Free movement for workers is one of the most important freedoms for ordinary citizens of the European Union, but if they lose their earned benefits this freedom becomes an empty shell. Only by adding (or more precisely, aggregating) these benefits can migrant workers really grab the opportunities offered by the common job market offered by the European Economic Area (EEA).
Social security benefits have to be calculated and paid across national borders to millions of workers and self-employed persons.
The EU Treaty of Lisbon lays the foundations for swifter and more comprehensive legislation on migrant workers’ rights by abolishing the requirement for unanimous Council acts, but qualified majority voting (QMV) is dampened by the installation of a so called emergency brake, which offers an obstructing member state the opportunity to postpone and ultimately scrap a proposal.
***
In the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL), under Free movement of workers, the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007) made the following amendments to Article 42 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). See OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/54:
51) Article 42 shall be amended as follows:
(a) in the first paragraph, the words ‘migrant workers and their dependants:’ shall be replaced by ‘employed and self-employed migrant workers and their dependants:’;
(b) the last paragraph shall be replaced by the following:
‘Where a member of the Council declares that a draft legislative act referred to in the first subparagraph would affect important aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system, it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council. In that case, the ordinary legislative procedure shall be suspended. After discussion, the European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, either:
(a) refer the draft back to the Council, which shall terminate the suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure; or
(b) take no action or request the Commission to submit a new proposal; in that case, the act originally proposed shall be deemed not to have been adopted.’.
***
Luckily, the Council has at least seen to that there is a consolidation of the current treaties, the TEU and the TEC, the latest one in OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/58-59, where we find Article 42 TEC as it is today:
Article 42 TEC
The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers; to this end, it shall make arrangements to secure for migrant workers and their dependants:
(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the several countries;
(b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member States.
The Council shall act unanimously throughout the procedure referred to in Article 251.
***
Whilst looking forward to the belated consolidated versions of the Lisbon Treaty to be published by the Council in all the treaty languages 15 April 2008, we piece together the provision according to the instructions given.
The express amendments are straightforward, the horizontal amendments to be kept in mind (ordinary legislative procedure) and the new numbering inserted. Additionally, it is helpful to see the context of each Article.
We should end up with a provision looking like this:
Part Three ‘Policies and internal actions of the Union’
Title III (renumbered Title IV) ‘Free movement of persons, services and capital’
Chapter 1 ‘Workers’
Article 42 TFEU (ToL), renumbered Article 48 TFEU
The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, adopt such measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers; to this end, it shall make arrangements to secure for employed and self-employed migrant workers and their dependants:
(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the several countries;
(b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member States.
Where a member of the Council declares that a draft legislative act referred to in the first subparagraph would affect important aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system, it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council. In that case, the ordinary legislative procedure shall be suspended. After discussion, the European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, either:
(a) refer the draft back to the Council, which shall terminate the suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure; or
(b) take no action or request the Commission to submit a new proposal; in that case, the act originally proposed shall be deemed not to have been adopted.
***
I then check my result against four of those who already have offered the public readable consolidated versions, namely the almost perfect consolidated Lisbon Treaties of the IIEA (Peadar รณ Broin), the FCO (Anonymous), Statewatch (Steve Peers) and ‘Der Vertrag von Lissabon’ (in German; Klemens H. Fischer).
Naturally, most people need only an accurate, readable text. They are advised to turn to one of the consolidations directly.
Since there is a daily demand for consolidated versions, there is a steady stream of visitors to this blog as a result of web searches. Sadly, many seem to stumble upon earlier and (even) less complete posts.
Therefore, I take the opportunity to refer the interested readers to my latest post on existing consolidated language versions ‘Consolidated EU Lisbon Treaty Update 29 March 2008’, and to the links presented in that post.
If kind readers bring other consolidations, official documents or secondary literature on the Lisbon Treaty to my attention, there may be cause for coming updates.
***
The objective of this blog is to offer the reader the tools to compare the current treaties Article by Article with the Lisbon Treaty, including the preceding steps, the draft Constitution and the Constitutional Treaty. (Depending on the situation, some suggestions for further reading may be offered about the politics and secondary legislation in question.)
***
Thus, our following stop is the European Convention and its draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The proposed Article III-21 looked like this (OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/31):
Article III-21 Draft Constitution
In the field of social security, European laws or framework laws shall establish such measures as are necessary to bring about freedom of movement for workers by introducing a system to secure for employed and self-employed migrant workers and their dependants:
(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the several countries;
(b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member States.
***
This is one instance where the IGC 2004 did not content itself with giving the work of the European Convention its blessing. Article III-136 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe introduced new elements (OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/60):
Article III-136 Constitution
1. In the field of social security, European laws or framework laws shall establish such measures as are necessary to bring about freedom of movement for workers by making arrangements to secure for employed and self-employed migrant workers and their dependants:
(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the different countries;
(b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member States.
2. Where a member of the Council considers that a draft European law or framework law referred to in paragraph 1 would affect fundamental aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system, it may request that the matter be referred to the European Council. In that case, the procedure referred to in Article III-396 shall be suspended. After discussion, the European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, either:
(a) refer the draft back to the Council, which shall terminate the suspension of the procedure referred to in Article III-396, or
(b) request the Commission to submit a new proposal; in that case, the act originally proposed shall be deemed not to have been adopted.
***
You now have the materials at your disposal for your comparison of the different stages of the treaty reform process.
Here are a few comments on the similarities and differences to get you going:
The draft Constitution used clearer and more expressive terms for legislative acts, so ‘European laws or framework laws’ made their appearance here, too, instead of the less elegant ‘procedure referred to in Article 251’ standing for co-decision.
The beef of the European Conventions proposal was, however, dropping the text of Article 42(2) TEC with the required unanimity in the Council ‘throughout’. This paved the way for qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council in order to better safeguard the interests of migrant workers.
In principle, adding ‘employed and self-employed’ to migrant workers and their dependants broadened the scope of the draft Constitution provision.
***
The IGC 2004 was more cautious in its approach. ‘Making arrangements’ can be seen as less ambitious than ‘introducing a system’ to secure migrant workers’ benefits, in the first paragraph. ‘Several’ or ‘different’ countries should not make any material difference.
But the real indication of some member states’ apprehension was the added second paragraph. The IGC 2004 introduced the so called emergency brake, which meant that any member state could refer a proposed legislative act to the European Council if it felt that it would ‘affect fundamental aspects of its social security system, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system’ or ‘the financial balance of that system’.
This would, in effect, remove a question referred from QMV to the unanimous decision making of the European Council, although such a question would plausibly have to ‘affect fundamental aspects’ of the social security system of the referring member state.
In four months, the European Council unanimously was to give a green light for the Council to go ahead or scrap the proposal (and request a new and neutered one).
***
The Lisbon Treaty retains the scope of both employed and self-employed (and their dependants) as well as the ordinary legislative procedure of the Constitution as the main procedural rule. But the IGC 2007 lowered the bar for referral compared to the Constitution by replacing ‘fundamental aspects’ by ‘important’ ones, making it less burdensome for an obstructing member state to argue its case for referral politically, although all it really would have taken and takes is the determination of a member state to issue a declaration.
***
One detail, of minor importance, is the the position of the word ‘shall’ in the sentences about acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. With no firm indications (point 2(c)) the consolidations (and I) have reached different conclusions along the way, but when the official unofficial consolidated versions appear (for illustrative purposes) we will follow their wording.
In the IIEA consolidation I have noticed a small, recurring omission. In essence, it is no problem, since the ordinary legislative procedure entails the participation of the European Parliament and the Council, but in some instances among the insidious horizontal amendments the words ‘the European Parliament and’ have not been inserted.
As I said earlier, as far as I have advanced, I have found the consolidated versions I have used to be highly reliable, ‘almost perfect’.
People may have different opinions about the blessings or dangers of the Lisbon Treaty, but these sources are dependable.
***
Just in case someone believes that the governments of the member states (IGC 2007) take matters concerning their coffers lightly, or that the European Council could escape the strictures of unanimity in case of referral (the emergency brake), two joint declarations have been attached to the Lisbon Treaty (Final Act, OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/256):
22. Declaration on Articles 42 and 63a of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
The Conference considers that in the event that a draft legislative act based on Article 69 A(2) would affect important aspects of the social security system of a Member State, including its scope, cost or financial structure, or would affect the financial balance of that system as set out in the second paragraph of Article 42, the interests of that Member State will be duly taken into account.
23. Declaration on the second paragraph of Article 42 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
The Conference recalls that in that case, in accordance with Article 9 B(4) of the Treaty on European Union, the European Council acts by consensus.
***
A brief history of social security benefits is presented on the European Parliament’s web page ‘Social security for migrant workers’ (last update 22 February 2001):
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/4_8_4_en.htm
The Commission’s Scadplus pages, with summaries of legislation, offer later information on the page ‘Social security schemes and free movement of persons: Basic Regulation’, last updated 25 June 2007:
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c10516.htm
Ralf Grahn
Showing posts with label unaninimity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label unaninimity. Show all posts
Thursday, 3 April 2008
Thursday, 17 January 2008
EU Treaty of Lisbon: CFSP decision making
Today, we look at one example of how the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007) manifested its commitment to fair play and its adherence to the existing aims of the European Union to take the decisions “as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen” (Article 1 TEU).
We start with the end product of the IGC 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306), to look at the next Article waiting to be consolidated, i.e. rendered readable:
“An Article 15b shall be inserted, with the text of Article 23, with the following amendments:
(a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph shall be replaced by the following: "Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded." and the last sentence in the second subparagraph shall be replaced by the following: "If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.";
(b) paragraph 2 shall be amended as follows:
(i) the first indent shall be replaced by the following two indents:
"– when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 10 B(1),
– when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,";
(ii) in the second indent, which shall become the third indent, the words "a joint action or a common position," shall be replaced by "a decision defining a Union action or position,";
(iii) in the second subparagraph, first sentence, the word "important" shall be replaced by "vital"; the last sentence shall be replaced by the following: "The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.";
(iv) the third subparagraph shall be replaced by the following new paragraph 3, the last subparagraph shall become paragraph 4 and paragraph 3 shall be renumbered 5:
"3. The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2.";
(c) in the paragraph now numbered 4, the words "This paragraph shall not apply" shall be replaced by "Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply".”
***
Next, we go to the existing Treaty on European Union (TEU) Article 23 (latest consolidated version OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E):
“Article 23
1. Decisions under this title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions.
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted.
2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:
- when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy,
- when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position,
- when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 18(5).
If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.
The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions shall require at least 232 votes in favour cast by at least two thirds of the members. When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority, a member of the Council may request verification that the Member States constituting the qualified majority represent at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that condition is shown not to have been met, the decision in question shall not be adopted.
This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.
3. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.”
***
To arrive at the new, consolidated wording of Article 15b TEU, we insert the IGC 2007 amendments into the existing Article 23 TEU:
“Article 15b
1. Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.
2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:
- when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 10 B(1),
- when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,
- when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position,
- when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 18(5).
If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.
3. The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2.
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.
5. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.”
***
The broadly based Convention was unable to reach a consensus on the general application of qualified majority voting (QMV) in questions pertaining to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). See Article III-201 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 18.7.2003 C 169).
The text taken over by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 16.12.2004 C 310) Article III-300 thus marked only limited progress towards more effective CFSP decision making by the EU.
In essence, the IGC 2007 took over the contents of the Constitutional Treaty; the modifications in Article 15b TEU are mainly technical.
Unanimity is still the norm in CFSP decision making, but follow-up decisions to unanimous decisions by the European Council offer some scope for more effective decision making by the Council, except in questions having military or defence implications.
***
Next time we look at information and consultation within the Council.
Ralf Grahn
We start with the end product of the IGC 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306), to look at the next Article waiting to be consolidated, i.e. rendered readable:
“An Article 15b shall be inserted, with the text of Article 23, with the following amendments:
(a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph shall be replaced by the following: "Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded." and the last sentence in the second subparagraph shall be replaced by the following: "If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.";
(b) paragraph 2 shall be amended as follows:
(i) the first indent shall be replaced by the following two indents:
"– when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 10 B(1),
– when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,";
(ii) in the second indent, which shall become the third indent, the words "a joint action or a common position," shall be replaced by "a decision defining a Union action or position,";
(iii) in the second subparagraph, first sentence, the word "important" shall be replaced by "vital"; the last sentence shall be replaced by the following: "The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.";
(iv) the third subparagraph shall be replaced by the following new paragraph 3, the last subparagraph shall become paragraph 4 and paragraph 3 shall be renumbered 5:
"3. The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2.";
(c) in the paragraph now numbered 4, the words "This paragraph shall not apply" shall be replaced by "Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply".”
***
Next, we go to the existing Treaty on European Union (TEU) Article 23 (latest consolidated version OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E):
“Article 23
1. Decisions under this title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions.
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted.
2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:
- when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy,
- when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position,
- when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 18(5).
If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.
The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with Article 205(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption, decisions shall require at least 232 votes in favour cast by at least two thirds of the members. When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority, a member of the Council may request verification that the Member States constituting the qualified majority represent at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that condition is shown not to have been met, the decision in question shall not be adopted.
This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.
3. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.”
***
To arrive at the new, consolidated wording of Article 15b TEU, we insert the IGC 2007 amendments into the existing Article 23 TEU:
“Article 15b
1. Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.
2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:
- when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 10 B(1),
- when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,
- when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position,
- when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 18(5).
If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.
3. The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2.
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.
5. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.”
***
The broadly based Convention was unable to reach a consensus on the general application of qualified majority voting (QMV) in questions pertaining to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). See Article III-201 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 18.7.2003 C 169).
The text taken over by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 16.12.2004 C 310) Article III-300 thus marked only limited progress towards more effective CFSP decision making by the EU.
In essence, the IGC 2007 took over the contents of the Constitutional Treaty; the modifications in Article 15b TEU are mainly technical.
Unanimity is still the norm in CFSP decision making, but follow-up decisions to unanimous decisions by the European Council offer some scope for more effective decision making by the Council, except in questions having military or defence implications.
***
Next time we look at information and consultation within the Council.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 10 January 2008
EU Treaty of Lisbon: CFSP competence
Strong or brittle? Feet of iron or feet of clay? The US Constitution or the Articles of Confederation? These questions deserve some thought when we look at the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union as laid out in the Treaty of Lisbon.
***
Basically, you can approach the European Union from two different angles. You can try to ponder what the Union could do for its citizens: external and internal security as well as enhancing prosperity. Or you can reason from a domestic perspective.
A sincere form of ‘special relationship’ would be to emulate the success of the United States of America. The main purposes of that Union were succinctly put by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, number XXIII:
“The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.
The principal purposes to be answered by the union are these – the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.”
***
According to the Reform Treaty, the scope of EU competence covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
We have to bear in mind the joint declarations 13 (see previous posting) and 14 (see below), which emphasize the continued freedom of Member States to pursue their national foreign and security policies, regardless of the common interest.
The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is almost exclusively in the hands of the Member States. The European Council and the Council rule, if they can reach unanimous decisions (as a rule).
The intergovernmental nature of the CFSP means that democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament and judicial review by the Court of Justice are nearly completely excluded. (The external action of the Commission is placed under intergovernmental tutelage.)
If not overridden by national policies or paralysed by dissenting views and vetoes, the Union conducts, defines and implements the CFSP, meant to lead to increasing convergence of Member States’ actions in the long run. The loyalty, solidarity and compliance of Member States are keys to effective common action on the world stage.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) amends Article 11 TEU. In the consolidated version paragraphs 1 and 2 have replaced the existing paragraph 1, and the present paragraph 2 has been renumbered paragraph 3 and amended slightly.
Article 11
1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 25b of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 240a of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
2. Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.
3. The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area.
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles.
***
Joint Declaration (number 14) concerning the common foreign and security policy continues in the same vein as Declaration 13 to subtract from the consistency of common policy by underlining the independent policies of the Member States, especially the Members of the UN Security Council, and the intergovernmental nature of the policies the Member States happen to agree on, as well as the “specific nature” of the Member States’ security and defence policy:
“In addition to the specific rules and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, the Conference underlines that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international organisations, including a Member State’s membership of the Security Council of the United Nations.
The Conference also notes that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament.
The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the Common Security and Defence Policy do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the Member States.”
***
Next time we look at the foreign policy instruments of the EU.
Ralf Grahn
***
Basically, you can approach the European Union from two different angles. You can try to ponder what the Union could do for its citizens: external and internal security as well as enhancing prosperity. Or you can reason from a domestic perspective.
A sincere form of ‘special relationship’ would be to emulate the success of the United States of America. The main purposes of that Union were succinctly put by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, number XXIII:
“The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.
The principal purposes to be answered by the union are these – the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.”
***
According to the Reform Treaty, the scope of EU competence covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
We have to bear in mind the joint declarations 13 (see previous posting) and 14 (see below), which emphasize the continued freedom of Member States to pursue their national foreign and security policies, regardless of the common interest.
The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is almost exclusively in the hands of the Member States. The European Council and the Council rule, if they can reach unanimous decisions (as a rule).
The intergovernmental nature of the CFSP means that democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament and judicial review by the Court of Justice are nearly completely excluded. (The external action of the Commission is placed under intergovernmental tutelage.)
If not overridden by national policies or paralysed by dissenting views and vetoes, the Union conducts, defines and implements the CFSP, meant to lead to increasing convergence of Member States’ actions in the long run. The loyalty, solidarity and compliance of Member States are keys to effective common action on the world stage.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) amends Article 11 TEU. In the consolidated version paragraphs 1 and 2 have replaced the existing paragraph 1, and the present paragraph 2 has been renumbered paragraph 3 and amended slightly.
Article 11
1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence.
The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 25b of this Treaty and to review the legality of certain decisions as provided for by the second paragraph of Article 240a of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
2. Within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development of mutual political solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions.
3. The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area.
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.
The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles.
***
Joint Declaration (number 14) concerning the common foreign and security policy continues in the same vein as Declaration 13 to subtract from the consistency of common policy by underlining the independent policies of the Member States, especially the Members of the UN Security Council, and the intergovernmental nature of the policies the Member States happen to agree on, as well as the “specific nature” of the Member States’ security and defence policy:
“In addition to the specific rules and procedures referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, the Conference underlines that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the External Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and participation in international organisations, including a Member State’s membership of the Security Council of the United Nations.
The Conference also notes that the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European Parliament.
The Conference also recalls that the provisions governing the Common Security and Defence Policy do not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of the Member States.”
***
Next time we look at the foreign policy instruments of the EU.
Ralf Grahn
Tuesday, 8 January 2008
EU Treaty of Lisbon: Foreign policy strategies
When the Heads of State or Government convene in the European Council, they have the option to make strategic decisions for the citizens of the European Union, but every one of the leaders bears a lock which can lead to paralysis: veto power.
The Reform Treaty formally makes the European Council an institution of the EU (Article 9 TEU), arguably the most important one, which shall “provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof” in general (Article 9b TEU).
In the fields of foreign and security policy, including all external action, the Lisbon Treaty proposes to further underline the decisive role of the European Council.
***
The existing Treaty on European Union (TEU; latest consolidation OJ 29.12.2006, C 321 E) Article 13 TEU says:
“1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.
3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action of the Union.”
***
The Convention proposed an Article III-194 underlining the strategic importance of the European Council. This was taken over as Article III-293 in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 16.12.2004, C 310).
The Lisbon Treaty takes over the substance of this provision. The differences are caused by the terminology of the Reform Treaty: “Article III-292” has become “Article 10 A”, “European decisions” have become “Decisions” and the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” has become the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”.
***
A few remarks by your glossator:
Potentially, 490 million inhabitants, who form the world’s largest trading block and greatest giver of development aid, and with the guiding principles mentioned in the new Article 10a TEU, could have a decisive impact on the world stage. The EU could enhance the security and prosperity of EU citizens as well as contribute to a better world.
Although the EU Member States themselves are democratic, they have not been able to agree to base their common external relations on democratic governance at the Union level. On the contrary, in the field of foreign and security policy (CFSP) they have chosen to strengthen the intergovernmental character of policy making, and to take over the external relations of the Commission (‘Community’).
They have felt the need for more effective decision making and implementation, but have been unwilling to cross the threshold. Even if the individual Member States are increasingly unable to deal with global challenges on their own, they continue to cherish their formal sovereignty.
The Lisbon Treaty is a result of these conflicting pressures. The European Council becomes the supreme foreign policy ‘government’ of the European Union, but it can act effectively only if every one of its members joins in a unanimous decision. Conversely, every Member State government can decide to let its perceived national interest override the common good. Even if compromises are patched together, suboptimal decisions are likely to result.
Dealing with the world’s unitary powers, the EU is at a disadvantage. More or less lacking “hard power” and with “soft power” often just a fig leaf for lack of consistent policy, the EU continues to be a yacht for fair weather sailing. ‘Liberum veto’ is an invitation to ‘divide et impera’ by other great powers.
The leaders of the Member States have designated their own institution, the European Council, as the prime mover, especially in all the fields of foreign policy. Consequently, the responsibility is theirs. When Europe fails, the failure is theirs.
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, it is up to the European Council to identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union and to reach unanimous decisions based on the principles in Article 10a. The need for independent foreign policy analysis is going to be great.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) inserts an Article 10b TEU.
Article 10b
1. On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 10 A, the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union.
Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific country or region or may be thematic in approach. They shall define their duration, and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.
The European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council, adopted by the latter under the arrangements laid down for each area. Decisions of the European Council shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Treaties.
2. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for the area of common foreign and security policy, and the Commission, for other areas of external action, may submit joint proposals to the Council.
***
Next, we are going to look at the specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy.
Ralf Grahn
The Reform Treaty formally makes the European Council an institution of the EU (Article 9 TEU), arguably the most important one, which shall “provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof” in general (Article 9b TEU).
In the fields of foreign and security policy, including all external action, the Lisbon Treaty proposes to further underline the decisive role of the European Council.
***
The existing Treaty on European Union (TEU; latest consolidation OJ 29.12.2006, C 321 E) Article 13 TEU says:
“1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.
Common strategies shall set out their objectives, duration and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.
3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.
The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall implement them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action of the Union.”
***
The Convention proposed an Article III-194 underlining the strategic importance of the European Council. This was taken over as Article III-293 in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 16.12.2004, C 310).
The Lisbon Treaty takes over the substance of this provision. The differences are caused by the terminology of the Reform Treaty: “Article III-292” has become “Article 10 A”, “European decisions” have become “Decisions” and the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” has become the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”.
***
A few remarks by your glossator:
Potentially, 490 million inhabitants, who form the world’s largest trading block and greatest giver of development aid, and with the guiding principles mentioned in the new Article 10a TEU, could have a decisive impact on the world stage. The EU could enhance the security and prosperity of EU citizens as well as contribute to a better world.
Although the EU Member States themselves are democratic, they have not been able to agree to base their common external relations on democratic governance at the Union level. On the contrary, in the field of foreign and security policy (CFSP) they have chosen to strengthen the intergovernmental character of policy making, and to take over the external relations of the Commission (‘Community’).
They have felt the need for more effective decision making and implementation, but have been unwilling to cross the threshold. Even if the individual Member States are increasingly unable to deal with global challenges on their own, they continue to cherish their formal sovereignty.
The Lisbon Treaty is a result of these conflicting pressures. The European Council becomes the supreme foreign policy ‘government’ of the European Union, but it can act effectively only if every one of its members joins in a unanimous decision. Conversely, every Member State government can decide to let its perceived national interest override the common good. Even if compromises are patched together, suboptimal decisions are likely to result.
Dealing with the world’s unitary powers, the EU is at a disadvantage. More or less lacking “hard power” and with “soft power” often just a fig leaf for lack of consistent policy, the EU continues to be a yacht for fair weather sailing. ‘Liberum veto’ is an invitation to ‘divide et impera’ by other great powers.
The leaders of the Member States have designated their own institution, the European Council, as the prime mover, especially in all the fields of foreign policy. Consequently, the responsibility is theirs. When Europe fails, the failure is theirs.
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, it is up to the European Council to identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union and to reach unanimous decisions based on the principles in Article 10a. The need for independent foreign policy analysis is going to be great.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) inserts an Article 10b TEU.
Article 10b
1. On the basis of the principles and objectives set out in Article 10 A, the European Council shall identify the strategic interests and objectives of the Union.
Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the Union with a specific country or region or may be thematic in approach. They shall define their duration, and the means to be made available by the Union and the Member States.
The European Council shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council, adopted by the latter under the arrangements laid down for each area. Decisions of the European Council shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Treaties.
2. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, for the area of common foreign and security policy, and the Commission, for other areas of external action, may submit joint proposals to the Council.
***
Next, we are going to look at the specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy.
Ralf Grahn
Wednesday, 2 January 2008
EU Treaty of Lisbon: Council
In a European Union of citizens and states, the latter have the upper hand. Not only is the EU based on international Treaties between the Member States, but the states are represented in the European Council and in the Council (of Ministers), the two most important institutions of the Union.
***
The main provisions on the Council are Articles 202 to 210 TEC (latest consolidated version OJ 29.12.2006, C 321 E).
The draft Constitution of the Convention consecrated three Articles to the Council, Article I-22 to Article I-24.
In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe these became Article I-23 The Council of Ministers, Article I-24 Configurations of the Council of Ministers and Article I-25 Definition of qualified majority within the European Council and the Council.
The mandate of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007; document 11218/07), point 12, mentioned the institutional changes agreed in the 2004 IGC and set out the institutional modifications to the existing system, e.g. the Council (introduction of the double majority voting system and changes in the six-monthly Council presidency system, with the possibility of modifying it). Point 13 was dedicated to the double majority voting system, to take effect on 1 November 2014, but with a transitional period until 31 March 2017.
***
A few comments on the end result:
Article 9c(1) has to be read bearing in mind that the Council is much more than a co-legislator. In addition to joint areas of legislation and budgetary functions, the Council prepares and carries out the foreign, security and defence policy guidelines of the European Council with little effective scrutiny by the European Parliament. The executive powers of the Council should not be underestimated. “Policy making and coordinating functions” have to be examined issue by issue throughout the Treaties if we want to arrive at a realistic picture.
If we assume that the European Union has been established with worthwhile values and objectives, to enhance our security and prosperity in a globalising world, then the effectiveness of the Union becomes an issue from a citizen’s point of view. The rule of unanimity (liberum veto) can destroy any organisation. The Lisbon Treaty extends the areas with qualified majority voting (QMV), but the crucial questions remain subject to unanimous decision making among the Member States.
The foundations of the Union and foreign, security and defence policy plus the long term budget and resources of the EU as well as sensitive legislative fields like taxation remain subject to unanimity. At the same time, these areas offer the least in terms of democratic scrutiny by the directly elected representatives of the citizens, the European Parliament.
Intergovernmental bargaining in the Council lacks openness and transparency. More often than not, the governments act as agents for their own and other particular interests, in conflict with the common interests of the Union’s citizens.
The Lisbon Treaty does little to remedy these basic faults, although legislative acts are formally adopted in public.
The rotating Council Presidency is going to change, when the European Council elects a semi-permanent President and the High Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. Potentially, the coordinating General Affairs Council configuration could become important.
The 18 month team Presidencies have been introduced ahead of the Treaty amendments. Germany, Portugal and Slovenia (from 1 January 2008) formed the first Presidency trio.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) inserts an article 9c TEU on the Council.
Article 9c
1. The Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. It shall carry out policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties.
2. The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of the Member State in question and cast its vote.
3. The Council shall act by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide otherwise.
4. As from 1 November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union.
A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained.
The other arrangements governing the qualified majority are laid down in Article 205(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
5. The transitional provisions relating to the definition of the qualified majority which shall be applicable until 31 October 2014 and those which shall be applicable from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017 are laid down in the Protocol on transitional provisions.
6. The Council shall meet in different configurations, the list of which shall be adopted in accordance with Article 201b of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The General Affairs Council shall ensure consistency in the work of the different Council configurations. It shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission.
The Foreign Affairs Council shall elaborate the Union's external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union's action is consistent.
7. A Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council.
8. The Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act. To this end, each Council meeting shall be divided into two parts, dealing respectively with deliberations on Union legislative acts and non-legislative activities.
9. The Presidency of Council configurations, other than that of Foreign Affairs, shall be held by Member State representatives in the Council on the basis of equal rotation, in accordance with the conditions established in accordance with Article 201b of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
***
An overview of the Commission will follow.
Ralf Grahn
***
The main provisions on the Council are Articles 202 to 210 TEC (latest consolidated version OJ 29.12.2006, C 321 E).
The draft Constitution of the Convention consecrated three Articles to the Council, Article I-22 to Article I-24.
In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe these became Article I-23 The Council of Ministers, Article I-24 Configurations of the Council of Ministers and Article I-25 Definition of qualified majority within the European Council and the Council.
The mandate of the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007; document 11218/07), point 12, mentioned the institutional changes agreed in the 2004 IGC and set out the institutional modifications to the existing system, e.g. the Council (introduction of the double majority voting system and changes in the six-monthly Council presidency system, with the possibility of modifying it). Point 13 was dedicated to the double majority voting system, to take effect on 1 November 2014, but with a transitional period until 31 March 2017.
***
A few comments on the end result:
Article 9c(1) has to be read bearing in mind that the Council is much more than a co-legislator. In addition to joint areas of legislation and budgetary functions, the Council prepares and carries out the foreign, security and defence policy guidelines of the European Council with little effective scrutiny by the European Parliament. The executive powers of the Council should not be underestimated. “Policy making and coordinating functions” have to be examined issue by issue throughout the Treaties if we want to arrive at a realistic picture.
If we assume that the European Union has been established with worthwhile values and objectives, to enhance our security and prosperity in a globalising world, then the effectiveness of the Union becomes an issue from a citizen’s point of view. The rule of unanimity (liberum veto) can destroy any organisation. The Lisbon Treaty extends the areas with qualified majority voting (QMV), but the crucial questions remain subject to unanimous decision making among the Member States.
The foundations of the Union and foreign, security and defence policy plus the long term budget and resources of the EU as well as sensitive legislative fields like taxation remain subject to unanimity. At the same time, these areas offer the least in terms of democratic scrutiny by the directly elected representatives of the citizens, the European Parliament.
Intergovernmental bargaining in the Council lacks openness and transparency. More often than not, the governments act as agents for their own and other particular interests, in conflict with the common interests of the Union’s citizens.
The Lisbon Treaty does little to remedy these basic faults, although legislative acts are formally adopted in public.
The rotating Council Presidency is going to change, when the European Council elects a semi-permanent President and the High Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. Potentially, the coordinating General Affairs Council configuration could become important.
The 18 month team Presidencies have been introduced ahead of the Treaty amendments. Germany, Portugal and Slovenia (from 1 January 2008) formed the first Presidency trio.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) inserts an article 9c TEU on the Council.
Article 9c
1. The Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. It shall carry out policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties.
2. The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of the Member State in question and cast its vote.
3. The Council shall act by a qualified majority except where the Treaties provide otherwise.
4. As from 1 November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union.
A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained.
The other arrangements governing the qualified majority are laid down in Article 205(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
5. The transitional provisions relating to the definition of the qualified majority which shall be applicable until 31 October 2014 and those which shall be applicable from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017 are laid down in the Protocol on transitional provisions.
6. The Council shall meet in different configurations, the list of which shall be adopted in accordance with Article 201b of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The General Affairs Council shall ensure consistency in the work of the different Council configurations. It shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission.
The Foreign Affairs Council shall elaborate the Union's external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union's action is consistent.
7. A Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council.
8. The Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act. To this end, each Council meeting shall be divided into two parts, dealing respectively with deliberations on Union legislative acts and non-legislative activities.
9. The Presidency of Council configurations, other than that of Foreign Affairs, shall be held by Member State representatives in the Council on the basis of equal rotation, in accordance with the conditions established in accordance with Article 201b of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
***
An overview of the Commission will follow.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 25 October 2007
EU multiannual financial framework
The finances of the European Union are mostly presented according to the relevant treaty provisions on budgetary procedure or give an overview of spending categories. However, the importance of present and future parliamentary features concerning annual budgets is relative, since both resources and expenditure are firmly lodged with the member state governments. The key to this is the multiannual financial framework, a compelling budget for the mid term.
The governments of the member states are driven by their divergent national interests and have to reach a unanimous decision (liberum veto). The substantial result is less than satisfactory for the citizens of the Union. Reaching an outcome more satisfying to the common interest would require a reform of the decision making for the financial framework.
The next financial framework should be in place at the beginning of 2014, so the Reform Treaty should have entered into force by then. The new treaty includes a new chapter “The multiannual finanancial framework” (Article 270a).
Until now, these multiannual budgets have grown in practice (inter-institutional agreements), without treaty basis, but now this practice would be codified. Since the annual budgets shall comply with the multiannual framework, this is the decisive financial document of the European Union (as it is today).
Member state governments retain decision making and veto power:
The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall adopt a regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for a period of at least five years. (Five years would coincide with the mandates of the Commission and the European Parliament. The present financial framework encompasses seven years.) The Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given by a majority of its component members (Article 270a, paragraph 1 and 2).
What if the European Parliament wanted to force the member state governments (the Council) to reform the budgets for the coming years by rejecting their financial framework?
Where no Council regulation determining a new financial framework has been adopted by the end of the previous financial framework, the ceilings and other provisions corresponding to the last year of that framework shall be extended until such time as that act is adopted (Article 270a, paragraph 4).
In other words, if the European Parliament does not take what it is offered, the following budgets are going to be built on priorities and expenditure levels fixed five or seven years earlier. This rule opens up possibilities for a member state government bent on sabotage, too. Thus, if no new financial framework is in place at the beginning of 2014, the budget then (and later) would reflect the political and negotiating positions of 2005 and 2006.
The “Lisbon Treaty” opens the door to an improved decision making process, although it is hard to believe that the governments would actually be mature enough to make use of this provision:
The European Council may, unanimously, adopt a decision authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority when adopting the regulation laying down the financial framework (Article 270a, paragraph 2).
The member states would still be in charge, but the chances for a somewhat more rational outcome would increase.
How many citizens of the European Union actually believe that 27 governments, unanimously, are going to be mature enough to let go of their veto power before 2014?
Ralf Grahn
The governments of the member states are driven by their divergent national interests and have to reach a unanimous decision (liberum veto). The substantial result is less than satisfactory for the citizens of the Union. Reaching an outcome more satisfying to the common interest would require a reform of the decision making for the financial framework.
The next financial framework should be in place at the beginning of 2014, so the Reform Treaty should have entered into force by then. The new treaty includes a new chapter “The multiannual finanancial framework” (Article 270a).
Until now, these multiannual budgets have grown in practice (inter-institutional agreements), without treaty basis, but now this practice would be codified. Since the annual budgets shall comply with the multiannual framework, this is the decisive financial document of the European Union (as it is today).
Member state governments retain decision making and veto power:
The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall adopt a regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for a period of at least five years. (Five years would coincide with the mandates of the Commission and the European Parliament. The present financial framework encompasses seven years.) The Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given by a majority of its component members (Article 270a, paragraph 1 and 2).
What if the European Parliament wanted to force the member state governments (the Council) to reform the budgets for the coming years by rejecting their financial framework?
Where no Council regulation determining a new financial framework has been adopted by the end of the previous financial framework, the ceilings and other provisions corresponding to the last year of that framework shall be extended until such time as that act is adopted (Article 270a, paragraph 4).
In other words, if the European Parliament does not take what it is offered, the following budgets are going to be built on priorities and expenditure levels fixed five or seven years earlier. This rule opens up possibilities for a member state government bent on sabotage, too. Thus, if no new financial framework is in place at the beginning of 2014, the budget then (and later) would reflect the political and negotiating positions of 2005 and 2006.
The “Lisbon Treaty” opens the door to an improved decision making process, although it is hard to believe that the governments would actually be mature enough to make use of this provision:
The European Council may, unanimously, adopt a decision authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority when adopting the regulation laying down the financial framework (Article 270a, paragraph 2).
The member states would still be in charge, but the chances for a somewhat more rational outcome would increase.
How many citizens of the European Union actually believe that 27 governments, unanimously, are going to be mature enough to let go of their veto power before 2014?
Ralf Grahn
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Subscribe To Grahnlaw
Posts
All Comments
