David Miliband: EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon

Today, David Miliband, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, spoke on EU foreign policy after Lisbon, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS):


“So the choice for Europe is simple. Get our act together and make the EU a leader on the world stage; or become spectators in a G2 world shaped by the US and China. But I think that the choice for the UK is also simply stated: we can lead a strong European foreign policy or – lost in hubris, nostalgia or xenophobia - watch our influence in the world wane.”


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UK approach

Ahead of the Treaty of Lisbon, the UK (Labour) government informed Parliament and the public by publishing “The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference, July 2007” (Command paper 7174).


With regard to the common foreign and security policy, the UK government stated:


“The Reform Treaty will affirm that CFSP will remain an intergovernmental process, distinct from other policy areas. Unanimity in decision-making will remain the norm (i.e. the UK will hold a veto). CFSP provisions will also remain in the Treaty on European Union. The IGC Mandate contains a declaration confirming that the provisions on CFSP will not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formation and conduct of their foreign policy, or of their national representations in third countries and international organisations.”



The British government underlined its independence and veto powers with regard to the common security and defence policy, as well:


“The Reform Treaty will meet UK objectives on the development of a flexible, militarily robust and NATO-friendly ESDP. The Reform Treaty will also preserve the principle of unanimity (and therefore the UK veto) for ESDP policy decisions and for initiating missions, and will maintain the prerogatives of Member States for defence and security issues (in the same way as it does for foreign policy).”


The government’s presentation of the President of the European Council did not exactly spell out that the choice of Tony Blair would become the make or break issue for the European Union’s future in the world:


“The President will chair the European Council, drive forward its work, ensure its preparation and continuity on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council, and facilitate cohesion and consensus. The President will also have a role in the most highlevel aspects of the EU’s external relations.”


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Comments


The government of the United Kingdom seems to have been quite happy for the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy to remain intergovernmental, primarily based on unanimous decisions, retained veto powers for every member state and minimal scrutiny by the directly elected European Parliament.

Miliband appears to reason that you first build a house of cards, but suddenly you need a traffic-stopping personality to counter the structural flaws.

Admittedly, Miliband’s approach is more constructive than that of the Conservative Party, which officially continues to reject the Treaty of Lisbon, democratically approved in 27 member states.



Ralf Grahn



P.S. (Update) Link to the IISS.

EU Council tasks: Security & defence policy CSDP

The European Union’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) is an integral part of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP). At this stage of development, it is geared towards humanitarian, peace and crisis management missions drawing on both civilian and military assets (Petersberg tasks).

The Treaty of Lisbon envisions the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, leading to a common defence.

The intergovernmental CSDP respects a) the ‘specific character’ of the security and defence policy of ‘certain member states’ (non-aligned, neutral) and b) the obligations of the vast majority which are NATO members.

We look at the Council’s CSDP tasks in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, with the relevant provisions located in the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU).


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Defining objectives

The Council of the European Union defines the objectives for the implementation of the CSDP, assisted by the European Defence Agency (EDA)(OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115):


Article 42(3) TEU


3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.


Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.


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Unanimity

The CSDP decisions are adopted unanimously by the Council:


4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.


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Delegation of tasks

The Council can delegate the execution of tasks (a mission) to a group of member states (Article 42(5) TEU), with the willing and able keeping the Council informed. If the decision needs to be changed, it is dealt with by the Council, as provided in Article 44 TEU.


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Implementation and scope

According to the second paragraph of Article 43 TEU, the Council adopts the decisions relating to the extended Petersberg tasks, listed in paragraph 1:


Article 43 TEU

1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.


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European Defence Agency

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is intergovernmental, ‘subject to the authority of the Council’ (Article 45 TEU). The EDA’s statute, seat and operational rules are adopted by the Council by a qualified majority.


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Permanent structured cooperation

According to Article 46 TEU, the Council adopts, by qualified majority, the decision establishing permanent structured cooperation (akin to enhanced cooperation in other policy areas) between member states, which fulfil the criteria and made the commitments on military capabilities in accordance with Protocol No. 10.

Decisions concerning later entrants are decided by the participating states.

Permanent structured cooperation is one of the questions in need of preparatory work, public discussion and implementing decisions, if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.


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Council configurations

The current Council configuration, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), already meets separately for its two main areas of activity. The Lisbon Treaty would separate the configurations, and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) would carry on with the whole of the European Union's external action, namely common foreign and security policy, European security and defence policy, foreign trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. (Cf. current Council’s Rules of Procedure and Lisbon Article 16(6) TEU.)


The Defence Ministers of the EU member states convene in connection with GAERC meetings and for separate informal meetings. The latest informal meeting was held in Prague on 12 to 13 March 2009.


The Council is assisted by the Political and Security Committee (known as PSC or COPS), which monitors the international situation, delivers opinions and can be authorised to direct crisis management operations (Article 38 TEU).


The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.

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European Parliament

Being on the sidelines of the intergovernmental CSDP does not prevent the European Parliament from showing a keen interest in The European Security Strategy and ESDP, as witnessed by the 19 February 2009 EP Resolution P6_TA-PROV(2009)0075, based on an own-initiative report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0075+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN

The European Parliament sees the need for a common defence policy in Europe requiring an integrated European Armed Force which consequently needs to be equipped with common weapon systems so as to guarantee commonality and interoperability.

In addition, the EP Resolution offers an updated overview on the latest proposals and current shortcomings of the EU’s security and defence policy.



Ralf Grahn

Swedish non-alignment and EU?

Fellow blogger The European Citizen discussed ’Neutrality and Europe’ in a blog post 9 March 2009, primarily from an Irish perspective:

http://theeuropeancitizen.blogspot.com/2009/03/neutrality-and-europe.html

The post concluded that the existence of the internal market and membership of the EU has changed the political context for neutral European states. This doesn't automatically mean that military integration should be adopted, but a range of options should be discussed.

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I have nothing to object to the conclusion that rational discussion is needed in the countries outside the security policy mainstream of the European Union.

What caught my eye was a detail, the opening sentence where The European Citizen described Ireland, Sweden and Austria as both neutral and EU member states, and asked but can you really be both.

In a comment on an earlier blog post, I had noted that Finland has narrowed down its definition to “military non-alignment”, because the country sees itself as politically aligned through EU membership, including the CFSP and the CSDP.

I also commented that I was unsure of how Sweden defines itself nowadays, although it continued to use both “non-alignment” and “neutrality” when Finland had ceased to utilise these defining terms.

For this comment off the cuff, I did not take the trouble to research the Swedish position. But when Swedish neutrality cropped up in the new post, I decided to take a look.


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Sweden

Traditional Swedish non-alignment aiming at neutrality in war seems to be in a flux. In the Foreign Policy Declaration of the Government of Sweden 18 February 2009 (Regeringens deklaration vid 2009 års utrikespolitiska debatt i Riksdagen onsdagen den 18 februari 2009), Foreign Minister Carl Bildt mentioned neither non-alignment nor neutrality.

Bildt mentioned the successful foreign, security and defence policies of the European Union and the good cooperation between Sweden and NATO in crisis management. He went on to declare that the Government is going to present a position paper on NATO relations during the spring.

Bildt mentioned Swedish security policy as firm, but in addition he mentioned the proposals for improved Nordic defence cooperation made by Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Swedish Government will consider them in a positive spirit and it promises a Bill on defence policy this spring.


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In other words, by deliberate omission Sweden is neither “non-aligned” nor “neutral”, but two Government papers will further define NATO relations and (Nordic) defence policy.

I don’t expect any sudden shifts, but Swedish foreign, security and defence policy is changing, although at glacier-like speed.


Ralf Grahn

Gordon Brown on Global Europe

Until now, the only thing that has maintained Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s credentials as a European statesman, has been the Conservative Party’s complete lack of constructive EU policy.

Yesterday, Brown did much to cast off his crown as curmudgeon of the year among EU leaders. Speaking to a business audience Brown finally outlined a programme for Britain in Europe, laying the background for future success, coming out strongly in favour of British EU membership and pointing towards the needed economic reforms within the Union.

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What is needed for future success? Brown clearly placed himself in the economic reform camp:
“The countries and continents that will succeed in the new era of globalisation will be those that are open rather than closed, for free trade rather than protectionism, are flexible rather than rigid, and invest in high skills and the potential of their people.”
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The future of the United Kingdom lies in the European Union, was the message of Brown:
“But what is clear is that at this time of global economic uncertainty, we should not be throwing into question -as some would - the stability of our relationship with Europe and even our future membership of the European Union --- risking trade, business and jobs. Indeed, I strongly believe that rather than retreating to the sidelines we must remain fully engaged in Europe so we can push forward the reforms that are essential for Europe's, and Britain's, economic future.
The EU is key to the success of business in the UK:
Europe accounts for nearly 60 per cent of our trade;
700,000 British companies have trading ties to Europe;
And 3.5 million British jobs depend upon Europe.
And even in the face of rapid globalisation, our trade with Europe continues to rise, meaning Europe is as important to the future of Britain than ever.”
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Economic reform is key to the European Union’s future and relevance, according to Brown:
“At the heart of a more competitive Europe in the 21st century must be a long-term commitment to a more outward looking relationship with the rest of the world. This is what I mean in practice by 'global Europe' - a Europe that knows it must face outwards if it is to be open for business.”
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A few comments:
Great Britain has a lot to give its continental European partners and the EU when it comes to a dynamic business climate, although the Nordic countries may have succeeded at least as well while excelling at public services and social security. Brown’s programme on economic stability, growth, competitiveness and jobs reads like a roadmap to a more prosperous future for European citizens.

On more foreign policy oriented themes, Brown made the case for European climate change and environmental policy and reforming international institutions.

So far, so good. But what did Gordon Brown leave uncovered, at least in this speech?

More than twenty years have passed since the European Community (formerly the EEC) began its transformation into a political union, with efforts to forge common foreign policy as well as new internal policies.

The future security and prosperity of EU citizens is going to depend on how successfully the European Union manages to pool the resources of its member states in the areas of common foreign, security and defence policies, including a common defence.

When are we going to hear this speech?


Ralf Grahn


Gordon Brown: Beyond The Reform Treaty: Business Priorities For A ‘Global Europe’; 14 January 2008;
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page14251.asp

EU Treaty of Lisbon: High Representative

Is the European Union entering the Facebook era? Perhaps not, but the Lisbon Treaty would go some way towards giving the EU recognisable leading personalities. The new President of the European Council is the clearest example, since this is a new post. If the candidate of the largest political party emerging from the European Parliament elections becomes Commission President, he or she will at the outset be much more of a European figure than the Presidents who until now have been sifted out by the European leaders behind closed doors. The High Representative already exists (presently Javier Solana), but the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is going to take over the external action of the European Commission, as Vice-President, and lead the External action service of the EU.

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Presently the Treaty on European Union (TEU; latest consolidated version OJ 29.12.2006, C 321 E) sets out the tasks of the High Representative in the following way in Article 26 TEU:

“The Secretary General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.”

The Convention proposed a Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Article I-27, one of its most important institutional innovations. The new Foreign Minister would unite the beginnings of a common foreign, security and defence policy of the Council with the external action, including the resources, of the Commission under a “double hat”, as High Representative and Vice-President.

In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 16.12.2004, C 310) all the Member States signed up to the Treaty, including Article I-28 The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Article I-28(3) added the following provision: The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.

The mandate for the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007; Council document 11218/07) gives a picture of the differences and likenesses between the constitutional setting and the amending Reform Treaty, including the fate of the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

“3. The TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union will not have a constitutional character. The terminology used throughout the Treaties will reflect this change: the term “Constitution” will not be used, the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” will be called High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the denominations “law” and “framework law” will be abandoned, the existing denominations “regulations”, “directives” and “decisions” being retained. Likewise, there will be no article in the amended Treaties mentioning the symbols of the EU such as the flag, the anthem or the motto. Concerning the primacy of EU law, the IGC will adopt a Declaration recalling the existing case law of the EU Court of Justice.”

Reneging on its signature, the United Kingdom had thus created, among other things, the word monster High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission.

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A few comments from your glossator:

The Lisbon Treaty devalues the rotating six month Presidency of the Council by creating a semi-permanent President for the European Council, who chairs the summits and represents the Union “at his level and in that capacity”, and by the High Representative/Vice-President, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and represents the EU externally.

With about 14 years between the Presidencies, it would be difficult for a Member State to keep up the proficiency to handle these questions. Within the very real constraints of decision making by consensus or unanimity, which mean that the European Union is bound to remain much less than a great power in foreign, security and defence policy, the new posts will give more coherence to Union policies if such have been defined.

Internally, the High Representative/Vice-President should be able, eventually, to coordinate the external action of the European Union better. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty can be seen more as a takeover by the Member States of the ‘Community’ (Commission) external action and its resources than the other way around. Thus, the common foreign, security and defence policies are further entrenched as intergovernmental playing fields, outside the scope of effective democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament.

The High Representative is relieved of his functions as Secretary General of the Council, opening up a coveted position for a “grey eminence”. In the near future the governments of the Member States are going to be intensely occupied with the filling of these offices (President of the European Council, High Representative/Vice-President, Commission President, Secretary General). These processes tend to be less than transparent.

The citizens of the Union can do very little to influence the choices; voting for a political party in the June 2009 elections to the European Parliament may influence the political alignment and person of the next President of the European Commission.

Alongside the nominations, the drafting of a new European Security Strategy has commenced, to replace the ESS of December 2003. Developed guidelines to handle the various security threats of our era would be welcome, as well as clear advances towards common defence commitments.

Interestingly, the EU Treaties are denounced, from different quarters, as being emanations of “socialist plots” and “ultra-liberalistic projects” set in stone. Snappier basic documents in a democratic setting would leave the economic policy orientations to fought out at elections, but objectively the security interests are common to all citizens (despite substantial variations in perceptions and rhetoric).

Long term, the security interests of EU citizens call for effective decision making and democratic scrutiny. The need for institutional reforms is far from over.

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The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) inserts an Article 9e.

Article 9e

1. The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council may end his term of office by the same procedure.

2. The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy.

3. The High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.

4. The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3.

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The renamed Court of Justice of the European Union is going to be next.


Ralf Grahn

Finland and NATO

President Tarja Halonen has reiterated her opposition to Finnish membership in the NATO alliance. She says that she has seen no convincing reasons for joining, and opinion polls show that a majority of the population is reticent about membership.

A history of post-war efforts to stay neutral, 1,200 kilometres of shared border with Russia, a unilateralist US administration perceived as adventurous and an inward looking mindset help to explain the mental inertia of Finland.

But, at least for the political leaders of the nation, strategic reasoning and the responsibilities of leadership should shift the burden of proof:

If there are no convincing reasons to the contrary (and none have been presented), Finland should act like a normal member of the European Union, which the country joined in 1995. Out of 27 EU members, 21 belong to NATO. To remain on the fringes of both organisations is a poor choice.

The government of Finland should set a clear new course: Full participation to enhance the common foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union, including the achievement of a common defence, and transatlantic ties through NATO membership.


Ralf Grahn


Background:

Tanja Alamurto & Kari Huhta: On the road to NATO: a guide for travellers; Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition; 18 November 2007;
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/On+the+road+to+NATO+a+guide+for+travellers/1135231972465

Tanja Alamurto & Kari Huhta: NATO Pros and Cons; Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition; 18 November 2007;
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/NATO+Pros+and+Cons+/1135231974078

New European Security Strategy

The European Council adopted the first holistic foreign policy strategy for the European Union in December 2003. “A Secure Europe in a Better World – the European Security Strategy” (EES) has become the basic document for the ambitions of the EU to become a global player; shortly, to export security to avoid importing insecurity.

The EU leaders and elites are not the only ones to profess the aims of peace and security; there is a demand from the citizens of the European Union for the EU to do more.

Sven Biscop of the Egmont Institute has analysed the European Security Strategy and the delivery of its aims. Despite fuzziness in parts, the EES has become a benchmark and a reference framework for the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy.

According to Biscop, Europe has the potential to be a global power. The adoption of the EES has supported the consolidation of the EU’s international actorness. The EES could yield more benefits by a more institutionalised strategic debate and the evaluation of EU policy. The main question is not whether the EES should be rewritten or not. The question is rather whether the EU is effectively implementing it.

Still, rewriting, or rather an EES 2.0, is on the wall. The work has already started.

Carl Bildt, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, told a conference in Stockholm:

“The European Security Strategy that was adopted then [late 2003] broke new ground, and there is little doubt that it has stood the test of time and served us well. But it was never meant to be just a stone tablet preserved for eternity, but rather a living document that would evolve and develop as the European Union developed and as its strategic environment and the challenges associated with it evolved. Much has happened since 2003.”

The process of writing a new European Security Strategy offers the European Union an opportunity to assess the new strategic challenges for the EU’s foreign and security policy, to fill in the gaps in the present EES, to try to reach new levels of consistency and coherence and to analyse the present shortcomings of delivery.

Given the fundamental interests at stake, the citizens of the European Union are entitled to real progress towards a more secure Europe in a better world.


Ralf Grahn


Sources:

A Secure Europe in a Better World – the European Security Strategy; Brussels, 12 December 2003; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g

Sven Biscop: The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture; Egmont Paper 16; Brussels, October 2007; http://www.egmontinstitute.be

Carl Bildt: Speech at the Conference for Global Foreign and Security Policy Challenges and the European Union in Stockholm 8-9 November, 2007; http://www.regeringen.se