Lisbon 2009 referendum: Better than Nice

Today three million Irish voters decide if they want Ireland to participate fully in an improved European Union, or if they want the EU to stagnate.

If they approve the Lisbon Treaty by answering Yes, the enlarged European Union will be able to work a little bit better to promote the values and interests of its 500 million citizens. Openness, democratic scrutiny and EU action will improve to a degree, helping the union to tackle the great challenges of our times in a more coherent manner.

If the Irish answer No, the 26 national parliaments and governments who have approved the Treaty of Lisbon will see their hopes for a modernised EU dashed.

The immediate choice is between the Treaty of Lisbon and the Treaty of Nice.

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Implications

People are often afraid of change, but in this case the change option is the safer one:

We know the limits of the incremental amendments unanimously agreed between the EU member states. Under the Lisbon Treaty the policies would be made together, by all the member states and within the EU institutions (Council, European Parliament and Commission).

There are no choices free from implications.

We know less about how the pressures for change erupt, if the Treaty of Nice remains the foundation. In principle, a more effective and more democratic union could be envisioned, between a smaller number of member states.

Groups of member states might opt for enhanced cooperation under the old Treaty of Nice, which would establish new cores, still nominally within the EU framework.

Some member states might choose to initiate deeper cooperation outside the EU institutions, on an intergovernmental basis, with a lead role for a few big states, less parliamentary scrutiny and limited openness.

A reticent Ireland, but also positive smaller member states as well as EU citizens would be marginalised. Some big EU states would take the lead and the possible benefits would accrue unevenly across a European Union still in existence, but becoming more of an empty shell.

Do we have to study the implications of a No vote more closely?

I hope not, but if Ireland turns down the Lisbon Treaty, a period of soul-searching will begin, not only for Ireland, but for all the EU members. Then it will not be a question if the dog barks, but how it bites.



I have to admit that I am worried at the prospects.


Ralf Grahn

Temporary EU Commission 2009?

According to the Article 214(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), the members of the Commission are appointed for a period of five years. (The term in office is renewable).

If the Treaty of Nice remains in force, the Commission which should take office from 1 November 2009 would normally be appointed for five years, until 31 October 2014.

However, if the Irish vote Yes in the Lisbon II referendum on 2 October 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon should enter into force, but we do not know if or for how long Czech President Vaclav Klaus might persist in his refusal to sign the ratification instrument.

Following an Irish Yes vote, the leaders of the EU member states may still have to initiate the appointment procedures for the next Commission under the Nice Treaty, without knowing when the Lisbon Treaty enters into force.

Article 17(4) of the amended Treaty on European Union (in the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty) states that “(t)he Commission appointed between the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and 31 October 2014, shall consist of one national of each Member State, including its President and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who shall be one of its Vice-Presidents”.


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The Lisbon Treaty seems to indicate that a new Commission is appointed from the day the treaty enters into force, and the new treaty replaces the old one.

After a Yes vote in Ireland, there would be no doubt about the democratic legitimacy of the Lisbon Treaty, despite eventual rearguard actions by President Vaclav Klaus and his fringe of supporters.

The "double-hatted" High Representative/Vice-President would have to be incorporated in his/her new capacity, despite a prior "26 + 1" solution under Nice.

This leads to the conclusion that the EU institutions should appoint the possible Nice Treaty Commission 2009 only until a new Commission can be appointed under the Treaty of Lisbon.


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We look forward to reasoned information from the Swedish Council Presidency.



Ralf Grahn

Irish EU Commissioner under the Nice Treaty

Aided and abetted by champions of parliamentary supremacy such as David Cameron and William Hague, President Vaclav Klaus defies the Czech parliament and government. His refusal compromises the EU’s Lisbon Treaty and the international credibility of the Czech Republic.

The Czech government together with the other member states of the European Union have promised Ireland and the rest of the members a Commissioner, if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force. The Irish voters hold the main key:

By voting Yes in the Lisbon II referendum, they assert their right to an Irish Commissioner.

President Klaus seems to want to weaken the Yes camp in Ireland, by refusing his long overdue signature on the Czech ratification instrument. If he succeeds by obstructing for another week and the Irish vote No, the Lisbon Treaty falls. Naturally, this is the preferred option for the anti-Europeans and the Europhobes.


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Yes, but ...

If Ireland joins its European partners by voting Yes on 2 October 2009, the problems caused by Vaclav Klaus are not completely over.

The European Union needs a new Commission, up and running, from 1 November 2009. If the Czechs are unable to sort out their constitutional mess, and President Klaus still refuses to budge, the European leaders are forced to look for alternative and perhaps temporary solutions, in order to put a new Commission in place, nearly in time. This is the burden of responsibility.

The European Council would have to initiate the appointment procedure under the existing Treaty of Nice.


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Nice Treaty Commission


Article 213 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) has been amended by the 2001 Protocol (No 10) on the enlargement of the European Union, as amended by the 2003 Act of Accession.

After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (2007), which brought the membership of the European Union to 27, Article 4(2) of the Protocol offers us the contents of the amended Article 213(1), currently in force:


“2. When the Union consists of 27 Member States, Article 213(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 126(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community shall be replaced by the following:

‘1. The Members of the Commission shall be chosen on the grounds of their general competence and their independence shall be beyond doubt.

The number of Members of the Commission shall be less than the number of Member States. The Members of the Commission shall be chosen according to a rotation system based on the principle of equality, the implementing arrangements for which shall be adopted by the Council, acting unanimously.

The number of Members of the Commission shall be set by the Council, acting unanimously.’.

This amendment shall apply as from the date on which the first Commission following the date of accession of the 27th Member State of the Union takes up its duties.


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Smaller Commission


The amended Treaty of Nice is unequivocal about the number of Commissioners: It must be less than the number of member states.

The intention of the member states was to agree on a rotation system, based on the principle of equality.

Article 4(3) of the Protocol offers us a view of how the member states wanted the rotation system to turn out:


“3. The Council, acting unanimously after signing the treaty of accession of the 27th Member State of the Union, shall adopt:

— the number of Members of the Commission,

— the implementing arrangements for a rotation system based on the principle of equality containing all the criteria and rules necessary for determining the composition of successive colleges automatically on the basis of the following principles:

(a) Member States shall be treated on a strictly equal footing as regards determination of the sequence of, and the time spent by, their nationals as Members of the Commission; consequently, the difference between the total number of terms of office held by nationals of any given pair of Member States may never be more than one;

(b) subject to point (a), each successive college shall be so composed as to reflect satisfactorily the demographic and geographical range of all the Member States of the Union.”


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How?


Before the Council nominates the members of the Commission, it needs to take the unanimous decision on the modalities.

Various news reports have indicated that the EU member states, once convinced of the need for an effective college of Commissioners, have taken fright at the prospect of ever losing “their” Commissioner. Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and EU Minister Cecilia Malmström have acknowledged the “stage-fright” of the member states.

The EU members seem to be heading for a solution, which reduces the Commission by just one member. The country of the High Representative would have no member of the Commission (but it is possible to arrange for him or her to attend the meetings of the Commission).

The “26 + 1” solution certainly flies in the face of the original purpose of the treaty provision, and it is hard to square with the wording about a rotation system and the modalities envisioned, but practically the same intentions and words are contained in the Lisbon Treaty, which the member states were ready to evade in order to help the Irish.

The difference is that there is no escape from some reduction under the (amended) Nice Treaty, whereas the Lisbon Treaty offers the European Council the possibility to alter the number by a unanimous decision.

The Council and Commission legal services must have found sufficient interpretations in favour of this minimalist solution for the member states to discuss it earnestly, but I would not bet my life on the outcome in case of a legal challenge to an act by such a Commission.

I hope that the Swedish Council Presidency, if it has to manage such a minimalist solution, offers the public not only the bare bones decision, but the legal reasoning behind it, preferably beforehand to allow for public discussion.


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Irish Commissioner?

Apart from my lingering doubts about the legality of the “26 + 1” Commission under the Treaty of Nice, does this option have implications for Ireland and the Lisbon II referendum?

Between the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and 31 October 2014, the Commission shall consist of one national of each member state (including the President and the High Representative/Vice-President), so the guarantee to Ireland would take practical effect from 1 November 2014.

Until then, both the Lisbon Treaty and the possible “26 + 1” decision would (practically) safeguard a member of the Commission from each member state. (Cf. Article 17(4) and (5) TEU in the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty.)

From 2014 the situation might be different. For the “Irish guarantee” to be meaningful, it has to be intended to cover the situation from 1 November 2014. Under the Treaty of Nice, it is hard to imagine that the member states agree on anything but a stopgap measure to avoid institutional deadlock.

It is difficult to predict if the member states return to their original aim to ensure a more cohesive Commission. If enlargement of the European Union is allowed to continue (a big if under the Nice Treaty), the “26 + 1” solution would in effect turn into a “n – 1” formula (with n representing the number of member states, if each new member gets a Commissioner.

By each accession the Commission would then become even more like an assembly, instead of an executive body. By 2014 the member states may well be frustrated enough to take the leap.


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Anti-Europeans and Europhobes have been quick to trumpet the “meaningless” guarantee in order to weaken the Yes vote.

But – again – have they done their homework?

The Lisbon Treaty is a safer bet for an Irish Commissioner beyond 2014 (and possibly even in 2009).



Ralf Grahn

Irish EU Commissioner under the Lisbon Treaty

If the EU Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, the heads of state or government of the member states have promised Ireland (and their own countries) that each member retains a Commissioner.

The European Council on 18 to 19 June 2009 issued the following (re)statement about the size of the Commission (Presidency Conclusions, point 2; Council document 11225/2/09 REV 2):



“Having carefully noted the concerns of the Irish people as set out by the Taoiseach, the European Council, at its meeting of 11-12 December 2008, agreed that, provided the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, a decision would be taken, in accordance with the necessary legal procedures, to the effect that the Commission shall continue to include one national of each Member State.”


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Lisbon II referendum

In principle, this means that there will continue to be an Irish member of the Commission 2009 and 2014, instead of a smaller Commission under the Treaty of Nice from 2009.

If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, there will be a national from each member state in 2009, but the appointment procedure will change. (In 2014 there would be a smaller Commission, without the promise to Ireland. Cf. amended Article 17(4) and (5) TEU.)

The European Council made the promise to Ireland in good faith in June: The parliaments of all the other member states had approved the Lisbon Treaty. Normally, the completion of formal ratification of international treaties causes no problems in constitutionally sound democracies.

After the 30 June ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have passed new enabling legislation, and on 22 September the Court has dismissed an appeal against the new legislation. Federal President Horst Köhler has signed the new enabling legislation, which will enter into force today. Tomorrow Köhler will sign the ratification instrument.

Polish President Lech Kaczynski has been politicking by refusing to sign the ratification instrument, but he has given the European leaders assurances that he will, if Germany ratifies and the Irish vote Yes in the Lisbon II referendum. Even Poland will not necessarily delay the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty beyond the date for Irish ratification, if Kaczynski acts promptly.

If all the formal ratifications take place within October, the Treaty of Lisbon would enter into force on 1 November 2009.

The new Commission should start its work the same day, but even in the best case a short delay is foreseeable.

Although the next President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, has been approved by the European Parliament, shifting to the Lisbon Treaty, the list of members has to be adopted by the Council by common accord with the President-elect. The European Parliament will hear the proposed Commissioners, before it gives its vote of consent to the Commission as a body, including the “double-hatted” High Representative.

In practice this means that the European Council would have to appoint both the new High Representative/Vice-President and the new President of the European Council before the proposal to the European Parliament.

If the European leaders remember their and the Lisbon Treaty’s words about “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen”, their nominations, proposals and decisions must leave ample time for the European Parliament and EU citizens, ahead of the final decisions.


After consent by the European Parliament, the Commission is then appointed by the European Council acting by a qualified majority (amended Article 17(7) TEU).

Naturally, the EU institutions and the member states want the new Commission in place as soon as possible, but time is running short.


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Czech sabotage

The European Union needs working institutions. A short “extra time” for the caretaker Commission, which has been hobbling on its last legs for quite a while, may be unavoidable. But a prolonged period of uncertainty is hardly acceptable.

The Czech Government, the Czech Parliament, the EU institutions and the member states are now held hostage by President Vaclav Klaus, who has refused to sign the ratification instrument and seems to thrive on damaging the reputation of his country, with the implicit support of David Cameron and William Hague.

If the Czech constitutional system (Government, Parliament, Constitutional Court) is unwilling or unable to sort out the deliberate sabotage of one state organ – the President – in short order, the Swedish Presidency of the EU Council seems to be heading for an unenviable task.

Are the Czech institutions unable to give any intelligent answers? Are they devoid of constructive solutions? Are Czech citizens content to see their President making a fool of their parliamentary democracy? Are the European leaders paralysed?

It is still possible that the Lisbon Treaty enters into force at a later date, which guarantees an Irish Commissioner, but there is a clear risk that the EU member states have to appoint a smaller Commission under the (amended) Treaty of Nice.

This gives rise to legal, political and practical problems. Are we going to have two Commissions before 31 October 2014, because of Vaclav Klaus?

The Swedish Council Presidency and the EU institutions have an obligation to keep the EU’s citizens informed about the options and their consequences, every step of the way.



Ralf Grahn

Shrinking the Commission?

EurActiv reported that Germany will opt for a 12 to 18 member Commission, if the Treaty of Nice remains in force, implying the “problem countries” would not be represented in the college. See: Ireland to re-vote to weigh on new Commission’s appointment (15 June 2009).




“Ominous noises”

On The European Citizen blog, Eurocentric noted the EurActiv article with the question about the size of the Commission: The Irish (Provisional) Guarantees (16 June 2009):



“The most important part of the guarantee will be that of one commissioner per member state, as the other guarantees really just restate and clarify the situation under the Lisbon Treaty. There have been some ominous noises out of Germany that it could push for a drastically reduced Commission if the Lisbon Treaty isn't passed - from 27 to between 12 and 18 commissioners. Under the Nice Treaty the number of commissioners must be reduced for the next Commission to be lower than that of the number of member states.”


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Name speculation

On the other hand, some information and speculation is emerging with regard to possible names to fill Commissioners’ jobs.

Jon Worth’s Euroblog has collected a number of comments with information about possible proposals from the member states and interested citizens: Think European Commission (since 15 June 2009).

/

EurActiv: Poland kicks off race for EU commissioner jobs (17 June 2009)



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Problem

A new Commission is needed after 31 October 2009, and a number of posts have to be filled. What we do not know, at this stage, is the applicable treaty, procedure and number of Commissioners.

If the European Council is prepared to play with open cards, it should publicly agree on two alternative scenarios, one for the Treaty of Nice and another for the Lisbon Treaty, before the discussion starts in earnest.


Ralf Grahn

European Union: What to do with Britain?

In the short term there are two problems of strategic importance with regard to the European Union itself. In the case of Britain, they are intertwined.

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After tying the knot with ultra-conservative homophobes and other Europhobes, David Cameron and William Hague have continued their quest to cut a United Kingdom under a Conservative government even further adrift from Europe.

The latest demonstration is their


B I L L

TO Make provision for a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon signed at Lisbon on 13 December 2007 for the suspension of the European Union (Amendment) Act 2008 until the result of that referendum; and for its repeal if the Treaty is not approved in the referendum.


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The reader is reminded of the fact that the United Kingdom has already completed formal ratification of the EU Treaty of Lisbon, after approval by both Houses of Parliament.

The Lisbon Treaty has been approved by the parliaments in 26 out of 27 member states. Ireland has announced a referendum on the “better deal”.


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Britain’s options

If the next general election brings in a Conservative government, the suspension and rejection of approval would either

a) frustrate the treaty reform process of the EU member states since 2000, leaving the European Union with the unsatisfactory Treaty of Nice (minus further UK repatriation of common policies), in case the Lisbon Treaty has not entered into force; or

b) lay the foundations for substantial renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with Europe, if the Lisbon Treaty is already in force.


The problem with the Conservatives’ attitude is that they seemingly want to eat the cake and have it too.

The straightforward policy would be to make a decision for or against withdrawal, with or without a referendum (in the country of “parliamentary sovereignty”).

If the United Kingdom wants to secede from the European Union, nobody will stop them. It would require detailed negotiations to deconstruct the manifold relationships, and to erect new structures, but it’s up to the British to start the negotiations.

However, it looks as if the Tories want even less responsibilities and show no team spirit, but wish to stay on the inside, in order to block progress between the EU member states.

Under the Nice Treaty their goals would be more limited, but if the Lisbon Treaty is in force, it is the foundation of the European Union, which means that a rejection would be tantamount to secession.

Cameron has announced that the following (long term) budget negotiations will give the United Kingdom needed leverage to ram through its demands. Veto power is generally the weapon of the rejectionists and obstructionists.

The political, media and popular discourse on Europe is such that secession would be a natural solution for Britain. The European Union would count its losses and go on with life, and the UK would search for its own role in world affairs and commercial relations.

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What to do with Britain?

The insular British discussion tends to forget that their moods and actions have consequences for others.

The ability to take an outside view seems to be an even more scarce commodity in contemporary Britain than a tolerably accurate picture of what the EU is and isn’t.

The twofold strategy of the Conservatives will make Britain one of the main strategic short term headaches for the European Union (the other one is the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty).

In about a year’s time, the new Conservative government is going to demand a renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with Europe, smaller changes under the Nice Treaty or larger under the Lisbon Treaty.

(The Lisbon Treaty would either have crashed, or the UK would repudiate major parts of it.)

It is easy to imagine the annoyance felt by European leaders in both cases.

Their timid and consensual treaty reforms would come to nought, or at least provide the UK with even greater exceptions from common rules, while being able to halt progress almost at will.

Cameron has already promised to hold the next long term budget hostage to his demands (naturally shrinking the relative size of the EU budget and keeping the UK rebate at the same time).


With regard to the Lisbon Treaty, the political leaders can mainly watch things unfold in the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland and Poland, so they are more or less reduced to passive bystanders.

But renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s membership terms requires treaty amendments. Here the national leaders have a real choice. This is actually one of the few instances, when veto powers favour a constructive policy.

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Britain may feel that it has a problem with Europe, but Britain can cause a disproportionate amount of harm to Europe as a whole.

It is already clear, where a road paved with concessions would lead the EU’s member states and the European Union. Paralysis, palsy, impotence, immobility and erosion of team spirit offer a hint.

When approached, the member states should politely tell David Cameron and William Hague where to find the door. If the other EU leaders are quick about it, they might be able to agree on the next long term budget in a less poisoned atmosphere than promised by Cameron.


Ralf Grahn

European elections: Libertas by bumpkins for dupes?

Only some 26 days remain before the first polling stations open in the European elections, and we see that the new contender Libertas has stepped up its increasingly shrill campaign against the Lisbon Treaty, now approved by the parliaments of 26 EU member states.

Let us turn to the policies Libertas offers voters for the following five year term of the European Parliament.

It is getting late in the European election campaign, but we are still offered the same text on the Policies page: The Libertas programme for a better Europe will be published on this site in the coming weeks.

That should be enough to disqualifiy Libertas from pretending to be a serious challenger to the existing EU order.

But we have pledged to study the so called core principles on which Libertas’ case rests.

The fifth and final one tells us:

“A lean EU: Cut the number of meetings in Brussels by 50 % in 2010.”


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You’re kidding?

You don’t need much sophistication to know that the European Union is a complex structure. The briefest ABC book on the EU tells you that much.

If you splash millions on creating a new political force intent on representing EU citizens in the European Parliament, you can be expected to familiar with at least the basics.

If you really want to cut the number of meetings and create a lean European Union, you have to give the union a simpler design.

This is not going to happen in 2010, although ideas concerning the future would be most welcome.

Even if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force, it is only going to improve the functioning of the European Union in an incremental way, without simplifying the basic structure.

If you campaign against the Lisbon Treaty, you work to preserve the current Treaty of Nice. It is hard to be more anti-lean than that.

Demanding Formula 1 performance from a horse cart is a joke. Elevating this slogan to the status of core principle reveals the paucity of knowledge and ideas.

This opens up two possible interpretations: Either you are (perhaps in good faith) ignorant bumpkins, or you are cynical enough to know full well what you are doing, assuming that your potential voters are gullible dupes, ready to be taken for a ride.

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Where are the details?

Libertas offers no clues as to which 50 per cent of meetings in Brussels should be scrapped next year.

Since no serious treatment of their proposal is possible, let us play along with their joke or scam.

Only meetings in Brussels are targeted. This could mean that the European Parliament is free to continue its hated monthly sessions in Strasbourg. Libertas has conjured up a mythical “Brussels” of axis of evil proportions, so perhaps the EP would have to sacrifice its convenient mini-sessions in Brussels to fill its part of the quota.

I am at a loss to propose which meetings the part executive and civil service of the EU, the Commission, should cancel. It is hard to prepare, to manage and to coordinate public bodies without meetings, even if they consume time and resources. I have to leave it at this: If Libertas has a working solution, I am sure that every government on earth will be queueing up to hear it.

Most of the “behind closed doors” dealings Libertas is foaming about take place within the Council structures, where the representatives of the member states meet and where the national administrations send committee members to steer the Commission.

If Libertas wants to undo the iron grip of the member states on the running of the European Union, it should say so. What I am fairly sure of is that such a reform is incompatible with a quest to maintain the current Treaty of Nice.

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Without serious proposals, Libertas idea is mush. Elevating the reduction of meetings to a core principle only tells us where the rot is.

Cynicism or stupidity, it’s your choice.


Ralf Grahn

EU reform without the Lisbon Treaty? Justice and Home Affairs

What if the Treaty of Nice remains the foundation of the European Union in the foreseeable future? Can reforms of the Lisbon Treaty be salvaged on the basis of the existing treaties?

Professor Steve Peers has written a new Statewatch Analysis on one of the important fields of the amending treaty, the area of freedom, security and justice as it is known in EU parlance, but with the British more accustomed to call it justice and home affairs (JHA).

‘Changing the institutional framework for EU Justice and Home Affairs law without the Lisbon Treaty’ (July 2008; 9 pages) looks at the possibilities to amend the existing treaty rules on JHA decision-making rules and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, without a fully-fledged amendment to the treaties:

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jul/sw-analysis-jha-transfer-july-2008.pdf

Peers concludes that the member states – acting unanimously – could achieve similar, but not identical results as under the Treaty of Lisbon through the existing ‘passerelle’ or enabling clauses.

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Peers has made a valuable contribution to the understanding of the Treaty of Lisbon through a number of Statewatch Analyses covering both treaties, available at the Statewatch Observatory on the EU Constitution-Reform-Lisbon Treaty.

Readers interested in justice and home affairs law are advised to look at ‘Analysis no 1.3: JHA provisions’ concerning the general framework.

If relevant to the reader, ‘Analysis no 4: British and Irish opt-outs from EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law’ sorts out the complications.

Peers has described the general possibilities to ratify the Lisbon Treaty after the Irish rejection, or at least to implement the reforms in practice, in ‘Can the Treaty of Lisbon be ratified or implemented? A legal analysis’ (19 June 2008).

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Individual JHA Articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) have also been compared with the current treaty provisions, the draft Constitution and the Constitution in posts on this blog, with references to additional sources.


Ralf Grahn

Lisbon Treaty: If conciliation fails

The striking thing about the interview with Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, as reported in my 28 June 2008 blog post ‘EU: Unable to make decisions’, was his conciliatory tone. The Irish should not be bullied. Failing ratification, negotiations are needed to solve the crisis for both Ireland and the European Union.

But there is always the risk of failure. Different alternatives need careful thought. Financial Times columnist Wolfgang Münchau has been looking at various scenarios in his articles, with the latest addition ‘The options for a Europe without a script’, published 29 June 2008 on FT.com:

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f24b5eda-45eb-11dd-9009-0000779fd2ac.html

It is natural that political leaders are loath to discuss unpleasant truths as long as there is some hope of avoiding trouble, but it is necessary that free-thinking spirits offer the public realistic options.

According to Münchau we are not at breakdown point yet, but we have to consider the possibility that the Irish may not ratify the Lisbon Treaty in the end.

To continue with the Nice Treaty is out of the question, so Münchau supposes that the ratifiers find a way to enforce the Lisbon Treaty without some. He mentions the options of offering the non-ratifiers a chance to quit, various forms of intensified cooperation among integrationist countries and a regrouping under a new organisation.

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If negotiations fail, Europe faces the stark choice between immobility and action by a narrower membership. Here I agree with Münchau.

But a more effective union would further lessen the democratic legitimacy and accountability of the European project and harden the popular resistance, if not coupled with profound democratic reform. It is time for the European leaders to face up to the democratic requirements of the 21st century.

Europe cannot preach to the world what it doesn’t practice itself.


Ralf Grahn