EU permanent structured cooperation: operational military headquarters OHQ

After the UK veto against a permanent military headquarters for the European Union, is a new EU core taking shape through the establishment of permanent structured cooperation in the context of the common security and defence policy (CSDP)?

The British veto resulted in a letter from France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain to the EU high representative Catherine Ashton to explore ways to make progress.


Group of five

Bruxelles2 noted that the foreign ministers of Italy and Spain publicly confirmed that they adhere to the proposal by France, Germany and Poland to establish a military HQ for Europe. Following the UK veto, the new letter demands action from the high representative Catherine Ashton. According to Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, everyone knows that the counter-argument about duplicating NATO structures is rubbish: Le club des 5. Espagne et Italie rejoignent le trio de Weimar sur le QG européen (3 September 2011).

Interestingly, the Polish press release about the informal (Gymnich) meeting of the foreign ministers does nothing to enlighten us about the development of defence policy or the initiative by the group of five countries: Informal meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU Member States (undated).

On EUobserver, Andrew Rettman reported on the call for action: Group of five calls for EU military headquarters (9 September 2011)

The Spanish Europa451 website published an article with some details about the letter from the five countries – France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain – to the high representative Catherine Ashton: España y cuatro países piden crear un ejército europeo (9 September 2011).


Public Service Europe

Yesterday on Public Service Europe, Hylke Dijkstra argued that Europe needs permanent military capabilities to respond quickly to international events, while creating efficiencies for member states; in the blog post: Why the EU needs a military headquarters (12 September 2011).


Egmont

The ideas about an operational HQ have been around before the letter from France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain.

Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont (Editors): Europe deploys towards a civil-military strategy for CSDP (Egmont paper 49, June 2011) suggested:

The EU could be the first to create a permanent civilian-military Operational Headquarters (OHQ), in Brussels, which could plan for and conduct both civilian and military operations and, allowing for close interaction with all relevant EU actors, could implement a truly comprehensive approach to crisis management.

SWP

Here is a description (in German) of permanent structured cooperation in the Treaty of Lisbon.

Christian Mölling described the only concrete security and defence policy reform of the Lisbon Treaty, in: Ständige Strukturierte Zusammenarbeit in der EU-Sicherheitspolitik (SWP-Aktuell 2010/A 13, Februar 2010, 4 Seiten).


Need for European action

With or without the help of the EU institutions and the national governments, there is the need for a truly European debate about the strategic defence choices concerning all citizens. Here are a few of my blog posts about the issues and the need for action.

Grahnlaw: EU military headquarters – CSDP permanent structured cooperation (9 September 2011)

Grahnlaw Suomi Finland: Finland and non-aligned in EU: With UK or Europe on defence? (9 September 2011)

Grahnlaw Suomi Finland: EU common defence: Military HQ first choice (10 September 2011)

Grahnlaw: Common European defence: some questions (10 September 2011)

Grahnlaw Suomi Finland: Rejoice! EU CSDP transparency & European Year of Citizens (11 September 2011)

Grahnblawg (in Swedish): EU: JA eller NEJ till permanent strukturerat militärt samarbete? (12 September 2011)



Ralf Grahn

EU: Special legislative procedure (IV)

European politics on the never-never plan.

The dynamics – if you can call them that – of European integration are such that 26 member states may see the need for common legislation, but a treaty has to be concluded by every member.

Enter Political Fudge.

One stubborn member state holds out, while the rest manage to consecrate the principle of future legislation, subject to unanimity and a special legislative procedure.

The European Union can proudly proclaim the potential to act, but nothing comes of it as long as even one member state invokes its veto. The directly elected European Parliament is marginalised.

We continue our Odyssey of the Council of the European Union and the special legislative procedure, as laid down in the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 9.5.2008 C 115.


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Indirect taxes

Harmonisation of VAT and other indirect taxes requires unanimity and a special legislative procedure.


Article 113 TFEU
(ex Article 93 TEC)

The Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, adopt provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation to the extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion of competition.


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Harmonisation of taxes, free movement and workers’ rights


Without qualified majority decisions there would be no working internal market, just a nice principle in the Treaty of Rome (EEC).

The ordinary legislative procedure applies to the approximation (harmonisation) of legislation aimed at the establishment and functioning of the internal market, with the exception of fiscal provisions, the free movement of persons and the rights and interests of employed persons (Article 114).

Unanimity and a special legislative procedure apply to the exceptions.


Article 115 TFEU
(ex Article 94 TEC)

Without prejudice to Article 114, the Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market.


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European intellectual property rights

The Treaty of Lisbon would allow the creation of European intellectual property rights according to the ordinary legislative procedure, but the language arrangements have proven to be as vexed as ever (Article 118).


Article 118 TFEU, second subparagraph

The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall by means of regulations establish language arrangements for the European intellectual property rights. The Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament.


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The European Union is as strong as its weakest link.



Ralf Grahn

Turkey ending its EU membership bid?

Is Turkey going to end its bid for accession to the European Union?

This is the way it looks after the opening of the NATO summit, where Turkey seems to have vetoed the candidacy of Danish premier Anders Fogh Rasmussen to become the next Secretary General.

The Turkish reforms were already down to snail’s pace, so perhaps Turkey’s prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has just decided to drive the last nail into the coffin of his country’s EU aspirations, without having to withdraw the bid formally.


Ralf Grahn

EU: How many humiliations?

Our interlocutor, the Tap Blog, has made a first venture into the world after the imagined European Union collapse. Their vision is a Europe of Nations, in ‘The World Needs Europe’s Nations, Not The EU’ (26 June 2008):

http://the-tap.blogspot.com/2008/06/world-needs-europes-nations-not-eu.html

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It sounds nice and cosy, but how on earth are the European nation states going to prosper on their own in a harsh world, when they fail to get their act together under the current (and proposed) veto-enabling rules?

Russia has been picking of the EU countries at will, to the extent that it seems to be sorry for their present state of disarray. On the other hand, the EU’s possibilities to negotiate have been blocked by repeated national vetoes.

For a realistic assessment of the EU countries’ predicament, read the summary on EU–Russia relations by Robert Amsterdam ‘A Broken Europe Can’t Negotiate with Moscow’ (25 June 2008):

http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/06/a_broken_europe_cant_negotiate.htm

For a realist assessment of the challenges for Europe, I repeat my recommendation to read the blog by James Rogers, Global Power Europe:

http://www.globalpowereurope.eu/

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Squabbling with each other and vetoing away their future, the EU member states are in for a lot of humiliations on the international scene.

Most of the time, they can, of course, cobble together a statement deploring the situation …

The Lisbon Treaty would improve the internal efficiency of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy, but the real world effectiveness of its policies would still be hostage to the ‘liberum veto’.

In other words, the proposed improvements are too little, too late.

The European leaders will the good outcomes, but they refuse the means to achieve them.

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But to propose a Europe of Nations – cosy as it sounds – is taking the wrong turn altogether, as long as there is no convincing explanation of how these proud nations would do better completely on their own or with an added dose of intergovernmental inefficiency.

The Tap Blog, in my humble opinion, suffers from one fundamental flaw. Its object of worship is the nation state.

My yardstick is the interest of the EU citizen. From two main angles: security and prosperity.

We already have our nations, and they are not going to disappear. But we need the team effort called the European Union, indeed a much improved EU, not only willing, but able to defend our common interests.

How many humiliations have to be endured before we get what we need?


Ralf Grahn

Vote and advance!

The chairman of the think-tank Notre Europe, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, makes an interesting – and true – observation of the history of European integration. France has been the determining factor. When France has put the brakes on, to preserve its veto, the European communities have stalled, often leading to severe crises. When France has agreed to effective decision-making, the European project has advanced and the common good has been given a firmer footing.

In other words, France has effectively regulated progress.

Padoa-Schioppas article ‘Président Sarkozy, faites voter !’ can be found in Le Monde (26 June 2008) :

http://www.lemonde.fr/opinions/article/2008/06/25/president-sarkozy-faites-voter-par-tommaso-padoa-schioppa_1062635_3232.html

In addition to his interesting analysis, the chairman of the think-tank founded by Jacques Delors issues an impassioned plea to France to use the six months of its Council presidency to become, once again, the engine of the European Union. Key to this is not to accept blocking vetoes, but to vote, to decide and to progress. The gist of Padoa-Schioppa’s plea can be read in the concluding paragraph of the article:

« La France a entre ses mains les clés pour libérer l'horizon. La présidence de l'Union représente une occasion unique qu'elle ne doit pas rater. Les débats sur le bilan de santé de la PAC, la politique d'immigration et l'énergie s'y prêteraient à merveille. Dès lors, ma recommandation centrale à la future présidence française tient en deux mots : n'acceptez pas le blocage par le veto, n'acceptez pas de retarder une décision pour attendre tout le monde, "faites voter !" La France démontrera ainsi sa capacité à redevenir le moteur d'une Europe en mouvement. »

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Padoa-Schioppa is right in his long term analysis of France’s often contradictory role as perceived engine of the European project, but persistently intergovernmentalist in practice, the phenomenon I have branded the “French paradox”.

He is also correct in pointing out the crucial factor between unanimity leading to minimalist solutions and qualified majority voting opening up vistas for the common good of the citizens of the European Union.

President Nicolas Sarkozy seems to have the requisite amount of ambition. But has he the courage needed to act?


Ralf Grahn

EU multiannual financial framework

The finances of the European Union are mostly presented according to the relevant treaty provisions on budgetary procedure or give an overview of spending categories. However, the importance of present and future parliamentary features concerning annual budgets is relative, since both resources and expenditure are firmly lodged with the member state governments. The key to this is the multiannual financial framework, a compelling budget for the mid term.

The governments of the member states are driven by their divergent national interests and have to reach a unanimous decision (liberum veto). The substantial result is less than satisfactory for the citizens of the Union. Reaching an outcome more satisfying to the common interest would require a reform of the decision making for the financial framework.

The next financial framework should be in place at the beginning of 2014, so the Reform Treaty should have entered into force by then. The new treaty includes a new chapter “The multiannual finanancial framework” (Article 270a).

Until now, these multiannual budgets have grown in practice (inter-institutional agreements), without treaty basis, but now this practice would be codified. Since the annual budgets shall comply with the multiannual framework, this is the decisive financial document of the European Union (as it is today).

Member state governments retain decision making and veto power:

The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall adopt a regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for a period of at least five years. (Five years would coincide with the mandates of the Commission and the European Parliament. The present financial framework encompasses seven years.) The Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given by a majority of its component members (Article 270a, paragraph 1 and 2).

What if the European Parliament wanted to force the member state governments (the Council) to reform the budgets for the coming years by rejecting their financial framework?

Where no Council regulation determining a new financial framework has been adopted by the end of the previous financial framework, the ceilings and other provisions corresponding to the last year of that framework shall be extended until such time as that act is adopted (Article 270a, paragraph 4).

In other words, if the European Parliament does not take what it is offered, the following budgets are going to be built on priorities and expenditure levels fixed five or seven years earlier. This rule opens up possibilities for a member state government bent on sabotage, too. Thus, if no new financial framework is in place at the beginning of 2014, the budget then (and later) would reflect the political and negotiating positions of 2005 and 2006.

The “Lisbon Treaty” opens the door to an improved decision making process, although it is hard to believe that the governments would actually be mature enough to make use of this provision:

The European Council may, unanimously, adopt a decision authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority when adopting the regulation laying down the financial framework (Article 270a, paragraph 2).

The member states would still be in charge, but the chances for a somewhat more rational outcome would increase.

How many citizens of the European Union actually believe that 27 governments, unanimously, are going to be mature enough to let go of their veto power before 2014?


Ralf Grahn

Reforming the EU budget?

In September the Commission of the European Communities launched a public consultation on reforming the EU budget. This review was a part of the decision on the financial framework (long term budget) 2007 to 2013. The Commission’s approach is one of openness and no taboos, says the Communication.

During this seven year period the yearly budget of the European Union is roughly one per cent of the combined gross national income of the member states: agreed payments 1.03 per cent and executed payments 0.98 per cent. In 2008, for a Union with more than 490 people, the commitment appropriations are 131,487 million euros and the payment appropriations 129,481 million euros.

If the advice of independent experts or enlightened citizens of the Union had been followed, three areas of activities would have received significantly more resources a long time ago:

1) EU as a global player, including external action and pre-accession support; presently 5.7 per cent of expenditure.
2) Internal affairs (area of freedom, security and justice as well as citizenship); 1.3 per cent of expenses.
3) Competitiveness (growth and employment); 8.6 per cent of expenditure.

The main part of the resources are allocated to agriculture (natural resources) to the tune of 43 per cent and cohesion (structural funds) with 35.6 per cent. Costs for administration are 5.8 per cent.

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Expenditure and revenue of the European Union is based on the multiannual financial framework (presently for seven years). This long term budget was the result of acrimonious negotiations, including the threats of veto power, between the member states governments. National, not common, interests were the driving force.

Once again we witness that structural defects in decision making lead to suboptimal results. In this case, including the 2002 Council decision to safeguard agricultural spending, there is scant hope of significant reform before 2014.

Therefore, the annual budget exercises of the European Union (TEC 268-280) offer very little in the way of new priorities, even if the European Parliament may choose to amend the more marginal outlays defined as not compulsory.

In principle, the following long term budget offers an opportunity to reform, but is the European Union going to be able to seize its chance even then?

If the rules for decision making are not improved, there is little cause for optimism.


Ralf Grahn


Källor:

Communication from the Commission: Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe; A public consultation paper in view of the 2008/2009 budget review; Brussels, 12.9.2007, SEC(2007) 1188 final

EU Budget – facts and myths; MEMO/07/350

A new Financial Framework for the enlarged Union (2007-2013); http://ec.europa.eu/budget/

Documents: Multiannual framework; http://ec.europa.eu/budget/documents/

Mojmir Mrak & Vasja Rant: Financial Perspective 2007-2013: Domination of national interests; EU-Consent EU-Budget Working Paper No. 1; July 2007; http://www.eu-consent.net

Interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management; OJ 2006/C 139/01;

Deciding the budget; http://ec.europa.eu/budget/

Improving the budgetary procedure; http://ec.europa.eu/budget/

Filipa Figueira: The EU Budget – Is this the moment for reform? CEPS Commentary, 15 October 2007; http://www.ceps.be

Europe’s political Economy: The EU budget review: challenges and opportunities; EPC 17 October 2007; http://www.epc.eu