politikens överensstämmelse med de allmänna riktlinjerna och regelbundet göra en samlad bedömning. För denna multilaterala övervakning ska medlemsstaterna lämna erforderliga uppgifter till kommissionen. Genom Lissabonfördraget anges att närmare föreskrifter om det multilaterala övervakningsförfarandet ska antas genom förordningar med tillämpning av det ordinarie lagstiftningsförfarandet (artikel 99.6 i EUF-fördraget). Ändringen innebär således en förstärkt ställning för Europaparlamentet.
I artiklarna 101–103 i EG-fördraget finns bestämmelser om förbud för Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) och nationella centralbanker att ge de gemensamma institutionerna eller de nationella offentliga organen, inklusive statsägda företag, rätt att övertrassera sina konton eller ge dem andra former av krediter. ECB eller centralbankerna får inte heller direkt från dem förvärva skuldförbindelser. En positiv särbehandling av gemenskapsorgan eller nationella offentliga institutioner eller företag är likaså förbjuden. Vidare ska gemenskapen inte ansvara för eller åta sig förpliktelser som har ingåtts av nationella offentliga institutioner eller företag. Genom Lissabonfördraget anges att rådet efter att ha hört Europaparlamentet får ange närmare hur dessa förbud ska tillämpas (artikel 103.2 i EUF-fördraget).”
***
Lissabonin sopimus
The Finnish ratification bill, ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan unionista tehdyn sopimuksen ja Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopimuksen muuttamisesta tehdyn Lissabonin sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 23/2008 vp), discusses economic and monetary policy (Talous- ja rahapolitiikka) on pages 209 to 214.
The ratification bill briefly describes Article 103 TFEU (ToL), renumbered Article 125 TFEU, where the union is not liable for member states’ debts or commitments, as essentially the same as Article III-183 Constitution and Article 103 TEC, [but it does not mention that the member states lack liability]. It then remarks on the expansion of paragraph 2 (page 210):
”103 artikla (uusi 125 artikla), jonka mukaan unioni ei ole vastuussa jäsenvaltioiden veloista tai niiden muista antamista taloudellisista sitoumuksista, vastaa asiasisällöltään perustuslakisopimuksen III-183 ja SEY 103 artiklaa.
Artiklan 2 kohtaa on laajennettu niin, että sen perusteella voidaan antaa myös 101 ja 102 artiklan soveltamista varten tarvittavat tarkemmat määräykset.”
The Finnish ratification bill is available at:
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf
The Swedish language version of the ratification bill ‘Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Lissabonfördraget om ändring av fördraget om Europeiska unionen och fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen’ (RP 23/2008 rd), makes the same remarks under ’Ekonomisk och monetär politik’ on Article 103 TFEU (ToL), the future Article 125 TFEU, on page 213:
”Artikel 103 (blivande artikel 125), enligt vilken unionen inte ska ansvara för medlemsstaternas skulder eller andra ekonomiska förpliktelser, motsvarar i sak artikel III-183 i det konstitutionella fördraget och artikel 103 i EG-fördraget.
Artikel 103.2 har utvidgats så att med stöd av den får antas även närmare bestämmelser som behövs för tillämpningen av artiklarna 101 och 102.”
The ratification bill in Swedish can be accessed at:
http://www.finlex.fi/sv/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf
***
de Poncins
Étienne de Poncins offers a few general comments on EU economic governance and budget matters, ‘La gouvernance économique et les questions budgétaires’ in his ‘Le traité de Lisbonne en 27 clés’ (Éditions Lignes de Repères, 2008), pages 245─251, but nothing specific on Article 125 TFEU.
Fischer
‚Der Vertrag von Lissabon‘, by Klemens H. Fischer (Nomos, Stämpfli & Verlag Österreich, 2008), traces the amendments Article by Article; here on pages 265─266. He offers the following statement on paragraph 2:
„Der bisherige Text von Absatz 2 wird gestrichen und durch einen neuen Text ersetzt, demgemäß in Hinkunft nicht mehr das Zustimmungsverfahren, sondern das Anhörungsverfahren zur Anwendung gelangt.“
Priollaud and Siritzky
François-Xavier Priollaud and David Siritzky offer a short introductory explanation on economic and monetary policy (pages 246 and 247) and on economic policy coordination, including the treaty amendments (pages 248 to 250) in their book ‘Le traité de Lisbonne – Commentaire, article par article, des nouveaux traités européens (TUE et TFUE)’ (La Documentation française, Paris, 2008), but there is no comment on Article 125 TFEU.
***
Consultation procedure
Just in case someone wants to reflect on the consultation procedure (and other decision-making procedures), Martin Gellermann offers a description in Rudolf Streinz (Hrsgb.): EUV/EGV Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (C.H.Beck, 2003). I quote the beginning of Konsultations- oder Anhörungsverfahren (page 2204):
„Als Ursprungsmodell für eine Beteiligung des Europäischen Parlaments am Prozess der gemeinschaftlichen Rechtsetzung erscheint das Konsultations- oder Anhörungsverfahren in dem der Kommission das Initiativrecht, dem Parlament eine Beratungsbefugnis und dem Rat das alleinige Entscheidungsrecht gebührt.“
Ralf Grahn
***
Lissabonfördraget
The consultation paper ’Lissabonfördraget’ was the first official Swedish description of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, and it is available at:
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/49/81/107aa077.pdf
It was followed by the Swedish government’s draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss – Lissabonfördraget’, published 29 May 2008:
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/5676/a/106277
The draft bill was given a green light by the Council on Legislation (Lagrådet):
http://www.lagradet.se/yttranden/Lissabonfordraget.pdf
The latest official government view, and now my standard reference for Sweden, is the ratification bill, with the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) expected to decide on approval in late autumn, probably November (Regeringens proposition 2007/08:168 Lissabonfördraget; 3 July 2008):
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/84/02/8c96cf3e.pdf
Economic and monetary policy (23.2 Ekonomisk och monetary politik) is discussed on pages 180 to 185. The Swedish government explains procedural questions, including Article 102 TFEU (ToL). The rare cooperation procedure is abolished and replaced partly by the ordinary legislative procedure (multilateral surveillance) and partly by consulting the European Parliament (prohibitions on overdraft facilities and privileged access, and the ‘no bail-out’ clause) (on page 184):
Ӏndring av beslutsprocedurerna
Proceduren för samarbetsförfarandet finns i artikel 252 i EG-fördraget. Amsterdamfördraget minskade avsevärt tillämpningsområdet för samarbetsförfarandet, vilket för närvarande endast tillämpas på den ekonomiska och monetära politiken (artiklarna 99.5, 102.2, 103.2 och 106.2 i EG-fördraget). Genom Lissabonfördraget upphävs det s.k. samarbetsförfarandet i nuvarande artikel 252 i EG-fördraget (jfr avsnitt 16.2 om förfaranden för antagande av akter och andra bestämmelser). Beslutsförfarandena i de artiklar där samarbetsförfarandet idag tillämpas ändras därför enligt följande.
För att säkerställa en fastare samordning av den ekonomiska politiken ska rådet i dag på grundval av rapporter från kommissionen övervaka den ekonomiska utvecklingen i varje medlemsstat och inom unionen samt den ekonomiska politikens överensstämmelse med de allmänna riktlinjerna och regelbundet göra en samlad bedömning. För denna multilaterala övervakning ska medlemsstaterna lämna erforderliga uppgifter till kommissionen. Genom Lissabonfördraget anges att närmare föreskrifter om det multilaterala övervakningsförfarandet ska antas genom förordningar med tillämpning av det ordinarie lagstiftningsförfarandet (artikel 99.6 i EUF-fördraget). Ändringen innebär således en förstärkt ställning för Europaparlamentet.
I artiklarna 101–103 i EG-fördraget finns bestämmelser om förbud för Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) och nationella centralbanker att ge de gemensamma institutionerna eller de nationella offentliga organen, inklusive statsägda företag, rätt att övertrassera sina konton eller ge dem andra former av krediter. ECB eller centralbankerna får inte heller direkt från dem förvärva skuldförbindelser. En positiv särbehandling av gemenskapsorgan eller nationella offentliga institutioner eller företag är likaså förbjuden. Vidare ska gemenskapen inte ansvara för eller åta sig förpliktelser som har ingåtts av nationella offentliga institutioner eller företag. Genom Lissabonfördraget anges att rådet efter att ha hört Europaparlamentet får ange närmare hur dessa förbud ska tillämpas (artikel 103.2 i EUF-fördraget).”
***
Lissabonin sopimus
The Finnish ratification bill, ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan unionista tehdyn sopimuksen ja Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopimuksen muuttamisesta tehdyn Lissabonin sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 23/2008 vp), discusses economic and monetary policy (Talous- ja rahapolitiikka) on pages 209 to 214.
The ratification bill briefly describes Article 103 TFEU (ToL), renumbered Article 125 TFEU, where the union is not liable for member states’ debts or commitments, as essentially the same as Article III-183 Constitution and Article 103 TEC, [but it does not mention that the member states lack liability]. It then remarks on the expansion of paragraph 2 (page 210):
”103 artikla (uusi 125 artikla), jonka mukaan unioni ei ole vastuussa jäsenvaltioiden veloista tai niiden muista antamista taloudellisista sitoumuksista, vastaa asiasisällöltään perustuslakisopimuksen III-183 ja SEY 103 artiklaa.
Artiklan 2 kohtaa on laajennettu niin, että sen perusteella voidaan antaa myös 101 ja 102 artiklan soveltamista varten tarvittavat tarkemmat määräykset.”
The Finnish ratification bill is available at:
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf
The Swedish language version of the ratification bill ‘Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Lissabonfördraget om ändring av fördraget om Europeiska unionen och fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen’ (RP 23/2008 rd), makes the same remarks under ’Ekonomisk och monetär politik’ on Article 103 TFEU (ToL), the future Article 125 TFEU, on page 213:
”Artikel 103 (blivande artikel 125), enligt vilken unionen inte ska ansvara för medlemsstaternas skulder eller andra ekonomiska förpliktelser, motsvarar i sak artikel III-183 i det konstitutionella fördraget och artikel 103 i EG-fördraget.
Artikel 103.2 har utvidgats så att med stöd av den får antas även närmare bestämmelser som behövs för tillämpningen av artiklarna 101 och 102.”
The ratification bill in Swedish can be accessed at:
http://www.finlex.fi/sv/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf
***
de Poncins
Étienne de Poncins offers a few general comments on EU economic governance and budget matters, ‘La gouvernance économique et les questions budgétaires’ in his ‘Le traité de Lisbonne en 27 clés’ (Éditions Lignes de Repères, 2008), pages 245─251, but nothing specific on Article 125 TFEU.
Fischer
‚Der Vertrag von Lissabon‘, by Klemens H. Fischer (Nomos, Stämpfli & Verlag Österreich, 2008), traces the amendments Article by Article; here on pages 265─266. He offers the following statement on paragraph 2:
„Der bisherige Text von Absatz 2 wird gestrichen und durch einen neuen Text ersetzt, demgemäß in Hinkunft nicht mehr das Zustimmungsverfahren, sondern das Anhörungsverfahren zur Anwendung gelangt.“
Priollaud and Siritzky
François-Xavier Priollaud and David Siritzky offer a short introductory explanation on economic and monetary policy (pages 246 and 247) and on economic policy coordination, including the treaty amendments (pages 248 to 250) in their book ‘Le traité de Lisbonne – Commentaire, article par article, des nouveaux traités européens (TUE et TFUE)’ (La Documentation française, Paris, 2008), but there is no comment on Article 125 TFEU.
***
Consultation procedure
Just in case someone wants to reflect on the consultation procedure (and other decision-making procedures), Martin Gellermann offers a description in Rudolf Streinz (Hrsgb.): EUV/EGV Vertrag über die Europäische Union und Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (C.H.Beck, 2003). I quote the beginning of Konsultations- oder Anhörungsverfahren (page 2204):
„Als Ursprungsmodell für eine Beteiligung des Europäischen Parlaments am Prozess der gemeinschaftlichen Rechtsetzung erscheint das Konsultations- oder Anhörungsverfahren in dem der Kommission das Initiativrecht, dem Parlament eine Beratungsbefugnis und dem Rat das alleinige Entscheidungsrecht gebührt.“
Ralf Grahn
Saturday, 4 October 2008
EU: No-bailout rule V
What, if anything, has been said about the amendments concerning Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)?
***
Statewatch
Professor Steve Peers covered the Treaty of Lisbon in a number of Statewatch Analyses. ‘EU Reform Treaty Analysis no. 3.4: Revised text of Part Three, Titles VII to XVII of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC): Other internal EC policies’ (Version 2, 24 October 2007) includes the current Title VII Economic and monetary policy.
Peers presented the text of Article 103 TFEU (ToL), to be renumbered Article 125 TFEU in the consolidated version, and highlighted the changes [except the small slip that ‘Community’ was not replaced by ‘Union’]. He offered the following comment (page 8):
“The consultation procedure will apply to this Article (along with Articles 101 and 102), in place of the ‘cooperation’ procedure. The measures concerned shall not constitute legislative acts. This entails a downgrade of the EP’s role here.”
The analysis 3.4 and other useful Statewatch analyses are available through:
http://www.statewatch.org/euconstitution.htm
***
FCO
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) offers a convenient source of brief annotations on Lisbon Treaty amendments in ‘A comparative table of the current EC and EU treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon’ (Command Paper 7311, published 21 January 2008). It offers the following comment on Article 125 TFEU, Article 103 TFEU (ToL) in the original Lisbon Treaty (page 12):
“Draws on Article 103 TEC. Paragraph 2 replaces the cooperation procedure with consultation with the EP.”
The FCO comparative table is available at:
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7311/7311.asp
***
House of Commons Library
The UK House of Commons Library Research Paper 07/86 ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Community’ (published 6 December 2007) discussed ‘H. Economic and Monetary Policy’ on pages 61 to 64, but I found nothing on Article 103 TFEU (ToL).
The Library Research Paper 07/86 is available at:
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-086.pdf
***
House of Lords
I found nothing on Article 103 TFEU (ToL) or 125 TFEU in the House of Lords European Union Committee report ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, Volume I: Report’ (HL Paper 62-I, published 13 March 2008), but the Glossary offered a brief explanation of ‘Consultation’, on page 297:
“Consultation (of the European Parliament): a procedure which requires the Council to consult the EP and take its views into account before voting on a Commission proposal.”
[For a somewhat different take on the consultation procedure, read the following post.]
The impact assessment report is accessible at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf
***
The following post is going to present additional legislative materials on Article 125 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
***
Statewatch
Professor Steve Peers covered the Treaty of Lisbon in a number of Statewatch Analyses. ‘EU Reform Treaty Analysis no. 3.4: Revised text of Part Three, Titles VII to XVII of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC): Other internal EC policies’ (Version 2, 24 October 2007) includes the current Title VII Economic and monetary policy.
Peers presented the text of Article 103 TFEU (ToL), to be renumbered Article 125 TFEU in the consolidated version, and highlighted the changes [except the small slip that ‘Community’ was not replaced by ‘Union’]. He offered the following comment (page 8):
“The consultation procedure will apply to this Article (along with Articles 101 and 102), in place of the ‘cooperation’ procedure. The measures concerned shall not constitute legislative acts. This entails a downgrade of the EP’s role here.”
The analysis 3.4 and other useful Statewatch analyses are available through:
http://www.statewatch.org/euconstitution.htm
***
FCO
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) offers a convenient source of brief annotations on Lisbon Treaty amendments in ‘A comparative table of the current EC and EU treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon’ (Command Paper 7311, published 21 January 2008). It offers the following comment on Article 125 TFEU, Article 103 TFEU (ToL) in the original Lisbon Treaty (page 12):
“Draws on Article 103 TEC. Paragraph 2 replaces the cooperation procedure with consultation with the EP.”
The FCO comparative table is available at:
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7311/7311.asp
***
House of Commons Library
The UK House of Commons Library Research Paper 07/86 ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Community’ (published 6 December 2007) discussed ‘H. Economic and Monetary Policy’ on pages 61 to 64, but I found nothing on Article 103 TFEU (ToL).
The Library Research Paper 07/86 is available at:
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-086.pdf
***
House of Lords
I found nothing on Article 103 TFEU (ToL) or 125 TFEU in the House of Lords European Union Committee report ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, Volume I: Report’ (HL Paper 62-I, published 13 March 2008), but the Glossary offered a brief explanation of ‘Consultation’, on page 297:
“Consultation (of the European Parliament): a procedure which requires the Council to consult the EP and take its views into account before voting on a Commission proposal.”
[For a somewhat different take on the consultation procedure, read the following post.]
The impact assessment report is accessible at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf
***
The following post is going to present additional legislative materials on Article 125 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
Friday, 3 October 2008
EU: No-bailout rule IV
Bailouts of financial institutions dominate the news in the United States and Europe, but does the EU Lisbon Treaty change the European Community’s (European Union’s) and other member states’ lack of responsibility for public debt of a member state, the so called ‘no-bailout’ clause?
***
The currentt Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) was to become the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and generally the innovations as agreed in the 2004 IGC were to be inserted into the Treaty by way of specific modifications ‘in the usual manner’ (points 17 and 18, pages 6 and 7). As we remember, the legal base in Article III-183(2) of the Constitutional Treaty was rewritten.
I found nothing specific in the mandate of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007 Mandate, Council document 11218/07, 26 June 2007) about Article 103 TEC.
***
In Article 2, point 89 of the original Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) the IGC 2007 agreed on the following concerning Article 103 TEC (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/71):
89) In Article 103, paragraph 2 shall be replaced by the following:
‘2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 101 and 102 and in this Article.’.
***
The TFEU table of equivalences confirms that Article 103 TFEU (ToL) in the original Treaty of Lisbon was to be renumbered Article 125 TFEU in the consolidated version, under the title ‘Economic and monetary policy’, renumbered Title VIII (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/211─212).
***
Consolidated Lisbon Treaty
Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is found in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/99:
Part Three Union policies and internal actions
Title VIII Economic and monetary policy
Chapter 1 Economic policy
Article 125 TFEU
(ex Article 103 TEC)
1. The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.
2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 123 and 124 and in this Article.
***
With regard to the current Article 103 TEC, in the first paragraph, the ‘Community’ was replaced by the ‘Union’; one of the so called horizontal amendments.
Paragraph 2 was rewritten. As in the cooperation procedure (Article 252 TEC), the Council acts on a proposal from the Commission. But according to the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament is only consulted.
***
Proposal from the Commission
Here is a reminder of the significance of a proposal from the Commission, as laid out in the Treaty of Lisbon (consolidated version, OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/173):
Article 293 TFEU
(ex Article 250 TEC)
1. Where, pursuant to the Treaties, the Council acts on a proposal from the Commission, it may amend that proposal only by acting unanimously, except in the cases referred to in paragraphs 10 and 13 of Article 294, in Articles 310, 312 and 314 and in the second paragraph of Article 315.
2. As long as the Council has not acted, the Commission may alter its proposal at any time during the procedures leading to the adoption of a Union act.
***
The following instalment is going to take a look at some comments concerning Article 125 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
***
The currentt Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) was to become the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and generally the innovations as agreed in the 2004 IGC were to be inserted into the Treaty by way of specific modifications ‘in the usual manner’ (points 17 and 18, pages 6 and 7). As we remember, the legal base in Article III-183(2) of the Constitutional Treaty was rewritten.
I found nothing specific in the mandate of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007 Mandate, Council document 11218/07, 26 June 2007) about Article 103 TEC.
***
In Article 2, point 89 of the original Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) the IGC 2007 agreed on the following concerning Article 103 TEC (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/71):
89) In Article 103, paragraph 2 shall be replaced by the following:
‘2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 101 and 102 and in this Article.’.
***
The TFEU table of equivalences confirms that Article 103 TFEU (ToL) in the original Treaty of Lisbon was to be renumbered Article 125 TFEU in the consolidated version, under the title ‘Economic and monetary policy’, renumbered Title VIII (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/211─212).
***
Consolidated Lisbon Treaty
Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is found in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/99:
Part Three Union policies and internal actions
Title VIII Economic and monetary policy
Chapter 1 Economic policy
Article 125 TFEU
(ex Article 103 TEC)
1. The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.
2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 123 and 124 and in this Article.
***
With regard to the current Article 103 TEC, in the first paragraph, the ‘Community’ was replaced by the ‘Union’; one of the so called horizontal amendments.
Paragraph 2 was rewritten. As in the cooperation procedure (Article 252 TEC), the Council acts on a proposal from the Commission. But according to the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament is only consulted.
***
Proposal from the Commission
Here is a reminder of the significance of a proposal from the Commission, as laid out in the Treaty of Lisbon (consolidated version, OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/173):
Article 293 TFEU
(ex Article 250 TEC)
1. Where, pursuant to the Treaties, the Council acts on a proposal from the Commission, it may amend that proposal only by acting unanimously, except in the cases referred to in paragraphs 10 and 13 of Article 294, in Articles 310, 312 and 314 and in the second paragraph of Article 315.
2. As long as the Council has not acted, the Commission may alter its proposal at any time during the procedures leading to the adoption of a Union act.
***
The following instalment is going to take a look at some comments concerning Article 125 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 2 October 2008
EU: No-bailout rule III
We look at the ‘no-bailout’ clause in the context of economic and monetary union (EMU). What, if anything, did the Constitutional Treaty contribute?
***
In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe the provisions on economic policy were located in Part III ‘The policies and functioning of the Union’, Title III ‘Internal policies and action’, Chapter II ‘Economic and monetary policy’, Section 1 ‘Economic policy’.
The ‘no-bailout’ clause is found in Article III-183, OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/78:
Article III-183 Constitution
1. The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.
2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt European regulations or decisions specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions laid down in Articles III-181 and III-182 and in this Article. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.
***
Does the Constitution differ from the draft? In the Constitutional Treaty ‘The Council of Ministers’ became ‘The Council’. Paragraph 2 became the legal base for three Articles, III-181, III-182 and III-183.
***
Let us see if the ‘no-bailout’ rule has led to any comments in our reference materials.
***
The Swedish government memorandum ‘Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (Utrikesdepartemetet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2004:52, december 2004) described the signed Constitutional Treaty, but I found no comment on Article III-183.
***
No reference was found in the Swedish draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss ─ Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (2 June 2005).
***
The government of Finland laid out the Constitutional Treaty in its ratification bill ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan perustuslaista tehdyn sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 67/2006 vp). On page 183 the government remarked that in Article III-183, as in Article 103 TEC, the union was not responsible for debts or commitments of member states [but it did not mention that the same lack of liability applies among member states]. It then remarked that the legal base for decisions specifying definitions had been expanded to cover Article III-182:
”III-183 artikla, jonka mukaan unioni ei ole vastuussa jäsenvaltioiden veloista tai niiden muista antamista taloudellisista sitoumuksista, vastaa asiasisällöltään SEY 103 artiklaa.
Artiklan 2 kohtaa on laajennettu niin, että sen perusteella voidaan antaa myös III-182 artiklan soveltamista varten tarvittavat tarkemmat määräykset.”
***
The same remark appears in Swedish in ’Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen (RP 67/2006 rd), page 187:
”Innehållet i artikel III-183, enligt vilken unionen inte skall ansvara för medlemsstaternas skulder eller andra ekonomiska förpliktelser, motsvarar i sak artikel 103 i EG-fördraget.
Artikel III-183.2 har utvidgats så att med stöd av den får antas även närmare bestämmelser som behövs för tillämpningen av artikel III-182.”
***
Klemens H. Fischer in ‘Der Europäische Verfassungsvertrag‘ (Nomos, Stämpfli & Manz, 2005), pages 310─311, makes the observations that „Artikel III-183 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel 103 EGV“ and „Artikel III-183 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel III-75 VVE“ [but he makes no remarks on the changes concerning paragraph 2],
***
The next instalment turns to the IGC 2007 and the Lisbon Treaty.
Ralf Grahn
***
In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe the provisions on economic policy were located in Part III ‘The policies and functioning of the Union’, Title III ‘Internal policies and action’, Chapter II ‘Economic and monetary policy’, Section 1 ‘Economic policy’.
The ‘no-bailout’ clause is found in Article III-183, OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/78:
Article III-183 Constitution
1. The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.
2. The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt European regulations or decisions specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions laid down in Articles III-181 and III-182 and in this Article. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.
***
Does the Constitution differ from the draft? In the Constitutional Treaty ‘The Council of Ministers’ became ‘The Council’. Paragraph 2 became the legal base for three Articles, III-181, III-182 and III-183.
***
Let us see if the ‘no-bailout’ rule has led to any comments in our reference materials.
***
The Swedish government memorandum ‘Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (Utrikesdepartemetet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2004:52, december 2004) described the signed Constitutional Treaty, but I found no comment on Article III-183.
***
No reference was found in the Swedish draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss ─ Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (2 June 2005).
***
The government of Finland laid out the Constitutional Treaty in its ratification bill ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan perustuslaista tehdyn sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 67/2006 vp). On page 183 the government remarked that in Article III-183, as in Article 103 TEC, the union was not responsible for debts or commitments of member states [but it did not mention that the same lack of liability applies among member states]. It then remarked that the legal base for decisions specifying definitions had been expanded to cover Article III-182:
”III-183 artikla, jonka mukaan unioni ei ole vastuussa jäsenvaltioiden veloista tai niiden muista antamista taloudellisista sitoumuksista, vastaa asiasisällöltään SEY 103 artiklaa.
Artiklan 2 kohtaa on laajennettu niin, että sen perusteella voidaan antaa myös III-182 artiklan soveltamista varten tarvittavat tarkemmat määräykset.”
***
The same remark appears in Swedish in ’Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen (RP 67/2006 rd), page 187:
”Innehållet i artikel III-183, enligt vilken unionen inte skall ansvara för medlemsstaternas skulder eller andra ekonomiska förpliktelser, motsvarar i sak artikel 103 i EG-fördraget.
Artikel III-183.2 har utvidgats så att med stöd av den får antas även närmare bestämmelser som behövs för tillämpningen av artikel III-182.”
***
Klemens H. Fischer in ‘Der Europäische Verfassungsvertrag‘ (Nomos, Stämpfli & Manz, 2005), pages 310─311, makes the observations that „Artikel III-183 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel 103 EGV“ and „Artikel III-183 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel III-75 VVE“ [but he makes no remarks on the changes concerning paragraph 2],
***
The next instalment turns to the IGC 2007 and the Lisbon Treaty.
Ralf Grahn
EU: No-bailout rule II
Article III-75 of the draft Constitution, proposed by the European Convention, corresponds with Article 103 TEC, and it is located in Part III ‘The policies and functioning of the Union’, Title III ‘Internal policies and action’, Chapter II ‘Economic and monetary policy’, Section 1 ‘Economic policy’.
In the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the ‘no-bailout’ clause is Article III-75, found in OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/40:
Article III-75 Draft Constitution
1. The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.
2. The Council of Ministers, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt European regulations or decisions specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Article III-73 and in this Article. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.
***
Paragraph 1 replaced ‘Community’ by ‘Union’.
Paragraph 2 rewrote the decision-making and downgraded the European Parliament, merely to be consulted.
***
The government of Sweden presented its views on the draft Constitution in ‘Europeiska konventet om EU:s framtid’ (Utrikesdepartementet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2003:58, 2003), but I found no reference to Article III-75.
***
Ahead of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2003─2004), the government of Sweden stated its positions on economic policy provisions, in ‘Europeiska konventet om EU:s framtid’ (Regeringens skrivelse 2003/04:13, den 2 oktober 2003), on pages 49─50, but I found no comment on Article III-75.
***
Étienne de Poncins presented the proposed text of Article III-75 of the draft Constitution in ‘Vers une Constitution européenne’ (Éditions 10/18, 2003), page 296, without comment.
***
For a look at the background, you can read the Final report of Working Group VI on Economic Governance, CONV 357/02 (21 October 2002), although the prohibitions concerning overdraft facilities (monetary financing) and privileged access and the ‘no-bailout’ clause were not mentioned:
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00357en2.pdf
Generally, the highly divided Working Group opted for the ‘status quo’ or more of the same, as seen in this snippet:
“The Group recommends that the current structure whereby exclusive competence for monetary policy within the Eurozone lies with the Community, exercised by the ECB under powers conferred upon it by the existing Treaty, and competence for economic policy lies with the Member States, should be maintained.
However, taking into account the fact that Member States' economic policies are regarded as a matter of common concern (Article 99 TEC), reflected in the existence of a number of rules at Community level, the Group also agrees that there is a need for improved coordination between the economic policies of the Member States.”
***
In the following instalment we look at the ‘no-bailout’ clause in the Constitutional Treaty.
Ralf Grahn
In the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the ‘no-bailout’ clause is Article III-75, found in OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/40:
Article III-75 Draft Constitution
1. The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.
2. The Council of Ministers, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt European regulations or decisions specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Article III-73 and in this Article. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.
***
Paragraph 1 replaced ‘Community’ by ‘Union’.
Paragraph 2 rewrote the decision-making and downgraded the European Parliament, merely to be consulted.
***
The government of Sweden presented its views on the draft Constitution in ‘Europeiska konventet om EU:s framtid’ (Utrikesdepartementet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2003:58, 2003), but I found no reference to Article III-75.
***
Ahead of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2003─2004), the government of Sweden stated its positions on economic policy provisions, in ‘Europeiska konventet om EU:s framtid’ (Regeringens skrivelse 2003/04:13, den 2 oktober 2003), on pages 49─50, but I found no comment on Article III-75.
***
Étienne de Poncins presented the proposed text of Article III-75 of the draft Constitution in ‘Vers une Constitution européenne’ (Éditions 10/18, 2003), page 296, without comment.
***
For a look at the background, you can read the Final report of Working Group VI on Economic Governance, CONV 357/02 (21 October 2002), although the prohibitions concerning overdraft facilities (monetary financing) and privileged access and the ‘no-bailout’ clause were not mentioned:
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00357en2.pdf
Generally, the highly divided Working Group opted for the ‘status quo’ or more of the same, as seen in this snippet:
“The Group recommends that the current structure whereby exclusive competence for monetary policy within the Eurozone lies with the Community, exercised by the ECB under powers conferred upon it by the existing Treaty, and competence for economic policy lies with the Member States, should be maintained.
However, taking into account the fact that Member States' economic policies are regarded as a matter of common concern (Article 99 TEC), reflected in the existence of a number of rules at Community level, the Group also agrees that there is a need for improved coordination between the economic policies of the Member States.”
***
In the following instalment we look at the ‘no-bailout’ clause in the Constitutional Treaty.
Ralf Grahn
EU: No-bailout rule I
Central banks, such as the European Central Bank, have injected massive amounts of liquidity into financial markets and governments are busy shoring up tottering private sector banks, but what if the failing entities in EU countries were public, like member states themselves or public sector undertakings?
The European Union (EU) is not a federal state, ready to pick up the tab for government failure. On the contrary, economic and monetary union (EMU) is designed only to ensure responsible government borrowing in each nation state separately.
The present financial turmoil is an added reason to look at some of the basic economic policy rules within the European Community.
After the prohibitions on overdraft facilities (monetary financing) and privileged access for the public sector, we turn to the ‘no-bailout’ rule in Article 103 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). The avoidance of excessive government deficits ─ a problem on the rise ─ will be taken up after the posts on the ‘no-bailout’ clause.
***
Article 103 (ex Article 104b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) is found in the latest consolidated version of the current treaties, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) 29.12.2006 C 321 E/84:
Part Three – Community policies
Title VII – Economic and monetary policy
Chapter 1 – Economic policy
Article 103 TEC
1. The Community shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.
2. If necessary, the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 252, may specify definitions for the application of the prohibition referred to in Article 101 and in this Article.
***
Objective
Article 103 TEC (originally Article 104b) is in force and directly applicable from 1 January 1994.
The objective of the ‘no-bailout’ rule in Article 103 TEC is to promote responsible budget policies, by stating that neither the European Community nor other member states shall be liable for or assume public debt in another ─ less responsible ─ member state.
***
Cooperation procedure
Economic and monetary union (EMU) is one of the rare areas where the cooperation procedure (Article 252 TEC) still applies with regard to the specifying measures mentioned in paragraph 2. Cf. Articles 99(5), 102(2) and 103(2).
Here is how the cooperation procedure is laid out in Article 252 TEC (OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/84):
Article 252 TEC
Where reference is made in this Treaty to this Article for the adoption of an act, the following procedure shall apply.
(a) The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament, shall adopt a common position.
(b) The Council's common position shall be communicated to the European Parliament. The Council and the Commission shall inform the European Parliament fully of the reasons which led the Council to adopt its common position and also of the Commission's position.
If, within three months of such communication, the European Parliament approves this common position or has not taken a decision within that period, the Council shall definitively adopt the act in question in accordance with the common position.
(c) The European Parliament may, within the period of three months referred to in point (b), by an absolute majority of its component Members, propose amendments to the Council's common position. The European Parliament may also, by the same majority, reject the Council's common position. The result of the proceedings shall be transmitted to the Council and the Commission.
If the European Parliament has rejected the Council's common position, unanimity shall be required for the Council to act on a second reading.
(d) The Commission shall, within a period of one month, re-examine the proposal on the basis of which the Council adopted its common position, by taking into account the amendments proposed by the European Parliament.
The Commission shall forward to the Council, at the same time as its re-examined proposal, the amendments of the European Parliament which it has not accepted, and shall express its opinion on them. The Council may adopt these amendments unanimously.
(e) The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt the proposal as re-examined by the Commission.
Unanimity shall be required for the Council to amend the proposal as re-examined by the Commission.
(f) In the cases referred to in points (c), (d) and (e), the Council shall be required to act within a period of three months. If no decision is taken within this period, the Commission proposal shall be deemed not to have been adopted.
(g) The periods referred to in points (b) and (f) may be extended by a maximum of one month by common accord between the Council and the European Parliament.
***
In short, the cooperation gives the European Parliament more influence than consultation, but less than the co-decision procedure.
***
Prohibitions specified
Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty (OJ 31.12.1993 L 332/1) is in force and directly applicable from 1 January 1994.
***
Next, we look at the corresponding proposal of the European Convention.
Ralf Grahn
The European Union (EU) is not a federal state, ready to pick up the tab for government failure. On the contrary, economic and monetary union (EMU) is designed only to ensure responsible government borrowing in each nation state separately.
The present financial turmoil is an added reason to look at some of the basic economic policy rules within the European Community.
After the prohibitions on overdraft facilities (monetary financing) and privileged access for the public sector, we turn to the ‘no-bailout’ rule in Article 103 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). The avoidance of excessive government deficits ─ a problem on the rise ─ will be taken up after the posts on the ‘no-bailout’ clause.
***
Article 103 (ex Article 104b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) is found in the latest consolidated version of the current treaties, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) 29.12.2006 C 321 E/84:
Part Three – Community policies
Title VII – Economic and monetary policy
Chapter 1 – Economic policy
Article 103 TEC
1. The Community shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.
2. If necessary, the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 252, may specify definitions for the application of the prohibition referred to in Article 101 and in this Article.
***
Objective
Article 103 TEC (originally Article 104b) is in force and directly applicable from 1 January 1994.
The objective of the ‘no-bailout’ rule in Article 103 TEC is to promote responsible budget policies, by stating that neither the European Community nor other member states shall be liable for or assume public debt in another ─ less responsible ─ member state.
***
Cooperation procedure
Economic and monetary union (EMU) is one of the rare areas where the cooperation procedure (Article 252 TEC) still applies with regard to the specifying measures mentioned in paragraph 2. Cf. Articles 99(5), 102(2) and 103(2).
Here is how the cooperation procedure is laid out in Article 252 TEC (OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/84):
Article 252 TEC
Where reference is made in this Treaty to this Article for the adoption of an act, the following procedure shall apply.
(a) The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament, shall adopt a common position.
(b) The Council's common position shall be communicated to the European Parliament. The Council and the Commission shall inform the European Parliament fully of the reasons which led the Council to adopt its common position and also of the Commission's position.
If, within three months of such communication, the European Parliament approves this common position or has not taken a decision within that period, the Council shall definitively adopt the act in question in accordance with the common position.
(c) The European Parliament may, within the period of three months referred to in point (b), by an absolute majority of its component Members, propose amendments to the Council's common position. The European Parliament may also, by the same majority, reject the Council's common position. The result of the proceedings shall be transmitted to the Council and the Commission.
If the European Parliament has rejected the Council's common position, unanimity shall be required for the Council to act on a second reading.
(d) The Commission shall, within a period of one month, re-examine the proposal on the basis of which the Council adopted its common position, by taking into account the amendments proposed by the European Parliament.
The Commission shall forward to the Council, at the same time as its re-examined proposal, the amendments of the European Parliament which it has not accepted, and shall express its opinion on them. The Council may adopt these amendments unanimously.
(e) The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt the proposal as re-examined by the Commission.
Unanimity shall be required for the Council to amend the proposal as re-examined by the Commission.
(f) In the cases referred to in points (c), (d) and (e), the Council shall be required to act within a period of three months. If no decision is taken within this period, the Commission proposal shall be deemed not to have been adopted.
(g) The periods referred to in points (b) and (f) may be extended by a maximum of one month by common accord between the Council and the European Parliament.
***
In short, the cooperation gives the European Parliament more influence than consultation, but less than the co-decision procedure.
***
Prohibitions specified
Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 104 and 104b (1) of the Treaty (OJ 31.12.1993 L 332/1) is in force and directly applicable from 1 January 1994.
***
Next, we look at the corresponding proposal of the European Convention.
Ralf Grahn
Wednesday, 1 October 2008
EU: Privileged access prohibited VI
The public sector is not allowed to legislate or administer itself outside the scope of market discipline, when it wants to borrow money. Privileged access to financial institutions is forbidden.
The previous post mentioned (the lack of) UK references to Article 124 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). We now turn to legislative materials from Sweden and Finland as well as some potential commentaries in book form.
***
Sweden
The consultation paper ’Lissabonfördraget’ was the first official Swedish description of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, and it is available at:
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/49/81/107aa077.pdf
It was followed by the Swedish government’s draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss – Lissabonfördraget’, published 29 May 2008:
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/5676/a/106277
The draft bill was given a green light by the Council on Legislation (Lagrådet):
http://www.lagradet.se/yttranden/Lissabonfordraget.pdf
The latest official government view, and now my standard reference for Sweden, is the ratification bill, with the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) expected to decide on approval in late autumn, probably November (Regeringens proposition 2007/08:168 Lissabonfördraget; 3 July 2008):
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/84/02/8c96cf3e.pdf
Economic and monetary policy (23.2 Ekonomisk och monetär politik) is discussed on pages 180 to 185. The Swedish government explains procedural questions, including Article 102 TFEU (ToL). The rare cooperation procedure is abolished and replaced partly by the ordinary legislative procedure (multilateral surveillance) and partly by consulting the European Parliament (prohibitions on overdraft facilities and privileged access, and the ‘no bail-out’ clause) (on page 184):
Ӏndring av beslutsprocedurerna
Proceduren för samarbetsförfarandet finns i artikel 252 i EG-fördraget. Amsterdamfördraget minskade avsevärt tillämpningsområdet för samarbetsförfarandet, vilket för närvarande endast tillämpas på den ekonomiska och monetära politiken (artiklarna 99.5, 102.2, 103.2 och 106.2 i EG-fördraget). Genom Lissabonfördraget upphävs det s.k. samarbetsförfarandet i nuvarande artikel 252 i EG-fördraget (jfr avsnitt 16.2 om förfaranden för antagande av akter och andra bestämmelser). Beslutsförfarandena i de artiklar där samarbetsförfarandet idag tillämpas ändras därför enligt följande.
För att säkerställa en fastare samordning av den ekonomiska politiken ska rådet i dag på grundval av rapporter från kommissionen övervaka den ekonomiska utvecklingen i varje medlemsstat och inom unionen samt den ekonomiska politikens överensstämmelse med de allmänna riktlinjerna och regelbundet göra en samlad bedömning. För denna multilaterala övervakning ska medlemsstaterna lämna erforderliga uppgifter till kommissionen. Genom Lissabonfördraget anges att närmare föreskrifter om det multilaterala övervakningsförfarandet ska antas genom förordningar med tillämpning av det ordinarie lagstiftningsförfarandet (artikel 99.6 i EUF-fördraget). Ändringen innebär således en förstärkt ställning för Europaparlamentet.
I artiklarna 101–103 i EG-fördraget finns bestämmelser om förbud för Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) och nationella centralbanker att ge de gemensamma institutionerna eller de nationella offentliga organen, inklusive statsägda företag, rätt att övertrassera sina konton eller ge dem andra former av krediter. ECB eller centralbankerna får inte heller direkt från dem förvärva skuldförbindelser. En positiv särbehandling av gemenskapsorgan eller nationella offentliga institutioner eller företag är likaså förbjuden. Vidare ska gemenskapen inte ansvara för eller åta sig förpliktelser som har ingåtts av nationella offentliga institutioner eller företag. Genom Lissabonfördraget anges att rådet efter att ha hört Europaparlamentet får ange närmare hur dessa förbud ska tillämpas (artikel 103.2 i EUF-fördraget).”
***
Finland
The Finnish ratification bill, ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan unionista tehdyn sopimuksen ja Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopimuksen muuttamisesta tehdyn Lissabonin sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 23/2008 vp), discusses economic and monetary policy (Talous- ja rahapolitiikka) on pages 209 to 214.
The ratification bill briefly describes Article 102 TFEU (ToL), renumbered Article 124 TFEU, as essentially the same as Article 102 TEC, except for the legal base moved to Article 103 TFEU (ToL) (page 210):
”102 artikla (uusi 124 artikla), joka kieltää unionin ja jäsenvaltioiden elimiltä ja viranomaisilta erityisoikeudet rahalaitoksissa, vastaa SEY 102 artiklaa lukuun ottamatta sitä, että kyseisen artiklan oikeusperusta, jonka perusteella voidaan antaa artiklassa määrätyn kiellon soveltamiseksi tarvittavat määritelmät, on siirretty 103 artiklaan.”
The Finnish ratification bill is available at:
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf
The Swedish language version of the ratification bill ‘Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Lissabonfördraget om ändring av fördraget om Europeiska unionen och fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen’ (RP 23/2008 rd), makes the same remarks under ’Ekonomisk och monetär politik’ on Article 102 TFEU (ToL), the future Article 124 TFEU, on page 213:
” Artikel 102 (blivande artikel 124), som förbjuder en positiv särbehandling av unionens och medlemsstaternas institutioner, organ eller myndigheter hos finansinstitut, motsvarar artikel 102 i EG-fördraget med undantag för att rättsgrunden för artikeln i fråga, med stöd av vilken bestämmelser får antas som anger hur förbuden i artikeln ska tillämpas, har överförts till artikel 103.”
The ratification bill in Swedish can be accessed at:
http://www.finlex.fi/sv/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf
***
de Poncins
Étienne de Poncins offers a few general comments on EU economic governance and budget matters, ‘La gouvernance économique et les questions budgétaires’ in his ‘Le traité de Lisbonne en 27 clés’ (Éditions Lignes de Repères, 2008), pages 245─251, but nothing specific on Article 124 TFEU.
Fischer
‚Der Vertrag von Lissabon‘, by Klemens H. Fischer (Nomos, Stämpfli & Verlag Österreich, 2008), traces the amendments Article by Article; here on page 265.
Priollaud and Siritzky
François-Xavier Priollaud and David Siritzky offer a short introductory explanation on economic and monetary policy (pages 246 and 247) and on economic policy coordination, including the treaty amendments (pages 248 to 250) in their book ‘Le traité de Lisbonne – Commentaire, article par article, des nouveaux traités européens (TUE et TFUE)’ (La Documentation française, Paris, 2008), but there is no comment on Article 124 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
The previous post mentioned (the lack of) UK references to Article 124 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). We now turn to legislative materials from Sweden and Finland as well as some potential commentaries in book form.
***
Sweden
The consultation paper ’Lissabonfördraget’ was the first official Swedish description of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, and it is available at:
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/49/81/107aa077.pdf
It was followed by the Swedish government’s draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss – Lissabonfördraget’, published 29 May 2008:
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/5676/a/106277
The draft bill was given a green light by the Council on Legislation (Lagrådet):
http://www.lagradet.se/yttranden/Lissabonfordraget.pdf
The latest official government view, and now my standard reference for Sweden, is the ratification bill, with the Swedish parliament (Riksdagen) expected to decide on approval in late autumn, probably November (Regeringens proposition 2007/08:168 Lissabonfördraget; 3 July 2008):
http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/84/02/8c96cf3e.pdf
Economic and monetary policy (23.2 Ekonomisk och monetär politik) is discussed on pages 180 to 185. The Swedish government explains procedural questions, including Article 102 TFEU (ToL). The rare cooperation procedure is abolished and replaced partly by the ordinary legislative procedure (multilateral surveillance) and partly by consulting the European Parliament (prohibitions on overdraft facilities and privileged access, and the ‘no bail-out’ clause) (on page 184):
Ӏndring av beslutsprocedurerna
Proceduren för samarbetsförfarandet finns i artikel 252 i EG-fördraget. Amsterdamfördraget minskade avsevärt tillämpningsområdet för samarbetsförfarandet, vilket för närvarande endast tillämpas på den ekonomiska och monetära politiken (artiklarna 99.5, 102.2, 103.2 och 106.2 i EG-fördraget). Genom Lissabonfördraget upphävs det s.k. samarbetsförfarandet i nuvarande artikel 252 i EG-fördraget (jfr avsnitt 16.2 om förfaranden för antagande av akter och andra bestämmelser). Beslutsförfarandena i de artiklar där samarbetsförfarandet idag tillämpas ändras därför enligt följande.
För att säkerställa en fastare samordning av den ekonomiska politiken ska rådet i dag på grundval av rapporter från kommissionen övervaka den ekonomiska utvecklingen i varje medlemsstat och inom unionen samt den ekonomiska politikens överensstämmelse med de allmänna riktlinjerna och regelbundet göra en samlad bedömning. För denna multilaterala övervakning ska medlemsstaterna lämna erforderliga uppgifter till kommissionen. Genom Lissabonfördraget anges att närmare föreskrifter om det multilaterala övervakningsförfarandet ska antas genom förordningar med tillämpning av det ordinarie lagstiftningsförfarandet (artikel 99.6 i EUF-fördraget). Ändringen innebär således en förstärkt ställning för Europaparlamentet.
I artiklarna 101–103 i EG-fördraget finns bestämmelser om förbud för Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) och nationella centralbanker att ge de gemensamma institutionerna eller de nationella offentliga organen, inklusive statsägda företag, rätt att övertrassera sina konton eller ge dem andra former av krediter. ECB eller centralbankerna får inte heller direkt från dem förvärva skuldförbindelser. En positiv särbehandling av gemenskapsorgan eller nationella offentliga institutioner eller företag är likaså förbjuden. Vidare ska gemenskapen inte ansvara för eller åta sig förpliktelser som har ingåtts av nationella offentliga institutioner eller företag. Genom Lissabonfördraget anges att rådet efter att ha hört Europaparlamentet får ange närmare hur dessa förbud ska tillämpas (artikel 103.2 i EUF-fördraget).”
***
Finland
The Finnish ratification bill, ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan unionista tehdyn sopimuksen ja Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopimuksen muuttamisesta tehdyn Lissabonin sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 23/2008 vp), discusses economic and monetary policy (Talous- ja rahapolitiikka) on pages 209 to 214.
The ratification bill briefly describes Article 102 TFEU (ToL), renumbered Article 124 TFEU, as essentially the same as Article 102 TEC, except for the legal base moved to Article 103 TFEU (ToL) (page 210):
”102 artikla (uusi 124 artikla), joka kieltää unionin ja jäsenvaltioiden elimiltä ja viranomaisilta erityisoikeudet rahalaitoksissa, vastaa SEY 102 artiklaa lukuun ottamatta sitä, että kyseisen artiklan oikeusperusta, jonka perusteella voidaan antaa artiklassa määrätyn kiellon soveltamiseksi tarvittavat määritelmät, on siirretty 103 artiklaan.”
The Finnish ratification bill is available at:
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf
The Swedish language version of the ratification bill ‘Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Lissabonfördraget om ändring av fördraget om Europeiska unionen och fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen’ (RP 23/2008 rd), makes the same remarks under ’Ekonomisk och monetär politik’ on Article 102 TFEU (ToL), the future Article 124 TFEU, on page 213:
” Artikel 102 (blivande artikel 124), som förbjuder en positiv särbehandling av unionens och medlemsstaternas institutioner, organ eller myndigheter hos finansinstitut, motsvarar artikel 102 i EG-fördraget med undantag för att rättsgrunden för artikeln i fråga, med stöd av vilken bestämmelser får antas som anger hur förbuden i artikeln ska tillämpas, har överförts till artikel 103.”
The ratification bill in Swedish can be accessed at:
http://www.finlex.fi/sv/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf
***
de Poncins
Étienne de Poncins offers a few general comments on EU economic governance and budget matters, ‘La gouvernance économique et les questions budgétaires’ in his ‘Le traité de Lisbonne en 27 clés’ (Éditions Lignes de Repères, 2008), pages 245─251, but nothing specific on Article 124 TFEU.
Fischer
‚Der Vertrag von Lissabon‘, by Klemens H. Fischer (Nomos, Stämpfli & Verlag Österreich, 2008), traces the amendments Article by Article; here on page 265.
Priollaud and Siritzky
François-Xavier Priollaud and David Siritzky offer a short introductory explanation on economic and monetary policy (pages 246 and 247) and on economic policy coordination, including the treaty amendments (pages 248 to 250) in their book ‘Le traité de Lisbonne – Commentaire, article par article, des nouveaux traités européens (TUE et TFUE)’ (La Documentation française, Paris, 2008), but there is no comment on Article 124 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
EU: Privileged access prohibited V
What, if anything, has been said about the minor amendments in Article 124 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)?
***
United Kingdom
Professor Steve Peers covered the Treaty of Lisbon in a number of Statewatch Analyses. ‘EU Reform Treaty Analysis no. 3.4: Revised text of Part Three, Titles VII to XVII of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC): Other internal EC policies’ (Version 2, 24 October 2007) includes the current Title VII Economic and monetary policy.
Peers presented the text of Article 102 TFEU (ToL), to be renumbered Article 122 TFEU in the consolidated version, and highlighted the changes, except the expanded Union ‘institutions, bodies, offices or agencies’. He offered the following comment (page 7):
“The legal base in paragraph 2 has been moved to Article 103(2), with amendments.”
The analysis 3.4 and other useful Statewatch analyses are available through:
http://www.statewatch.org/euconstitution.htm
***
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) offers a convenient source of brief annotations on Lisbon Treaty amendments in ‘A comparative table of the current EC and EU treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon’ (Command Paper 7311, published 21 January 2008). It offers the following comment on Article 124 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU (ToL) in the original Lisbon Treaty (page 12):
“In substance the same as Article 102 TEC, but now includes a reference to agencies. Outdated paragraph 2 is deleted.”
[Nit-picking: Both ‘offices’ and ‘agencies’ are new. The ‘deleted’ paragraph 2 reappears in the following Article, with amendments.]
The FCO comparative table is available at:
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7311/7311.asp
***
The UK House of Commons Library Research Paper 07/86 ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Community’ (published 6 December 2007) discussed ‘H. Economic and Monetary Policy’ on pages 61 to 64, but I found nothing on Article 102 TFEU (ToL).
The Library Research Paper 07/86 is available at:
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-086.pdf
***
The House of Lords European Union Committee report ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, Volume I: Report’ (HL Paper 62-I, published 13 March 2008) is refreshing in that it evaluates amendments and evidence given, but nothing seems to have been said about Article 102 TFEU (ToL).
The impact assessment report is accessible at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf
***
The following post is going to present additional legislative materials on Article 124 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
***
United Kingdom
Professor Steve Peers covered the Treaty of Lisbon in a number of Statewatch Analyses. ‘EU Reform Treaty Analysis no. 3.4: Revised text of Part Three, Titles VII to XVII of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC): Other internal EC policies’ (Version 2, 24 October 2007) includes the current Title VII Economic and monetary policy.
Peers presented the text of Article 102 TFEU (ToL), to be renumbered Article 122 TFEU in the consolidated version, and highlighted the changes, except the expanded Union ‘institutions, bodies, offices or agencies’. He offered the following comment (page 7):
“The legal base in paragraph 2 has been moved to Article 103(2), with amendments.”
The analysis 3.4 and other useful Statewatch analyses are available through:
http://www.statewatch.org/euconstitution.htm
***
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) offers a convenient source of brief annotations on Lisbon Treaty amendments in ‘A comparative table of the current EC and EU treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon’ (Command Paper 7311, published 21 January 2008). It offers the following comment on Article 124 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU (ToL) in the original Lisbon Treaty (page 12):
“In substance the same as Article 102 TEC, but now includes a reference to agencies. Outdated paragraph 2 is deleted.”
[Nit-picking: Both ‘offices’ and ‘agencies’ are new. The ‘deleted’ paragraph 2 reappears in the following Article, with amendments.]
The FCO comparative table is available at:
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7311/7311.asp
***
The UK House of Commons Library Research Paper 07/86 ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Community’ (published 6 December 2007) discussed ‘H. Economic and Monetary Policy’ on pages 61 to 64, but I found nothing on Article 102 TFEU (ToL).
The Library Research Paper 07/86 is available at:
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-086.pdf
***
The House of Lords European Union Committee report ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, Volume I: Report’ (HL Paper 62-I, published 13 March 2008) is refreshing in that it evaluates amendments and evidence given, but nothing seems to have been said about Article 102 TFEU (ToL).
The impact assessment report is accessible at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf
***
The following post is going to present additional legislative materials on Article 124 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
EU: Privileged access prohibited IV
Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) underwent no substantial change during the European Convention or the IGC 2004.
We turn to the Treaty of Lisbon.
***
The current Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) was to become the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and generally the innovations as agreed in the 2004 IGC were to be inserted into the Treaty by way of specific modifications ‘in the usual manner’ (points 17 and 18, pages 6 and 7). As we remember, Article III-182 of the Constitutional Treaty contained a few small changes or ‘innovations’.
I found nothing specific in the mandate of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007 Mandate, Council document 11218/07, 26 June 2007) about Article 102 TEC.
***
In Article 2, point 88 of the original Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) the IGC 2007 agreed on the following concerning Article 102 TEC (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/71):
OTHER PROVISIONS — ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY
88) In Article 102, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and paragraph 1 shall not be numbered;
***
The TFEU table of equivalences confirms that Article 102 TFEU (ToL) in the original Treaty of Lisbon was to be renumbered Article 124 TFEU in the consolidated version, under the title ‘Economic and monetary policy’ renumbered Title VIII (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/211─212).
***
Consolidated Lisbon Treaty
Article 124 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is found in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/99:
Part Three Union policies and internal actions
Title VIII Economic and monetary policy
Chapter 1 Economic policy
Article 124 TFEU
(ex Article 102 TEC)
Any measure, not based on prudential considerations, establishing privileged access by Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial institutions, shall be prohibited.
***
We notice, in addition to the express amendments mentioned above, that horizontal amendments have replaced ‘Community institutions or bodies’ by ‘Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies’.
Compared with Article III-182 of the Constitutional Treaty, Article 124 TFEU only lacks the words ‘or provision’. Otherwise it is identical, but the result was reached in a roundabout manner.
The following instalment is going to take a look at some comments concerning Article 124 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
We turn to the Treaty of Lisbon.
***
The current Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) was to become the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and generally the innovations as agreed in the 2004 IGC were to be inserted into the Treaty by way of specific modifications ‘in the usual manner’ (points 17 and 18, pages 6 and 7). As we remember, Article III-182 of the Constitutional Treaty contained a few small changes or ‘innovations’.
I found nothing specific in the mandate of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007 Mandate, Council document 11218/07, 26 June 2007) about Article 102 TEC.
***
In Article 2, point 88 of the original Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) the IGC 2007 agreed on the following concerning Article 102 TEC (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/71):
OTHER PROVISIONS — ECONOMIC AND MONETARY POLICY
88) In Article 102, paragraph 2 shall be deleted and paragraph 1 shall not be numbered;
***
The TFEU table of equivalences confirms that Article 102 TFEU (ToL) in the original Treaty of Lisbon was to be renumbered Article 124 TFEU in the consolidated version, under the title ‘Economic and monetary policy’ renumbered Title VIII (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/211─212).
***
Consolidated Lisbon Treaty
Article 124 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is found in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/99:
Part Three Union policies and internal actions
Title VIII Economic and monetary policy
Chapter 1 Economic policy
Article 124 TFEU
(ex Article 102 TEC)
Any measure, not based on prudential considerations, establishing privileged access by Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial institutions, shall be prohibited.
***
We notice, in addition to the express amendments mentioned above, that horizontal amendments have replaced ‘Community institutions or bodies’ by ‘Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies’.
Compared with Article III-182 of the Constitutional Treaty, Article 124 TFEU only lacks the words ‘or provision’. Otherwise it is identical, but the result was reached in a roundabout manner.
The following instalment is going to take a look at some comments concerning Article 124 TFEU.
Ralf Grahn
EU: Privileged access prohibited III
In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe the provisions on economic policy were located in Part III ‘The policies and functioning of the Union’, Title III ‘Internal policies and action’, Chapter II ‘Economic and monetary policy’, Section 1 ‘Economic policy’.
Article III-182 is found in OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/78:
Article III-182 Constitution
Any measure or provision, not based on prudential considerations, establishing privileged access by Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial institutions shall be prohibited.
***
We see that Article III-182 of the Constitutional Treaty added the word ‘offices’ to what became ‘Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies’. Otherwise the first paragraph is identical with the draft Constitution Article III-74(1).
The second paragraph we saw in the draft Constitution and the current Article 100 TEC was eliminated, but it reappears in the Constitution Article III-183(2).
***
The Swedish government memorandum ‘Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (Utrikesdepartemetet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2004:52, december 2004) described the signed Constitutional Treaty, but I found no comment on Article III-182 (or III-183).
***
No reference was found in the Swedish draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss ─ Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (2 June 2005).
***
The government of Finland laid out the Constitutional Treaty in its ratification bill ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan perustuslaista tehdyn sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 67/2006 vp). On page 183 Article III-182 was stated to be substantially the same as Article 102 TEC, with the exception that the legal basis for decisions specifying definitions had been moved to Article III-183:
”III-182 artikla, joka kieltää unionin ja jäsenvaltioiden elimiltä ja viranomaisilta erityisoikeudet rahalaitoksissa, vastaa SEY 102 artiklaa lukuun ottamatta sitä, että kyseisen artiklan oikeusperusta, jonka perusteella voidaan antaa artiklassa määrätyn kiellon soveltamiseksi tarvittavat määritelmät, on siirretty III-183 artiklaan.”
***
The same remark appears in Swedish in ’Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen (RP 67/2006 rd), page 187:
”Artikel III-182, som förbjuder en positiv särbehandling av unionens och medlemsstaternas institutioner, organ och myndigheter hos finansinstitut, motsvarar artikel 102 i EG-fördraget med undantag för att rättsgrunden för artikeln i fråga, med stöd av vilken bestämmelser får antas som anger hur förbuden i artikeln skall tillämpas, har överförts till artikel III-183.”
***
Klemens H. Fischer in ‘Der Europäische Verfassungsvertrag‘ (Nomos, Stämpfli & Manz, 2005), page 310, makes the observations that „Artikel III-182 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel 102 EGV“ and „Artikel III-182 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel III-74 VVE“.
Fischer then remarks „Die Regierungskonferenz strich Artikel III-74 Absatz 2 VVE. Diese Bestimmung hatte die konkrete Frist von Artikel 102 Absatz 2 EGV durch eine Ermächtigungsklausel ersätzt“, but he missed that the legal basis reappeared in the following Article.
***
Both the texts of the Articles and the (lack of) comments have shown that there was no essential change between the current TEC and the Constitutional Treaty.
The next instalment turns to the IGC 2007 and the Lisbon Treaty.
Ralf Grahn
Article III-182 is found in OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/78:
Article III-182 Constitution
Any measure or provision, not based on prudential considerations, establishing privileged access by Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial institutions shall be prohibited.
***
We see that Article III-182 of the Constitutional Treaty added the word ‘offices’ to what became ‘Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies’. Otherwise the first paragraph is identical with the draft Constitution Article III-74(1).
The second paragraph we saw in the draft Constitution and the current Article 100 TEC was eliminated, but it reappears in the Constitution Article III-183(2).
***
The Swedish government memorandum ‘Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (Utrikesdepartemetet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2004:52, december 2004) described the signed Constitutional Treaty, but I found no comment on Article III-182 (or III-183).
***
No reference was found in the Swedish draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss ─ Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa’ (2 June 2005).
***
The government of Finland laid out the Constitutional Treaty in its ratification bill ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan perustuslaista tehdyn sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 67/2006 vp). On page 183 Article III-182 was stated to be substantially the same as Article 102 TEC, with the exception that the legal basis for decisions specifying definitions had been moved to Article III-183:
”III-182 artikla, joka kieltää unionin ja jäsenvaltioiden elimiltä ja viranomaisilta erityisoikeudet rahalaitoksissa, vastaa SEY 102 artiklaa lukuun ottamatta sitä, että kyseisen artiklan oikeusperusta, jonka perusteella voidaan antaa artiklassa määrätyn kiellon soveltamiseksi tarvittavat määritelmät, on siirretty III-183 artiklaan.”
***
The same remark appears in Swedish in ’Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Fördraget om upprättande av en konstitution för Europa och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen (RP 67/2006 rd), page 187:
”Artikel III-182, som förbjuder en positiv särbehandling av unionens och medlemsstaternas institutioner, organ och myndigheter hos finansinstitut, motsvarar artikel 102 i EG-fördraget med undantag för att rättsgrunden för artikeln i fråga, med stöd av vilken bestämmelser får antas som anger hur förbuden i artikeln skall tillämpas, har överförts till artikel III-183.”
***
Klemens H. Fischer in ‘Der Europäische Verfassungsvertrag‘ (Nomos, Stämpfli & Manz, 2005), page 310, makes the observations that „Artikel III-182 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel 102 EGV“ and „Artikel III-182 EUVV korrespondiert mit Artikel III-74 VVE“.
Fischer then remarks „Die Regierungskonferenz strich Artikel III-74 Absatz 2 VVE. Diese Bestimmung hatte die konkrete Frist von Artikel 102 Absatz 2 EGV durch eine Ermächtigungsklausel ersätzt“, but he missed that the legal basis reappeared in the following Article.
***
Both the texts of the Articles and the (lack of) comments have shown that there was no essential change between the current TEC and the Constitutional Treaty.
The next instalment turns to the IGC 2007 and the Lisbon Treaty.
Ralf Grahn
EU: Privileged access prohibited II
Article III-74 of the draft Constitution, proposed by the European Convention, corresponds with Article 102 TEC, and it is located in Part III ‘The policies and functioning of the Union’, Title III ‘Internal policies and action’, Chapter II ‘Economic and monetary policy’, Section 1 ‘Economic policy’.
Article III-74 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/40:
Article III-74 Draft Constitution
1. Any measure or provision, not based on prudential considerations, establishing privileged access by Union institutions, bodies or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial institutions shall be prohibited.
2. The Council of Ministers, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt European regulations or decisions specifying definitions for the application of the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.
***
Paragraph 1 added ‘provision’ and ‘agencies’ and replaces ‘Community’ by ‘Union’.
Paragraph 2 eliminated the target date long since passed and rewrote the decision-making procedure.
***
The government of Sweden presented its views on the draft Constitution in ‘Europeiska konventet om EU:s framtid’ (Utrikesdepartementet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2003:58, 2003), but I found no reference to Article III-74.
***
Ahead of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2003─2004), the government of Sweden stated its positions on economic policy provisions, in ‘Europeiska konventet om EU:s framtid’ (Regeringens skrivelse 2003/04:13, den 2 oktober 2003), on pages 49─50, but I found no comment on Article III-74.
***
Étienne de Poncins presented the proposed text of Article III-74 of the draft Constitution in ‘Vers une Constitution européenne’ (Éditions 10/18, 2003), page 295, without comment.
***
In the following instalment we look at the prohibition of privileged access for public sector borrowers to financial institutions in the Constitutional Treaty.
Ralf Grahn
Article III-74 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/40:
Article III-74 Draft Constitution
1. Any measure or provision, not based on prudential considerations, establishing privileged access by Union institutions, bodies or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States to financial institutions shall be prohibited.
2. The Council of Ministers, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt European regulations or decisions specifying definitions for the application of the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament.
***
Paragraph 1 added ‘provision’ and ‘agencies’ and replaces ‘Community’ by ‘Union’.
Paragraph 2 eliminated the target date long since passed and rewrote the decision-making procedure.
***
The government of Sweden presented its views on the draft Constitution in ‘Europeiska konventet om EU:s framtid’ (Utrikesdepartementet, Departementsserien (Ds) 2003:58, 2003), but I found no reference to Article III-74.
***
Ahead of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2003─2004), the government of Sweden stated its positions on economic policy provisions, in ‘Europeiska konventet om EU:s framtid’ (Regeringens skrivelse 2003/04:13, den 2 oktober 2003), on pages 49─50, but I found no comment on Article III-74.
***
Étienne de Poncins presented the proposed text of Article III-74 of the draft Constitution in ‘Vers une Constitution européenne’ (Éditions 10/18, 2003), page 295, without comment.
***
In the following instalment we look at the prohibition of privileged access for public sector borrowers to financial institutions in the Constitutional Treaty.
Ralf Grahn
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