Euro crises exposed and added to EU lack of legitimacy and democracy

The discussion began in the entries Transparency during the eurozone crises and Euro crises: European Council eviscerated? and Eurozone governance: Fundamental flaws but better presentation. This is the fourth instalment based on my speech at the 22 February 2012 Attac seminar about the implications of the new fiscal discipline in the EU. This text contains some modifications, updates and documentary references, which complement the oral presentation.


Democracy

The preceding discussion about openness (transparency) brings us to the the need for democracy.

Let me start with the good news.

In addition to EU citizenship and the principle of equality of citizens (Article 9 TEU), Article 10(1) of the Treaty on European Union tells us:

The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.

Even the second paragraph – Article 10(2) – looks promising:

Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament.

However, the European Union is essentially ”owned” by the member states, represented in the two most important institutions, the European Council and the Council, by their governments. The member states hold the treaty making powers (and fairly little radical change can be accomplished without bumping into the walls of the absurdly detailed treaties).

New competences (powers) require treaty change, almost a mission impossible with unanimous decisions and national ratifications by every member.

The member states control expenditure through the long term budget (officially the multiannual financial framework MFF), so the European Parliament is allowed to play along with regard to the annual budget within the framework.

The member states limit the EU's opportunities to tax and to borrow for its policies.

Most importantly, the citizens are not able to vote in, or out, those who govern the union.

In short, the European Union could not become a member of the EU, because it is not a functioning democracy, although it has democratic elements or ornaments.


A democratic union

In my view, it would be better for the security and prosperity European citizens in a globalising world to have a fully democratic union, with accountable government, robust structures and needed powers, starting with foreign and security policy and a common defence, plus a real federal budget.

It is not for the Basic Law to prescribe the contents of the policies to shape, but to offer the ground rules for democratic government and to guarantee fundamental rights.

The arrangement with multiple unanimity rules, 27 national governments dealing with each other in diplomatic mode and as many national parliaments more or less diligently scrutinising what they are up to, was artificial.

The repeated financial, economic and sovereign debt crises since 2008 have exposed fundamental flaws.

The informal coteries and intergovernmental agreements have worsened the situation.

The current system is neither legitimate nor effective.

In interdependent 21st century Europe the question should be the sovereignty of the people, not the sovereignty of states.



Ralf Grahn
speaker on EU affairs, especially digital policy and law

P.S. 1: For better or for worse, between the global issues and the national level, the European Union institutions and the eurozone coteries shape our future. At the same time we see an emerging European online public sphere. More than 900 euroblogs are aggregated by multilingual Bloggingportal.eu. Is your blog already listed among them? Are you following the debates which matter for your future?

P.S. 2: Referring the anti-piracy treaty #ACTA to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) marks a lull in the proceedings, but not an end to the political battle. A few moments ago, the online petition launched by @Avaaz for the European Parliament (and the national parliaments) to reject ACTA had already been signed by 2,436,282 netizens, but more are welcome until the official burial.

Forcing ACTA on EU citizens

Was it too much to tweet the following to @davidmartinmep – the new ACTA rapporteur in the European Parliament: 100 demonstrations this week & 1.8 million signatures against #ACTA cause for rejection of current IPR agenda?

On the face of it, yes, as @awbMaven pointed out: By themselves they're not cause 4 rejection, but it IS cause 4 IN DEPTH consideration of the issues raised imv.

Good point, but what about the wider questions of the right aims and objectives, common sense (proportionality), legitimacy and acceptance?

The Group of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) had just appointed David Martin MEP the new rapporteur for ACTA in the Committee on International Trade (INTA) in the European Parliament. Martin seemed to dismiss the widespread concerns among citizens as myths, and took a narrow, technical view of the treaty, removing ACTA from the context of the EU Commission's copyright and IPR enforcement agenda.

I was not the only one worried by the first signs from the new rapporteur, after the recent spectacular defection by Kader Arif. La Quadrature du Net asked: Will the New ACTA Rapporteur Stand For Citizens' Freedoms?


Wider issues are real concerns

The Anti-Counterfeiting (and much more) Trade Agreement ACTA has wider implications than its deceptive packaging as merely an intergovernmental trade pact and the misleading headline evoking counterfeit goods would lead us to believe.

Read the article about the wider stakes and common sense by professor Michael Kennedy, For Your Digital Freedom and Ours, mentioned in the previous Grahnlaw post (about the EU IPR enforcement agenda).

David Jolly reports from Paris for the New York Times: A New Question of Internet Freedom. The article was written for American readers, so it offers an excellent introduction to others as well, who are curious about the commotion, but do not yet know the issues.

Alexander Furnas provides a more detailed analysis in The Atlantic: Why an International Trade Agreement Could Be as Bad as SOPA. Even if some people make exaggerated assertions about ACTA, the treaty seen in context is dangerous.


Legitimacy

After the wave of protest in Central Europe, the BBC speaks about a hundred demonstrations planned for this week all over Europe. Saturday, 11 February 2012, is the main day of action according to the map and the facts provided by stoppacta-protest.info.

The Avaaz online petition for the European Parliament (and the national parliaments) to reject ACTA has now been signed by 1.84 million citizens, and the number keeps growing every few seconds.

For a treaty which allegedly changes nothing in EU law (but perhaps something in the member states), it looks stupid to purposefully lose the respect of citizens, especially the younger generations.

Aren't the relations of the European Union with civil society bad enough as they are, without a determined effort to poison them further?

I am all for statesmen having to do the right thing, when needed. But leadership and legitimacy are not about persisting in doing the wrong thing, however efficiently.

Paradoxically, the stubborn and callous policies of the EU Commission and its repressive allies have united Europeans more than anything to date. My humble congratulations.

With the arrival of the new EP rapporteur, the need for the petitions and demonstrations has only grown greater.



Ralf Grahn

P.S. For better or for worse, between the global issues and the national level, the European Union shapes our digital future and online freedoms. Is your blog already listed among the more than 900 euroblogs aggregated by multilingual Bloggingportal.eu? Are you following the debates which matter for your future?

Information society, ACTA and copyright legislation

Here they are, in all their glory, the 22 language versions of ACTA, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. But, as we soon find out, the European Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America did not limit their ambitions to anti-counterfeiting.

If you look at the proposal, you soon find out that the aim of ACTA is ”to effectively combat the infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR)” in general, including by ”provisions on civil, criminal, border and digital environment enforcement measures, robust cooperation mechanisms among ACTA Parties to assist in their enforcement efforts, and the establishment of best practices for effective IPR enforcement”.

Intellectual property in ACTA refers to all categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement, including copyright.


Troubling questions

How should governments and parliaments legislate for the information society, where they easily seem to end up defending outdated models and particular interests against the digital natives (who are also citizens) and, perhaps, the general interest?

How important is trust and interaction between governments and the governed? Legitimacy?

When does legislation drive innovation, and when does it drive it away?


Infosoc roundup

These questions have cropped up in my latest blog posts, written in Finnish (FI), Swedish (SV) and English (EN).

Grahnlaw (EN): ACTA update (in part)

Grahnlaw (EN): ACTA in European Parliament committees: International Trade and Development

Grahnlaw (EN): ACTA in European Parliament committees: Legal Affairs (JURI)

Grahnblawg (SV): Framtiden online i Riksdagen

Eurooppaoikeus (FI): Tekijänoikeustoimikunta verkkopiratismia vastaan

Grahnlaw (EN): Information society, online media and Bloggingportal.eu

Grahnlblawg (SV): Upphovsrättskommissionen i Finland angriper nätpiratismen

Grahnlaw (EN): A communication disaster called ACTA

Grahnlaw (EN): ACTA signatures and content

Eurooppaoikeus (FI): ACTA ja fakta

Grahnblawg (SV): Lagstifta för den digitala världen, inte gårdagen – ACTA?

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Getting the facts straight and the arguments based on evidence would help meeting the challenges of our common digital agenda.



Ralf Grahn


P.S. Bloggingportal.eu, the multilingual aggregator of euroblogs, joins the national and thematical blogospheres at the European level.

Germany leading eurozone and EU reform?

Could Germany lead reform to take the right decisions at the right level, in a democratic manner? As Hamilton wrote, ”the means ought to be proportioned to the end”, but powers needed for the eurozone and the European Union should be based on their citizens.


Eurozone

Only the European Central Bank can act right now, but eurobonds would be sensible in the medium term, said Dr Daniela Schwarzer of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik SWP): Eurokrise: Der Preis des Zauderns (4 August 2011).

The title evokes the cost of delaying effective action in the eurozone, when the market players keep driving the politicians. The ESM is too small to prevent a market run on one of the bigger euro area members, and it is hard to imagine that a rescue fund large enough would be politically feasible.

Just a few days before the weekend, Schwarzer saw the ECB as the only euro area institution with the ability to act, despite the drawbacks.

Eurobonds would mean a quantum leap in integration, but instituting common borrowing as part of ”crisis management” would further harden resistance by opponents to the euro currency.

In June 2011, Schwarzer had criticised the decision makers of wasting a year, even if some progress had been made: Eurokrise: Das vergeudete Jahr (22 June 2011).

I see willingness to advance beyond the mute national governments, but little in the way of democratic reform.

Interested readers can find more on the through the SWP web pages ”Die Eurozone” as well as the broader SWP-Themendossier ”Finanz- und Schuldenkrise”.


Germany in Europe

With its population and economic clout, Germany is needed for indispensable reform to strengthen the European Union and the eurozone on a democratic basis, but we see little inclination among the current German political leadership. Researchers seem to be more ready for incremental progress in various policy areas, but discussion about remedying the lack of democratic legitimacy remains vague. See:

Annegret Bendiek, Barbara Lippert and Daniela Schwarzer (eds.): Entwicklungsperspektiven der EU - Herausforderungen für die deutsche Europapolitik; SWP-Studien 2011/S 18, July 2011, 147 pages

***

The German government and its allies need to set a new course towards democratic and substantive reform.



Ralf Grahn

EU is confidently moving forward every day, says Daniel Hannan: Campaigns for EU ‘in or out’ referendum in Britain

As nationalism rises, will the European Union fall? This was the question posed by professor Charles Kupchan, of Georgetown University and the US Council on Foreign Relations, in The Washington Post (29 August 2010).

Suddenly, we are offered a contrary view.

Should pro-Europeans and others, discouraged by the European Union’s descent into institutional confusion, intergovernmental bickering and lack of leadership, take heart?



Daniel Hannan, who sits in the anti-integrationist European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Group in the European Parliament, sees it differently from Kupchan:


The EU doesn't just bound forward in great treaties. It's confidently moving forward every day, says Hannan according to BBC News.



Tory Daniel Hannan calls for 'in or out' EU referendum (8 September 2010, last update 09:47 GMT), we are told by the BBC.


Hannan, an MEP for South East England, is a high profile critic of the European Union, in the EP and on his Telegraph blog. He has now decided to campaign actively for an ‘in or out’ referendum in Britain, putting his energies behind the EU Referendum Campaign (EURC), which aims to take the United Kingdom out of the EU.

Norway (member of the European Economic Area, EEA) and Switzerland (120 bilateral treaties with the EU) are vaguely used by the EURC as examples of alternative relationships, but in my humble opinion the EU Referendum Campaign needs to do some serious work on what a British future outside the EU means and how it should be organised.



Tactically, Hannan has chosen a good moment. The coalition government between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats has recently made a major breach in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, by introducing the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill, which would lead to a referendum on a reform of the outdated system of representation.



Britain and EU


The United Kingdom first applied for membership in the three European Communities in 1961, but was twice vetoed by Charles de Gaulle, an inveterate nationalist himself.



Britain was finally allowed to join in 1973. In 1975 a British referendum endorsed UK membership by a margin of two to one (Wikipedia).



The United Kingdom has four opt-outs from the EU Treaties: the Schengen Agreement on the common travel area, the Eurozone, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (with an opportunity to opt in). (Source: Wikipedia)

Despite positioning itself squarely outside core Europe, almost half a century since the first membership application and nearly four decades after becoming a member, Britain has not come to terms with its role in Europe or the EU’s needed role in world affairs.



There is little dedication to promoting European integration and fair burden-sharing in the political discourse, the media treatment and public opinion in Britain. The UK level of trust in the European Union is low; uniquely low across the 27 EU member states, according to the latest Eurobarometer opinion poll.



Meaning of democracy?

The United Kingdom is a heavyweight in a European context, but we may ask how useful its reticent membership is for the European Union, given the EU’s weak structures, lack of full democracy and faltering political leadership.

Anyway, each member state is free to leave the European Union. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) explicitly states the right of withdrawal, and the modalities of secession are outlined.

‘In or out’ is consequently an internal issue for Britain.

The dichotomy between official EU membership and negative public opinion leads to the question of political legitimacy.

Is it right for a “wise” political establishment to disregard public opinion, even if withdrawal would be short-sighted and against the national interest?

Are wise decisions the essence of democracy, or is democratic government fundamentally a question of legitimacy?

In a democratic society, people assume the consequences of their collective vote, but they later have the right to try to correct their bad choices.

Is trial and error the right way for Britain?




Ralf Grahn

The best of all possible European Unions

A few words of irony on standards of governance and quality of information readily served.




In Eurozone transparency: Greek rescue package (17 May 2010) we found that the ECOFIN Council conclusions 9 to 10 May 2010 did little to enlighten the EU citizen who wanted to know more about her future liabilities.

Since we absolutely refuse to believe that obscurantism is the guiding principle of the Council of the European Union, or even one of their fetishes, a minor setback should not dampen our spirits.



In addition, chasing documents is intellectually stimulating and it keeps you out of mischief, so we can candidly add some pangloss to our outlook: All is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

In the best of all possible worlds, it is merely childish to expect everything to become clear by reading the latest announcement about the decisions or finding references to the materials.

In the best of all possible worlds the most important decisions are taken between governments with national mandates, without the EU citizens setting the course for the European Union. Naturally it would be politically incorrect to imagine that this system is dysfunctional or less than fully legitimate, or that the EU should fulfil its own membership criteria with regard to democracy.

Rest assured: All is for the best. Pay up and shut up.




Ralf Grahn

Fear of EU democracy unfounded

The Lisbon Treaty reflects our national leaders’ preferences for their union, adorned with elements of EU level democracy.

Does the belief that EU citizens are not mature enough for European level democracy hold water?

Could direct democratic legitimacy lead to good or even better government than the somewhat contorted “double legitimacy” of today?

Let us look at the results of the European Parliament elections 2009, where the citizens of the European Union were given an chance to express their political preferences.

Despite the lack of a uniform election code, European level top candidates, functioning Europarties, common campaigns, and a real say over the course of government, four out of ten EU citizens expressed their choice. Not a bad mark for the sense of civic duty, given the limitation imposed on voters.



For the sake of the argument, I am going to make a crude and subjective division of the groups in the European Parliament into two camps.


Part of the problem


Much criticism and little constructiveness is the dominating trait of the more or less nationalist right and left outside the European political mainstream: the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) 54 MEPs, United European Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) 35, Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) 32 and non-attached members (NI) 27.

For these political groups, with parochial views, the European Parliament seems to be an arena for protest and clownery rather than a place of work.

Of the 736 members of the European Parliament elected, only 148 MEPs, or about 20 per cent, belong to these groups which are more a part of the problem than a part of the solution in the development of the European Union.


Part of the solution


Despite the “second order” status ordained for the elections, the citizens of the European Union showed restraint and maturity by returning 588 MEPs (about 80 per cent) from the four mainstream political groups (mostly) with their democratic credentials in order: the European People’s Party (EPP) 265, the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) 184, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 84 and the Greens/European Free Alliance 55 MEPs.

These are the parties, which take responsibility for the legislative work and other tasks of the European Union.

They are also clearly political groups on which the government of the European Union could be built.

If the EU has not become a parliamentary democracy yet, with a politically responsible executive, the reasons must be somewhere else than in the European Parliament election result (and the citizens).



Ralf Grahn



P.S. The Euroblogs aggregated on multilingual Bloggingportal.eu expose the real EUSSR. Read and comment! You can also propose an interesting blog post or a whole new blog (click Contribute).

Heritage Foundation: Dividing USA and EU

Yesterday evening the Irish blog Semper Idem drew my attention to one of the more astounding positions I have seen on the EU Treaty of Lisbon: The Heritage on the Lisbon Treaty (13 May 2009).


On the Heritage Foundation’s blog The Foundry, Sally McNamara presents her view on the relations between the United States and Europe: A Lisbon Treaty Retrospective? (Posted May 13th, 2009 at 11.41am)



The last paragraph is worth reading on both shores of the Atlantic:

“The Lisbon Treaty is an affront to democracy that lacks any semblance of popular support or legitimacy. It also threatens the transatlantic relationship, and underscores the EU’s ambitions to become a global power and challenge American leadership on the world stage. If the Conservative’s make good on their pledge to take the Treaty to the British public, it will almost certainly be rejected and hopefully save Europe from itself.”

***

Legitimacy of Lisbon Treaty

First, we look at the legitimacy and popular support of the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Treaty of Lisbon was agreed by the democratically legitimate national governments of all 27 EU member states. It has been approved, according to their constitutional requirements, by the national parliaments in 26 of these member states.

The Lisbon Treaty does not alter the fundamental basis of the European Union.

Lisbon remains an international treaty and the European Union is still an organisation based on an international treaty between states.

Objectively, there was little cause to subject either the Constitutional or the Lisbon Treaty, of incremental reform, to a referendum.

It is absurd to contend that the Lisbon Treaty lacks legitimacy, where it has been approved.

Some national leaders had stupidly promised national referendums on the previous Constitutional Treaty, but these were settled during the parliamentary ratification processes concerning the slightly watered-down Treaty of Lisbon. The legitimacy point is moot.

The exception is Ireland, where a constitutional interpretation requires a referendum. A majority of the Irish rejected the Lisbon Treaty, hoping for at “better deal”.

The No side never presented a credible formula for the better deal, but the second referendum in Ireland will be based on the “better deal” the Irish government has secured (although the finer details have not been published).

Popular support for the Lisbon Treaty as for many government measures is far from overwhelming, but we live under the rules of representative democracy. Governments are even expected to “do the right thing” for the long term, despite short term unpopularity.

The Lisbon Treaty is a complicated document, resembling a technical manual more than a rousing political document. It is hard to understand for ordinary voters, and much of the vocal opposition seems to be based on misunderstanding or misrepresentation of its contents and implications. The less educated were more prone to vote No in Ireland.

Lacking “any semblance of popular support” is a wild exaggeration, but the political atmosphere in one major member state, the United Kingdom, can be described as Eurotoxic. Still, even there both Houses of Parliament approved the Lisbon Treaty and the ratification procedure has been formally concluded. Under the rules of representative democracy, the decision is legitimate.

If we want to discuss lack of democratic legitimacy, we have to move to the European level.

The Lisbon Treaty fails to bring about an effective and democratically legitimate government at EU level, but that is hardly what McNamara is complaining about.

Following the Golden Rule, she should advocate the Articles of Confederation for the United States, if she wants Europe to preserve the Treaty of Nice.

I find it astounding when someone extols the virtues of the US Constitution, but wants to deny Europeans even a pale shadow.


Ralf Grahn

Anyone But Barroso and EU 2.0

I have not joined the Anyone But Barroso campaign, because I have limited my demands to competing candidates for the Commission Presidency. For me, the pan-European election comes first, the personalities second.

But I have been saddened by the fact that the Anyone But Barroso campaign has been in dire straits. Even if the campaigners were right about the need for a new President of the European Commission, the Europarties have failed in the very reason for their existence, to field competing candidates. They failed because of national heads of state or government, who are also national party leaders.

A host of heads of state or government in EU member states have gone back on the miserly concession they made when signing the Lisbon Treaty, to let the votes of EU citizens influence the nomination; this well ahead of the European elections.

N.B. These elites ─ heads of state or government ─are not “Brussels”, but national.


***

The Anyone But Barroso campaign site has reported on mischievous use, emanating from Portugal, and a few minutes ago I was unable to access the site because of overload.

Are these dark forces going to target the Financial Times next?

Wolfgang Münchau’s Financial Times column Like a fish, Europe is rotting from the head is a clear indictment of the premature choice of national leaders and the European People’s Party.



Well, I cannot remember even one spontaneous exclamation of joy from EPP grass roots.

***

An ever closer union among the members of the European Council against the EU citizens fails in two respects: legitimacy and outcomes.

To the extent possible, vote for the citizens’ European Union 2.0 in the European elections.


Ralf Grahn

EU: Special legislative procedure (VI)

To vote or not to vote: that is the question: Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer the secret vagaries of Council dealings, Or to take arms against a sea of apathy.

In my mind, every vote for a constructive alternative in the European elections counts. The Treaty of Lisbon would widen the area where the directly elected European Parliament legislates on an equal basis with the Council of the European Union.

But the intergovernmental Council remains the principal decision-maker and legislator in many policy areas.

If an issue is important or sensitive enough for the member states, they keep the reins and leave the European Parliament on the sidelines.

Our Odyssey of the Council of the European Union and the special legislative procedure continues, taking us through the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty, published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) 9.5.2008 C 115.

***

Social policy

In EU terms social policy is mainly concerned with employment and working conditions. Action by the European Union is generally a complement to member states’ action. According to Article 153(1) and (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in the following fields the Council shall act unanimously, in accordance with a special legislative procedure, after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (paragraph 1):




(c) social security and social protection of workers;

(d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated;

(f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including codetermination, subject to paragraph 5;

(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory;


However, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, after consulting the European Parliament, may decide to render the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to paragraph 1(d), (f) and (g).

An enabling clause (passerelle) like this may be more important in principle than in practice, because a move to qualified majority voting and the ordinary legislative procedure requires unanimity, which was not in existence when the treaty was agreed. But it would make the procedure more flexible, since laborious treaty amendment and ratifications would be unnecessary.

Anyway, the enabling clause (passerelle) is blocked with regard to social security and social protection of workers; paragraph 1(c).


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Research and technological development

According to Article 182 TFEU, the multiannual framework programme for research and technological development, is adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure after consulting the Economic and Social Committee.


But the implementing specific programmes are adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee; paragraphs 3 and 4.


***

Environment

There has been much talk about the European Union’s role in protecting the environment (cf. Article 191 TFEU).

The ordinary legislative procedure applies as a rule, according Article 192(1) TFEU, but the second paragraph lists the exceptions subject to unanimity and a special legislative procedure:


Article 192(2) TFEU

2. By way of derogation from the decision-making procedure provided for in paragraph 1 and without prejudice to Article 114, the Council acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt:

(a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature;

(b) measures affecting:

— town and country planning,

— quantitative management of water resources or affecting, directly or indirectly, the availability of those resources,

— land use, with the exception of waste management;

(c) measures significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.


**

Here, too, in a second subparagraph there is a passerelle, opening up at least a theoretical possibility to shift to qualified majority voting at some future date:


The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
may make the ordinary legislative procedure applicable to the matters referred to in the
first subparagraph.


***


Comment


In general ‘special legislative procedure’ can be read as a prognosis for either:

a) no EU legislation, or
b) legislation of low quality (based on the lowest common denominator).

In addition, although the European Parliament is normally consulted, its opinion lacks power. Thus, the process is less transparent and the outcome is less legitimate than legislation based on the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision).



Ralf Grahn

Lisbon Treaty & European Council: “Presidential elections”

The Treaty of Lisbon would endow the European Union with a new office-holder: the President of the European Council.

The new President would be elected by the European Council, by a qualified majority.

The President’s term in office would be two and a half years, renewable once.

The relevant provision is Article 15(5) of the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU), published in the consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115/23:


Article 15(5) TEU

5. The European Council shall elect its President, by a qualified majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. In the event of an impediment or serious misconduct, the European Council can end the President's term of office in accordance with the same procedure.


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Declaration 6

In Declaration 6 the heads of state or government (intergovernmental conference) agreed on the following guidance for the election of the President of the European Council (OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115/338):



6. Declaration on Article 15(5) and (6), Article 17(6) and (7) and Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union

In choosing the persons called upon to hold the offices of President of the European Council, President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, due account is to be taken of the need to respect the geographical and demographic diversity of the Union and its Member States.


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Development of Council Presidency

In The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing the Institutional Innovations (joint study by CEPS, EGMONT and EPC, November 2007), the chapter The Presidency of the Council: The paradox of the new presidency (from page 39) paints a background picture of how the Council Presidency has evolved, and presents an analysis of weaknesses of and the requirements for the potential success of the proposed system.

Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council Presidency will be split up into no less than five different and somewhat unconnected levels of responsibility namely (page 46):

(1) the President of the European Council,
(2) the group of three Member States in the eighteen-month Presidency Team,
(3) the Member State in the team holding the six-month Presidency,
(4) the High Representative for foreign policy, President of the Foreign Aff airs Council, and
(5) the President of the euro group.


***

Pros and cons

Another discussion of the pros and cons of the permanent President of the European Council is presented in the UK House of Lords report The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment, Volume I: Report (HL Paper 62-I, 13 March 2008), from page 41.

The witnesses presented quite different views on how difficult the coordination between the President of the Commission, the President of the European Council, the High Representative and the member state holding the rotating Council Presidency would turn out to be.

Conclusion 4.34 acknowledged the significance of the post and the disputed role of the President of the European Council (page 48):

“The creation of a full-time European Council President, in place of a six-monthly rotation among heads of government, is a significant move, and is likely to make the European Council more effective at creating direction and action. This could mean a more active/activist European Council—a consequence which would be welcomed in some quarters but not in others.”


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European elections

In Think global, act European (published by Notre Europe), thirteen European think tanks gave their views to the upcoming trio, the EU Council Presidencies of France, the Czech Republic and Sweden, against the background of the planned entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul and Elvire Fabry advised against including the President of the Commission in a crude package deal within the European Council (page 19):

“The troika must also take care to ensure that the European Council does not agree to any upstream intergovernmental deal concerning the nominations of the Council president, the Commission president and the High Representative. The appointment of the new President of the Commission should depend upon the outcome of the European elections of June 2009. More than ever these elections need a genuine political agenda in order to mobilise voters, since turnout has been declining since 1979.”


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Interinstitutional agreement

The thirteen think-tanks made further recommendations on the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. The trio of Council Presidencies should negotiate an interinstitutional agreement with the Commission and the European Parliament (page 25):



“To negotiate with the Commission and the European Parliament a sort of “code of conduct” (Europeum), an inter-institutional agreement to define the principles that should prevail not just in the choice of individuals to fill key posts, but also in the way these new functions will be incorporated into the existing institutional framework (impact on COREPER, working groups, rotating Presidencies, role of the General Affairs Council, conciliation of co-decision, etc.) (SIEPS, DemosEuropa).”


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Selection of President

The think tanks made the following recommendation for the selection of the President of the European Council (page 26):


“To select a President of the European Council who does not become, in any form whatsoever, a rival to the President of the European Commission. The Council President should be a prominent European figure respected by all member states, capable of having authority vis-à-vis the exterior and, at the same time, of building a consensus within the community. This implies someone from the heart of the current European integration process, that is from a member of the euro-zone and of the Schengen Agreement (CEPS, Eliamep, Notre Europe).”


***

Interinstitutional relations


The post of the President of the Commission and the new posts of President of the European Council and the double-hatted High Representative are linked, as shown by Declaration 6 (above). It is possible that the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty coincides more or less exactly with the start of the next Commission’s term of office, and the Treaty of Lisbon creates the two other posts.

On 9 March 2009 the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) of the European Parliament voted on the draft report by Jean-Luc Dehaene on the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon on the development of the institutional balance of the European Union (2008/2073(INI)).

The AFCO report proposes a procedure and a timetable for the nominations, with a wish to see them applied already after the June 2009 European elections:

“42. In this context, proposes as a possible model the following procedure and timetable for the nominations, which could be agreed by the European Parliament and the European Council:

– weeks 1 and 2 after the European elections: installation of the political groups in the European Parliament;

– week 3 after the elections: consultations between the President of the European Council and the President of the European Parliament, followed by separate meetings between the President of the European Council and the Presidents of the political groups (possibly also with the Presidents of the European political families or restricted delegations);

– week 4 after the elections: indication by the European Council, taking into account the results of the consultations mentioned in the previous indent, of the candidate for President of the Commission;

– weeks 5 and 6 after the elections: contacts between the candidate for President of the Commission and the political groups; statements by that candidate and presentation of his/her political guidelines to the European Parliament; vote in the European Parliament on the candidate for President of the Commission;

– July/August/September: the elected President of the Commission agrees with the European Council on the nomination of the High Representative and proposes the list of Commissioners-designate (including the High Representative/Vice-President);

– September: the European Council adopts the list of Commissioners-designate (including the High Representative/Vice-President);

– September/October: hearings of the Commissioners-designate and of the High Representative/Vice-President-designate by the European Parliament;

– October: presentation of the college of Commissioners and their programme to the European Parliament; vote on the entire college (including the High Representative/Vice-President); the European Council approves the new Commission; the new Commission takes up its duties;

– November: the European Council nominates the President of the European Council;


***

EP President

Against the background of the link between the posts and the Deahaene report, at the spring European Council the President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering spoke about the nomination and the election of the next President of the Commission, but with implications for the whole “package”:

“What we need in this difficult situation is a clear timetable. On 14 July the newly-elected European Parliament will hold its constitutative part-session.

No matter what, we want that the election of the President of the Commission takes place on 15 July 2009. This election must reflect the outcome of the European elections. For this to happen, consultations between the Council Presidency and the European Parliament will be necessary.

This consultation procedure need not be exclusively related to the choice of person for Commission President, but must also include upcoming legal, political and personnel questions.

Parliament would be willing to conduct them after the elections and before the June meeting of the European Council. We must also make arrangements to ensure that the new Commission can still take office this year.”


***

Reflections

Instead of a European Union based on representative democracy, with a directly elected European Parliament and a politically accountable executive built on the existing Commission, the leaders of the member states have opted for the strengthening of the intergovernmental European Council, where they direct union affairs.

A permanent President of the European Council serves this interest by bringing continuity to the post and by full-time employment.

As an internal choice of the European Council, without direct input from the EU’s citizens or the other institutions, the new President has little democratic legitimacy. He or she is selected behind closed doors by an electoral college of 27. These are “Presidential elections” European style.

Against this background, the President of the European Council is not and cannot be the President of Europe. Possibly, the new position will sow confusion outside and create complications inside.

If the six month rotating presidency is felt to be inadequate for the European Council, the post could be merged with the post of the President of the Commission, which would give it a modicum of democratic legitimacy at the current stage of development, as well as continuity. This has been proposed by the WhoDoICall.eu campaign.



A future directly elected President of the European Council, as some have speculated, would in my opinion be a wrong turn, leading to a presidential system alien to most of the EU member states, with the notable exception of France. The vast majority of the member states are parliamentary democracies, and there is reason to simplify the structures at EU level, not to add complications.

In the long run, if the European project is to survive and prosper, it has to be re-founded on its citizens, with a democratically legitimate government.



Ralf Grahn

EU Lisbon Treaty: The incredible Mr Ganley

Do you remember the Libertas ‘no’ campaign spearheaded by Declan Ganley? Can you still recall the main reasons they put forward to vote ‘no’ on the Lisbon Treaty in the Irish referendum?

Here is their ‘8 reasons to Vote No to Lisbon’ (with, in my view, distortive and manipulative reasons added):

1. Creates an unelected President and a Foreign Minister of Europe
2. Halves Ireland’s voting weight while doubling Germany’s
3. Abolishes Ireland’s Commissioner for five years at a time
4. Opens the door to interference in tax and other key economic interests
5. Hands over power in 60 areas of decision making to Brussels
6. Gives exclusive competence to Brussels over International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
7. Enshrines EU law as superior to Irish law
8. The Treaty can be changed without another referendum

Incidentally, the latest on Libertas’ web site is still their thank you note from 17 June 2008. The eight reasons are accessible here:

http://www.libertas.org/content/view/293/139/

***

Compare this with Declan Ganley’s appearance at the US Heritage Foundation, where he is introduced as a modern-day freedom fighter.

Yes, the Heritage Foundation, where the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom has been on a long crusade to drive a wedge between the US administration and its European allies.

What did Declan Ganley tell his hosts on 15 July 2008? Hardly anything to please his anti-European hostess:

Ireland and he are no Eurosceptics, but pro-European.
We need a strong and prosperous Europe.
The fundamental point of the ‘no’ campaign was democracy.
The European leaders have to offer Europe’s citizens democratic accountability and legitimacy.
The have to sell the vision of a democratic Europe to the people in order to succeed with the people.
Europe needs a 20 to 25 page Constitution, which can be read and understood by a 15 year old.
The Constitution has to be approved by the people.
If not, the politicians have to go back to the drawing-board.
A second referendum in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty would result in a bigger ‘no’.

You can look up the hour long event on the Heritage Foundation’s web site:

http://www.heritage.org/

***

Which Declan Ganley are we supposed to believe? The one spreading nationalistic fears before the referendum? The apostle of European level democracy and a strong Europe after the plebiscite?


Ralf Grahn

More on EU democracy

How long can ’Versailles’ continue oblivious of the fact that it has lost the love of the people and the respect of the intellectuals?

Roughly half of EU citizens may dream of the halcyon days of all-encompassing national level democracy, an illusion given voice and credence by anti-EU campaigners. Yes, an illusion, because the world has changed, and the European nation states are not up to the task of enhancing citizens’ security and prosperity on their own.

This, at least, should be acknowledged on the basis of the crushing pro-Lisbon votes of the ratifying parliaments after thorough deliberation.

But in addition to large segments of the populations, the European Council has managed to disillusion increasing numbers of pro-Europeans, who are free to speak their mind. Six decades of resistance against democratic legitimacy and accountability are taking their toll.

The ‘double legitimacy’ of the European Union suffers from the same flaw as other artificial qualifiers like ‘people’s democracy’, which was anything but democratic.

The only sustainable strategy to recover support and respect is to take the qualitative jump to real EU level democracy, giving the citizens the choice of changing their leaders and setting the basic course for the European Union.

***

Incidentally, if I counted correctly, this is my 27th post following and somehow related to the Irish referendum, the same as the number of member states.

I still believe that the substance of the Treaty of Lisbon would go some way towards an improved European Union, which is in the interest of the citizens of the EU.

But I now think that more fundamental values are at stake. Hardening resistance and growing disenchantment lead towards ultimate failure, if our leaders fail to heed the calls. Therefore the metaphor of 18th century Versailles.

***

The Federal Trust report by professor Vernon Bogdanor, mentioned in the preceding post, is worth careful thought. If my reading is correct, it has taken the member states and their creatures, the Council and the European Council, as inescapable, and then looked at what else can be done to improve democratic legitimacy and accountability in the European Union.

The proposed improvements would be real, although the structure of the EU would remain lopsided; perhaps not wholly unlike some early stage in Britain, when the powers of the House of Commons grew, but the Sovereign or the House of Lords remained the strong or even dominant players.

A lopsided but real democracy may be the most the citizens of the European Union can hope for in a near (or far) future, given six decades of fierce resistance from the member states' governments against any truly democratic system of European governance.

***

My proposal is that the (willing) governments of the European Union decide to introduce a European ‘Bill of Rights’ in conjunction with but above the Treaty of Lisbon. This means a solemn undertaking to introduce real democratic reform at the EU level. The pledge would contain the core reforms and a commitment to enact them at the earliest opportunity.

(In the United States the Constitution already laid the democratic and republican foundations of government, so the first amendment package had to address concerns about citizens’ liberties. Here Europe is behind the curve, not only by two centuries, but also qualitatively.)

***

Since many EU citizens still imagine that national democracy or safeguards against the general interest are viable options, the reasons for real EU level democracy would have to be thoroughly explained as well as enacted.

Possibly, this would happen in a pan-European referendum, and it would require a double majority of population and states.

In Ireland, a second referendum is possible only if the question is different, and elsewhere the prospect of real democracy would have to be understood and embraced.

***

In my book, the fundamental reasons for the European Union are: security and prosperity.

What is more political than security?

In other words, a future European Union able to employ all the soft and hard means of international politics is needed.

(The purpose and functioning of NATO do not cover this, although NATO remains an important transatlantic alliance. Therefore, a European Union reverting to become an economic community is not a desirable outcome for EU citizens as a whole, although some governments and electorates may not be ready for a union effective on the international stage.)

Such a fundamental European interest has to find working expressions even if some state governments and populations act as if oblivious of the fact. For them suitable arrangements have to be found, such as the European Economic Area (perhaps with some policy areas added) or a second tier EU membership.

A second split looks inevitable, too. I am afraid that the ingrained hostility of some member states to a democratic European Union is such that the only way forward is to leave them behind and institute a new citizens' union based on democratic legitimacy and accountability.

***

If one or two vessels belonging to a convoy cut their engines on purpose, are the rest to do likewise?

None-speed Europe lacking popular support and democratic legitimacy is not in the interest of the EU citizens.

Standing on its own, the Treaty of Lisbon is as much a problem as a solution with regard to the real issues of Europe.


Ralf Grahn

European Union: Legitimacy, accountability and democracy

How to bring the institutional forms of the European Union into line with the democratic forces?

Since the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, a number of posts on this blog have looked at various deep flaws of the European Union from a democratic perspective. European voices have mixed with American experiences and my own views.

Now could be a suitable time to look at these questions as a whole. The Federal Trust Report by professor Vernon Bogdanor ‘Legitimacy, Accountability and Democracy in the European Union’ (January 2007) is a reasoned attempt to discuss the improvement of the EU institutions within the existing structures, in order to arrive at a more democratic Europe.

The 20 page report is available at:

http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/uploads/FedT_LAD.pdf

The report is evolutionary in character, in that it does not propose a re-establishment of the European Union with new structures, but suggests improvements to the existing ones.

My suggestion is for every concerned EU citizen to read the report, so I will present only a few short annotations of the proposals:

* The nomination of the European Commission directly on the basis of the result of the European elections.

* European Parliament power to hold individual European Commissioners to account for mismanagement, and to secure, if necessary, their dismissal.

* Referendums, preferably Europe-wide with a double and qualified majority of states and population on treaty change.

The report brings forward weighty remarks on the de-legitimising effects of the Council, but stops short of proposing effective remedies.

***

After an era of public indifference, the European project encountered increasing hostility. The time has come to work with the citizens of the EU.


Ralf Grahn

European Union: Choice of leaders

”What kind of democracy is this, when citizens have no say in the choice of their leaders?”

“European citizens would not be so cynical if they were regularly invited to choose the people who run European affairs. We need real campaigns, dealing with European issues, just as in national elections.”

These and a number of other interesting thoughts are put forward by Charles Wyplosz in a comment on FT.com (18 June 2008): What dream will Europe dream now?

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7238e13e-3d46-11dd-bbb5-0000779fd2ac.html

***

An increasing number of pro-Europeans voice their concerns over the plans to circumvent the Irish rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon, ignoring the demands for EU level democracy and accountability.

Regardless of the fate of the Lisbon Treaty, the leaders of the European Union seem set on a course towards ultimate failure.

Since the referendum in Ireland, my own thoughts have shifted in one aspect: Democratic accountability is more important than the technical merits of the proposed treaty.


Ralf Grahn

EU democracy

The European Union has rolled out a plethora of ’democratic’ measures towards its citizens, such as information, communication, listening, dialogue, debate, some voting rights, NGO financing and participatory exercises, with the citizens’ initiative promised as a Lisbon Treaty sweetener.

Only one thing seems to be missing: real democracy.

***

“It is not just a matter of communicating the content of European politics better. The basic problem with the EU is a lack of democracy. Citizens cannot see how they can influence European decisions”, said Rev. Thomas Wipf, the president of the Community of Protestant Churches in Europe.

See Ecumenical News International: Irish vote exposes EU democracy challenge says churches’ leader (16 June 2008):

http://www.eni.ch/featured/article.php?id=1997

***

There is a huge difference between ‘more democratic’ and plain democratic, which no amount of sweet-talking is going to erase.

The essential requirement is the ability to vote the responsible people into and out of office.

Only then do the electors carry the moral responsibility to live by their choices, good and bad.

***

I have started to doubt if the Lisbon Treaty is worth having with sham democracy at the European Union level.

I have begun to feel that further alienating about half of the EU citizens is too high a price to pay for institutional reform.

Institutional EU reform is necessary, and so is continuing progress, but if they come without democracy, accountability and legitimacy, they are not worth having.


Ralf Grahn

EU for US on legitimacy

The heads of state of government who make up the European Council have a few months to think before they are confronted with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty again. Besides listening to each other and not listening to Europeans, how about lending their ears to an American?

On the EU for US blog, Linda Margaret filters the European Union. In her 19 June 2008 post ‘Referendums, efficiency, and legitimacy’ this quiet American offers food for thought on EU reform:

http://euforus.blogspot.com/2008/06/referendums-efficiency-and-legitimacy.html

Read and reflect.


Ralf Grahn

Lisbon Treaty and democratic reform

Even if the EU Treaty of Lisbon is an improvement on the current Treaty of Nice for anyone who cares about a European Union working better, we can ask if ‘getting around’ the Irish rejection is the right remedy.

The referendum outcome may be both deplorable and unwise, but the Irish voters should be treated as adults. They live with their decision, until they are ready to make a new one, without being force-fed.

At this moment I think that it is improbable that the voters in Ireland would endorse any conceivable add-ons in the form of declarations. The attitudes might even harden, resulting in embarrassment for the government, the European Council and the European Union in general.

Failing that, an amicable solution may be found. Ireland, perhaps the Czech Republic and some others, might be persuaded to let the willing states proceed on the basis of substance of the Lisbon Treaty. But can we bet on such an outcome, and could it be done without an amending treaty? In the end, the countries wanting to move ahead could establish a new union, if they have to and if they have the will.

***

The parliamentary ratifications show a strong voting record in favour of the Lisbon Treaty. In my view, representative democracy is clearly superior to plebiscites in scrutinising and approving international treaties, including the EU ones.

At the same time, the anti-EU sentiments are gathering force because of the methods used and contemplated to enact EU treaty reform.

Strong as the sentiments are, the motives behind them are misguided. The main idea seems to be to wreck the process and to debilitate the European Union.

A feeble European Union is less able to enhance the security and prosperity of EU citizens. It is an illusion to imagine that global challenges and European level questions could effectively be handled by re-exporting them to the national governments and parliaments.

Therefore, it lies in our collective interest that the substance of the Treaty of Lisbon, with its modest reforms, is allowed to enter into force.

***

But the handling of the ratification processes is damaging for the relationship between the national leaders, the European Council and the European Union on the one hand and large swathes of EU citizens on the other hand.

This does not augur well for the future of the European project. Legitimacy is a core problem, and it is not being addressed adequately within the present parameters.

***

During the ratification process of the US Constitution, the Bill of Rights was introduced and put in place as soon as the new union commenced work.

Europe needs something of the kind.

Democratic accountability in EU affairs can not be achieved by the present dual character of the European Union, and the national level is not an effective answer.

Therefore, the substance of the Lisbon Treaty as an initial foundation, needs the additional change of the European Union into a democratic polity.

The European “Bill of Rights” would be this qualitative jump, as a solemn undertaking by the member states.

They need to understand that all EU affairs have to emanate from the EU’s citizens, to be exercised by their elected representatives and with a politically responsible government.

This is the crucial reform principle to prepare during the coming months, jointly with the efforts to bring the Lisbon Treaty reforms into force.

The democratic principle is not only a groundbreaking novelty. It goes against the intergovernmentalist credo of a number of member states.

Therefore, putting it into practice would require some member states to embrace democracy as the only viable option for the 21st century, knowing that they would have to leave a number of recalcitrant members behind.

In other words, two major shifts are needed: The full adoption of the principle of EU level representative democracy and the sacrifice of EU unity (one-speed Europe) in favour of a legitimate union.

But what is the alternative? Growing popular disillusionment, hardening resistance, blocked future reform and ultimate failure. The writing is on the wall.

The democratic European Union is worth the sacrifice of two current principles of lesser value.

In short, we need the substance of the Lisbon Treaty, but not without a ground-breaking democratic reform.


Ralf Grahn





,

Achilles’ heels of Europe

The aftermath of the Irish referendum is potentially a fertile moment for Europe.

The Irish government seems to be clueless about how to proceed, reduced to pleading for extra time even beyond October 2008. But the referendum Catch 22 is set to remain, and nothing indicates that the ‘pro-European’ voters are going to become pro EU reform.

The vast majority of the EU member states is set to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon, which can be seen as a political statement on the necessity of reform.

But if the Irish want themselves and the rest of the EU stuck with the Treaty of Nice, as the crowning achievement of European integration, there is very little the other European leaders can do, presuming that they stick to the ‘liberum veto’.

We have an Irish Catch 22 and a European Catch 22.

What can be fertile about stalemate?

***

If political leaders have let their rules paint them into a corner with no or only limited room for manoeuvre, there are still people free to think and to speak.

Researchers, students, editorialists, columnists, bloggers and concerned EU citizens can discuss the challenges of European integration and the needed remedies against irrelevance, without pussyfooting.

Even if there seems to be little hope for effective cures in the short term, those interested in Europe’s place in the world can use the deep flaws exposed by the Irish referendum as a starting point for serious thought and discussion.

Here are some suggestions for further discussion:

1) National referendums on European level questions, and more generally the merits of representative vs. direct democracy.

2) The effects of EU’s treaty base and unanimous ratification.

3) Unanimous decision-making and the consequences of ‘liberum veto’.

4) The lack of democratic foundations and democratic legitimacy of the EU.

5) American and European experiences compared.

***

I wouldn’t go as far as to say that a weak European Union is in nobody’s interest. But it is not in the interest of us EU citizens.

One important reminder of that is James Rogers on Global Power Europe:

http://www.globalpowereurope.eu/

Read and reflect.


Ralf Grahn

Two from the same country?

The WhoDoICall blog discusses an entry by Richard Corbett on the possible choice of two Rasmussens from Denmark for EU top posts:

http://www.whodoicall.eu/blog/

It is difficult to imagine that two out of three top jobs would land with citizens of the same member state, if the European Council does not merge the two presidencies, as proposed by the ‘Who do I call?’ initiative.

This is what Declaration number 6 on Article 9 B(5) and (6), Article 9 D(6) and (7) and
Article 9 E of the Treaty on European Union says:

In choosing the persons called upon to hold the offices of President of the European Council, President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, due account is to be taken of the need to respect the geographical and demographic diversity of the Union and its Member States.

***

To date, the European leaders have spoken publicly only of geographical and demographic diversity, leaving out other factors such as gender and democratic legitimacy.

In spite of the popularity of name dropping, I would want to see more discussion on the fundamentals, as proposed again in my post ‘Heavyweight president for European Council?’ two days ago.

Let us hope that the debate turns a bit more serious, and that European leaders show that their thinking can evolve.


Ralf Grahn