Lisbon Treaty ratification count 24 states and 471 million

Both Houses of Parliament in Italy (population 59.1 million) have now unanimously approved the EU Treaty of Lisbon. This means that the parliamentary ratification stage is concluded in 24 member states, which account for 471.4 million Europeans (about 95 per cent of the total EU population of 495.1 million).

The group of slow, undecided or negative member states has now shrunk to three out of 27, with the following population numbers (millions):


The Czech Republic 10.3

Sweden 9.1

---

Ireland 4.3




Ralf Grahn

Italian Chamber of Deputies approved Lisbon Treaty

Today the Italian Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei deputati) unanimously voted to approve the EU Treaty of Lisbon:

“Seguito della discussione del disegno di legge:

S. 759 - Ratifica ed esecuzione del Trattato di Lisbona che modifica il Trattato sull’Unione europea e il Trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea e alcuni atti connessi, con atto finale, protocolli e dichiarazioni, fatto a Lisbona il 13 dicembre 2007 (Approvato dal Senato). (1519)”

Source: www.camera.it

The Italian Senate (Senato della Repubblica) earlier voted unanimously for approval, 286 against 0.

The Deputies’ vote concludes the parliamentary stage of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in Italy.


Ralf Grahn

Unelected Lords support unelected Brussels bureaucrats

During the last weeks there have been lively exchanges on this blog about the reasons for the European Union and its future nature. I want to thank the commentators for many valuable remarks from various viewpoints.

Time to glance at the European as it is, for a change.

Let us now present an outside contribution with regard to European Union legislation, one of the main areas of EU activity. Specifically, it looks at the process to initiate EU legislation.

The European Union Committee of the UK House of Lords has published a report ‘Initiation of EU Legislation – Report with Evidence’ (22nd Report of Session 2007–08, published 24 July 2008, HL Paper 150), available at:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/150/150.pdf

The 216 page report continues the tradition of thematic analysis not only of British interest, but generally within the European Union, by the Committee. At the centre, naturally, is the European Commission’s right of legislative initiative concerning Community law, with the Lords largely supportive of the monopoly of initiative of the Commission within the present institutional set-up.

Ergo, the headline of this blog post is true.


Ralf Grahn

Italian Senate approved Lisbon Treaty

Wednesday evening the Italian Senate (Senato della Repubblica) debated the government bill on ratification of the EU Lisbon Treaty:

“2. Ratifica ed esecuzione del Trattato di Lisbona che modifica il Trattato sull'Unione europea e il Trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea e alcuni atti connessi, con atto finale, protocolli e dichiarazioni, fatto a Lisbona il 13 dicembre 2007 - Relatore DINI (759)”

The Senate voted unanimously for approval (286) against 0.

Source: Mercoledì 23 luglio 2008, Ratifiaca del Trattato di Lisbona : via libera all’unanimità
http://www.senato.it/notizie/index.htm

The Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei deputati) still has to vote on the Lisbon Treaty.


Ralf Grahn

European elections 2009: Investing in Libertas?

NDN has now posted a transcript of Declan Ganley’s appearance 17 July 2008. NDN describes itself as a (Democratic) ‘progressive think tank and advocacy organization’, and the transcript called ‘Conversation on the Future of Europe with Declan Ganley’ can be accessed here:

http://www.ndn.org/transcripts/071708.html

Although Ganley has later floated the idea to launch 400 Libertas candidates in the European elections 2009, this is the latest comprehensive information we have about his ideas for the future of Europe.

Dear reader, I ask you to read and reflect.

Is this a credible outline for a programme aiming to raise 75 million British pounds in campaign contributions, mobilise 400 candidates to vie for support and millions of voters to cast their ballots?

While I am trying to digest the contents, I would be happy to read your comments on how you perceive the message of Ganley and Libertas with a view to the next five year legislative mandate of the European Parliament, starting with the June 2009 elections.


Ralf Grahn


Update 23 July 2008: There is now a video available on the NDN web site with Declan Ganley's presentation: http://www.ndn.org/

Update II, 23 July 2008: There is now a new item on Libertas' web site 'Ganley tells Sarkozy that the Lisbon Treaty is dead: http://www.libertas.org/content/view/308/1/

EU: Invest 75 million pounds in the Nice Treaty!

Declan Ganley seems to be planning to field more than 400 candidates in the June 2009 European elections. He is starting to raise £75 million from online donations to run candidates for the European Parliament throughout the European Union.

See the Telegraph article by Tim Shipman “Irish ‘No’ vote architect plans Europe-wide ‘referendum’ on Lisbon Treaty” (20 July 2008):

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ireland/2308990/Irish-%27No%27-vote-architect-plans-Europe-wide-%27referendum%27-on-Lisbon-Treaty.html

According to the article, the message will be to give people a referendum with a chance to say ‘no’ to the Lisbon Treaty. Ganley hopes to win more than 80 seats in the European Parliament, creating a Europe-wide voting bloc with a strong mandate to block passage of the treaty.

***

At this point in time, Shipman’s interview seems to be closest thing we have to a prospectus for the initial public offering of the Libertas European level party.

Let us take a closer look at what we can surmise of the offer from the viewpoint of potential donors, candidates and voters.

Given my modest circumstances, 75 million British pounds looks like a hefty investment even for a good cause.

The only message of the Libertas party seems to be an opportunity to vote ‘no’ to the Lisbon Treaty.

Consequently, 75 million pounds could lead to a protest vote, just possibly massive enough to save the Nice Treaty for the foreseeable future. A lot of money to remain stuck where we already are.

Given the simplicity of the message, the already proven capacity to market forceful simplifications in one test market and popular disillusionment with the EU project, we cannot exclude the possibility of some electoral success.

We could end up with a number of anti-Lisbon MEPs in the next European Parliament, possibly enough toform a new parliamentary group (according to the new rules).

Before the five year mandate comes to a close, at least part of the voters would have realised that the European Parliament has no voice in treaty change. Even if this can be seen as undemocratic, amending the EU treaties is in the hands of the member states’ governments and ultimately parliaments. The European Parliament is only consulted on calling an intergovernmental conference.

Even if a successful electoral campaign could be launched on a protest against the Lisbon Treaty, the Europarliamentarians are in fact elected to act as co-legislators for five years. What would the Libertas MEPs do during their mandate?

There is no programme, as far as we know, and if the campaign is solely about protesting against the Lisbon Treaty, we cannot be sure that there is going to be any platform of substance before the elections.

Still, as elected representatives, Libertas’ MEPs would be supposed to vote on all ‘Community pillar’ questions within the European Parliament’s powers.

Donors would not know what they invest in.

Candidates would be unaware of what they stake their reputation on.

Voters would be clueless as to the future policies beyond the initial protest.

***

How about this as a return on investment?

***

Democracy, legitimacy and accountability are key demands on any political group, especially one campaigning on these issues.

More – much more – is needed if Libertas wants to become a credible EU level political party.


Ralf Grahn

Declan Ganley still short on specifics

The Sunday Tribune runs a story ”Ganley slams Sarkozy’s ‘arrogance’”:

http://www.tribune.ie/article/2008/jul/20/ganley-slams-sarkozys-arrogance/

The report is long on comment about the three minutes allotted to each of the sixteen organisations invited to the French Embassy to meet with president Nicolas Sarkozy.

According to the story, Declan Ganley would support a new European constitution “that is built on democracy, is legible and runs to no more than 20 to 25 pages that everyone can read”.

Ganley would insist on a reference to Europe’s Christian roots, but there are no other clarifications as to the required contents of this Constitution.


Ralf Grahn

EU reform without the Lisbon Treaty? Justice and Home Affairs

What if the Treaty of Nice remains the foundation of the European Union in the foreseeable future? Can reforms of the Lisbon Treaty be salvaged on the basis of the existing treaties?

Professor Steve Peers has written a new Statewatch Analysis on one of the important fields of the amending treaty, the area of freedom, security and justice as it is known in EU parlance, but with the British more accustomed to call it justice and home affairs (JHA).

‘Changing the institutional framework for EU Justice and Home Affairs law without the Lisbon Treaty’ (July 2008; 9 pages) looks at the possibilities to amend the existing treaty rules on JHA decision-making rules and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, without a fully-fledged amendment to the treaties:

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jul/sw-analysis-jha-transfer-july-2008.pdf

Peers concludes that the member states – acting unanimously – could achieve similar, but not identical results as under the Treaty of Lisbon through the existing ‘passerelle’ or enabling clauses.

***

Peers has made a valuable contribution to the understanding of the Treaty of Lisbon through a number of Statewatch Analyses covering both treaties, available at the Statewatch Observatory on the EU Constitution-Reform-Lisbon Treaty.

Readers interested in justice and home affairs law are advised to look at ‘Analysis no 1.3: JHA provisions’ concerning the general framework.

If relevant to the reader, ‘Analysis no 4: British and Irish opt-outs from EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law’ sorts out the complications.

Peers has described the general possibilities to ratify the Lisbon Treaty after the Irish rejection, or at least to implement the reforms in practice, in ‘Can the Treaty of Lisbon be ratified or implemented? A legal analysis’ (19 June 2008).

***

Individual JHA Articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) have also been compared with the current treaty provisions, the draft Constitution and the Constitution in posts on this blog, with references to additional sources.


Ralf Grahn

Will the real Mr Ganley please stand up?

If you try to describe the messages of Declan Ganley of the Libertas Institute in US American terms, you would end up with two different versions.

Before the Irish referendum to reject the EU Lisbon Treaty, Mr Ganley sounded like the Anti-Federalists or the secessionist Confederate States.

One month later, at the Heritage Foundation in the USA, Mr Ganley resembled Madison, Hamilton and Jay in the Federalist Papers or Abraham Lincoln in face of the rebellion.

***

There is finally an update on Libertas’ home page ‘Libertas accepts invitation to meet Sarkozy’ (18 July 2008):

http://www.libertas.org/

The message seems to straddle these contradictory positions.

On the one hand: Declan Ganley is offended by the prospect of Ireland having to vote again. Sarkozy has a democratic responsibility to respect the will of the Irish people. The Lisbon Treaty is dead. He will be asking Sarkozy to accept that the Irish people have rejected the Lisbon Treaty.

On the other hand: Declan Ganley wants Europe to be strong, prosperous and democratically legitimate.

***

With the post ending with the statement that Libertas will not participate in any debate on the Lisbon Treaty, Libertas leaves everything hanging in the air.

More – much more – is needed on how to bridge the gap.

What does a strong, prosperous and democratically legitimate Europe look like?

How is it going to be accomplished?

How is Libertas going to contribute?

Where is Ganley’s blueprint?

***

It is time for the real Mr Ganley to stand up.


Ralf Grahn

European Union: Danish opt-outs

The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) recently published a report ’De danske forbehold over den Europæiske Union: Udviklingen siden 2000’ (The Danish Opt Outs from the European Union: developments since 2000). Today the downloadable report has been published in book form, but for most international readers there is a handy four page executive summary in English:

http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Books2008/EU_udredningen_08/Preversion/EU08_Executive_Summary%28en%29.pdf

As an appetizer I quote from the summary:

“Since 1993, Denmark has had four opt-outs covering defence policy, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Union citizenship, and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The opt-out for Union citizenship has no practical significance today, but in the three other areas the consequences now are considerably greater than they were in 2000. The Lisbon Treaty will further increase the significance of the Danish opt-outs, especially in relation to JHA.”

***

The report, commissioned by the Danish Parliament (Folketinget), has the following background:

Prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s government has planned to let the Danes vote on the abolishment of at least some of the opt-outs, seen as more of an obstacle than a help to Denmark.

But the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty has lead to the postponement of these plans.

See, for instance Information.dk ‘Irsk nej truer afskaffelse af danske forbehold’ (Irish no delays abolishing Danish opt-outs), 14 June 2008:

http://www.information.dk/160827


Ralf Grahn

EU Lisbon Treaty: The incredible Mr Ganley

Do you remember the Libertas ‘no’ campaign spearheaded by Declan Ganley? Can you still recall the main reasons they put forward to vote ‘no’ on the Lisbon Treaty in the Irish referendum?

Here is their ‘8 reasons to Vote No to Lisbon’ (with, in my view, distortive and manipulative reasons added):

1. Creates an unelected President and a Foreign Minister of Europe
2. Halves Ireland’s voting weight while doubling Germany’s
3. Abolishes Ireland’s Commissioner for five years at a time
4. Opens the door to interference in tax and other key economic interests
5. Hands over power in 60 areas of decision making to Brussels
6. Gives exclusive competence to Brussels over International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
7. Enshrines EU law as superior to Irish law
8. The Treaty can be changed without another referendum

Incidentally, the latest on Libertas’ web site is still their thank you note from 17 June 2008. The eight reasons are accessible here:

http://www.libertas.org/content/view/293/139/

***

Compare this with Declan Ganley’s appearance at the US Heritage Foundation, where he is introduced as a modern-day freedom fighter.

Yes, the Heritage Foundation, where the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom has been on a long crusade to drive a wedge between the US administration and its European allies.

What did Declan Ganley tell his hosts on 15 July 2008? Hardly anything to please his anti-European hostess:

Ireland and he are no Eurosceptics, but pro-European.
We need a strong and prosperous Europe.
The fundamental point of the ‘no’ campaign was democracy.
The European leaders have to offer Europe’s citizens democratic accountability and legitimacy.
The have to sell the vision of a democratic Europe to the people in order to succeed with the people.
Europe needs a 20 to 25 page Constitution, which can be read and understood by a 15 year old.
The Constitution has to be approved by the people.
If not, the politicians have to go back to the drawing-board.
A second referendum in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty would result in a bigger ‘no’.

You can look up the hour long event on the Heritage Foundation’s web site:

http://www.heritage.org/

***

Which Declan Ganley are we supposed to believe? The one spreading nationalistic fears before the referendum? The apostle of European level democracy and a strong Europe after the plebiscite?


Ralf Grahn

Lisbon Treaty: Sarkozy accused

The Irish ’no’ side has hurled accusations at the current president of the European Council, France’s Nicoalas Sarkozy, for suggesting a second referendum in Ireland on the EU Treaty of Lisbon, ahead of his discussions with the Irish government 21 July 2008.

Criticism against bullying, a more resounding ‘no’ victory next time, as well as national or pan-European ‘no’ campaigns at the European elections 2009 have been aired by different activists.

Without constructive proposals, these opinions would lead to the Treaty of Nice remaining the crowning achievement of European integration.

The common objective of the campaigners seems to be to harden resistance against any constructive solution for Europe.

The supposedly pro-European Irish have baffled not only European opinion, as recorded by The Irish Times ‘Lisbon vote baffles US, says Bruton’ (17 July 2008):

http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2008/0717/1216073186168.html

***

A number of Irish government ministers have only been able to say that they need time to think about solutions.

Not a great help, this far.

***

Legally, the European Union is based on the Nice Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty requires the ratification of all 27 member states, as it now stands.

Still, it is highly simplistic to say that the Lisbon Treaty is dead, period.

It would be foolish to disregard the political dynamics behind almost a decade of EU treaty reform exertions.

All the member states’ governments have signed up to the Treaty of Lisbon, and more than four out of five of the national parliaments have approved the amending treaty. The ratification processes have continued, with only three parliamentary ratifications missing.

***

If neither ‘no’ campaigners nor the government in Ireland are willing or able to formulate solutions, what should the rest of Europe do?

President Sarkozy has the unwelcome duty to look for ways to solve the problems.

In spite of abuse from opponents, a second referendum leading to a ‘yes’ vote, is legally possible within the constraints of the Lisbon Treaty. Supposing that all the other member states ratify, this would preserve the unity of the European Union. Sarkozy is almost duty bound to ask if this is the first option of the Irish government.

(Personally, I doubt the wisdom of putting the same question to a second vote in Ireland.)

Sooner or later the Irish government has to decide.

Is there going to be a new plebiscite?

Are there Irish concerns which can be accommodated within the parameters of the Lisbon Treaty?

What happens if a second referendum leads to a new ‘no’ vote?

How is Ireland going to act in case of a new ‘no’ victory, or if no second referendum is arranged?

Is Ireland going to look for a solution, which allows the ratifying states to move along?

Is Ireland going to fight to the end to fetter the rest of Europe to the Nice Treaty?

***

In each case, the other EU member states have to decide what they want and what it takes to achieve it.

But first they need answers from Ireland. Dallying is no help.


Ralf Grahn

European Union: Economic policy

Certain basic principles of economic policy emerge between the member states and the European Union, when we look at the EU treaties.

We advance from the current Treaty establishing the European Community to the Treaty of Lisbon.


***

Article 98 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) is found in the latest consolidated version of the current treaties, published in the Official Journal of the European Union 29.12.2006 C 321 E/82:

Part Three – Community policies

Title VII – Economic and monetary policy

Chapter 1 – Economic policy

Article 98 TEC

Member States shall conduct their economic policies with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community, as defined in Article 2, and in the context of the broad guidelines referred to in Article 99(2). The Member States and the Community shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 4.

***

We look at the different stages of the treaty reform process.

First, we turn to the European Convention, the closest thing to a constituent assembly EU citizens have had since the 1950s and 1980s. The corresponding Article is located in Part III ‘The policies and functioning of the Union’, Title III ‘Internal policies and action’, Chapter II ‘Economic and monetary policy’, Section 1 ‘Economic policy’.

Article III-70 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/39:

Article III-70 Draft Constitution

Member States shall conduct their economic policies in order to contribute to the achievement of the Union's objectives, as defined in Article I-3, and in the context of the broad guidelines referred to in Article III-71(2). The Member States and the Union shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article III-69.

***

‘In order to contribute’ is a bit firmer than ‘with a view to contributing’, but otherwise the proposal of the Convention differed only technically from the current text.

***

In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, approved by 18 member states, the introductory provisions on economic policy were located in Part III ‘The policies and functioning of the Union’, Title III ‘Internal policies and action’, Chapter II ‘Economic and monetary policy’, Section 1 ‘Economic policy’.

Article III-178 is found in OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/76:

Article III-178 Constitution

Member States shall conduct their economic policies in order to contribute to the achievement of the Union's objectives, as defined in Article I-3, and in the context of the broad guidelines referred to in Article III-179(2). The Member States and the Union shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article III-177.

***

Between the draft Constitution and the Constitutional Treaty only the numbering of the Article and those referred to changed.

***

I found no specific mention of the economic and monetary policy in the mandate of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007 Mandate, Council document 11218/07, 26 June 2007).

The present TEC was to become the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the innovations as agreed in the 2004 IGC were to be inserted into the Treaty by way of specific modifications in the usual manner (points 17 and 18, pages 6 and 7).

***

In Article 2, point 85 of the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) the IGC 2007 inserted an Article 97b into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and in point 86, Article 99 TEC was amended (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/70).

In other words, no specific amendments concerned Article 98 TEC, leaving only a few horizontal amendments to be made, notably the one mentioned in Article 2 ToL, point 8, replacing the reference to Article TEc by a reference to Article 2 TEU (later renumbered Article 3 TEU). See OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/44 and Table of equivalences OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/200.

***

The TFEU table of equivalences confirms that the new Article 98 TFEU (ToL) in the original Treaty of Lisbon was later renumbered Article 120 TFEU in the consolidated version, under the title ‘Economic and monetary policy’ renumbered Title VIII (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/211–212).

***

Article 120 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is found in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/97:

Part Three Union policies and internal actions

Title VIII Economic and monetary policy

Article 120 TFEU
(ex Article 98 TEC)

Member States shall conduct their economic policies with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union, as defined in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, and in the context of the broad guidelines referred to in Article 121(2). The Member States and the Union shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 119.

***

The IGC 2007 did not interpret the wording of the Convention and the Constitution on contributing as an innovation, so the weaker ‘with a view to contributing’ was preserved. This and other detail decisions contributed to limiting the volume of the Lisbon Treaty.

***

What has been said about Article 120 TFEU?


United Kingdom

Professor Steve Peers covered the Treaty of Lisbon in a number of Statewatch Analyses. ‘EU Reform Treaty Analysis no. 3.4: Revised text of Part Three, Titles VII to XVII of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC): Other internal EC policies (Version 2, 24 October 2007) includes the current Title VII Economic and monetary policy.

Peers presented the numbering of Article 98 TFEU (ToL), to be renumbered Article 120 TFEU in the consolidated version, and highlighted the changes, without comment (page 5).

The analysis 3.4 and other useful Statewatch analyses are available through:

http://www.statewatch.org/euconstitution.htm


***

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) offers a convenient source of brief annotations on Lisbon Treaty amendments in ‘A comparative table of the current EC and EU treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon’ (Command Paper 7311, published 21 January 2008). It offers the following comment on Article 120 TFEU, Article 98 TFEU (ToL) in the original Lisbon Treaty (page 12):

“In substance the same as Article 98 TEC.”

The FCO comparative table is available at:

http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7311/7311.asp

***

The UK House of Commons Library Research Paper 07/86 ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Community’ (published 6 December 2007) discussed ‘H. Economic and Monetary Policy’ on pages 61 to 64. Article 98 TFEU (ToL) was mentioned in passing on page 61.

The Library Research Paper 07/86 is available at:

http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-086.pdf

***

The House of Lords European Union Committee report ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, Volume I: Report’ (HL Paper 62-I, published 13 March 2008) is a valuable resource on the Treaty of Lisbon, but it did not dwell on economic and monetary policy.

The report is accessible at:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf


***

Sweden

The consultation paper ’Lissabonfördraget’ was the first official Swedish description of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, and it is available at:

http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/49/81/107aa077.pdf

It was followed by the Swedish government’s draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss – Lissabonfördraget’, published 29 May 2008:

http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/5676/a/106277

The draft bill was given a green light by the Council on Legislation (Lagrådet):

http://www.lagradet.se/yttranden/Lissabonfordraget.pdf

The latest official government view, and now my standard reference for Sweden, is the ratification bill (Regeringens proposition 2007/08:168 Lissabonfördraget; 3 July 2008):

http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/84/02/8c96cf3e.pdf

Economic and monetary policy (23.2 Ekonomisk och monetary politik) is discussed on pages 180 to 185.

***

Finland

Among our standard sample of Lisbon Treaty commentaries, Finland is the first Eurozone country.

The Finnish ratification bill, ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan unionista tehdyn sopimuksen ja Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopimuksen muuttamisesta tehdyn Lissabonin sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 23/2008 vp), discusses economic and monetary policy (Talous- ja rahapolitiikka) on pages 209 to 214.

The ratification bill briefly describes Article 98 TFEU (ToL), renumbered Article 120 TFEU, as unchanged (page 209):

”98 artiklaa (uusi 120 artikla), jossa jäsenvaltiot velvoitetaan harjoittamaan talouspolitiikkaansa niin, että ne myötävaikuttavat unionin tavoitteiden toteuttamiseen, ei muuteta.”

The Finnish ratification bill is available at:

http://www.finlex.fi/fi/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf


The Swedish language version of the ratification bill ‘Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Lissabonfördraget om ändring av fördraget om Europeiska unionen och fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen’ (RP 23/2008 rd), makes the same remark under ’Ekonomisk och monetär politik’ on Article 98 TFEU (ToL), the future Article 120 TFEU, on page 212:

”Artikel 98 (blivande artikel 120), där medlemsstaterna åläggs att föra sin ekonomiska politik så att de bidrar till att förverkliga unionens mål, ändras inte.”

The ratification bill in Swedish can be accessed at:

http://www.finlex.fi/sv/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf

***

François-Xavier Priollaud and David Siritzky offer a short introductory explanation on economic and monetary policy (pages 246 and 247) and on economic policy (pages 248 to 250) in their book ‘Le traité de Lisbonne – Commentaire, article par article, des nouveaux traités européens (TUE et TFUE)’ (La Documentation française, Paris, 2008).



Ralf Grahn

Lisbon Treaty ratification count 23 states and 412 million

Spain (population 44.5 million) is the latest European Union member state to complete the parliamentary ratification process of the Treaty of Lisbon after the resounding Senate vote today: 232 for, 6 against.

Source: Senado http://www.senado.es



The 23 member states where the parliamentary ratification is concluded account for 412.3 million Europeans (about 83 per cent of the total EU population of 495.1 million).

The group of slow, undecided or negative member states has now shrunk to four, with the following population numbers (millions):


The Czech Republic 10.3

Italy 59.1

Sweden 9.1

---

Ireland 4.3


***

As of today more than four fifths (85 per cent) of the member states, representing more than four fifths (83 per cent) of the total EU population, have already concluded the parliamentary ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.



Ralf Grahn

European Union: Economic and monetary policy

Close coordination of economic policies and a single monetary policy, including a single currency, the euro, promote the aims of the European Union.

We advance from the current Treaty establishing the European Community to the Treaty of Lisbon.


***

Article 4 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) is found in the latest consolidated version, published in the Official Journal of the European Union 29.12.2006 C 321 E/45–46:

Part One – Principles

Article 4 TEC

1. For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Member States and the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable set out therein, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.

2. Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable and the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the introduction of a single currency, the ecu, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in the Community, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.

3. These activities of the Member States and the Community shall entail compliance with the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.

***

We look at the different stages of the treaty reform process.

First, we turn to the European Convention, the closest thing to a constituent assembly EU citizens have had. The corresponding Article is located in Part III ‘The policies and functioning of the Union’, Title III ‘Internal policies and action’, Chapter II ‘Economic and monetary policy’.

Article III-69 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/39:

Article III-69 Draft Constitution

1. For the purposes set out in Article I-3, the activities of the Member States and the Union shall include, as provided in the Constitution, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.

2. Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in the Constitution and in accordance with the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include a single currency, the euro, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy, the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.

3. These activities of the Member States and the Union shall entail compliance with the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a stable balance of payments.

***

In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, ‘ratified’ by 18 member states, the introductory provisions on economic and monetary policy were located in Part III ‘The policies and functioning of the Union’, Title III ‘Internal policies and action’, Chapter II ‘Economic and monetary policy’.

Article III-177 is found in OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/76:

Article III-177 Constitution

For the purposes set out in Article I-3, the activities of the Member States and the Union shall include, as provided in the Constitution, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.

Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in the Constitution and in accordance with the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include a single currency, the euro, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy, the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.

These activities of the Member States and the Union shall entail compliance with the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a stable balance of payments.

***

I found no specific mention of the economic and monetary policy in the mandate of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007 Mandate, Council document 11218/07, 26 June 2007).

The present TEC was to become the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the innovations as agreed in the 2004 IGC were to be inserted into the Treaty by way of specific modifications in the usual manner (points 17 and 18, pages 6 and 7).

***

In Article 2, point 85 of the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) the IGC 2007 inserted an Article 97b into the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/70):

85) An Article 97b shall be inserted as the first article of Title VII, with the wording of Article 4; it shall be amended as follows:

(a) in paragraph 1, the words ‘and in accordance with the timetable set out therein’ shall be deleted;

(b) in paragraph 2, the words ‘Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable and the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the introduction of a single currency, the ecu,’ shall be replaced by ‘Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in the Treaties and in accordance with the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include a single currency, the euro,’.

***

The TFEU table of equivalences confirms that the new Article 97b TFEU (ToL) in the original Treaty of Lisbon was later renumbered Article 119 TFEU in the consolidated version (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/211).

***

Article 119 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is found in the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/96–97:

Part Three Union policies and internal actions

Title VIII Economic and monetary policy

Article 119 TFEU
(ex Article 4 TEC)

1. For the purposes set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the activities of the Member States and the Union shall include, as provided in the Treaties, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.

2. Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in the Treaties and in accordance with the procedures set out therein, these activities shall include a single currency, the euro, and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in the Union, in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.

3. These activities of the Member States and the Union shall entail compliance with the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.

***

What has been said about Article 119 TFEU?


United Kingdom

Professor Steve Peers covered the Treaty of Lisbon in a number of Statewatch Analyses. ‘EU Reform Treaty Analysis no. 3.4: Revised text of Part Three, Titles VII to XVII of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC): Other internal EC policies (Version 2, 24 October 2007) includes the current Title VII Economic and monetary policy.

Peers presented the text and numbering of Article 97b TFEU (ToL), to be renumbered Article 119 TFEU in the consolidated version, without comment (pages 4–5).

The analysis 3.3 and other useful Statewatch analyses are available through:

http://www.statewatch.org/euconstitution.htm


***

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) offers a convenient source of brief annotations on Lisbon Treaty amendments in ‘A comparative table of the current EC and EU treaties as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon’ (Command Paper 7311, published 21 January 2008). It offers the following comment on Article 119 TFEU, Article 97b TFEU (ToL) in the original Lisbon Treaty (page 12):

“In substance the same as Article 4 TEC, which it updates.”

The FCO comparative table is available at:

http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7311/7311.asp

***

The UK House of Commons Library Research Paper 07/86 ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: amendments to the Treaty establishing the European Community’ (published 6 December 2007) discussed ‘H. Economic and Monetary Policy’ on pages 61 to 64. The new Article 97b TFEU (ToL) was mentioned on page 61:

Article 97(b) (Constitution Article III-177) corresponds with the principles set out in Article 4 TEC in the “Principles of the Community” on the adoption of an “economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member States’ economic policies”.

The Library Research Paper 07/86 is available at:

http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2007/rp07-086.pdf

***

The House of Lords European Union Committee report ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, Volume I: Report’ (HL Paper 62-I, published 13 March 2008) is a valuable resource on the Treaty of Lisbon, but it did not dwell on economic and monetary policy.

The report is accessible at:

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/62.pdf


***

Sweden

The consultation paper ’Lissabonfördraget’ was the first official Swedish description of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, and it is available at:

http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/49/81/107aa077.pdf

It was followed by the Swedish government’s draft ratification bill ‘Lagrådsremiss – Lissabonfördraget’, published 29 May 2008:

http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/5676/a/106277

The draft bill was given a green light by the Council on Legislation (Lagrådet):

http://www.lagradet.se/yttranden/Lissabonfordraget.pdf

The latest official government view is the ratification bill (Regeringens proposition 2007/08:168 Lissabonfördraget; 3 July 2008):

http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/84/02/8c96cf3e.pdf

Economic and monetary policy (23.2 Ekonomisk och monetary politik) is discussed on pages 180 to 185.

***

Finland

Among our standard sample of Lisbon Treaty commentaries, Finland is the first Eurozone country.

The Finnish ratification bill, ‘Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle Euroopan unionista tehdyn sopimuksen ja Euroopan yhteisön perustamissopimuksen muuttamisesta tehdyn Lissabonin sopimuksen hyväksymisestä ja laiksi sen lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta’ (HE 23/2008 vp), discusses economic and monetary policy (Talous- ja rahapolitiikka) on pages 209 to 214.

The ratification bill briefly mentions that Article 97b TFEU (ToL), renumbered Article 119 TFEU, corresponds with Article III-177 of the Constitutional Treaty and Article 4 TEC (page 209):

”97 b artikla (uusi 119 artikla), jossa määritellään unionin talous- ja rahapolitiikan tavoitteet, vastaa perustuslakisopimuksen III-177 artiklaa ja SEY 4 artiklaa.”

The Finnish ratification bill is available at:

http://www.finlex.fi/fi/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf


The Swedish language version of the ratification bill ‘Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag om godkännande av Lissabonfördraget om ändring av fördraget om Europeiska unionen och fördraget om upprättandet av Europeiska gemenskapen och till lag om sättande i kraft av de bestämmelser i fördraget som hör till området för lagstiftningen’ (RP 23/2008 rd), makes the same remark under ’Ekonomisk och monetär politik’ on Article 97b TFEU (ToL), the future Article 119 TFEU, on page 212:

”Artikel 97b (blivande artikel 119), där målen för unionens ekonomiska och monetära politik definieras, motsvarar artikel III-177 i det konstitutionella fördraget och artikel 4 i EG-fördraget.”

The ratification bill in Swedish can be accessed at:

http://www.finlex.fi/sv/esitykset/he/2008/20080023.pdf

***

François-Xavier Priollaud and David Siritzky offer a short introductory explanation on pages 246 and 247 of their book Le traité de Lisbonne – Commentaire, article par article, des nouveaux traités européens (TUE et TFUE) (La Documentation française, Paris, 2008).



Ralf Grahn

The latest from Libertas

Four weeks gone from the Irish referendum on the EU Lisbon Treaty is a suitable time to check how the better deal for Ireland and Europe is shaping up.

Surprise, surprise, ‘The Latest from Libertas’ is still their Thank you note, dated 17 June 2008.

The positive alternative to the direction Europe is taking is nowhere to be seen.

Unbelievable.


Ralf Grahn

EU Council presidency: Slovenia and France – Two media approaches

Until the end of June, Slovenia held the rotating EU Council presidency. For a news consumer it was easy to register, and during the presidency all the press releases dropped into my e-mail without further trouble. It was then easy to scan each headline and the first lines to see, if the e-mail required further attention (tied as it is to current writing activities).

The same methods have worked during previous presidencies.


The only troubling thing was the Slovenian use of long and bureaucratic headlines, which meant that the e-mail headline seldom said anything about the contents; only the second headline (of the press release) did that.

Since the beginning of July things have changed – for the worse.

France has high ambitions, but things have turned out messy:

France has accreditation for journalists and even for select NGO participants, but no simple system for interested citizens to keep up to date. According to some reports, journalists have encountered difficulties trying to register.

The French EU Council presidency promises a daily newsletter, but if they have sent one, I have missed it.

The French EU Council presidency offers updates on events via a reader, but this has meant that my Google reader is swamped a few times daily with scores of events (66 at the last count), old and new. Am I supposed to wade through each item a couple of times each day to find out if there is something really new? I want updates – nothing more, nothing less.

Multimedia is chic, but do I really have to follow speeches and presentations via web TV, which means an hour or so for each, instead of reading the contents in about five minutes to find out where the beef is? A few moments ago, there was still no written version of president Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech in front of the European Parliament, but I could have followed the performance live yesterday or canned today.

Elysian style high-tech sounds progressive, until you have to use it.

Please give me and other news consumers simple tools that work.


Ralf Grahn

Lisbon Treaty ratification count 22 and 367

Belgium is the latest European Union member state to complete the parliamentary ratification process of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Reuters reports ‘Belgium completes approval of EU Lisbon treaty’:

http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL1051159420080710

The 22 member states where the parliamentary ratification is concluded account for 367.8 million Europeans (about 74 per cent of the total EU population of 495.1 million).

The group of slow, undecided or negative member states has now shrunk to five, with the following population numbers (millions):


The Czech Republic 10.3

Italy 59.1

Spain 44.5

Sweden 9.1

---

Ireland 4.3


***

As of yesterday evening, four out of five member states (81 per cent), representing almost three quarters of the total EU population (74 per cent), have concluded the parliamentary ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.



Ralf Grahn

Sarkozy on EU treaty perspectives

Waiting for the French EU Council presidency site – www.ue2008.fr – to post a written version of president Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech in the European Parliament, we turn to a few news reports, because it is more convenient for readers to read than to follow the videos from beginning to end.

BBC News reports that ‘Sarkozy warns EU on treaty debate’:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7499143.stm

‘France determined to end EU treaty woes by year’s end’, says EUbusiness.com:

http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1215685022.25

‘Nicolas Sarkozy devant le Parlement européen’, is the headline at Radio France International :

http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/103/article_68451.asp

***

Short term we have the following expectations, based on Sarkozy’s speech:

France wants to propose a solution in October or December.
The choice is between the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.
No country should be left behind at this stage.
Clarity is needed before the European elections.
Enlargement and Lisbon walk hand in hand.

***

Today, president Sarkozy was not ready to speak about long term perspectives. He only hinted at two-speed Europe as a last resort.

***

How much wiser are we now?


Ralf Grahn

Joschka Fischer’s EU avant-garde

Germany’s former foreign minister Joschka Fischer presented his view on EU reform in his Zeit Online column ‘Vive l’Avant-Garde!’ (30 June 2008):

http://www.zeit.de/online/2008/27/joschka-fischer-europa

The surrounding world changes at Formula 1 speed, but the Europeans have decided on a snail’s pace through a compromise between Euroskeptics and pro-Europeans.

According to Fischer, the parallel progress of enlargement and deepening has worked only for enlargement. Europe will lose power to decide on its own fate in the world.

The pro-Europeans have to end the compromise with the Euroskeptics, regardless of if a new Irish referendum saves the Lisbon Treaty or not.

The only possibility is a European avant-garde, a group of EU countries willing and able to advance. The willing and able participate, but the others shall not block progress anymore.

The Lisbon Treaty would provide both civilian enhanced cooperation and military permanent structured cooperation, but if the Treaty of Lisbon fails, the pro-European governments and states need to establish an avant-garde group outside the treaties.

The negative consequence of this would be that the community institutions would not develop for a long time, for example in the foreign policy field.

Even if European unity is an important value, it cannot be upheld if the price is permanent immobility or even backward steps. In the middle term the Nice Treaty status quo is a bigger threat to European unity than an avant-garde group.

If the best solution is unavailable, you have to grasp the second best option. The avant-garde group should take on the areas of energy policy, economic and financial policy, foreign and security policy, as well as social policy.

New institutions cannot be created in this way, but the participating countries can better determine their positions with regard to the outside world and, like Schengen, create new structures for integration beyond the treaties.

***

It worth noticing how silent the EU leaders and the EU institutions are on the hard choices facing Europe. Only free citizens seem to be able to contribute to the discussion with new facts and proposals.

Fischer’s analysis of Europe’s diminishing role in the world is compelling, as is his prescription that something has to be done to break the deadlock, with or without the Lisbon Treaty.

At least three of Fischer’s assumptions require special attention and deeper discussion:

1) The vast policy areas proposed by Fischer require effective action, but without decision-making rules to support decisive action, even a smaller group would become bogged down by the unanimity rule inherent to intergovernmental cooperation.

2) The relations between the core group policies and the regular Nice or Lisbon institutions’ decisions require careful thought. How would it play out? We would, for instance, have situations where a core group has a common position, but the EU does not.

3) Intergovernmental avant-garde groups outside the treaties or based on the Lisbon Treaty would do nothing to enhance the democratic legitimacy and accountability of their actions. Only democratic foundations can ultimately legitimise deeper integration, even if the commendable aim is to enhance the security and prosperity of EU citizens.

Should the integrationist countries realise that they need more than avant-garde groups? Should they finally accept that they need both effective institutions and democratic foundations, if they want to build a functioning Europe?


Ralf Grahn

Clingendael: Lisbon Treaty options

Rob Boudewijn and Janis A. Emmanouilidis ask

How to proceed after the Irish “No”

in Clingendael Commentary 5 (9 July 2008). The two page analysis can be accessed at the web page of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’:

http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080709_clingendael_commentary_005.pdf

The researchers Boudewijn and Emmanouilidis present four options, of which they dismiss the first three:

1) A core group, leaving Ireland outside a new union.

2) Ireland’s voluntary withdrawal from the European Union.

3) Abandoning the Lisbon Treaty and negotiating a new one.

Their fourth and final option, deemed to be the most attractive and realistic one, is for the member states to continue the ratification procedure. Ireland would arrange a repeat referendum in early 2009.

The writers find it highly likely that Ireland will be the only member state to have rejected the Lisbon Treaty. Then 26 member states, representing 99 per cent of the EU’s population would have every moral right to ask the Irish to reconsider.

Ireland might be granted some concessions in return, for example in the field of taxes, family law and defence.

***

A few comments on the Clingendael Commentary:

The fourth option with continued ratification looks attractive – until the second Irish referendum.

The repeated plebiscite would have to be won by the ‘yes’ side to make any difference. Otherwise it is just a humiliation more for those who have invested in the treaty reform process.

None of the reasons for the ‘no’ vote was pro-European, so why should the Irish voters suddenly care about the rest of Europe the second time around?

Having discredited their own political leadership, why should they rehabilitate them?

Wouldn’t asking the Irish the same question again prompt new and more bloody-minded resistance?

Would the concessions mentioned by Boudewijn and Emmanouilidis change anything in practice or in the perception of Irish electors?

The Lisbon Treaty already contains the legal guarantees mentioned, which means that Irish particularities on (company) tax, abortion and neutrality are no real issues. A declaration makes them no more real, but neither is it a real concession.

Opening up the Lisbon Treaty would, on the other hand, lead to new ratifications and waste of time. The margins are slim.

***

The option offered by Boudewijn and Emmanouilidis seems to build on the most human of grounds: Miracles can always happen, and if they do, nobody has to draw real conclusions.

But is the solution good after the second Irish referendum?


Ralf Grahn

Lisbon Treaty ratifiers represent 357 million Europeans

If we take the latest Eurostat figures (as of 1 January 2007), the total population of the European Union is 495.1 million.

The 21 member states where the parliamentary ratification is concluded account for 357.2 million Europeans (about 72 per cent of the EU total).

The slow, undecided or negative member states have the following population numbers (millions):

Belgium 10.6

The Czech Republic 10.3

Italy 59.1

Spain 44.5

Sweden 9.1

---

Ireland 4.3


***

As of today, we have 77 per cent of the member states, representing 72 per cent of the total EU population, behind the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.

Is the Irish electorate a better judge on the future of Europe than the national parliaments?


Ralf Grahn

Netherlands: Lisbon Treaty ratification 21

The Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament or the Dutch House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal) had approved the EU Treaty of Lisbon 5 June 2008 by an overwhelming majority, 111 against 39. From there the ratification bill went to the Senate.

Today, 8 July 2008, the indirectly elected Dutch First Chamber or Senate (Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal) voted to approve the Lisbon Treaty.

Source NOS ‘Eerste Kamer akoord met EU-verdrag’:

http://www.nos.nl/nos/artikelen/2008/07/art000001C8E0E8A41A39C4.html

The Dutch Senate vote concludes the parliamentary ratification process in the Netherlands, which becomes the 21st EU member state to approve the reform treaty.

***

The five remaining member states more or less on course are:

Belgium, with its manifold parliaments

The Czech Republic, a source of uncertainty and notably the next rotating EU Council president after France

Italy, where the new Berlusconi government after the elections has issued its ratification bill

Spain, where the Senate has yet to vote, but the Congress of Deputies voted a crushing 322 to 6 for approval

Sweden, with its slow timetable, where the government has issued its ratification bill only last week; notably the third EU Council president of the 18 month troika or trio: France, Czech Republic, Sweden


For details on dates and votes you can check for instance Wikipedia:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Lisbon#Ratification

***

The sixth member state, off course, is ‘pro-European’ Ireland where the Lisbon Treaty was rejected by a referendum.

***

Two questions to think about:

Has anyone found even one pro-European reason for the Irish ‘no’ vote?

Has anybody detected generally sustainable arguments for the use of national referenda?



Ralf Grahn

Traité de Lisbonne – A Lisbon Treaty commentary

François-Xavier Priollaud and David Siritzky have produced a valuable commentary on the Treaty of Lisbon ’Le traité de Lisbonne – Commentaire, article par article, des nouveaux traités européens (TUE et TFUE)’.

The contents of the amended Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are presented as in the first Council consolidation published 16 April 2008, but with the amendments highlighted for ease of use.

Fairly detailed comments explain each Article of the Treaty on European Union, whereas the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is dealt with in thematic summaries.

Regardless of the ultimate fate of the Lisbon Treaty, the book is going to be of lasting interest to people interested in the EU treaty reform process.

***

François-Xavier Priollaud & David Siritzky : ’Le traité de Lisbonne – Commentaire, article par article, des nouveaux traités européens (TUE et TFUE) (La Documentation française, Paris, 2008 ; 523 pages ; about 21 EUR)

www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr


Ralf Grahn

To Peter Davidson on the European Union

Peter Davidson wrote a thoughtful comment on the post ‘Government and consent’. It would have stayed ‘hidden’ there if I had responded in the comments section, but after a while I thought that I could draw attention to it by making my answer a separate post and request the readers to reflect on Davidson’s thoughts.

***

Peter Davidson,

You offer such a rich source of reflections that it is hard to know where to begin. But I will try to comment on at least a few of them:

1) Actually, just a little while before reading your comment, I was contemplating on the vogue among European politicians to decry a European super-state, when our common interests seem to call for at least a European super-power. And a super-power without effective institutions does not work. In other words, they would have to be state-like (effective and democratic).

In my view, the brevity of the US Constitution is an ideal; actually it would be even shorter without some redundant stuff on slave trade and slave population.

But I imagine that the Federal Republic of Europe would be a parliamentary democracy, more in line with European traditions, not a presidential one. (Poland and the Czech Republic as well as ‘cohabitation’ offer some examples of why hydras with one head might be preferred.)

In today’s terms the Lisbon Treaty version of the Treaty on European Union, less the provisions on the common foreign and security policy (including the common security and defence policy), might be a suitable temporary basic law for the citizens of the European Union, provided that the member states pledged to institute a real parliamentary democracy and to eliminate the paralysing unanimity principle.

2) I agree that the EU seems to develop mainly through humiliating experiences. In essence, I support the modest Lisbon Treaty amendments as a step in the right direction, but I see the paternalistic European project heading for failure without the support of the citizens.

No amount of citizens’ forums and public relations exercises is going to bridge the gap between the EU leaders and the union’s citizens. Only real political rights will do.

Enhanced intergovernmental cooperation based on the Treaty of Nice offers fairly slim opportunities substantively, and it would only increase the legitimacy gap.

3) I am not on a sure footing with regard to the regions you mention. With common European rules covering cross-border trade and human contacts and a united Europe facing the world, I imagine that secession by regions would not be a catastrophe.

There is, however, one important aspect that would have to be rectified. Nowadays, the smallest EU member states are overrepresented. It would not be fair to aggravate this lack of balance further.

In my view, the future EU should be closer to the principle of one man, one vote (with the second chamber of the European Parliament the notable exception).

4) Instead of the Lisbon Treaty withering away, I would say that its modest reforms are welcome, but that I hope for the reform to succeed only with the add-ons of democratic reform and a scrapping of the liberum veto.

5) Without the CFSP and the CSDP the Lisbon Treaty is not structurally that far from the ‘brief statement’ you call for.

6) I think that there are some genuinely European politicians among the European level parties, and I imagine that at least you and I are among the citizens who try to discuss in the terms of common interests.

Appeal is another matter, but we shall see. Although many Europeans seem to long for national level politics to save them from both globalisation and the EU, I think that great enough numbers would be mature enough to embrace European level democracy if offered and explained to them.


Ralf Grahn

European Union: Holy Alliance or robust and democratic?

The European Union stands at a crossroads. It can continue to emulate the Holy Alliance or it can transform itself into a robust and democratic union.

For the briefest of outlines on the Holy Alliance, read the Wikipedia article:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holy_Alliance

***

Robust means a union able to reform and to decide, without being frustrated by its own liberum veto (unanimity).

The tragicomic history of treaty reform shows how the European leaders have almost invented the ‘perpetuum mobile’, an unending sequence of failure.

Institutional reform is not navel-gazing, because it is a precondition for the ability to deliver common public goods still outside the effective reach of the European Union, for instance security.

Democratic means giving the citizens of the European Union the power to vote the legislators into and out of office and to set the course for the union in all questions European, through the composition of a politically accountable government.

***

Perhaps the paternalistic order of the Lisbon Treaty deserves to fail, until the ‘Copernican revolution’ of democracy dawns on the European Council.

See the Wikipedia article ‘Copernican revolution’ on the paradigm shift from the Ptolemaic model of the heavens, which placed Earth at the centre of the Universe:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copernican_revolution

***

Two paradigm shifts to save the European project: Robust rules with the EU citizens at the centre.


Ralf Grahn

Government and consent

The Declaration of Independence, 4 July 1776, is still an evocative document:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. – That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”

The first attempt to institute this government between the thirteen states on a surer footing was the Articles of Confederation, 9 July 1778, but showing even more structural weaknesses than the present day European Union.

The Americans were quicker on the uptake than the Europeans, so on 17 September 1787 the Philadelphia Convention agreed upon the Constitution of the United States of America:

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

***

Yes, with distractions like the War of Independence, it took the Americans about a decade to lay the democratic and federal foundations for the rise to economic and military world power.

Government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Congratulations.

What has Europe to celebrate this 4 July 2008?


Ralf Grahn

Cyprus approves Lisbon Treaty

The Earth Time reported that the parliament in Cyprus approved the EU Treaty of Lisbon with 31 votes against 18 opposing votes by the communist AKEL party. See:

http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/216778,cyprus-parliament-approves-lisbon-treaty.html

This means that 20 member states have completed the essentials of the Lisbon Treaty ratification, namely approval by parliament.

Of the seven remaining countries Sweden sent the ratification bill to parliament today, 3 July 2008, as reported in the previous post.


Ralf Grahn

Sweden: Lisbon Treaty ratification bill

The Swedish government has issued its Lisbon Treaty ratification bill. The government’s press release ‘Regeringen fattar beslut om Lissabonfördraget’ (The government decides on Lisbon Treaty; 3 July 2008) can be found here:

http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/10778/a/108364


Swedish committee reports and government bills are traditionally thorough. This one runs to 288 pages and it is the latest official Swedish reference about the Treaty of Lisbon: Regeringens proposition 2007/08:168 Lissabonfördraget.

It can be accessed here:

http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/10/84/02/8c96cf3e.pdf


Ralf Grahn

EU: Secession (withdrawal)

The European Community and the European Union are based on the principal aim of “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. Both treaties are concluded for an unlimited period (Article 312 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 51 of the Treaty on European Union).

There is no provision in either treaty on the expulsion of or secession by a member state, although the agreed aim and the changed preferences of a member state may come into conflict.

The difficulties surrounding the Lisbon Treaty merit a closer look at fundamentals concerning membership and secession than the mere discussion of a second Irish referendum or not.

***

What if a member state of the European Union wanted to withdraw, and made a democratic decision to stake its future outside the EU?

If a member state finds itself out of tune with the aspirations of the others, it could make its changed resolve clear, and start negotiations to change its relationship with the European Union. International treaties can be changed by mutual agreement, although the level of interdependence is very high and the alternatives uncharted, if the seceding country wanted something else than the European Economic Area model. The task would be demanding, but not impossible, with good will on both sides.

***

Failing common accord, could a “Better outside” decision be enforced unilaterally by a member state?

Some campaigners contend, from an internal point of view, that a sovereign nation (at least theirs) can do what it pleases and that a decision by Parliament would suffice (presumably without notification, negotiation or respect for treaty obligations).

Others have studied the matter more closely, taking into account the international community, and have read the law of treaties to find a reasoned response to this vexing question.

***

International law

Let us take a look at what the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded 23 May 1969 and entered into force 27 January 1980, has to say about the existing state of international law (de lege lata).

Professor Steve Peers referred to Article 56(1) of the Vienna Convention in the Statewatch analysis ‘Can the Treaty of Lisbon be ratified or implemented? A legal analysis’ (19 June 2008), when he explored the possibility of indirect expulsion of Ireland:

“The legal problem with this option is that the current Treaties do not provide for Member States to denounce them, and so arguably either a provision for denunciation would first have to be added to the Treaties, or the mass denunciation itself would have to take the form of a Treaty amendment. Either way, this would require Ireland’s consent – so Ireland could not be expelled indirectly by this process against its will.

But an alternative argument is that Member States have an implied right to withdraw from the Union, even if this right is not expressly mentioned in the Treaty, by virtue of the general rules of international law. Article 56(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties states that:

1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:

a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or

b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.

A leading text on the law of treaties states that ‘the constituent instrument of an international organisation…almost certainly falls within paragraph (b)’. (see Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd edition (Cambridge University Press, 2007), page 291; and see also page 398).”

Peers’ analysis can be accessed at:

http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jun/analysis-lisbon-june-sp-2008.pdf

***

On the face of it, the European Union is an international organisation, based on treaties. Withdrawal, both by individual countries and as a ‘mass action’ would seem possible, although the unique complexity and highly integrated nature of the European Union might lead to different lines of reasoning.

***

It may therefore be helpful to look at other arguments, especially the doctrine ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’ (things thus standing). As I understand it, a treaty may be revoked only under strict conditions: There has to be a fundamental change of circumstances, which constituted an essential basis of the consent, and this change causes a radical transformation of the obligations.


Article 62 Vienna Convention
Fundamental change of circumstances

1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:

(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and

(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty.

2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:

(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or

(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.

3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.

***

If a number of EU member states find that the agreed aim to achieve an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe is continuously and unreasonably frustrated by one or more member states blocking progress, wouldn’t mass denunciation (and the subsequent establishment of a closer union) be legally warranted to break the deadlock imposed by the proponents of “none-speed Europe”?

Is it unreasonable to believe that continued and only partially successful efforts to reform the European Community and the European Union since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) offer grounds enough, especially given the last years of complete deadlock?

***

Lisbon Treaty

The drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon saw the need for provisions on withdrawal from the European Union and the modalities for such a move:

There will in particular be … an Article on voluntary withdrawal from the Union, said the mandate for the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007 Mandate, Council document 11218/07, point 16).

***

The IGC 2007 proceeded to fulfil its promise, by inserting an Article 49a into the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/39 and 40). This was renumbered Article 50 TEU in the consolidated version (OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/43–44):

Article 50 TEU

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.

***

The proposed Lisbon Treaty provision does not preclude the mass denunciation of the treaties, although it clearly is drafted with one or perhaps more individual secessions in mind. Article 50 explicitly affirms the right to secede, and it tries to bring a semblance of order into the proceedings following a notification.

***

Current TEU and TEC

The current TEU is concluded for and unlimited period, Article 51, and so is the Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 312 (latest consolidated version of TEU and TEC in OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E). There is no provision on leaving the European Union or the European Community (and there has been no concrete need for one, except for the Danish territory Greenland).

***

Draft Constitution

We can look at the preceding stages of the treaty reform process.

For the source of inspiration we go to the Convention and its draft Treaty on establishing a Constitution for Europe, Article I-59 (OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/22).

Article 59 Draft Constitution
Voluntary withdrawal from the Union

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention; the European Council shall examine that notification. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council of Ministers, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

The representative of the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in Council of Ministers or European Council discussions or decisions concerning it.

3. The Constitution shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, decides to extend this period.

4. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 57.

***

Constitutional Treaty

The IGC 2004 agreed on the following text, which became Article I-60 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/40):

Article I-60
Voluntary withdrawal from the Union

1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article III-325(3). It shall be concluded by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

3. The Constitution shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in European decisions concerning it.

A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 72 % of the members of the Council, representing the participating Member States, comprising at least 65 % of the population of these States.

5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article I-58.

***

We can see that between the draft Constitution and the Constitutional Treaty there is a slight reordering of the text and the qualified majority was defined in the Constitution, but there is no substantial difference between the texts.

The differences between the Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty are only technical.

***

Let us take a look at the negotiation procedure referred to in Article 188n(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in the Reform Treaty (OJ 17,12,2007 C 306/96), which became Article 218(3) in the consolidated version (OJ 9.5.2008 C 115/145), under Title V International agreements:

Article 218(3) TFEU

3. The Commission, or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign and security policy, shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and, depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the Union's negotiating team.

***

Perhaps even more clearly than before, we can see how the Lisbon Treaty is adapted to the secession of one member state (at a time), but not to a mass escape.

If, for instance, 26 member states were leaving, the one remaining could hardly represent the Council, with all the others on the other side of the table, and if the still existing Council tried to negotiate with one leaving member at a time, the separation of roles would break down.

In other words, while not in force, the Lisbon Treaty gives some guidance on how to deal with an individual secessionist, but not with escape ‘en masse’.

***

A few additional comments by your glossator on the right to withdraw:

The European Union is founded on principles such as democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for the competences of the member states and their constitutional systems.

It would, in my view, be inconceivable for the European Union to disregard a democratic decision by a member state to secede. In the context of the EU democratic legitimacy constitutes a basic requirement for accession, and a subsequent clearly expressed withdrawal of consent would entail a fundamental change of circumstances (even if it depended on the party itself, namely popular opinion turned into government action).

Thus, legally the essence of the Lisbon Treaty Article 50 TEU on voluntary withdrawal from the EU is redundant, since it adds nothing of substance to the existing principle of law, only the modalities. On the other hand, withdrawal would have to be negotiated anyway.

The Treaty of Lisbon is, in effect, a codification of law as it stands.

Outside the strictly legal sphere, the provision clarifies matters making it easy to point at the new Article 50 TEU, where the right to withdraw from the EU voluntarily is expressly stated. At least the more level-headed critics will have to admit that there is no Babylonian captivity within the European Union.

Then, one can ask how much the procedural provisions actually achieve.

Notification of the intention is such a basic requirement as to be almost self-evident in international relations.

In practice, the relations between the seceding member state and the EU are so manifold as to require negotiations. The European Council provides guidelines, the Council makes decisions and a team conducts the negotiations. These would resemble ‘reverse engineering’ of an accession process, where potentially the whole ‘acquis communautaire’ would have to be de-negotiated, Chapter by Chapter.

It is hard to believe that the government of a seceding state would approach these negotiations without a clear own idea of how it wanted to shape its future relations with the EU, even if the basic decision to withdraw were the accidental result of a referendum.

Anyway, the negotiated withdrawal is just an option. Failing negotiations the membership would end two years after the notification (if no extension were to be agreed).

I have seen someone rail against the exclusion of the seceding state from the EU decision making on withdrawal. I must admit that I find it hard to understand how a voluntary secessionist could form part of both teams, its own with the purpose to transform itself into an outsider and the EU team negotiating the future relations with that state as an element of shaping the Union’s relations with the outside world. Here too, one could think of secession as reverse engineering of accession, with each party on its side of the table.

As argued above, the situation would be different if a clear majority of the EU member states found that the existing European Union could not advance, but one or more member states blocked progress. Then the mass secession and the establishment of a new union would have to take place under the general principles of international law.

Should the seceded state come to regret its ‘divorce’, it would have to conclude the same prenuptials and nuptials as other accession states. Since the Lisbon Treaty does not offer a right to accede, only to apply, there would be no guarantee of success, just as in the divorce case.


Ralf Grahn

To Libertas: Where is the better deal for Ireland and Europe?

Ireland voted to reject the Lisbon Treaty on 12 June 2008. Libertas promised a better deal for Ireland and Europe.

In an ideal world of direct democracy the voters would have known the programme ahead of casting their ballots.

In this case they didn’t know and didn’t care, but enough of them suspected the Lisbon Treaty of something.

***

The referendum has gone and the result was clear the following day.

Where is the better deal?

The European heads of state or government (the European Council) have promised continued ratification of the agreed treaty. No answer there.

The Irish government has not been able to come up with any concrete ideas. No answer there.

Surely, then the ‘no’ side must be actively campaigning for its magic formula for Irish and European satisfaction beyond the confines of the Lisbon Treaty?

Wrong. This 2 July 2008, almost three weeks on, Libertas’ latest web page entry, dated 17 June 2008, thanks its voters and promises to start outlining a positive programme in the future.

Unbelievable.


Ralf Grahn

EU enlargement and liberum veto

Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union has found much favour among anti-Europeans lately. Amendments to the treaties have to be made by common accord and they have to be ratified by all the member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

Team spirit and team play are essential if such a rickety organisation is to function even half decently.

If the road of political blackmail, divisiveness and disruption is chosen, the treaties offer plenty of opportunities to exercise the liberum veto, the blocking potential of the unanimity rule.

One of these is enlargement. The European Union has by far outgrown its institutional set-up, if the aim is an EU able to defend the interests of its citizens in a globalising world.

Adding to the membership would aggravate the problem. If institutional reform is blocked, it is hardly illogical to scrutinise the provisions on enlargement.

***

This is what Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) has to say on the matter (latest consolidated version of the treaties, published in the Official Journal of the European Union 29.12.2006 C 321 E/34–35):


Article 49 TEU

Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union. It shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the assent of the European Parliament, which shall act by an absolute majority of its component members.

The conditions of admission and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded, which such admission entails, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State. This agreement shall be submitted for ratification by all the contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

***

Any European state which respects the fundamental aims of the European Union (as subsequently elaborated by the so called Copenhagen criteria) can apply for EU membership.

Nowhere is there any mention of a subjective right for an applicant to be admitted.

On the contrary, the hurdles abound:

a) The Commission has to give its opinion, which can be unfavourable.

b) The Council shall act unanimously, giving each member state government a veto.

c) The European Parliament has to give its prior assent, meaning a majority can refuse.

d) The conditions of accession have to be agreed, in great detail, by all the member states and the applicant, offering a basket of items to wreck the deal.

e) Each member state has to ratify the accession treaty according to its constitutional requirements, giving each member state parliament an opportunity to prevent membership.

f) Some member states’ constitutions may be flawed enough to enable a president to postpone or refuse signing the ratification bill or act, despite parliamentary approval.

g) Some member states might have or institute a national referendum on accession, offering the local electorate a chance to vent any frustrations it may feel at the moment.

***

Legally, further enlargement of the European Union may be possible with the necessary adjustments to the treaties.

But legally, it does not matter how pigheaded and egoistic any potential refusal is. It may result from total lack of cooperative will and solidarity, from corruption or from outside influences. Any rejection is legally binding, according to the rule of liberum veto, this great Polish export product.

In fact, accession is almost the exact mirror image of treaty amendment.

***

The consequences are political. In a system as dependent on trust and team-play as the European Union, the standing of an unreasonable partner may suffer and its chances of coalition-building diminish as a result of its disruptive behaviour.

Liberum veto is an effective tool, with headline-grabbing potential, but exceedingly blunt. On the other hand, the daily working of the European Union requires daily decisions and alliances on literally thousands of details annually, with potential for death by a thousand cuts for members with the ambition to become outcasts.

The prospects for a refusenik presidency (such as the Czech might turn out to be) are worrying, not only for the EU as a whole.

Even if the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty concerned treaty amendment, not accession, it should be remembered that France became more or less a zombie in the European Union as a result, until the new president Nicolas Sarkozy was able to re-engage his country.

The European Union and its predecessors have usually been able to clear hurdles only after humiliating experiences. Perhaps the obstructionists have precipitated the next move towards an effective and democratic (new) European Union(?)


Ralf Grahn