Lisbon 2009 referendum: Better than Nice

Today three million Irish voters decide if they want Ireland to participate fully in an improved European Union, or if they want the EU to stagnate.

If they approve the Lisbon Treaty by answering Yes, the enlarged European Union will be able to work a little bit better to promote the values and interests of its 500 million citizens. Openness, democratic scrutiny and EU action will improve to a degree, helping the union to tackle the great challenges of our times in a more coherent manner.

If the Irish answer No, the 26 national parliaments and governments who have approved the Treaty of Lisbon will see their hopes for a modernised EU dashed.

The immediate choice is between the Treaty of Lisbon and the Treaty of Nice.

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Implications

People are often afraid of change, but in this case the change option is the safer one:

We know the limits of the incremental amendments unanimously agreed between the EU member states. Under the Lisbon Treaty the policies would be made together, by all the member states and within the EU institutions (Council, European Parliament and Commission).

There are no choices free from implications.

We know less about how the pressures for change erupt, if the Treaty of Nice remains the foundation. In principle, a more effective and more democratic union could be envisioned, between a smaller number of member states.

Groups of member states might opt for enhanced cooperation under the old Treaty of Nice, which would establish new cores, still nominally within the EU framework.

Some member states might choose to initiate deeper cooperation outside the EU institutions, on an intergovernmental basis, with a lead role for a few big states, less parliamentary scrutiny and limited openness.

A reticent Ireland, but also positive smaller member states as well as EU citizens would be marginalised. Some big EU states would take the lead and the possible benefits would accrue unevenly across a European Union still in existence, but becoming more of an empty shell.

Do we have to study the implications of a No vote more closely?

I hope not, but if Ireland turns down the Lisbon Treaty, a period of soul-searching will begin, not only for Ireland, but for all the EU members. Then it will not be a question if the dog barks, but how it bites.



I have to admit that I am worried at the prospects.


Ralf Grahn

Joschka Fischer’s EU avant-garde

Germany’s former foreign minister Joschka Fischer presented his view on EU reform in his Zeit Online column ‘Vive l’Avant-Garde!’ (30 June 2008):

http://www.zeit.de/online/2008/27/joschka-fischer-europa

The surrounding world changes at Formula 1 speed, but the Europeans have decided on a snail’s pace through a compromise between Euroskeptics and pro-Europeans.

According to Fischer, the parallel progress of enlargement and deepening has worked only for enlargement. Europe will lose power to decide on its own fate in the world.

The pro-Europeans have to end the compromise with the Euroskeptics, regardless of if a new Irish referendum saves the Lisbon Treaty or not.

The only possibility is a European avant-garde, a group of EU countries willing and able to advance. The willing and able participate, but the others shall not block progress anymore.

The Lisbon Treaty would provide both civilian enhanced cooperation and military permanent structured cooperation, but if the Treaty of Lisbon fails, the pro-European governments and states need to establish an avant-garde group outside the treaties.

The negative consequence of this would be that the community institutions would not develop for a long time, for example in the foreign policy field.

Even if European unity is an important value, it cannot be upheld if the price is permanent immobility or even backward steps. In the middle term the Nice Treaty status quo is a bigger threat to European unity than an avant-garde group.

If the best solution is unavailable, you have to grasp the second best option. The avant-garde group should take on the areas of energy policy, economic and financial policy, foreign and security policy, as well as social policy.

New institutions cannot be created in this way, but the participating countries can better determine their positions with regard to the outside world and, like Schengen, create new structures for integration beyond the treaties.

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It worth noticing how silent the EU leaders and the EU institutions are on the hard choices facing Europe. Only free citizens seem to be able to contribute to the discussion with new facts and proposals.

Fischer’s analysis of Europe’s diminishing role in the world is compelling, as is his prescription that something has to be done to break the deadlock, with or without the Lisbon Treaty.

At least three of Fischer’s assumptions require special attention and deeper discussion:

1) The vast policy areas proposed by Fischer require effective action, but without decision-making rules to support decisive action, even a smaller group would become bogged down by the unanimity rule inherent to intergovernmental cooperation.

2) The relations between the core group policies and the regular Nice or Lisbon institutions’ decisions require careful thought. How would it play out? We would, for instance, have situations where a core group has a common position, but the EU does not.

3) Intergovernmental avant-garde groups outside the treaties or based on the Lisbon Treaty would do nothing to enhance the democratic legitimacy and accountability of their actions. Only democratic foundations can ultimately legitimise deeper integration, even if the commendable aim is to enhance the security and prosperity of EU citizens.

Should the integrationist countries realise that they need more than avant-garde groups? Should they finally accept that they need both effective institutions and democratic foundations, if they want to build a functioning Europe?


Ralf Grahn