Response to Junckers' State of the European Union #SOTEU

First, we take a look at the case of the European Commission, as presented in the available materials. Second, we explore the response to the State of the European Union (SOTEU) address from three European think tanks.

State of the European Union debate

The case of president Jean-Claude Juncker and the European Commission is set out in the ”full picture” booklet, now available in English and French:

State of the Union 2015 – by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission 9 September 2015 [9MB]

État de l'Union 2015 – Discours de Jean-Claude Juncker, président de la Commission européenne devant le Parlement européen le 9 septembre 2015

The broadly favourable response from the political groups and some individual MEPs is included in the multilingual verbatim record of the plenary debate.

Salvador Llaudes

In the post Juncker, el #SOTEU yun año de mandato, on the Blog Elcano, Salvador Llaudes described the commencement of the political and dynamic European Commission under the Spitzenkandidat Jean-Claude Juncker, including his initiatives to solve the Greek crisis and the first and the second refugee crisis. Public opinion is showing some signs of recognition of Junckers' rejection of past 'path dependency' and 'business as usual'.

The EU member states are still divided in this respect, which means that Juncker has to keep working to arrive at a necessary consensus.

Valentin Kreilinger

Valentin Kreilinger, of the Jacques Delors Institut Berlin, began his blog post #SOTEU:Der Kommissionspräsident alsFeuerwhrmann und Architekt by recalling the purpose of the State of the (European) Union address (here the English version, in Annex IV of the inter-institutional agreement):

5. Each year in the first part-session of September, a State of the Union debate will be held in which the President of the Commission shall deliver an address, taking stock of the current year and looking ahead to priorities for the following years. To that end, the President of the Commission will in parallel set out in writing to Parliament the main elements guiding the preparation of the Commission Work Programme for the following year.

The refugee crisis dominated Junckers' address, but he acts as a ”fireman” and an ”architect” to strengthen the ”Community method” regarding the other priorities as well. His architectural aspirations can be seen clearly in the deepening of the economic and monetary union (EMU), building on the five presidents' report.

Right after the SOTEU debate Frans Timmermans and Dimitris Avramopoulos presented the package of proposals to manage the refugee crisis, including resettlement of 120,000 asylum seekers and a permanent relocation system.

Josef Janning

In a Note from Berlin, Josef Janning of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) saw Junckers' address as a missed opportunity, because it failed to confront the slow poison of intergovernmentalism killing the European Union: More Union for the EU.

European media watch political actors struggling with major challenges to the union such as the sovereign debt crisis, the war in Ukraine, and the refugee crisis (each of them clear cases for a common response), and conclude that Europe is failing.

The EU’s underperformance stems from three trends, which seem to reinforce each other: a hybrid deepening, a utilitarian widening, and a fragmentation of the political centre (with description and reasoning about each trend in the blog post).

The refugee crisis is a case in point of the diverging union and the lack of consensus among member states.

Comment

The intergovernmental drift of the European Union towards a confederation of short-sighted and disparate member states is evident, with consequent lack of effective solutions.

For a final verdict the jury can only follow the proceedings until the five years of the European Commission are up. In the interim both Llaudes and Kreilinger attest to Junckers' leadership role.

Janning called Junckers' address a missed opportunity, but analysed the institutional failings of the European Union, viz. the lack of EU powers and the paucity of political will among the member states to act decisively on the ”big issues”.

My question is: What more could the Commission president have done, given the constraints? What can Juncker do in the future?

Like Chernyshevsky and Lenin we can ask, although this time with regard to the European Union: What Is to Be Done?

Ralf Grahn

New ”fiscal compact” for eurozone (2 x updated)

How can anyone defend (or even call for more) intergovernmental solutions to common problems at the European level, or even tolerate the EU our leaders and their predecessors have built?

With democratic government and sufficient powers the European Union, the eurozone and we would not be in this impotent mess.

Well, upon leaving Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank (ECB) called it a very good outcome for the euro area countries, although the deal has to be fleshed out in the coming days.

The European Council dinner finally broke up and after 5 o'clock Friday morning (local time) the announced press conference of European Council and Euro Summit president Herman Van Rompuy and Commission president José Manuel Barroso took place.

Update 9 December 2011: Herman Van Rompuy's written statement has now been posted, and it offers more detail.

Update 2, 9 December 2011: Statement by the euro area heads of state or government (9 December 2011; 7 pages). This is the paper to read, both for actions and blank spaces.

A ”new fiscal compact” is the novel Sesame between 17 eurozone members and six others, an intergovernmental agreement between 23 member states (perhaps more).

Self-imposed structural weaknesses force the leaders to continue on the road of intergovernmentalism, although credible and sustainable solutions need durable and legitimate foundations.

The United Kingdom is clearly a problem, not a part of the solution, as shown by the Financial Times report on prime minister David Cameron's demands for Britain to be able to be excepted from regulation of a crucial part of the internal market, financial services.

Thus, Cameron wants to undermine the integrity of the internal market.



Ralf Grahn

Merkozy fiddles while eurozone burns

The president of the European Council and the Euro Summits, Herman Van Rompuy, and the leaders in the 25 other European capitals sit twiddling their thumbs, waiting for Merkozy.

What makes it even more absurd is that few expect the German chancellor Angela Merkel and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy to sort out much of their mutual differences today, let alone the euro crisis.

The Elysee blog of Arnaud Leparmentier (Le Monde) discusses the issues on the table and the persisting malfunction of the Franco-German ”engine”:

Accords et désaccords entre Merkel et Sarkozy, juste avant leur énième rencontre (4 December 2011)

The hopeless machinations of ”sovereign Princes” continue, instead of the needed rise to the federal level, records Jean Brochier.

Laurence Boon states on Telos that an intergovernmental eurozone just does not work.

Trisha Craig notes the impassioned plea for German action from the Polish foreign minister Radek Sikorski (via The Economist).

If it does not work, try more of the same, is how Andy Carling sees the EU institutions and the political parties reacting to the existential crisis.

***

Despite the imminent bankruptcy of intergovernmental Europe and the Franco-German duopoly, the two (and other) national leaders refuse to change tack.

Our national leaders never have time for EU democracy, but there is always time for another eurozone failure.

What impact can we expect from the European Council 8 to 9 December 2011 in the real world?



Ralf Grahn

Sweden in European integration (recap)

Sweden is fairly British in its EU politics and policies, although more pragmatic and much less abrasive. Here is a recap of some aspects of Sweden in European integration.

Sweden has a long tradition of intergovernmental thinking in international relations. Sweden is one of the top countries in almost all important global rankings, so Swedes do not always see EU standards as an improvement.


Sweden

With regard to EU2020 growth reforms and sustainable public finances, the member states of the European Union have reason to use Sweden as a model, even if the Swedish government is unclear about defence cooperation, well outside the eurozone core, leading a rich-country rebellion against the proposed long term budget (multiannual financial framework MFF) 2014-2020, willing to promote enlargement with no end in sight, and opposing preassures for core countries to advance more rapidly than the 27-member EU as a whole.

The Swedish government showed its competent and pragmatic qualities during the EU Council presidency during the latter half of 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty finally entered into force (from 1 December 2009).



Ralf Grahn

Peter Spiegel (FT Brussels blog): Merkel-Sarkozy weaken Commission?

After Protesilaos Stavrou, we look at what another valued euroblogger wrote about the joint letter, or should we say letters, from the German chancellor Angela Merkel and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy to Herman Van Rompuy, the president of the European Council invited to come up with concrete proposals by October.


FT Brussels blog

On the FT Brussels blog, Peter Spiegel discussed the sidelining of the European Commission. Van Rompuy would chair the summits, aided by a new secretariat, and new analytical capacities would be created (to complement those of the Commission, the ECB and the IMF).

The intergovernmental approach would play into the hands of the governments of the bigger eurozone countries, like France and Germany.

Spiegel foresees some nasty institutional fights: Is the Sarko-Merkel plan anti-Commission? (18 August 2011).

Since then, Stanley Pignal has discussed the ideas of the Belgian acting finance minister Didier Reynders on eurozone reform, a finance minister for the euro area and eurobonds, on the FT Brussels blog: Reynders redux (19 August 2011).

***

I agree with the analysis about the intergovernmental thrust of the Franco-German letter, but the eurozone summits would undermine the Euro Group as well as the Commission.

When chancellor Merkel and president Sarkozy say that ”(t)he European Parliament, the European Commission and the national parliaments should be associated to this process in their respective capacities”, it looks like a polite way of telling them not to expect any crumbs from the table of the leaders of this silent coup.

***

Multilingual Bloggingportal.eu is an important part of the European public space, bringing you the new articles on 839 euroblogs.



Ralf Grahn

To The European Citizen: The EUnion is behind us, we shall not be moved

Thoughtful, well reasoned and moderate, The European Citizen is a star among Euroblogs. The posts by Conor Slowey are a pleasure to read and instructive to boot, for those interested in the law and politics of the European Union.




Now there is a special reason to note The European Citizen, who in his blog entry Onward, Community Soldiers replied that the defunct “Community method” could be replaced by the “Union method” for co-decision under the Lisbon Treaty, perhaps opposed by the “Council method” or “Special method” for more intergovernmental forms of decision-making.



After I argued that the “Union method” would be a seamless and (politically) correct shift, but the “Federal method” a better description, The European Citizen returned with a pondered reply: Calling a spade a federal method.

He now proposes the “States’ method” for intergovernmental decision-making, but still favours the “Union method” as a replacement for the “Community method”:

It will probably be a matter of taste - who knows, the Community method label could survive for quite a while longer, and other different variations will probably surface. Avoiding "federal" may be a politically correct option, but I feel that if federal has been rejected from the Treaties in favour of "ever closer union", then adopting the f-word is a declaration of political ideology and aspiration, even if European law has a federal character. I have little problem with the term "federal method" in itself, but I'll stick with the (in my opinion) more neutral "Union method" and "States' method".

The reason for my series of blog posts was that leading EU politicians, such as Herman Van Rompuy and Martin Schulz recently used the old term “Community method”, terminology central to European integration (not only ‘cosmetics’).

Slowey and I seem to be in agreement that a new term to reflect the Treaty of Lisbon is preferable, and our different preferences can be described as a matter of taste.

However, continuing the hymn-like headlines, I do not embrace Slowey’s argument that the choice of the “Federal method” is dictated by political ideology and aspiration, at least in my case (although I am a federalist). I see the term “federal” as a better, though wide, description of co-decision in the European Union, including the ordinary legislative procedure (default mode).

I don’t buy ‘ever closer union’ as a supportive argument either. All the Treaties have stated this phrase about the latest leg of the journey, while leaving the ultimate goal (finalité) undisclosed, but this is a slightly different issue. In addition, we have the various forms of intergovernmental decision-making, so “federal” describes only a part of the functioning of the European Union, not the whole.

A rhetorical question, if you like: Do you want a physician to offer a politically or clinically correct diagnosis?

Politicians and officials may, or may not, prefer politically correct terms, in order to evade sensitive issues, especially when the ‘liberum veto’ forces them to adopt the lowest common denominator, but I see no reason why researchers, teachers, students, practitioners or other free citizens should.

Ergo, at this stage I still prefer the “Federal system” to replace the antiquated “Community system”.

The “States’ system” can, in my view, be tested as a headline concept for more or less intergovernmental decisions relating to the EU.

Perhaps there are others in the EU related online community thinking about these tools of trade(?)




Ralf Grahn

EU: Union or federal method?

I have suggested that federal decision-making or the “federal method” could replace the obsolete “Community method”, when the European Commission proposes, the Council and the European Parliament jointly dispose, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) interprets the acts and actions.



This far the only contribution regarding the ‘cosmetic part of the question’ I have seen is by The European Citizen, who suggests the use of the “Union method”, as opposed to the “Council method” or “Special method”.

Naturally, the “Union method” in an EU context cannot be wrong, because it takes into consideration the peculiarities of the European Union (‘sui generis’). It seamlessly marks the shift from the era of the various European Communities to the verbal monolith European Union.

My reason for putting forward the “federal method” was to describe one part of the European Union more bluntly for what it is, a federal system, using terms in general use around the world, even if there are many variations between different federal systems.

In my humble opinion, political correctness should not prevent us from describing the European Union as it is, though only in part.

‘Cosmetics’, especially make-up, has been used for thousands of years both to accentuate and to conceal. Political terms aren’t that different.

The Lisbon Treaty has created a ‘verbal monolith’, but structurally and operationally the European Union is still fragmented.

In my view, “intergovernmental” still covers the rest of the areas, from decisions (predominantly) by the European Council and the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers) to agreements made between all or some EU member states as such.

How would Herman Van Rompuy, José Manuel Barroso, Yves Leterme and Didier Reynders and and Olivier Chastel (provisionally), Jerzy Buzek, Joseph Daul, Martin Schulz, Guy Verhofstadt, Daniel Cohn-Bendit and about 501 million other Europeans (including the readers of this blog) act as make-up artists in a European Union where the Lisbon Treaty is in force?

Union method or Federal method? Something else?





Ralf Grahn





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EU politics and law: Part federation, part something else? What?

Yesterday’s blog post “EU politics and law: “Community method” dead and reburied – What instead?” found that the European Union has “parliamentary” traits, but because of the structure of the EU it still feels artificial to try to cram even co-decision (the ordinary legislative procedure) under such a heading, now that the term “Community method” is obsolete.

I still hope for teachers, researchers and students of European Union politics and law, as well as others, to offer their views, but in the meanwhile I will continue the soliloqui.



Federal?

By the structure of the European Union I mean that its powers are basically derived from its constituent parts, the member states, not from the people, although democracy is one of the founding values of the EU (Article 2 TEU) and the functioning of the union is said to be founded on representative democracy (Article 10 TEU).

When the directly elected European Parliament acts at eyelevel with the Council, we can describe the system and the decision making as federal, although the term seems to lack precision.

Should we try that: federal decision making or the federal method?

Does it satisfy sense and sensibility?



What about the rest?

If part of EU decision making is described as federal, we are still left with a few problems.

Are we to exclude the term “federal” when we discuss EU politics, policies or issues, where the European Parliament plays a lesser role than the governments of the member states?

I have a hard time imagining that a 21st century political system in Europe could be called federal, if not also democratic: based on legitimate representative democracy at federal level (with powers at least equal to those of the states).

This leaves outside a number of matters on a sliding scale of intergovernmentalism, from more limited participation by the European Parliament and the Commission to inexistent.

On the flip side of the coin, there are special legislative procedures where the European Council and the Council decide as EU institutions, within the EU framework and its powers (competences), but in principle everything outside the attributed powers is left to purely intergovernmental decisions.

Actually, the existential questions for the European Union are in the hands of the member states, each of them sovereign enough on its own to prevent a decision (liberum veto). Only unanimous agreement by all governments (possibly requiring ratification by all parliaments, or even some national electorates) can reform the structures and powers.

This means that the future development of the European Union could be held hostage by first the government, then the parliament and possibly (if national constitutional requirements so say) the voters as well, even in the smallest member state; at present Malta with about 416,000 people, something like 0.083 per cent of the total EU population of 501 million. Big or small, is this legitimate?

Despite my reticence, should anything on this sliding scale of intergovernmental decision making be included under the concept “federal”?

If not federal, which terms should we employ for the various modes?

Intergovernmental? Confederal? International?




Ralf Grahn


P.S. Comments relevant to the topic discussed in each Grahnlaw blog post are most welcome. However, the number of spam comments keeps skyrocketing. This is the sad reason for comment moderation, so it may take a while before your valued comment appears.



It is easier to understand a language than to use it correctly. As Eurobloggers we could and should promote interaction among Europeans across linguistic and national borders. We can link to blogs and other sources in foreign languages and share different viewpoints with our readers, perhaps explaining the gist of the arguments.

Another opportunity is to invite comments in different languages, those we are able to read or by using machine translation to understand the essentials.

Grahnlaw has adopted a multilingual comment policy:

I do my best to read comments in Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish or Swedish, even if the Grahnlaw blog and my possible replies are in English.

EU: "Community method" RIP – or a stake through its heart!

Why on Earth did they start a debate about the “Community method” now? (Opening shots here and more discussion here; ‘they’ meaning leading EU politicians)

At 50, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) met its preordained fate and passed away (23 July 2002).



"Nobody" ever talks about the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom), although there is now a consolidated (updated) version of the Euratom Treaty.

When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009, the European Community disappeared into the mist of history, succeeded by the European Union. (In everyday speech the EU had taken over from the EC long before that, with only official documents and meticulous lawyers fighting a rearguard battle.)

In short, there is no (European) Community, if we take a practical view.



Requiescat in pace

“Old habits die hard”, we know, but this blog post argues that we should escort the term “Community method” back to its mausoleum, with full historical honours, the Ode to Joy playing.

RIP = Requiescat in pace (Rest in peace), or I’ll drive a stake through your heart!

To be really smug, we could ask: Why don’t 'they' read this blog and live longer, happier lives in the present?



In a December 2009 blog post, when the Treaty of Lisbon was fresh, I published a few notes on how the European Union makes laws:

Ordinary legislative procedure

In principle, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009. Article 289(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115/172) defines the ordinary legislative procedure, referring to more detailed provisions in Article 294 TFEU:


Article 289(1) TFEU

1. The ordinary legislative procedure shall consist in the joint adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of a regulation, directive or decision on a proposal from the Commission. This procedure is defined in Article 294.



Historically, the “Community method” has been the shorthand expression for a triangle, where the Commission proposes and the Council and the European Parliament adopt the laws.

Here is how the Europa Glossary describes the Community method with a bit more detail:

The Community method is the expression used for the institutional operating mode set up in the first pillar of the European Union. It proceeds from an integration logic with due respect for the subsidiarity principle, and has the following salient features:
 Commission monopoly of the right of initiative;
 widespread use of qualified majority voting in the Council;
 an active role for the European Parliament;
 uniform interpretation of Community law by the Court of Justice.


In my view, the term “Community method” should be heading for the scrap-heap of history, replaced by “the ordinary legislative procedure”, when we have to be exact. In daily use “EU legislation”, “EU lawmaking” and other shorter expressions can be used, because the ordinary legislative procedure is the default mode.

Clarifications are needed mainly when the “special legislative procedure” is used (with a smaller role for the European Parliament) for lawmaking, or when we discuss intergovernmental decision making, as in the areas of foreign, security and defence policy.

Partly this methodological detour was caused by reflections on the future use of EU terms, partly by the fact that we are still seeing the tail end of new legislation approved under the Treaty of Nice, with the European Community still in existence.

The somewhat antiquated Europa Glossary page on the Community and intergovernmental methods is still there, and there is continued need for an explanation of this historically important political term, just as we visit the graves of our loved ones to connect with our past.

After the Coroner’s verdict and solemn reburial, we need a Baptist for the newborn.




Ralf Grahn

EU future: Member states boon or bane?

The previous blog post covered the opening shots in the renewed, mainly inter-institutional debate about a more parliamentary or an intergovernmental European Union.

Even if the protagonists seem to address each other, the future solutions are far from arcane irrelevancies. They will determine our security and prosperity, the fate of 501 million Europeans in a globalising world.

We have reason to listen to what some protagonists had to say in the European Parliament Wednesday: Herman Van Rompuy, Martin Schulz and Rebecca Harms.

How should we interpret the silence of the European People’s Party (EPP)?

Can a look outside this one EP debate shed more light on Guy Verhofstadt and Daniel Cohn Bendit, and what does the commentator Stanley Crossick add?



Herman Van Rompuy



Two days after his speech in Paris, on 22 September 2010 the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, reported on the 16 September European Council meeting to the European Parliament. He presented his efforts to get the national governments to cooperate more effectively.

Van Rompuy remarked that the heads of state or government want more ownership by the European Council (themselves) in EU foreign policy.

With regard to economic governance, all heads of state or government want to continue the work and to keep the momentum. Van Rompuy will submit a draft of the global report to the Task Force consisting of the ministers of finance on September 27, with the aim to reach an understanding in the middle of October, so that the European Council can conclude in its meeting of the 28th and 29th October.

Later Van Rompuy returned to the discussion about the “Community method” versus “intergovernmental” coordination:

Dear colleagues, Mr President, meetings of the European Council should not be considered as "summits" but as regular -- even routine -- meetings of a Union institution.

Indeed, allow me to emphasise -- at this time of renewed debate in your Parliament about the "Community method" -- that the European Council is an institution of our Union and not a summit in the manner of the G8 or the G20. It is embedded in the institutional framework of the Union, but it brings to the Union inputs from the highest political level in the member states, and it gives to the member states a sense of ownership and participation in the Union and reinforces their commitment to its success.

Stanley Crossick

Van Rompuy rallied at least one enthusiastic supporter.



According to Stanley Crossick, on Stanley’s blog yesterday, there is no longer any space for an ideological confrontation between the Community method and intergovernmentalism. ‘Our’ approach should be pragmatic and there should be a mixture of the two approaches, depending on the circumstances. Herman Van Rompuy rightly seeks to bring cohesion within the European Council and between the EU institutions.

Crossick also supported Van Rompuy’s idea of downgrading the European Council summits, with EU leaders meeting more regularly in dialogue as an excellent one.



EPP group dilemma



I failed to find anything immediately relevant in group leader Joseph Daul’s or other press releases on the news page of the largest political group in the European Parliament: the 265 member EPP group.



As the centre-right European People’s Party likes to point out in its press releases:

The EPP is the largest and most influential European-level political party of the centre-right, which currently includes 73 member-parties from 39 countries, the Presidents of the Commission, Council, and Parliament, 15 EU and 6 non-EU heads of state and government, 13 members of the European Commission and the largest Group in the European Parliament.

Actually, they forgot to mention the president of the European Council (Herman Van Rompuy).

Mentioning the Council is more complicated: The prime minister of the caretaker government in Belgium, the current EU Council presidency, is the Christian Democratic and Flemish (EPP) Yves Leterme, although it is a coalition government, so representatives of different parties could be expected to chair various Council ‘configurations’.

In other words, it is somewhat uncomfortable for the EPP to come out strongly in public for or against one of the EU institutions, or most of member states’ governments for that matter.



Socialists and Democrats



I failed to find anything in the newsroom of the second largest political group: the Socialists and Democrats.



However, the S&D group leader Martin Schulz has few of the inhibitions of his EPP counterpart. The summary of the debate published by the EP press service tells us:

Socialist Martin Schulz said that…

…the Parliament is calling for the community method in terms of resolving problems. He said his group wanted it to be done at EU level in a community way and that the task of EP is to get the community method through.

Other political groups



The EP press summary was written mostly from the viewpoint of economic governance and the Roma issue, so the extracts concerning Guy Verhofstadt (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats ALDE), Rebecca Harms (Greens/EFA), Timothy Kirkhope (European Conservatives and Reformists ECR), Patrick Le Hyaric(leftist GUE/NGL) and Niki Tzavela (nationalist Europe of Freedom and Democracy EFD) do not enlighten us much in this respect.



I found no press release with more details from ALDE, but co-chair Rebecca Harms for the Green group clearly warned against the growing influence of member states in ‘very European’ issues, while it is the task of the Commission to defend the general interest of Europeans.



We do know that the ALDE group leader Guy Verhofstadt and co-chair Daniel Cohn Bendit (Greens) are among the members of the Spinelli Group for a federal Europe. The Spinelli Group network consists of the signatories of the manifesto, 1052 by now.

Are the member states indispensable for or the bane of an ever closer union?

We are still far from a definitive answer.




Ralf Grahn




P.S. In two days, Sunday 26 September 2010, people all over Europe celebrate the European Day of Languages, organised by the Council of Europe and the European Union as an inspiration to language learning.



For bloggers in Europe there is a special event, which takes place on the Internet: the Day of Multilingual Blogging. The blog post behind the link offers suggestions on how to participate, as well as information about the event, the Facebook page and the Twitter hashtag #babel. For a richer life, please join!

Sarkozy and Berlusconi: Helping or hurting their countries?

One of the questions in the wake of the French “Romagate” affair is how it affects the international standing of France. Regards citoyens republished an article by Christian Lequesne in Le Monde: L’attitude du pouvoir vis-à-vis de l’Europe isole la France au lieu de renforcer son rôle.



Lequesne, who is director of CERI (Centre for International Studies and Research), identifies four different elements in president Nicolas Sarkozy’s intergovernmental view of the European Union. This view is counter-productive, and it leads to isolation.


Thomas Friang and Solène Meissonnier speak about an insolent sovereignty in Le Taurillon, when they predict that the Roma policy of the French government will affect the building of Europe, as well as France’s international standing: Une souveraineté insolente.



The only other major EU member state to give the French government clamorous support is Silvio Berlusconi’s Italy. Therefore it is interesting to see how Ferruccio Pastore deals with Paris and Rome in Affari Internazionali: L’asse Parigi-Roma scuote le fondamenta dell’Ue.

According to Pastore the split at the European Council concerned a fundamental question about EU citizenship: does it belong to the poor. The axis between Paris and Rome looks like a precarious alliance between two leaders in crisis. The opened crack concerns the very foundations of the community project.



Also in Affari Internazionali, Bruno Nascimbene writes about the Roma and EU citizenship: La disputa dei rom e i diritti dei cittadini dell’Ue.

Nascimbene discusses EU citizenship, discrimination, free movement, ‘voluntary’ repatriation and the requirement to decide on a case by case basis.


All in all, it looks like Sarkozy and Berlusconi have harmed their countries much more than they have helped.




Ralf Grahn



P.S. The multilingual aggregator for EU related blogs keeps growing. There are now 669 Euroblogs listed on Bloggingportal.eu. You can take a look at the stream of all new posts, or following the editors' choices on the front page. You can also subscribe to the streams and the newsletters without cost.



Bloggingportal.eu needs a few more voluntary editors to tag posts according to subjects. Why not keep informed by reading about European affairs, improve your language skills and do something useful by joining the team of editors?

Tracking eurozone crisis measures: Collective defence doctrine and foundations

How do the heads of state or government of the eurozone countries add to our knowledge about crisis prevention and mitigation at the time of the Spring European Council?



Statement by the heads of state and government of the euro area; Brussels, 25 March 2010



Greece

The participants stated that ‘ambitious and decisive’ action by the Greek government should allow Greece to regain the full confidence of the markets. Greece had not requested financial assistance, so no decision was taken to activate such assistance.

The euro area member states reaffirmed their willingness to safeguard stability in the euro area as a whole.

However, the eurozone member states outlined an aid package, should the market disturbances continue or deepen:

As part of a package involving substantial International Monetary Fund financing and a majority of European financing, Euro area member states, are ready to contribute to coordinated bilateral loans.

This mechanism, complementing International Monetary Fund financing, has to be considered ultima ratio, meaning in particular that market financing is insufficient. Any disbursement on the bilateral loans would be decided by the euro area member states by unanimity subject to strong conditionality and based on an assessment by the European Commission and the European Central Bank. We expect Euro-Member states to participate on the basis of their respective ECB capital key.

The objective of this mechanism will not be to provide financing at average euro area interest rates, but to set incentives to return to market financing as soon as possible by risk adequate pricing. Interest rates will be non-concessional, i.e. not contain any subsidy element. Decisions under this mechanism will be taken in full consistency with the Treaty framework and national laws.

We reaffirm our commitment to implement policies aimed at restoring strong, sustainable and stable growth in order to foster job creation and social cohesion.

Furthermore, we commit to promote a strong coordination of economic policies in Europe. We consider that the European Council must improve the economic governance of the European Union and we propose to increase its role in economic coordination and the definition of the European Union growth strategy.

The current situation demonstrates the need to strengthen and complement the existing framework to ensure fiscal sustainability in the euro zone and enhance its capacity to act in times of crises.

For the future, surveillance of economic and budgetary risks and the instruments for their prevention, including the Excessive Deficit Procedure, must be strengthened. Moreover, we need a robust framework for crisis resolution respecting the principle of member states' own budgetary responsibility.

We ask the President of the European Council to establish, in cooperation with the Commission, a task force with representatives of Member States, the rotating presidency and the ECB, to present to the Council, before the end of this year, the measures needed to reach this aim, exploring all options to reinforce the legal framework.

From Greece to collective defence doctrine

It is remarkable that the most significant outcomes at the Spring European Council were not brought about by the institution, but cooked up at the margins, by a gathering even more informal than the Euro Group.

The national leaders of the eurozone countries proclaimed the doctrine of ‘collective defence’ for the common currency.

They were not willing or able to take the detailed decisions on mutual aid, but they laid the foundations for lending at average rates of interest:

• Intergovernmental, decisions requiring unanimity
• By euro area member states
• Minority participation but leading role for the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
• Coordinated bilateral loans
• Conditionality
• Assessment by the European Commission and the ECB
• Country shares based on ECB capital key
• Loans bearing interest, not subsidised
• Unspecified incentives for return to market financing of sovereign debt
• National legal and budget decisions as needed


There are limits to what the EU member states or the euro area countries can do within the treaty framework. It is something of an irony that for more profound action they have to resort to classical intergovernmental cooperation.

Did the markets doubt the ability of the euro area members to walk the talk?

Did the markets distrust the Greek government’s promises, or did they bet on Greece going broke anyway (with, perhaps, a gentle push)?

Soon enough the eurozone countries were going to wake up to the fact that both the Greek economy and the euro currency itself faced an existential threat. They could give up resistance or they had to bring out the big guns.




Ralf Grahn

My Europe Week: Trivium of European integration: Council of Europe at 61

In the 5th century the seven liberal arts were set as the basis for the new school curriculum. First came Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric (later known as the Trivium). (Source: Keith Sidwell: Reading Medieval Latin; Cambridge University Press)



Council of Europe

The Council of Europe was established on 5 May 1949 by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.



According to the Statute of the Council of Europe, every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 3).

Each member must collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council:

Article 1

a. The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.
b. This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern and by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
c. Participation in the Council of Europe shall not affect the collaboration of its members in the work of the United Nations and of other international organisations or unions to which they are parties.
d. Matters relating to national defence do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe.

The United Kingdom and the Nordic countries fended off attempts to endow the Council of Europe with supranational powers, so it remained an expression of primary level international cooperation, an intergovernmental organisation.

The Committee of Ministers makes the decisions, regarding all important matters by unanimity.

The Consultative Assembly, nowadays called the Parliamentary Assembly, is allowed to discuss matters and to make recommendations to the Committee of Ministers. The members of the Parliamentary Assembly are elected indirectly, by the national parliaments among their members.



In the area of human rights, the Council of Europe has become a pioneer internationally. The groundbreaking 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) has been developed further by amending protocols, and especially the establishment in 1959 of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), now issuing binding judgments, has offered Europeans an important and evolving instrument for the protection of the rule of law.

The CoE has widened into a pan-European organisation, with 47 members hosting about 800 million people. Some of the members were admitted on fairly optimistic assumptions about future progress. The ECtHR has become the victim of deep-rooted structural human rights problems in a number of CoE member states, leading to a huge backlog of cases.


A great number of treaties have been concluded within the European Council.

There are reasons to take note of the Council of Europe during My Europe Week. Tomorrow, 5 May 2010, the Council of Europe turns 61. It is worthy of our respect and felicitations, but the limits of intergovernmental cooperation have left its academic achievements at primary level.


My European vision is on the lookout for more: Is there a Quadrivium out there?




Ralf Grahn



P.S. I noticed that the website of the European Council had succumbed to multimedia temptations, making it harder to find solid and useable material without being dragged into picture shows.

EU: Special legislative procedure (VI)

To vote or not to vote: that is the question: Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer the secret vagaries of Council dealings, Or to take arms against a sea of apathy.

In my mind, every vote for a constructive alternative in the European elections counts. The Treaty of Lisbon would widen the area where the directly elected European Parliament legislates on an equal basis with the Council of the European Union.

But the intergovernmental Council remains the principal decision-maker and legislator in many policy areas.

If an issue is important or sensitive enough for the member states, they keep the reins and leave the European Parliament on the sidelines.

Our Odyssey of the Council of the European Union and the special legislative procedure continues, taking us through the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 9.5.2008 C 115.

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Social policy

In EU terms social policy is mainly concerned with employment and working conditions. Action by the European Union is generally a complement to member states’ action. According to Article 153(1) and (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in the following fields the Council shall act unanimously, in accordance with a special legislative procedure, after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (paragraph 1):




(c) social security and social protection of workers;

(d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated;

(f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including codetermination, subject to paragraph 5;

(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory;


However, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, after consulting the European Parliament, may decide to render the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to paragraph 1(d), (f) and (g).

An enabling clause (passerelle) like this may be more important in principle than in practice, because a move to qualified majority voting and the ordinary legislative procedure requires unanimity, which was not in existence when the treaty was agreed. But it would make the procedure more flexible, since laborious treaty amendment and ratifications would be unnecessary.

Anyway, the enabling clause (passerelle) is blocked with regard to social security and social protection of workers; paragraph 1(c).


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Research and technological development

According to Article 182 TFEU, the multiannual framework programme for research and technological development, is adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure after consulting the Economic and Social Committee.


But the implementing specific programmes are adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee; paragraphs 3 and 4.


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Environment

There has been much talk about the European Union’s role in protecting the environment (cf. Article 191 TFEU).

The ordinary legislative procedure applies as a rule, according Article 192(1) TFEU, but the second paragraph lists the exceptions subject to unanimity and a special legislative procedure:


Article 192(2) TFEU

2. By way of derogation from the decision-making procedure provided for in paragraph 1 and without prejudice to Article 114, the Council acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt:

(a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;

(b) measures affecting:

— town and country planning,

— quantitative management of water resources or affecting, directly or indirectly, the availability of those resources,

— land use, with the exception of waste management;

(c) measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.


**

Here, too, in a second subparagraph there is a passerelle, opening up at least a theoretical possibility to shift to qualified majority voting at some future date:


The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
may make the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to the matters referred to in the
first subparagraph.


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Comment


In general ‘special legislative procedure’ can be read as a prognosis for either:

a) no EU legislation, or
b) legislation of low quality (based on the lowest common denominator).

In addition, although the European Parliament is normally consulted, its opinion lacks power. Thus, the process is less transparent and the outcome is less legitimate than legislation based on the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision).



Ralf Grahn

EU Council tasks: Enlargement

According to the Treaty of Lisbon, any European state which respects the EU’s founding values and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the European Union.

Although the Commission does the donkey work, the decisive steps of the accession process are intergovernmental, with the European Council, the Council as well as the member states’ governments and parliaments in key roles.


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Eligibility

There are three groups of criteria for eligibility:

1) European state has not been defined, but in 1987 Morocco’s application to join the European Community was rejected on the grounds that it was not a European state. .

2) The values Article 49 of the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU) refers to are mentioned in Article 2 TEU: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities (OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115).

3) The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account. The current criteria have been laid down by the European Council in Copenhagen (1993) and Madrid (1995).


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Council’s tasks

The applicant state addresses its application to the intergovernmental Council. The Council consults the Commission and needs the consent of the European Parliament for a decision to open membership negotiations.

Even if the formal decision is taken by the Council, unanimously, almost everyone would agree that the decisive political green light is given by the European Council.

The donkey work of conducting the accession negotiations is delegated to the Commission, but regulated and keenly followed by the Council. The applicant state has to adopt the existing Community legislation (acquis communautaire), and the negotiations advance Chapter by Chapter (35 in all).

The accession treaty is concluded intergovernmentally, between the member states and the applicant state, subject to ratification by all of them.



Ralf Grahn

EU Council tasks: Treaty reform

If the areas of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the common security and defence policy (CSDP), including permanent structured cooperation, are intergovernmental, even more so is changing the primary legislation of the European Union at the present time.

Treaty amendments have seen the governments of the EU member states convening in intergovernmental conferences outside the institutions (but using Council infrastructure).

The Treaty of Lisbon would reform the process of treaty amendment, by making the Convention method the primary option. The Convention is more broadly based than an intergovernmental conference, and it bears some traits of a constituent assembly.

There have been two Convention experiments, leading to proposals to the member states’ governments.

The first Convention led to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, declared politically binding by the institutions in December 2000 in Nice and destined to become legally binding if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force.

The second, known as the European Convention, wrote the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The intergovernmental conference 2003 and 2004 pared down the proposals somewhat to agree on the Constitutional Treaty, but the ratification processes petered out after the French and Dutch referenda.

The IGC 2007 produced the ‘Constitution light’ initially prepared as the Reform Treaty, but now known as the Treaty of Lisbon, after the city where it was signed on 13 December 2007. (The consolidated version was published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115.)


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Treaty revision procedures

In the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 48 of the amended Treaty on European Union offers two modes for treaty amendment:

1. the ordinary revision procedure
2. simplified revision procedures.


Proposals for the amendment of the treaties are addressed to the Council, and they can be made by any member state, the European Parliament of the Commission.

The Council submits the proposals to the European Council and notifies the national parliaments.

(The European Council can reject the proposal or it can vote for a Convention or an intergovernmental conference; but formally the latter take place outside the institutions. A Convention makes proposals only, but a subsequent IGC decides. )

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Simplified revision procedures


TFEU internal policies and action

Interestingly, proposals for revising all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFUE) relating to the internal policies and action of the Union are addressed directly to the European Council. They may lead to a unanimous decision to revise the treaty, but cannot increase the competences (powers) of the EU.


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Added flexibility

Some flexibility is built into the provisions enabling the European Council to facilitate decision making in the Council, by moving to qualified majority voting in an area or in a certain case. (In a similar way, the European Parliament can be involved by moving from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary legislative procedure.)


***


The formal provisions mentioning the Council do not offer a comprehensive view of the active participation of the governments (ministers) in the various stages of treaty reform. With or without a preparatory Convention, the ordinary revision procedure is concluded by an intergovernmental conference.


Ralf Grahn

EU Council tasks: Security & defence policy CSDP

The European Union’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) is an integral part of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP). At this stage of development, it is geared towards humanitarian, peace and crisis management missions drawing on both civilian and military assets (Petersberg tasks).

The Treaty of Lisbon envisions the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, leading to a common defence.

The intergovernmental CSDP respects a) the ‘specific character’ of the security and defence policy of ‘certain member states’ (non-aligned, neutral) and b) the obligations of the vast majority which are NATO members.

We look at the Council’s CSDP tasks in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, with the relevant provisions located in the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU).


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Defining objectives

The Council of the European Union defines the objectives for the implementation of the CSDP, assisted by the European Defence Agency (EDA)(OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115):


Article 42(3) TEU


3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.


Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.


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Unanimity

The CSDP decisions are adopted unanimously by the Council:


4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.


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Delegation of tasks

The Council can delegate the execution of tasks (a mission) to a group of member states (Article 42(5) TEU), with the willing and able keeping the Council informed. If the decision needs to be changed, it is dealt with by the Council, as provided in Article 44 TEU.


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Implementation and scope

According to the second paragraph of Article 43 TEU, the Council adopts the decisions relating to the extended Petersberg tasks, listed in paragraph 1:


Article 43 TEU

1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.


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European Defence Agency

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is intergovernmental, ‘subject to the authority of the Council’ (Article 45 TEU). The EDA’s statute, seat and operational rules are adopted by the Council by a qualified majority.


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Permanent structured cooperation

According to Article 46 TEU, the Council adopts, by qualified majority, the decision establishing permanent structured cooperation (akin to enhanced cooperation in other policy areas) between member states, which fulfil the criteria and made the commitments on military capabilities in accordance with Protocol No. 10.

Decisions concerning later entrants are decided by the participating states.

Permanent structured cooperation is one of the questions in need of preparatory work, public discussion and implementing decisions, if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.


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Council configurations

The current Council configuration, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), already meets separately for its two main areas of activity. The Lisbon Treaty would separate the configurations, and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) would carry on with the whole of the European Union's external action, namely common foreign and security policy, European security and defence policy, foreign trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. (Cf. current Council’s Rules of Procedure and Lisbon Article 16(6) TEU.)


The Defence Ministers of the EU member states convene in connection with GAERC meetings and for separate informal meetings. The latest informal meeting was held in Prague on 12 to 13 March 2009.


The Council is assisted by the Political and Security Committee (known as PSC or COPS), which monitors the international situation, delivers opinions and can be authorised to direct crisis management operations (Article 38 TEU).


The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.

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European Parliament

Being on the sidelines of the intergovernmental CSDP does not prevent the European Parliament from showing a keen interest in The European Security Strategy and ESDP, as witnessed by the 19 February 2009 EP Resolution P6_TA-PROV(2009)0075, based on an own-initiative report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0075+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

The European Parliament sees the need for a common defence policy in Europe requiring an integrated European Armed Force which consequently needs to be equipped with common weapon systems so as to guarantee commonality and interoperability.

In addition, the EP Resolution offers an updated overview on the latest proposals and current shortcomings of the EU’s security and defence policy.



Ralf Grahn

EU Council tasks (principles)

Each member state of the European Union is represented by its head of state or government in the European Council and by its government in the Council, the two most powerful institutions of the EU (although the European Council formally becomes an institution only if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force).

The second of these intergovernmental institutions, the Council of the European Union (European Community) exercises legislative and budgetary functions. It also holds executive powers, but in the Treaty of Lisbon this is expressed more obliquely by using the words policy-making and coordinating functions.


This post looks at some general principles concerning the exercise of power by the Council (and the other institutions).



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Treaty in force

The main provision expresses the tasks of the Council in a fragmented manner in Article 202 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), published in the latest codified version of the treaties in force in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 29.12.2006 C 321 E/135:

SECTION 2
THE COUNCIL

Article 202 TEC

To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained the Council shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty:

— ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member States,

— have power to take decisions,

— confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays down. The Council may impose certain requirements in respect of the exercise of these powers. The Council may also reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise directly implementing powers itself. The procedures referred to above must be consonant with principles and rules to be laid down in advance by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament.


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Consolidated Lisbon Treaty

Council’s tasks in general

Since the publication of the consolidated version of the Treaty of Lisbon on 9 May 2008, the proposed primary legislation of the European Union is on the whole more readable than the existing treaties (although a modernised text cannot abolish the complicated structure of the EU).

In two sentences Article 16(1) of the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU) in the consolidated version of the Treaty of Lisbon manages to convey a general idea of what the Council is supposed to do (OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115/24):

Article 16 TEU

1. The Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legislative and budgetary functions. It shall carry out policy-making and coordinating functions as laid down in the Treaties.


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Conferred powers

According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the institutions of the European Union act within the limits of the treaties; the principle of attributed or conferred powers:


Article 5(1) TEU

1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.


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Institutional framework


The guiding principles are common to the institutions, which depend on each other:


Article 13(1) TEU, first subparagraph

1. The Union shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions.


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Limited powers

The powers of each institution are set out and limited by the treaties, and the need for interinstitutional cooperation is stated (institutional balance):


Article 13(2) TEU

2. Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them. The institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation.


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This sets the background for the treatment of the various tasks the Lisbon Treaty confers upon the Council.



Ralf Grahn