Without democratic government and sufficient powers at the European Union or eurozone level, the national leaders have been forced to proceed further on the road of intergovernmentalism, although credible and sustainable solutions need durable and legitimate foundations.
While we wait for the conclusions from the European Council, this is how the leaders of the euro area countries and other EU member states have tried to manoeuvre despite these self-imposed structural weaknesses: Statement by the euro area heads of state or government (9 December 2011; 7 pages).
United Kingdom
If Britain has been a constant gardener of weakening its position in the European Union, prime minister Cavid Cameron managed to drive the wedge further in, by alienating almost all the rest of the participants, by demanding escape clauses for British financial services from internal market rules.
With the global financial system in danger, Nero would have been proud of Cameron's priorities.
Let us look at some early reactions after the EUCO all-nighter, especially with regard to the United Kingdom.
Financial services are, as we know, part and parcel of the internal market. What remains of UK goodwill capital to press for future concessions among the 27? Le Monde quotes the French president Nicolas Sarkozy on Britain's ”unacceptable” demands regarding financial regulation, the absence of which Sarkozy sees as a root cause of the current problems.
On Fundación Civil, the headline of Mario Conde says that the English have become ”anti-system” in the European Union, but he also notes that the fiscal compact is all discipline (Merkel), but no eurobonds or new tasks for the ECB (in Spanish).
According to David Cameron, the agreement between the EU countries is not in Britain's interest, so he hopes that the EU institutions will protect British interests and he wishes the rest of the union well in their endeavours to safeguard the euro.
How many Europeans do you think, by now hope that Cameron arranges an exit referendum?
***
Update 9 December 2011: The euro area statement has been revised, tentatively bringing the participants to 26 (all but UK). Here is the web page with the statement in all EU languages.
Ralf Grahn
Showing posts with label intergovernmentalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intergovernmentalism. Show all posts
Friday, 9 December 2011
Friday, 2 December 2011
Media reports: Sarkozy's euro speech in Toulon
I already tried to present the essentials of the speech by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, plus a few comments.
President Sarkozy's speech in Toulon is frontpage news in Europe, but what do the media reports emphasise?
The Financial Times sees the emerging shape of a last-ditch eurozone deal.
The New York Times runs through the views of the different proponents.
Reuters underlines Sarkozy's view that governments must keep control of the European Union, as well as the looming presidential election in five months.
The Guardian thinks that Sarkozy's focus appeared to be on a new deal enabling the leaders of the 17 eurozone countries to strike political bargains among themselves.
The Wall Street Journal brings up the internal challenge from the right-wing populist leader Marine Le Pen.
The BBC highlights the Franco-German ties central to Sarkozy's thinking.
EUobserver draws attention to Sarkozy's intergovernmental credo.
Financial Times Deutschland leads with an intergovernmental European Monetary Fund.
Ralf Grahn
President Sarkozy's speech in Toulon is frontpage news in Europe, but what do the media reports emphasise?
The Financial Times sees the emerging shape of a last-ditch eurozone deal.
The New York Times runs through the views of the different proponents.
Reuters underlines Sarkozy's view that governments must keep control of the European Union, as well as the looming presidential election in five months.
The Guardian thinks that Sarkozy's focus appeared to be on a new deal enabling the leaders of the 17 eurozone countries to strike political bargains among themselves.
The Wall Street Journal brings up the internal challenge from the right-wing populist leader Marine Le Pen.
The BBC highlights the Franco-German ties central to Sarkozy's thinking.
EUobserver draws attention to Sarkozy's intergovernmental credo.
Financial Times Deutschland leads with an intergovernmental European Monetary Fund.
Ralf Grahn
Sarkozy: French president and German chancellor to save euro
Yesterday, 1 December 2011, president Nicolas Sarkozy promised the French people later retirement, longer working weeks and smaller public deficits. Europe offers more sovereignty through added opportunities to act.
If France and Germany are united, Europe is united. On Monday the two countries are going to make proposals to guarantee the future of Europe. Sarkozy promised to do his utmost to create an area of stability and confidence at the heart of the eurozone.
Europe has to be rebuilt on more solidarity and discipline. More political responsibility means rejecting blind adherence to the rules of competition and free trade.
Europe needs more democracy. The accountable politicians make the decisions. No march towards supranationality. The heads of state or government and intergovernmentalism are the road ahead for European integration.
The eurozone needs more qualified majority voting [in the Council]. Europe has to protect its commercial interests and to rethink Schengen.
Europe has to end social and fiscal dumping among EU member states. Europe needs to protect its industries against global predators. Europe needs to protect the common agricultural policy.
The euro has to be defended. This is the reason for the heads of state or government as the government of the euro area. France has proposed a European Monetary Fund to serve as a bastion against speculation.
Sarkozy is confident that the European Central Bank will act. The euro area countries have to accept stricter budgetary discipline, including scrutiny of budgets, quick and automatic sanctions and a ”golden rule” on balanced budgets. Convergence is the key concept.
France and Germany campaign for a new Treaty.
Comment
Internally the all but confirmed presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy showed some bravery in Toulon by exhorting the voters to work longer and harder and to prepare for public belt-tightening.
More than ever since the Fouchet plan, Sarkozy assumes the Gaullist legacy to marginalise the EU institutions permanently, especially the Commission and the European Parliament.
He casts the president of France and the chancellor of Germany as the saviours of the euro currency, although even these two countries still have to agree on a joint proposal ahead of the European Council 9 December 2011.
The rest of the eurozone countries and particularly the other EU member states are relegated to pawn status.
Sarkozy's ferociously protectionist blasts may go down well in France, but how many among the 17 – now divided into core and non-core countries - or 27 welcome his calls to scrap free trade and the competition rules underpinning the internal market, as well as social and fiscal ”dumping” [later remembered and added: plus free movement and Schengen]?
Perhaps Sarkozy sees a golden opportunity to create a eurozone core in his own image, when a euro crash seems imminent without extraordinary measures and most of the new EU member states are still outside the eurozone, as are the open market economies Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Ralf Grahn
If France and Germany are united, Europe is united. On Monday the two countries are going to make proposals to guarantee the future of Europe. Sarkozy promised to do his utmost to create an area of stability and confidence at the heart of the eurozone.
Europe has to be rebuilt on more solidarity and discipline. More political responsibility means rejecting blind adherence to the rules of competition and free trade.
Europe needs more democracy. The accountable politicians make the decisions. No march towards supranationality. The heads of state or government and intergovernmentalism are the road ahead for European integration.
The eurozone needs more qualified majority voting [in the Council]. Europe has to protect its commercial interests and to rethink Schengen.
Europe has to end social and fiscal dumping among EU member states. Europe needs to protect its industries against global predators. Europe needs to protect the common agricultural policy.
The euro has to be defended. This is the reason for the heads of state or government as the government of the euro area. France has proposed a European Monetary Fund to serve as a bastion against speculation.
Sarkozy is confident that the European Central Bank will act. The euro area countries have to accept stricter budgetary discipline, including scrutiny of budgets, quick and automatic sanctions and a ”golden rule” on balanced budgets. Convergence is the key concept.
France and Germany campaign for a new Treaty.
Comment
Internally the all but confirmed presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy showed some bravery in Toulon by exhorting the voters to work longer and harder and to prepare for public belt-tightening.
More than ever since the Fouchet plan, Sarkozy assumes the Gaullist legacy to marginalise the EU institutions permanently, especially the Commission and the European Parliament.
He casts the president of France and the chancellor of Germany as the saviours of the euro currency, although even these two countries still have to agree on a joint proposal ahead of the European Council 9 December 2011.
The rest of the eurozone countries and particularly the other EU member states are relegated to pawn status.
Sarkozy's ferociously protectionist blasts may go down well in France, but how many among the 17 – now divided into core and non-core countries - or 27 welcome his calls to scrap free trade and the competition rules underpinning the internal market, as well as social and fiscal ”dumping” [later remembered and added: plus free movement and Schengen]?
Perhaps Sarkozy sees a golden opportunity to create a eurozone core in his own image, when a euro crash seems imminent without extraordinary measures and most of the new EU member states are still outside the eurozone, as are the open market economies Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Ralf Grahn
Friday, 19 August 2011
Merkel-Sarkozy letter: My reading
In the blog post Merkel and Sarkozy: Eurozone letter to Van Rompuy you find links to the letter on two websites in three languages, as well as transcripts of the press conference and some press releases.
Here is a link to the letter in English, as posted on the presidential Élysée web portal.
A few lines into the text, we start to wonder when the French and German leaders were last updated about growth figures and events on the financial markets and stock exchanges, as well as sentiments:
Merkel and Sarkozy refer to paragraph 16 of the declaration of heads of state or governement of the euro area and EU institutions (my addition, based on original) of 21 July 2011, which said:
In other words, the declaration referred to recognised institutional players, without inciting member state activism, although the letter somehow leaves the reader with such an impression.
We should be grateful for every effective and democratic proposal to stop the worsening slide. Let us quit nit-picking in order to look at how France and Germany propose to strenghten further the governance of the euro area, in line with existing treaties.
Eurozone governance
Whereas the leaders spoke about ”economic government” in both French and German at the press conference, the letter more humbly refers to enhanced ”economic governance” of the euro area.
However, the French version uses ”gouvernement économique” whereas the German version resembles the English translation. Strange, when speaking about key concepts.
The Twin Peaks solution of two annual summits could hardly be more intergovernmental, although only the regularity and the special chairman are new in this ongoing coup d'état.
Having just wanted to set their leading role in concrete, the wish to reinforce the eurogroup of finance ministers sounds as reassuring as the first pronouncement about human rights following a military coup.
The leaders must doubt the analytical capacities of the Commission, the ECB and the IMF, since the new European Stability Mechanism ESM should be equipped with ”complementing” analytical capacities in particular as regards debt and capital markets analysis. No prizes for guessing if transparency and accountability would decrease, or the ”unseen hand” of political remote control from the zone's main capitals increase.
Market reactions have shown that the proposals are seen as ineffective, but the more I think about them, the more I find them harmful as well.
Constitutional debt-brake
Merkel and Sarkozy propose a mandatory constitutional debt-brake for every euro area country. Germany already has one, and Sarkozy is trying to rally support for an internal balanced budget rule in France.
The member states are already internationally bound by the Stability and Growth Pact (1997), but how many of them are willingly going to enshrine such a rigid and permanent rule internally?
Although I am a firm supporter of sustainable public finances, hard and fast rules make bad law.
What happens when one or more euro area parliaments refuse to obey the diktat?
It sounds pompous, but essentially the euro area states have politically agreed to the Ecofin recommendations, so they should carry them out:
The leaders sent a signal on coordination of direct taxes, but the required unanimity for meaningful common rules remains as elusive as ever.
Macro-economic conditionality seems to be targeted at the weaker economies with potentially greater problems to master their public finances as well.
Euro area legislation (Article 136 TFEU) could give the Franco-German aspirations a shot in the arm.
Financial Transaction Tax
We can expect a joint proposal on a Financial Transaction Tax, also known as a Tobin Tax or Robin Hood Tax.
The United Kingdom has rejected it before seeing the proposals (Commission one included), so eurozone Ireland has been content to require an EU-wide tax. Merkel's coalition partner FDP has sent the same kind of signals.
The European public favours a tax on financial transactions, but without fiscal and political union this remains just another example of the limits of intergovernmental deal-making.
***
All in all, the Franco-German proposals would enhance the influence of the heads of state or government (of the biggest eurozone states) at the expense of the other EU institutions, without solving the fundamental problems of the euro area: lack of robust institutions and democratic legitimacy at European level.
How about the confidence factor?
BBC News tells us that European stock markets continued to fall today.
Ralf Grahn
Here is a link to the letter in English, as posted on the presidential Élysée web portal.
A few lines into the text, we start to wonder when the French and German leaders were last updated about growth figures and events on the financial markets and stock exchanges, as well as sentiments:
In the last months, the Heads of State and Government of the euro area have taken all the necessary measures in order to preserve the stability of the economic and monetary union.
Merkel and Sarkozy refer to paragraph 16 of the declaration of heads of state or governement of the euro area and EU institutions (my addition, based on original) of 21 July 2011, which said:
16. We invite the President of the European Council, in close consultation with the President of the Commission and the President of the Eurogroup, to make concrete proposals by October on how to improve working methods and enhance crisis management in the euro area.
In other words, the declaration referred to recognised institutional players, without inciting member state activism, although the letter somehow leaves the reader with such an impression.
We should be grateful for every effective and democratic proposal to stop the worsening slide. Let us quit nit-picking in order to look at how France and Germany propose to strenghten further the governance of the euro area, in line with existing treaties.
Eurozone governance
Whereas the leaders spoke about ”economic government” in both French and German at the press conference, the letter more humbly refers to enhanced ”economic governance” of the euro area.
However, the French version uses ”gouvernement économique” whereas the German version resembles the English translation. Strange, when speaking about key concepts.
The Twin Peaks solution of two annual summits could hardly be more intergovernmental, although only the regularity and the special chairman are new in this ongoing coup d'état.
Having just wanted to set their leading role in concrete, the wish to reinforce the eurogroup of finance ministers sounds as reassuring as the first pronouncement about human rights following a military coup.
The leaders must doubt the analytical capacities of the Commission, the ECB and the IMF, since the new European Stability Mechanism ESM should be equipped with ”complementing” analytical capacities in particular as regards debt and capital markets analysis. No prizes for guessing if transparency and accountability would decrease, or the ”unseen hand” of political remote control from the zone's main capitals increase.
Market reactions have shown that the proposals are seen as ineffective, but the more I think about them, the more I find them harmful as well.
Constitutional debt-brake
Merkel and Sarkozy propose a mandatory constitutional debt-brake for every euro area country. Germany already has one, and Sarkozy is trying to rally support for an internal balanced budget rule in France.
The member states are already internationally bound by the Stability and Growth Pact (1997), but how many of them are willingly going to enshrine such a rigid and permanent rule internally?
Although I am a firm supporter of sustainable public finances, hard and fast rules make bad law.
What happens when one or more euro area parliaments refuse to obey the diktat?
It sounds pompous, but essentially the euro area states have politically agreed to the Ecofin recommendations, so they should carry them out:
All Member States of the euro area should confirm without delay their resolve to swiftly implement the European recommendations for fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, especially as regards labour-market, competition in services and pensions policy, and adapt appropriately their draft budget.
The leaders sent a signal on coordination of direct taxes, but the required unanimity for meaningful common rules remains as elusive as ever.
Macro-economic conditionality seems to be targeted at the weaker economies with potentially greater problems to master their public finances as well.
Euro area legislation (Article 136 TFEU) could give the Franco-German aspirations a shot in the arm.
Financial Transaction Tax
We can expect a joint proposal on a Financial Transaction Tax, also known as a Tobin Tax or Robin Hood Tax.
The United Kingdom has rejected it before seeing the proposals (Commission one included), so eurozone Ireland has been content to require an EU-wide tax. Merkel's coalition partner FDP has sent the same kind of signals.
The European public favours a tax on financial transactions, but without fiscal and political union this remains just another example of the limits of intergovernmental deal-making.
***
All in all, the Franco-German proposals would enhance the influence of the heads of state or government (of the biggest eurozone states) at the expense of the other EU institutions, without solving the fundamental problems of the euro area: lack of robust institutions and democratic legitimacy at European level.
How about the confidence factor?
BBC News tells us that European stock markets continued to fall today.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 18 August 2011
Eurozone leaders talk and shares fall
This afternoon BBC Business News reports that Shares fall in Europe and US as confidence drops (18 August 2011).
Why are the markets so ungrateful after chancellor Angela Merkel and president Nicolas Sarkozy promised the eurozone ”economic government”, consisting of two annual summits for heads of state or government in the euro area, as well as constitutionally enshrined debt-brakes?
Perhaps the commentariat could give us a few clues.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard's Telegraph blog post In defence of PIGS (17 August 2011) named the non-decisions succinctly:
The LabourList post by Jon Worth argues that it is better to save the Euro and the EU through fiscal integration than provoke the mother of all financial crises: The Eurozone predicament is undesirable, not unexplainable (16 August 2011).
Professor Karl Whelan argues on the IIEA blog that it is certainly unlikely that a continent-wide campaign to pass rigid fiscal rules that run counter to textbook macroeconomic principles will do much to boost the Euro’s popularity: The Merkozy Summit – Bad Politics, Bad Economics (17 August 2011).
Vihar Geogiev writes on European Union Law that this proposal will not solve the urgent problems of the eurozone. Any further dodging of the eurobond issue will only add damage to the eurozone economy. The proposals on ”economic government” stay within the logic of intergovernmentalism, which is a recipe for failure: Dissecting the New Franco-German Proposal for the Eurozone (17 August 2011).
***
While effective and democratic European level solutions remain officially banned, remember to check old and new comments on Bloggingportal.eu about the continuing eurozone descent.
Ralf Grahn
Why are the markets so ungrateful after chancellor Angela Merkel and president Nicolas Sarkozy promised the eurozone ”economic government”, consisting of two annual summits for heads of state or government in the euro area, as well as constitutionally enshrined debt-brakes?
Perhaps the commentariat could give us a few clues.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard's Telegraph blog post In defence of PIGS (17 August 2011) named the non-decisions succinctly:
No eurobonds, no fiscal union, no boost to the EFSF rescue fund, no change of policy on the ECB’s mandate. Zilch.
The LabourList post by Jon Worth argues that it is better to save the Euro and the EU through fiscal integration than provoke the mother of all financial crises: The Eurozone predicament is undesirable, not unexplainable (16 August 2011).
Professor Karl Whelan argues on the IIEA blog that it is certainly unlikely that a continent-wide campaign to pass rigid fiscal rules that run counter to textbook macroeconomic principles will do much to boost the Euro’s popularity: The Merkozy Summit – Bad Politics, Bad Economics (17 August 2011).
Vihar Geogiev writes on European Union Law that this proposal will not solve the urgent problems of the eurozone. Any further dodging of the eurobond issue will only add damage to the eurozone economy. The proposals on ”economic government” stay within the logic of intergovernmentalism, which is a recipe for failure: Dissecting the New Franco-German Proposal for the Eurozone (17 August 2011).
***
While effective and democratic European level solutions remain officially banned, remember to check old and new comments on Bloggingportal.eu about the continuing eurozone descent.
Ralf Grahn
Friday, 24 September 2010
European Union challenges: Parliament or governments? Opening shots
This September 2010 has been a fertile month for a renewed debate about the fundamental traits of the European Union, although the discussion takes place between the institutions, unnoticed by most EU citizens and with scant reference to them (us). Is this the “Brussels bubble” at its best or its worst?
Here is an introduction to positions taken by a few protagonists: José Manuel Barroso, Martin Schulz, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Michał Tomasz Kamiński and Herman Van Rompuy.
José Manuel Barroso
The president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, outlined the “State of the Union” in the European Parliament 7 September 2010. He wanted to strengthen the bonds between the Commission, which promotes the general interest, and the directly elected Parliament, which represents the citizens of the EU:
EP group leaders
According to the EP press release with a summary of the debate, the Socialist and Democrat group leader Martin Schulz promised to support the European Commission in efforts to defend the "community method" against "intergovernmentalism".
For the Greens, Daniel Cohn-Bendit asked whether the EU is headed towards "an intergovernmental Europe or a Community".
Using the same terms, but heading in the opposite direction, Michał Tomasz Kamiński for the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group told the House that: "The 27 member states are going to stay there, they are elected by citizens. We want balance between community and what is intergovernmental in Europe."
Herman Van Rompuy
On 20 September 2010 the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy spoke about Europe’s great challenges at the Sciences-Po in Paris (blog post one here, post two here, speech in French here). Before explaining why the member states are necessary in his view, Van Rompuy laid out the two models of governance (page 5-6):
“A false debate” - is it really that simple?
Where do the citizens of the European Union fit in?
These were just the opening shots. There is more to explore.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. In two days, Sunday 26 September 2010, people all over Europe celebrate the European Day of Languages, organised by the Council of Europe and the European Union as an inspiration to language learning.
For bloggers in Europe there is a special event, which takes place on the Internet: the Day of Multilingual Blogging. The blog post behind the link offers suggestions on how you can participate, as well as information about the event, the Facebook page and the Twitter hashtag #babel. Make the most of your opportunities - start by joining!
Here is an introduction to positions taken by a few protagonists: José Manuel Barroso, Martin Schulz, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Michał Tomasz Kamiński and Herman Van Rompuy.
José Manuel Barroso
The president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, outlined the “State of the Union” in the European Parliament 7 September 2010. He wanted to strengthen the bonds between the Commission, which promotes the general interest, and the directly elected Parliament, which represents the citizens of the EU:
The secret of Europe's success is its unique Community model. More than ever, the Commission must drive the political agenda with its vision and proposals.
I have called for a special relationship between the Commission and Parliament, the two Community institutions par excellence. I am intensifying my political cooperation with you.
EP group leaders
According to the EP press release with a summary of the debate, the Socialist and Democrat group leader Martin Schulz promised to support the European Commission in efforts to defend the "community method" against "intergovernmentalism".
For the Greens, Daniel Cohn-Bendit asked whether the EU is headed towards "an intergovernmental Europe or a Community".
Using the same terms, but heading in the opposite direction, Michał Tomasz Kamiński for the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group told the House that: "The 27 member states are going to stay there, they are elected by citizens. We want balance between community and what is intergovernmental in Europe."
Herman Van Rompuy
On 20 September 2010 the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy spoke about Europe’s great challenges at the Sciences-Po in Paris (blog post one here, post two here, speech in French here). Before explaining why the member states are necessary in his view, Van Rompuy laid out the two models of governance (page 5-6):
Avant l’été, des voix se sont élevées pour critiquer ce rôle de l’institution que je préside. Un vieux schéma (que les étudiants connaissent sans doute de leurs manuels de droit européen) a fait sa réapparition : la « Méthode Communautaire » serait menacée par l’irruption de l’« intergouvernemental », sous la forme notamment du Conseil européen.
(Pour les non-initiés (s’il y en a ici !) : on appelle Méthode Communautaire la méthode spécifique qu’a développée la Communauté européenne pour prendre des décisions. Dans la forme pure, la Commission fait une proposition, le Conseil vote à la majorité, le Parlement co-légifère, la Cour est compétente pour juger l’application de la règle par les Etats ; un système d’équilibres qui garantirait tant l’efficacité que la légitimité.
L’intergouvernemental, à l’inverse, est une méthode de coopération où les gouvernements nationaux et non pas des institutions communes ont le premier rang, tels qu’aux sommets du G8 ou G20.)
J’ai entendu parler de ce schéma binaire, opposant le bien et le mal, au Parlement européen et ailleurs.
À mon avis, c’est un faux débat.
“A false debate” - is it really that simple?
Where do the citizens of the European Union fit in?
These were just the opening shots. There is more to explore.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. In two days, Sunday 26 September 2010, people all over Europe celebrate the European Day of Languages, organised by the Council of Europe and the European Union as an inspiration to language learning.
For bloggers in Europe there is a special event, which takes place on the Internet: the Day of Multilingual Blogging. The blog post behind the link offers suggestions on how you can participate, as well as information about the event, the Facebook page and the Twitter hashtag #babel. Make the most of your opportunities - start by joining!
Friday, 13 November 2009
Intergovernmental EU: Freely cooperating, sovereign nation states
When I wrote the 10 November 2009 blog post EU top nominations: Edifying spectacle, I did not know how soon and how emphatically this picture of “freely cooperating, sovereign nation states” would be confirmed, by Sweden’s prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, the (s)election procedures and Charlemagne’s notebook.
Swedish prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, who heads the current EU Council presidency, talked about the difficult balancing act:
Reinfeldt emphasised that it is important to have an open dialogue among the heads of state and government about which individuals the EU wants to see in the three posts, but he also stressed that this type of negotiation must not take place via the media.
“It is my job to take responsibility for the process and show respect for the candidates' possible current duties. I have learnt from experience to be careful about speculating on the names being discussed", said Fredrik Reinfeldt (11 November 2009).
***
Openness between heads of government
Speaking about an open dialogue, Reinfeldt limits it to the charmed circle of heads of state and government.
At national level, these leading politicians are criticised, sometimes unfairly. They often have to take abuse of the worst kind, but the (s)election procedure of the European Council offers the opposite.
Our leaders, with their preferences and aspirations, are treated as tender sucklings, unable to meet the light of day. Their sensitivities are paramount. The citizens of the European Union are like the devotees crowding in Saint Peter’s Square, waiting for a puff of white smoke.
***
Charlemagne’s notebook
Charlemagne’s notebook shows the guts to stand up for the intergovernmental and diplomatic paradigms, in the blog post The EU top jobs race should be secretive and elitist (12 November 2009).
This is the logical position to take, if you want a union of freely cooperating nation states and national leaders. Opacity, not to say total black-out, is the price to pay, so be happy to pay it, if intergovernmentalism is your persuasion. Don’t whimper!
If you want openness and real EU level democracy, you have to look beyond the Lisbon Treaty.
Quod erat demonstrandum.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. The Euroblogs aggregated on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu expose the real EUSSR. Read and comment! You can also propose an interesting blog post or a whole new blog (click Contribute).
Swedish prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt, who heads the current EU Council presidency, talked about the difficult balancing act:
“We must of course consider the whole Union in this, and look for a balance of candidates based on many different aspects: male or female, from a large or small Member State, in the east or the west, the north or the south".
Reinfeldt emphasised that it is important to have an open dialogue among the heads of state and government about which individuals the EU wants to see in the three posts, but he also stressed that this type of negotiation must not take place via the media.
“It is my job to take responsibility for the process and show respect for the candidates' possible current duties. I have learnt from experience to be careful about speculating on the names being discussed", said Fredrik Reinfeldt (11 November 2009).
***
Openness between heads of government
Speaking about an open dialogue, Reinfeldt limits it to the charmed circle of heads of state and government.
At national level, these leading politicians are criticised, sometimes unfairly. They often have to take abuse of the worst kind, but the (s)election procedure of the European Council offers the opposite.
Our leaders, with their preferences and aspirations, are treated as tender sucklings, unable to meet the light of day. Their sensitivities are paramount. The citizens of the European Union are like the devotees crowding in Saint Peter’s Square, waiting for a puff of white smoke.
***
Charlemagne’s notebook
Charlemagne’s notebook shows the guts to stand up for the intergovernmental and diplomatic paradigms, in the blog post The EU top jobs race should be secretive and elitist (12 November 2009).
This is the logical position to take, if you want a union of freely cooperating nation states and national leaders. Opacity, not to say total black-out, is the price to pay, so be happy to pay it, if intergovernmentalism is your persuasion. Don’t whimper!
If you want openness and real EU level democracy, you have to look beyond the Lisbon Treaty.
Quod erat demonstrandum.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. The Euroblogs aggregated on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu expose the real EUSSR. Read and comment! You can also propose an interesting blog post or a whole new blog (click Contribute).
Friday, 15 May 2009
EPIN: Weak Barroso Commission
The European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) has published a working paper: The European Commission 2004-09: A politically weakened institution? Views from the National Capitals (No 23 / May 2009; 20 pages), which compiles the views of 26 EU researchers.
The main findings are devastating for the Barroso Commission and worrying with regard to the European general interest:
“First, the Commission remains at the centre of European decision-making process. At the same time however, its political position seems to have weakened since 2004. The national capitals’ perception is that it has lost out vis-à-vis other institutions, especially the Council of Ministers. Within the Council the Commission is perceived as being largely dependent on bigger member states. This view is shared by both the bigger (especially France and Germany) and smaller nations.
Second, the Commission seems to be losing political leadership in the Union. It is more and more perceived as serving the interests of the larger member states, sometimes even at the expense of smaller ones. The dominant perception is that among the European institutions the lowest common denominator is no longer determined as it was by the Council, because the Commission is increasingly anticipating national positions at an earlier stage and taking them into account at the preparatory level. Hence, it is no longer the institution that seeks the higher standards of ‘Community interest’ – this may well be the role for the new European Parliament.
Even if not all countries share these perceptions, there was not a single member country claiming that the Commission is gaining (rather than losing) ground vis-à-vis the other institutions; that it has improved its independence record against the larger nations or that it seeks higher standards rather than the lowest common denominator. “
***
Successes and failures
For those who care to read the report, it contains an overview of the Commission’s perceived successes and failures during the last five years. In this way, it serves as a reminder of the major European policy issues, including bilateral questions between the Commission and individual member states.
The Commission’s (lack of) response to the financial and economic crisis was seen as its greatest failure.
The institutional shift came next:
“The second single most popular feeling in national capitals is that the Barroso Commission lacks political leadership. There is an argument put out across the Union that the Commission’s dependency on member states has increased to such an extent that it challenges
1) the inter-institutional balance;
2) the balance between the big and small members;
3) the institution’s capacity to uphold and guard the prerequisites of the acquis communautaire, notably vis-à-vis the bigger member states;
4) the Commission’s collegiality and
5) [the] its future effectiveness. “
***
New Commission
There is an Annex, where probable renewed mandates and exiting Commissioners are presented, based on information from the capitals.
***
Comment
This blog has argued that the European Union has become increasingly intergovernmentalist, with the European Council (heads of state or government), especially from a few larger member states, taking over more and more of the lead role (including failures to act), in tandem with the Council (ministers). In parallel, the Barroso Commission has been weak(ened).
The EPIN report supports these observations, although it refers only to increased intergovernmentalism and the role of the Council of Ministers, without discussing the European Council. The role of the heads of state or government, especially in the greater member states, would have merited special attention.
Effective and legitimate government?
Outside the scope of the report, the weaknesses of the existing institutional framework, including the incremental reforms by the Lisbon Treaty, require critical discussion. Effective and legitimate European level government won’t be found inside the box.
Done deal?
Politically, ahead of the European elections, the report questions the wisdom as well as the motives of heads of state or government to support a new term as President of the Commission for José Manuel Barroso. The failure of the Europarties to field alternative candidates is a lamentable loss for European level democracy.
Ralf Grahn
The main findings are devastating for the Barroso Commission and worrying with regard to the European general interest:
“First, the Commission remains at the centre of European decision-making process. At the same time however, its political position seems to have weakened since 2004. The national capitals’ perception is that it has lost out vis-à-vis other institutions, especially the Council of Ministers. Within the Council the Commission is perceived as being largely dependent on bigger member states. This view is shared by both the bigger (especially France and Germany) and smaller nations.
Second, the Commission seems to be losing political leadership in the Union. It is more and more perceived as serving the interests of the larger member states, sometimes even at the expense of smaller ones. The dominant perception is that among the European institutions the lowest common denominator is no longer determined as it was by the Council, because the Commission is increasingly anticipating national positions at an earlier stage and taking them into account at the preparatory level. Hence, it is no longer the institution that seeks the higher standards of ‘Community interest’ – this may well be the role for the new European Parliament.
Even if not all countries share these perceptions, there was not a single member country claiming that the Commission is gaining (rather than losing) ground vis-à-vis the other institutions; that it has improved its independence record against the larger nations or that it seeks higher standards rather than the lowest common denominator. “
***
Successes and failures
For those who care to read the report, it contains an overview of the Commission’s perceived successes and failures during the last five years. In this way, it serves as a reminder of the major European policy issues, including bilateral questions between the Commission and individual member states.
The Commission’s (lack of) response to the financial and economic crisis was seen as its greatest failure.
The institutional shift came next:
“The second single most popular feeling in national capitals is that the Barroso Commission lacks political leadership. There is an argument put out across the Union that the Commission’s dependency on member states has increased to such an extent that it challenges
1) the inter-institutional balance;
2) the balance between the big and small members;
3) the institution’s capacity to uphold and guard the prerequisites of the acquis communautaire, notably vis-à-vis the bigger member states;
4) the Commission’s collegiality and
5) [the] its future effectiveness. “
***
New Commission
There is an Annex, where probable renewed mandates and exiting Commissioners are presented, based on information from the capitals.
***
Comment
This blog has argued that the European Union has become increasingly intergovernmentalist, with the European Council (heads of state or government), especially from a few larger member states, taking over more and more of the lead role (including failures to act), in tandem with the Council (ministers). In parallel, the Barroso Commission has been weak(ened).
The EPIN report supports these observations, although it refers only to increased intergovernmentalism and the role of the Council of Ministers, without discussing the European Council. The role of the heads of state or government, especially in the greater member states, would have merited special attention.
Effective and legitimate government?
Outside the scope of the report, the weaknesses of the existing institutional framework, including the incremental reforms by the Lisbon Treaty, require critical discussion. Effective and legitimate European level government won’t be found inside the box.
Done deal?
Politically, ahead of the European elections, the report questions the wisdom as well as the motives of heads of state or government to support a new term as President of the Commission for José Manuel Barroso. The failure of the Europarties to field alternative candidates is a lamentable loss for European level democracy.
Ralf Grahn
Monday, 13 April 2009
Europe’s road to oblivion
The BBC’s Mark Mardell wrote an interesting post on his Euroblog on 9 April 2009 A battle with Eurobabble.
During the USA – EU summit president Barack Obama represented the United States, but nobody represented Europe. Instead a number of national prime ministers or presidents addressed each issue.
How is the United States supposed to communicate with a cacophony of voices?
(An aside: Is strenuous American support for EU enlargement going to diminish the communication problems?)
***
Confusion can reign at national level, too. According to Helsingin Sanomat Halonen ja Vanhanen kehuivat Obama-henkeä (5 April 2009) both prime minister Matti Vanhanen and president Tarja Halonen denied that their competing claims to address the summit was the cause of both being denied the chance to speak.
***
Are there any lessons for the defenders of intergovernmentalism: freely cooperating sovereign nations (former great powers and all)?
They already have what they want: Bickering member states and leaders competing for two and a half minutes in the limelight are the political reality of the European Union’s supposedly common foreign policy.
Europe’s road to oblivion is paved with petty ambitions.
The real question is what the citizens of the European Union need for a better future.
Ralf Grahn
During the USA – EU summit president Barack Obama represented the United States, but nobody represented Europe. Instead a number of national prime ministers or presidents addressed each issue.
How is the United States supposed to communicate with a cacophony of voices?
(An aside: Is strenuous American support for EU enlargement going to diminish the communication problems?)
***
Confusion can reign at national level, too. According to Helsingin Sanomat Halonen ja Vanhanen kehuivat Obama-henkeä (5 April 2009) both prime minister Matti Vanhanen and president Tarja Halonen denied that their competing claims to address the summit was the cause of both being denied the chance to speak.
***
Are there any lessons for the defenders of intergovernmentalism: freely cooperating sovereign nations (former great powers and all)?
They already have what they want: Bickering member states and leaders competing for two and a half minutes in the limelight are the political reality of the European Union’s supposedly common foreign policy.
Europe’s road to oblivion is paved with petty ambitions.
The real question is what the citizens of the European Union need for a better future.
Ralf Grahn
Monday, 27 October 2008
Europe: Populism or democracy?
Ahead of the European elections in June 2009, we have seen two political trends. One the one hand, after the historic EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 and since the beginning of the current Commission, the communitarian spirit seems to have ceded to increasing intergovernmentalism and national self-interest. The financial turmoil has accelerated both nationalistic responses and intergovernmental summiteering, with various ‘ad hoc’ initiatives thrown in for good measure. The Treaty of Lisbon would have brought some belated efficiency gains after the expansion to 27 members, but the Lisbon Treaty fails miserably in creating a European level democracy.
On the other hand, popular estrangement has increasingly favoured nationalistic and populist parties in national and sub-national elections. Referendums, purportedly on pan-European issues like the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, have boosted anti-reformist and self-absorbed movements, left or right, in France, the Netherlands and Ireland.
Municipal elections in Finland are hardly hot stuff for international media generally, but the spectacular gains by the populist True Finns are the latest indication of anti-European sentiments on the rise. Although the True Finns captured less than six per cent of the vote, their swayed almost six times as many voters as four years ago.
The International Edition of Helsingin Sanomat has more:
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/MUNICIPAL+ELECTIONS+SUNDAY+2345+National+Coalition+Party+largest+party+True+Finns+big+winners+gains+for+Greens+/1135240557573
***
More than ever, pan-European solutions and actions are needed to enhance our security and to regain our prosperity, but populations are increasingly rejecting the European leaders’ intergovernmentalist and functionalist project.
The group of wise persons has been expressly forbidden to even think about so called institutional issues, but today’s challenges do not call for institutional tinkering in the customary manner.
The wise persons ─ and the European leaders ─ have to look at the foundations of the European project. Without democratic legitimacy and accountability the European Union is running aground. Only a European Union based on its citizens can give us the foundations we need to weather the storms.
Ralf Grahn
On the other hand, popular estrangement has increasingly favoured nationalistic and populist parties in national and sub-national elections. Referendums, purportedly on pan-European issues like the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, have boosted anti-reformist and self-absorbed movements, left or right, in France, the Netherlands and Ireland.
Municipal elections in Finland are hardly hot stuff for international media generally, but the spectacular gains by the populist True Finns are the latest indication of anti-European sentiments on the rise. Although the True Finns captured less than six per cent of the vote, their swayed almost six times as many voters as four years ago.
The International Edition of Helsingin Sanomat has more:
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/MUNICIPAL+ELECTIONS+SUNDAY+2345+National+Coalition+Party+largest+party+True+Finns+big+winners+gains+for+Greens+/1135240557573
***
More than ever, pan-European solutions and actions are needed to enhance our security and to regain our prosperity, but populations are increasingly rejecting the European leaders’ intergovernmentalist and functionalist project.
The group of wise persons has been expressly forbidden to even think about so called institutional issues, but today’s challenges do not call for institutional tinkering in the customary manner.
The wise persons ─ and the European leaders ─ have to look at the foundations of the European project. Without democratic legitimacy and accountability the European Union is running aground. Only a European Union based on its citizens can give us the foundations we need to weather the storms.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 10 January 2008
EU Treaty of Lisbon: CFSP competence
Strong or brittle? Feet of iron or feet of clay? The US Constitution or the Articles of Confederation? These questions deserve some thought when we look at the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union as laid out in the Treaty of Lisbon.
***
Basically, you can approach the European Union from two different angles. You can try to ponder what the Union could do for its citizens: external and internal security as well as enhancing prosperity. Or you can reason from a domestic perspective.
A sincere form of ‘special relationship’ would be to emulate the success of the United States of America. The main purposes of that Union were succinctly put by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, number XXIII:
“The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.
The principal purposes to be answered by the union are these – the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.”
***
According to the Reform Treaty, the scope of EU competence covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
We have to bear in mind the joint declarations 13 (see previous posting) and 14 (see below), which emphasize the continued freedom of Member States to pursue their national foreign and security policies, regardless of the common interest.
The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is almost exclusively in the hands of the Member States. The European Council and the Council rule, if they can reach unanimous decisions (as a rule).
The intergovernmental nature of the CFSP means that democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament and judicial review by the Court of Justice are nearly completely excluded. (The external action of the Commission is placed under intergovernmental tutelage.)
If not overridden by national policies or paralysed by dissenting views and vetoes, the Union conducts, defines and implements the CFSP, meant to lead to increasing convergence of Member States’ actions in the long run. The loyalty, solidarity and compliance of Member States are keys to effective common action on the world stage.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) amends Article 11 TEU. In the consolidated version paragraphs 1 and 2 have replaced the existing paragraph 1, and the present paragraph 2 has been renumbered paragraph 3 and amended slightly.
Article 11
1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 25b of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 240a of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
2. Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.
3. The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area.
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles.
***
Joint Declaration (number 14) concerning the common foreign and security policy continues in the same vein as Declaration 13 to subtract from the consistency of common policy by underlining the independent policies of the Member States, especially the Members of the UN Security Council, and the intergovernmental nature of the policies the Member States happen to agree on, as well as the “specific nature” of the Member States’ security and defence policy:
“In addition to the specific rules and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, the Conference underlines that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international organisations, including a Member State’s membership of the Security Council of the United Nations.
The Conference also notes that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament.
The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the Common Security and Defence Policy do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the Member States.”
***
Next time we look at the foreign policy instruments of the EU.
Ralf Grahn
***
Basically, you can approach the European Union from two different angles. You can try to ponder what the Union could do for its citizens: external and internal security as well as enhancing prosperity. Or you can reason from a domestic perspective.
A sincere form of ‘special relationship’ would be to emulate the success of the United States of America. The main purposes of that Union were succinctly put by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, number XXIII:
“The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.
The principal purposes to be answered by the union are these – the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.”
***
According to the Reform Treaty, the scope of EU competence covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
We have to bear in mind the joint declarations 13 (see previous posting) and 14 (see below), which emphasize the continued freedom of Member States to pursue their national foreign and security policies, regardless of the common interest.
The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is almost exclusively in the hands of the Member States. The European Council and the Council rule, if they can reach unanimous decisions (as a rule).
The intergovernmental nature of the CFSP means that democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament and judicial review by the Court of Justice are nearly completely excluded. (The external action of the Commission is placed under intergovernmental tutelage.)
If not overridden by national policies or paralysed by dissenting views and vetoes, the Union conducts, defines and implements the CFSP, meant to lead to increasing convergence of Member States’ actions in the long run. The loyalty, solidarity and compliance of Member States are keys to effective common action on the world stage.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) amends Article 11 TEU. In the consolidated version paragraphs 1 and 2 have replaced the existing paragraph 1, and the present paragraph 2 has been renumbered paragraph 3 and amended slightly.
Article 11
1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 25b of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 240a of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
2. Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.
3. The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area.
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles.
***
Joint Declaration (number 14) concerning the common foreign and security policy continues in the same vein as Declaration 13 to subtract from the consistency of common policy by underlining the independent policies of the Member States, especially the Members of the UN Security Council, and the intergovernmental nature of the policies the Member States happen to agree on, as well as the “specific nature” of the Member States’ security and defence policy:
“In addition to the specific rules and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, the Conference underlines that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international organisations, including a Member State’s membership of the Security Council of the United Nations.
The Conference also notes that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament.
The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the Common Security and Defence Policy do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the Member States.”
***
Next time we look at the foreign policy instruments of the EU.
Ralf Grahn
Sunday, 30 September 2007
Update
A democratic European Union is the challenge for the 21st century as the struggle for local and national representative democracy was during the 19th century.
During the last eleven days I have written in Finnish on themes concerning democracy, inter-governmentalism, European languages, the Reform Treaty, the group of wise men, Jens Peter Bonde MEP, EU politics of the Finnish government and the fault lines of the present EU structure.
The posts can be found on:
http://grahnlaw.blogs.fi
They have the following headings:
Sekavuudesta selkeyteen
Kansallisten eliittien kaappaama EU
Protektionismille huutia
Le Taurillon
Euroopan kielten päivä
Reformisopimus
Mugabelle käsipäivää?
Euroopan kielten päivänä
Suomesta löytyy viisas
Väärä oppi ojaan kaataa
Jens Peter Bonde
Hallitus terästäytyy
Vanhasen teesit
Järki ja tunteet
Kurkkudirektiivi
Pääasiat ja sivuseikat
Regards
Ralf Grahn
During the last eleven days I have written in Finnish on themes concerning democracy, inter-governmentalism, European languages, the Reform Treaty, the group of wise men, Jens Peter Bonde MEP, EU politics of the Finnish government and the fault lines of the present EU structure.
The posts can be found on:
http://grahnlaw.blogs.fi
They have the following headings:
Sekavuudesta selkeyteen
Kansallisten eliittien kaappaama EU
Protektionismille huutia
Le Taurillon
Euroopan kielten päivä
Reformisopimus
Mugabelle käsipäivää?
Euroopan kielten päivänä
Suomesta löytyy viisas
Väärä oppi ojaan kaataa
Jens Peter Bonde
Hallitus terästäytyy
Vanhasen teesit
Järki ja tunteet
Kurkkudirektiivi
Pääasiat ja sivuseikat
Regards
Ralf Grahn
Tuesday, 24 July 2007
Portugals öppenhet (in Swedish)
Regeringskonferensen för Europeiska unionens fördragsreform inleddes i går i tecken av samförstånd. Europeiska rådet gav under midsommaren efter sega förhandlingar konferensen ett synnerligen detaljerat uppdrag, så arbetet borde rimligtvis löpa smärtfritt, om inte några mindre förutsägbara länder plötsligt får för sig att ställa till bråk.
Portugal, som sköter ordförandeskapet i EU-rådet, har lovat hålla fast vid det överenskomna mandatet. Dessutom har Portugal lovat ge unionens medborgare möjligheter att följa med hur regeringskonferensen framskrider genom att publicera dokumenten på webben.
Rådets sekretariat hade berett utkast till nya fördrag jämte bilagor. Redan i går fanns de tillgängliga via ordförandeskapets webbsidor, visserligen enbart på franska.
Som namnet regeringskonferens anger är unionens medborgare inte inviterade eller involverade, men kan i någon mån hålla sig informerade.
Ralf Grahn
Portugal, som sköter ordförandeskapet i EU-rådet, har lovat hålla fast vid det överenskomna mandatet. Dessutom har Portugal lovat ge unionens medborgare möjligheter att följa med hur regeringskonferensen framskrider genom att publicera dokumenten på webben.
Rådets sekretariat hade berett utkast till nya fördrag jämte bilagor. Redan i går fanns de tillgängliga via ordförandeskapets webbsidor, visserligen enbart på franska.
Som namnet regeringskonferens anger är unionens medborgare inte inviterade eller involverade, men kan i någon mån hålla sig informerade.
Ralf Grahn
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