Today, David Miliband, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, spoke on EU foreign policy after Lisbon, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS):
“So the choice for Europe is simple. Get our act together and make the EU a leader on the world stage; or become spectators in a G2 world shaped by the US and China. But I think that the choice for the UK is also simply stated: we can lead a strong European foreign policy or – lost in hubris, nostalgia or xenophobia - watch our influence in the world wane.”
***
UK approach
Ahead of the Treaty of Lisbon, the UK (Labour) government informed Parliament and the public by publishing “The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference, July 2007” (Command paper 7174).
With regard to the common foreign and security policy, the UK government stated:
“The Reform Treaty will affirm that CFSP will remain an intergovernmental process, distinct from other policy areas. Unanimity in decision-making will remain the norm (i.e. the UK will hold a veto). CFSP provisions will also remain in the Treaty on European Union. The IGC Mandate contains a declaration confirming that the provisions on CFSP will not affect the responsibilities of the Member States, as they currently exist, for the formation and conduct of their foreign policy, or of their national representations in third countries and international organisations.”
The British government underlined its independence and veto powers with regard to the common security and defence policy, as well:
“The Reform Treaty will meet UK objectives on the development of a flexible, militarily robust and NATO-friendly ESDP. The Reform Treaty will also preserve the principle of unanimity (and therefore the UK veto) for ESDP policy decisions and for initiating missions, and will maintain the prerogatives of Member States for defence and security issues (in the same way as it does for foreign policy).”
The government’s presentation of the President of the European Council did not exactly spell out that the choice of Tony Blair would become the make or break issue for the European Union’s future in the world:
“The President will chair the European Council, drive forward its work, ensure its preparation and continuity on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council, and facilitate cohesion and consensus. The President will also have a role in the most highlevel aspects of the EU’s external relations.”
***
Comments
The government of the United Kingdom seems to have been quite happy for the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy to remain intergovernmental, primarily based on unanimous decisions, retained veto powers for every member state and minimal scrutiny by the directly elected European Parliament.
Miliband appears to reason that you first build a house of cards, but suddenly you need a traffic-stopping personality to counter the structural flaws.
Admittedly, Miliband’s approach is more constructive than that of the Conservative Party, which officially continues to reject the Treaty of Lisbon, democratically approved in 27 member states.
Ralf Grahn
P.S. (Update) Link to the IISS.
Showing posts with label security policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label security policy. Show all posts
Monday, 26 October 2009
Thursday, 8 October 2009
European External Action Service (EEAS) - Preparatory work
The European External Action Service (EEAS) will work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the member states and it will comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the member states.
***
Establishment
The EEAS is one of the important Lisby Treaty reforms.
The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service will be established by a Council decision, on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.
***
Preparation
According to Lisbon Treaty Declaration (No 15) on Article 27 of the Treaty on European Union stated that as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon is signed, the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, the Commission and the Member States should begin preparatory work on the European External Action Service.
As usual, the Council has been less than zealous in informing the public on the preparatory work.
***
Benelux leak?
The only breach has been the memorandum of the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), which has found its way into the public domain, for instance Jamie Smyth’s blog post “The Benelux strikes back against Blair” (EUobserver, 6 October 2009).
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde presents the Benelux position on the EEAS in “L’avis du Benelux sur le futur service européen d’action extérieure” (Bruxelles2, 8 October 2009), with a link to the whole document and discussion about other aspects of the memo in other blog posts.
Patrice Cardot also presents the memorandum and comments on it in “Mise en oeuvre du traité de Lisbonne : le point de vue du Bénélux” (Regards citoyens, 8 October 2009). There is a link to the document.
I did not find the Benelux position paper on any official web site, so it has probably been leaked. Positive for the free flow of information, but lower marks for openness as a fundamental principle of policy making.
***
European Parliament
Grosso modo, the European Parliament is the only EU institution which has prepared its opinions about Lisbon Treaty implementation in public. A number of resolutions were prepared and voted last spring (and presented on this blog).
Yesterday’s Grahnlaw blog post ‘EU “diplomatic service”: All shock and horror?’ mentioned the Draft report on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service (Committee on Constitutional Affairs AFCO, 23 September 2009, rapporteur: Elmar Brok).
The Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) is preparing an opinion for AFCO: Draft opinion on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service (25 September 2009, rapporteur: Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck).
***
The Council and the Commission have done little to inform the public about preparatory work for the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. When the democratic approval has been attained in 27 EU member states, there are few excuses left for leaving the public in the dark.
Openness is the first test of the Lisbon Treaty.
Where are the documents?
Where are the candidates?
Ralf Grahn
***
Establishment
The EEAS is one of the important Lisby Treaty reforms.
The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service will be established by a Council decision, on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.
***
Preparation
According to Lisbon Treaty Declaration (No 15) on Article 27 of the Treaty on European Union stated that as soon as the Treaty of Lisbon is signed, the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, the Commission and the Member States should begin preparatory work on the European External Action Service.
As usual, the Council has been less than zealous in informing the public on the preparatory work.
***
Benelux leak?
The only breach has been the memorandum of the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), which has found its way into the public domain, for instance Jamie Smyth’s blog post “The Benelux strikes back against Blair” (EUobserver, 6 October 2009).
Nicolas Gros-Verheyde presents the Benelux position on the EEAS in “L’avis du Benelux sur le futur service européen d’action extérieure” (Bruxelles2, 8 October 2009), with a link to the whole document and discussion about other aspects of the memo in other blog posts.
Patrice Cardot also presents the memorandum and comments on it in “Mise en oeuvre du traité de Lisbonne : le point de vue du Bénélux” (Regards citoyens, 8 October 2009). There is a link to the document.
I did not find the Benelux position paper on any official web site, so it has probably been leaked. Positive for the free flow of information, but lower marks for openness as a fundamental principle of policy making.
***
European Parliament
Grosso modo, the European Parliament is the only EU institution which has prepared its opinions about Lisbon Treaty implementation in public. A number of resolutions were prepared and voted last spring (and presented on this blog).
Yesterday’s Grahnlaw blog post ‘EU “diplomatic service”: All shock and horror?’ mentioned the Draft report on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service (Committee on Constitutional Affairs AFCO, 23 September 2009, rapporteur: Elmar Brok).
The Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) is preparing an opinion for AFCO: Draft opinion on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service (25 September 2009, rapporteur: Annemie Neyts-Uyttebroeck).
***
The Council and the Commission have done little to inform the public about preparatory work for the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. When the democratic approval has been attained in 27 EU member states, there are few excuses left for leaving the public in the dark.
Openness is the first test of the Lisbon Treaty.
Where are the documents?
Where are the candidates?
Ralf Grahn
New EU High Representative – the most important job
The most important job to fill, now that the democratic legitimacy of the Lisbon Treaty is assured in all 27 EU member states, is not the media sexy President of the European Council, despite attempts to inflate the job description way beyond that outlined in the amending treaty in order to justify the (s)election of Tony Blair.
The crucial post for the European Union is the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as Vice-President of the Commission, in charge of the external action of the union. He or she will chair the Foreign Affairs Council and lead the European External Action Service (EEAS).
This is also the assessment of Timothy Garton Ash, in “The US has lost its focus on Europe. It's up to us to get our act together” (The Guardian, 7 October 2009):
“… the personalities chosen as president – that is, chair – of the European council and as high representative for foreign and security policy will matter a lot; second, nobody [among US officials] understands that, for Europe's future role in the world, the latter is actually the more important job”.
Ralf Grahn
The crucial post for the European Union is the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as Vice-President of the Commission, in charge of the external action of the union. He or she will chair the Foreign Affairs Council and lead the European External Action Service (EEAS).
This is also the assessment of Timothy Garton Ash, in “The US has lost its focus on Europe. It's up to us to get our act together” (The Guardian, 7 October 2009):
“… the personalities chosen as president – that is, chair – of the European council and as high representative for foreign and security policy will matter a lot; second, nobody [among US officials] understands that, for Europe's future role in the world, the latter is actually the more important job”.
Ralf Grahn
Monday, 30 March 2009
EU Council tasks: Security & defence policy CSDP
The European Union’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) is an integral part of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP). At this stage of development, it is geared towards humanitarian, peace and crisis management missions drawing on both civilian and military assets (Petersberg tasks).
The Treaty of Lisbon envisions the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, leading to a common defence.
The intergovernmental CSDP respects a) the ‘specific character’ of the security and defence policy of ‘certain member states’ (non-aligned, neutral) and b) the obligations of the vast majority which are NATO members.
We look at the Council’s CSDP tasks in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, with the relevant provisions located in the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU).
***
Defining objectives
The Council of the European Union defines the objectives for the implementation of the CSDP, assisted by the European Defence Agency (EDA)(OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115):
Article 42(3) TEU
3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.
Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
***
Unanimity
The CSDP decisions are adopted unanimously by the Council:
4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.
***
Delegation of tasks
The Council can delegate the execution of tasks (a mission) to a group of member states (Article 42(5) TEU), with the willing and able keeping the Council informed. If the decision needs to be changed, it is dealt with by the Council, as provided in Article 44 TEU.
***
Implementation and scope
According to the second paragraph of Article 43 TEU, the Council adopts the decisions relating to the extended Petersberg tasks, listed in paragraph 1:
Article 43 TEU
1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.
2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.
***
European Defence Agency
The European Defence Agency (EDA) is intergovernmental, ‘subject to the authority of the Council’ (Article 45 TEU). The EDA’s statute, seat and operational rules are adopted by the Council by a qualified majority.
***
Permanent structured cooperation
According to Article 46 TEU, the Council adopts, by qualified majority, the decision establishing permanent structured cooperation (akin to enhanced cooperation in other policy areas) between member states, which fulfil the criteria and made the commitments on military capabilities in accordance with Protocol No. 10.
Decisions concerning later entrants are decided by the participating states.
Permanent structured cooperation is one of the questions in need of preparatory work, public discussion and implementing decisions, if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.
***
Council configurations
The current Council configuration, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), already meets separately for its two main areas of activity. The Lisbon Treaty would separate the configurations, and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) would carry on with the whole of the European Union's external action, namely common foreign and security policy, European security and defence policy, foreign trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. (Cf. current Council’s Rules of Procedure and Lisbon Article 16(6) TEU.)
The Defence Ministers of the EU member states convene in connection with GAERC meetings and for separate informal meetings. The latest informal meeting was held in Prague on 12 to 13 March 2009.
The Council is assisted by the Political and Security Committee (known as PSC or COPS), which monitors the international situation, delivers opinions and can be authorised to direct crisis management operations (Article 38 TEU).
The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.
***
European Parliament
Being on the sidelines of the intergovernmental CSDP does not prevent the European Parliament from showing a keen interest in The European Security Strategy and ESDP, as witnessed by the 19 February 2009 EP Resolution P6_TA-PROV(2009)0075, based on an own-initiative report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0075+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
The European Parliament sees the need for a common defence policy in Europe requiring an integrated European Armed Force which consequently needs to be equipped with common weapon systems so as to guarantee commonality and interoperability.
In addition, the EP Resolution offers an updated overview on the latest proposals and current shortcomings of the EU’s security and defence policy.
Ralf Grahn
The Treaty of Lisbon envisions the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, leading to a common defence.
The intergovernmental CSDP respects a) the ‘specific character’ of the security and defence policy of ‘certain member states’ (non-aligned, neutral) and b) the obligations of the vast majority which are NATO members.
We look at the Council’s CSDP tasks in the light of the Lisbon Treaty, with the relevant provisions located in the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU).
***
Defining objectives
The Council of the European Union defines the objectives for the implementation of the CSDP, assisted by the European Defence Agency (EDA)(OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115):
Article 42(3) TEU
3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.
Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
***
Unanimity
The CSDP decisions are adopted unanimously by the Council:
4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.
***
Delegation of tasks
The Council can delegate the execution of tasks (a mission) to a group of member states (Article 42(5) TEU), with the willing and able keeping the Council informed. If the decision needs to be changed, it is dealt with by the Council, as provided in Article 44 TEU.
***
Implementation and scope
According to the second paragraph of Article 43 TEU, the Council adopts the decisions relating to the extended Petersberg tasks, listed in paragraph 1:
Article 43 TEU
1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.
2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.
***
European Defence Agency
The European Defence Agency (EDA) is intergovernmental, ‘subject to the authority of the Council’ (Article 45 TEU). The EDA’s statute, seat and operational rules are adopted by the Council by a qualified majority.
***
Permanent structured cooperation
According to Article 46 TEU, the Council adopts, by qualified majority, the decision establishing permanent structured cooperation (akin to enhanced cooperation in other policy areas) between member states, which fulfil the criteria and made the commitments on military capabilities in accordance with Protocol No. 10.
Decisions concerning later entrants are decided by the participating states.
Permanent structured cooperation is one of the questions in need of preparatory work, public discussion and implementing decisions, if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force.
***
Council configurations
The current Council configuration, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), already meets separately for its two main areas of activity. The Lisbon Treaty would separate the configurations, and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) would carry on with the whole of the European Union's external action, namely common foreign and security policy, European security and defence policy, foreign trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. (Cf. current Council’s Rules of Procedure and Lisbon Article 16(6) TEU.)
The Defence Ministers of the EU member states convene in connection with GAERC meetings and for separate informal meetings. The latest informal meeting was held in Prague on 12 to 13 March 2009.
The Council is assisted by the Political and Security Committee (known as PSC or COPS), which monitors the international situation, delivers opinions and can be authorised to direct crisis management operations (Article 38 TEU).
The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.
***
European Parliament
Being on the sidelines of the intergovernmental CSDP does not prevent the European Parliament from showing a keen interest in The European Security Strategy and ESDP, as witnessed by the 19 February 2009 EP Resolution P6_TA-PROV(2009)0075, based on an own-initiative report by the Committee on Foreign Affairs:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0075+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
The European Parliament sees the need for a common defence policy in Europe requiring an integrated European Armed Force which consequently needs to be equipped with common weapon systems so as to guarantee commonality and interoperability.
In addition, the EP Resolution offers an updated overview on the latest proposals and current shortcomings of the EU’s security and defence policy.
Ralf Grahn
Sunday, 29 March 2009
EU Council tasks: Foreign & security policy CFSP
Nationally elected ministers decide on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union in Brussels.
Currently the foreign ministers meet in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), but if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, they would convene in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), while the coordination of Council activities would take place in the General Affairs Council (GAC).
We take a closer look at the CFSP tasks of the Council in the light of the Lisbon Treaty.
***
Conduct of foreign policy
Unanimity rule
External action is a wide concept, covering all areas including the ones managed by the Commission. The CFSP (including the CSDP) is narrower and intergovernmental (but the Foreign Affairs Council deals with all aspects of external relations).
Roughly, the Lisbon Treaty splits the provisions on external relations in two. After principles common to external relations in general, the CFSP and the CSDP provision are laid down in the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the rest of external relations are regulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (common commercial policy, cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid).
According to Article 24(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence (consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty, published OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115).
The CFSP is subject to specific rules and procedures. It is defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts is excluded, as is generally the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The intergovernmental character of the CFSP and the EU’s inability to “speak with one voice on the world scene” are enshrined in the basic unanimity rule, allowing even one dogged member state to paralyse the EU in key questions, despite the evocation of the principle of mutual political solidarity (paragraph 3).
***
CFSP
Instead of dealing with the EU’s external action as a whole in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007) broke the unity by keeping the CFSP and CSDP provisions in the Treaty on European Union.
Because of the specific character of the CFSP, Article 26 TEU reiterates the leading role of the European Council and the tasks of the Council in an area where the Commission and the European Parliament are on the sidelines.
The Council’s tasks are laid down in the second paragraph:
Article 26(2) TEU
2. The Council shall frame the common foreign and security policy and take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council.
The Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.
***
European External Action Service
If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, the European External Action Service (EEAS) will be established by a Council decision. This is one of the more demanding implementing tasks with regard to the Lisbon Treaty, requiring preparation and public discussion (naturally based on an open preparatory stage, so far sadly lacking):
Article 27(3) TEU
3. In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.
***
Operational action
At the operational level, the Council (FAC) makes the decisions, according to Article 28(1) TEU:
Article 28 TEU
(ex Article 14 TEU)
1. Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.
If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to such a decision, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that decision and take the necessary decisions.
***
Particular matters
In addition to the operational action mentioned above, the Council may adopt decisions on a common approach to particular CFSP matters. If the Council is able to agree, the member states are supposed to act in accordance with the adopted approach:
Article 29 TEU
(ex Article 15 TEU)
The Council shall adopt decisions which shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions.
***
CFSP initiatives and proposals
Whereas the Commission has a near monopoly in making formal proposals within the current ‘Community pillar’, the intergovernmental and political character of the CFSP is illustrated by the right of each member state to submit initiatives or proposals to the Council (besides the right of the High Representative):
Article 30(1) TEU
(ex Article 22 TEU)
1. Any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission's support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals as appropriate.
***
Qualified abstention
Article 31(1) TEU repeats that CFSP decisions are generally taken unanimously by the European Council and the Council. According to the general voting rules, abstention does not prevent a decision from being taken, but the second subparagraph of Article 31(1) adds that a member state can make a formal declaration to the effect that it is not obliged to apply the decision (qualified abstention). It is expected not to act against the decision. This is described as a spirit of mutual solidarity. If the minority is sizeable, no decision is taken:
Article 31 TEU
(ex Article 23 TEU)
1. Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.
***
Qualified majority
The main rule for CFSP decisions is unanimity, but there are exceptions. According to Article 31(2) TEU qualified majority voting (QMV) applies to questions where the European Council has laid down the guiding principles or asked for a detailed proposal. It applies also to implementing decisions and to appointing special representatives.
Despite these limitations, the Lisbon Treaty contains an “emergency brake”. Even one member state can prevent a vote. This leads to a mediation effort by the High Representative, but if this fails, the matter may be delegated upwards to the European Council for a unanimous decision:
Article 31(2) TEU
2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:
— when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 22(1),
— when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,
— when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position,
— when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33.
If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.
***
Expanding QMV in CFSP
There is a cautious opening towards wider use of qualified majority voting in the Council with regard to the common foreign and security policy, but only by unanimous decision by the European Council:
Article 31(3) TEU
3. The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2.
***
Further limits
Qualified majority voting is excluded for matters with military implications and even a unanimous European Council is unable to extend QMV to these questions:
Article 31(4) TEU
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.
***
Procedural questions
Procedural questions are the only ones where the Council (FAC) can advance by “normal” majority decisions:
Article 31(5) TEU
5. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.
***
Consultation
The member states are supposed to consult each other in the European Council and the Council, leading to converging views and coordinated action:
Article 32 TEU, first subparagraph
(ex Article 16 TEU)
Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.
***
Special Representative
The Council can appoint a special representative, on a proposal by the High Representative (Article 33 TEU).
***
Personal data protection
The protection of personal data is one of the principles the European Union prides itself on, but in the area of the common foreign and security policy the member states’ governments do not want to be hampered by the rules laid down in Article 16 TFEU, including the movement of such data.
Therefore, in a treaty written by the member states, the Council adopts the rules in the CFSP area, without the need to co-legislate with the European Parliament:
Article 39 TEU
In accordance with Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by way of derogation from paragraph 2 thereof, the Council shall adopt a decision laying down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of this Chapter, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities.
***
CFSP expenditure
Article 41 TEU lays down basic rules on the allocation of CFSP expenses, with various Council decisions, including some instances where the Council can unanimously deviate from the main rules.
***
Hobbled Giant
The Lisbon Treaty preserves the unanimity rule (liberum veto), with minor exceptions, and the intergovernmental character of the common foreign and security policy. These principles constitute the “clay feet” of the European Union in world affairs.
With these constraints, the Council (FAC) ─ guided by the European Council ─ requires intensive efforts to formulate working common policies. The foreign ministers meet frequently, including informal meetings (Gymnich), to agree on the CFSP, perhaps even effective implementation.
Despite its shortcomings, the Lisbon Treaty would improve the chances of more consistency and coherence in EU foreign affairs. In this respect, non-conclusive treaty reform and ratification difficulties cause competing powers much joy.
Ralf Grahn
Currently the foreign ministers meet in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), but if the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, they would convene in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), while the coordination of Council activities would take place in the General Affairs Council (GAC).
We take a closer look at the CFSP tasks of the Council in the light of the Lisbon Treaty.
***
Conduct of foreign policy
Unanimity rule
External action is a wide concept, covering all areas including the ones managed by the Commission. The CFSP (including the CSDP) is narrower and intergovernmental (but the Foreign Affairs Council deals with all aspects of external relations).
Roughly, the Lisbon Treaty splits the provisions on external relations in two. After principles common to external relations in general, the CFSP and the CSDP provision are laid down in the amended Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the rest of external relations are regulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (common commercial policy, cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid).
According to Article 24(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence (consolidated version of the Lisbon Treaty, published OJEU 9.5.2008 C 115).
The CFSP is subject to specific rules and procedures. It is defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts is excluded, as is generally the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
The intergovernmental character of the CFSP and the EU’s inability to “speak with one voice on the world scene” are enshrined in the basic unanimity rule, allowing even one dogged member state to paralyse the EU in key questions, despite the evocation of the principle of mutual political solidarity (paragraph 3).
***
CFSP
Instead of dealing with the EU’s external action as a whole in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007) broke the unity by keeping the CFSP and CSDP provisions in the Treaty on European Union.
Because of the specific character of the CFSP, Article 26 TEU reiterates the leading role of the European Council and the tasks of the Council in an area where the Commission and the European Parliament are on the sidelines.
The Council’s tasks are laid down in the second paragraph:
Article 26(2) TEU
2. The Council shall frame the common foreign and security policy and take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing it on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council.
The Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.
***
European External Action Service
If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, the European External Action Service (EEAS) will be established by a Council decision. This is one of the more demanding implementing tasks with regard to the Lisbon Treaty, requiring preparation and public discussion (naturally based on an open preparatory stage, so far sadly lacking):
Article 27(3) TEU
3. In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.
***
Operational action
At the operational level, the Council (FAC) makes the decisions, according to Article 28(1) TEU:
Article 28 TEU
(ex Article 14 TEU)
1. Where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.
If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to such a decision, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that decision and take the necessary decisions.
***
Particular matters
In addition to the operational action mentioned above, the Council may adopt decisions on a common approach to particular CFSP matters. If the Council is able to agree, the member states are supposed to act in accordance with the adopted approach:
Article 29 TEU
(ex Article 15 TEU)
The Council shall adopt decisions which shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions.
***
CFSP initiatives and proposals
Whereas the Commission has a near monopoly in making formal proposals within the current ‘Community pillar’, the intergovernmental and political character of the CFSP is illustrated by the right of each member state to submit initiatives or proposals to the Council (besides the right of the High Representative):
Article 30(1) TEU
(ex Article 22 TEU)
1. Any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission's support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals as appropriate.
***
Qualified abstention
Article 31(1) TEU repeats that CFSP decisions are generally taken unanimously by the European Council and the Council. According to the general voting rules, abstention does not prevent a decision from being taken, but the second subparagraph of Article 31(1) adds that a member state can make a formal declaration to the effect that it is not obliged to apply the decision (qualified abstention). It is expected not to act against the decision. This is described as a spirit of mutual solidarity. If the minority is sizeable, no decision is taken:
Article 31 TEU
(ex Article 23 TEU)
1. Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.
***
Qualified majority
The main rule for CFSP decisions is unanimity, but there are exceptions. According to Article 31(2) TEU qualified majority voting (QMV) applies to questions where the European Council has laid down the guiding principles or asked for a detailed proposal. It applies also to implementing decisions and to appointing special representatives.
Despite these limitations, the Lisbon Treaty contains an “emergency brake”. Even one member state can prevent a vote. This leads to a mediation effort by the High Representative, but if this fails, the matter may be delegated upwards to the European Council for a unanimous decision:
Article 31(2) TEU
2. By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:
— when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 22(1),
— when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative,
— when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position,
— when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33.
If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.
***
Expanding QMV in CFSP
There is a cautious opening towards wider use of qualified majority voting in the Council with regard to the common foreign and security policy, but only by unanimous decision by the European Council:
Article 31(3) TEU
3. The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in paragraph 2.
***
Further limits
Qualified majority voting is excluded for matters with military implications and even a unanimous European Council is unable to extend QMV to these questions:
Article 31(4) TEU
4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications.
***
Procedural questions
Procedural questions are the only ones where the Council (FAC) can advance by “normal” majority decisions:
Article 31(5) TEU
5. For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.
***
Consultation
The member states are supposed to consult each other in the European Council and the Council, leading to converging views and coordinated action:
Article 32 TEU, first subparagraph
(ex Article 16 TEU)
Member States shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.
***
Special Representative
The Council can appoint a special representative, on a proposal by the High Representative (Article 33 TEU).
***
Personal data protection
The protection of personal data is one of the principles the European Union prides itself on, but in the area of the common foreign and security policy the member states’ governments do not want to be hampered by the rules laid down in Article 16 TFEU, including the movement of such data.
Therefore, in a treaty written by the member states, the Council adopts the rules in the CFSP area, without the need to co-legislate with the European Parliament:
Article 39 TEU
In accordance with Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and by way of derogation from paragraph 2 thereof, the Council shall adopt a decision laying down the rules relating to the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of this Chapter, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities.
***
CFSP expenditure
Article 41 TEU lays down basic rules on the allocation of CFSP expenses, with various Council decisions, including some instances where the Council can unanimously deviate from the main rules.
***
Hobbled Giant
The Lisbon Treaty preserves the unanimity rule (liberum veto), with minor exceptions, and the intergovernmental character of the common foreign and security policy. These principles constitute the “clay feet” of the European Union in world affairs.
With these constraints, the Council (FAC) ─ guided by the European Council ─ requires intensive efforts to formulate working common policies. The foreign ministers meet frequently, including informal meetings (Gymnich), to agree on the CFSP, perhaps even effective implementation.
Despite its shortcomings, the Lisbon Treaty would improve the chances of more consistency and coherence in EU foreign affairs. In this respect, non-conclusive treaty reform and ratification difficulties cause competing powers much joy.
Ralf Grahn
Tuesday, 10 March 2009
Swedish non-alignment and EU?
Fellow blogger The European Citizen discussed ’Neutrality and Europe’ in a blog post 9 March 2009, primarily from an Irish perspective:
http://theeuropeancitizen.blogspot.com/2009/03/neutrality-and-europe.html
The post concluded that the existence of the internal market and membership of the EU has changed the political context for neutral European states. This doesn't automatically mean that military integration should be adopted, but a range of options should be discussed.
***
I have nothing to object to the conclusion that rational discussion is needed in the countries outside the security policy mainstream of the European Union.
What caught my eye was a detail, the opening sentence where The European Citizen described Ireland, Sweden and Austria as both neutral and EU member states, and asked but can you really be both.
In a comment on an earlier blog post, I had noted that Finland has narrowed down its definition to “military non-alignment”, because the country sees itself as politically aligned through EU membership, including the CFSP and the CSDP.
I also commented that I was unsure of how Sweden defines itself nowadays, although it continued to use both “non-alignment” and “neutrality” when Finland had ceased to utilise these defining terms.
For this comment off the cuff, I did not take the trouble to research the Swedish position. But when Swedish neutrality cropped up in the new post, I decided to take a look.
***
Sweden
Traditional Swedish non-alignment aiming at neutrality in war seems to be in a flux. In the Foreign Policy Declaration of the Government of Sweden 18 February 2009 (Regeringens deklaration vid 2009 års utrikespolitiska debatt i Riksdagen onsdagen den 18 februari 2009), Foreign Minister Carl Bildt mentioned neither non-alignment nor neutrality.
Bildt mentioned the successful foreign, security and defence policies of the European Union and the good cooperation between Sweden and NATO in crisis management. He went on to declare that the Government is going to present a position paper on NATO relations during the spring.
Bildt mentioned Swedish security policy as firm, but in addition he mentioned the proposals for improved Nordic defence cooperation made by Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Swedish Government will consider them in a positive spirit and it promises a Bill on defence policy this spring.
***
In other words, by deliberate omission Sweden is neither “non-aligned” nor “neutral”, but two Government papers will further define NATO relations and (Nordic) defence policy.
I don’t expect any sudden shifts, but Swedish foreign, security and defence policy is changing, although at glacier-like speed.
Ralf Grahn
http://theeuropeancitizen.blogspot.com/2009/03/neutrality-and-europe.html
The post concluded that the existence of the internal market and membership of the EU has changed the political context for neutral European states. This doesn't automatically mean that military integration should be adopted, but a range of options should be discussed.
***
I have nothing to object to the conclusion that rational discussion is needed in the countries outside the security policy mainstream of the European Union.
What caught my eye was a detail, the opening sentence where The European Citizen described Ireland, Sweden and Austria as both neutral and EU member states, and asked but can you really be both.
In a comment on an earlier blog post, I had noted that Finland has narrowed down its definition to “military non-alignment”, because the country sees itself as politically aligned through EU membership, including the CFSP and the CSDP.
I also commented that I was unsure of how Sweden defines itself nowadays, although it continued to use both “non-alignment” and “neutrality” when Finland had ceased to utilise these defining terms.
For this comment off the cuff, I did not take the trouble to research the Swedish position. But when Swedish neutrality cropped up in the new post, I decided to take a look.
***
Sweden
Traditional Swedish non-alignment aiming at neutrality in war seems to be in a flux. In the Foreign Policy Declaration of the Government of Sweden 18 February 2009 (Regeringens deklaration vid 2009 års utrikespolitiska debatt i Riksdagen onsdagen den 18 februari 2009), Foreign Minister Carl Bildt mentioned neither non-alignment nor neutrality.
Bildt mentioned the successful foreign, security and defence policies of the European Union and the good cooperation between Sweden and NATO in crisis management. He went on to declare that the Government is going to present a position paper on NATO relations during the spring.
Bildt mentioned Swedish security policy as firm, but in addition he mentioned the proposals for improved Nordic defence cooperation made by Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Swedish Government will consider them in a positive spirit and it promises a Bill on defence policy this spring.
***
In other words, by deliberate omission Sweden is neither “non-aligned” nor “neutral”, but two Government papers will further define NATO relations and (Nordic) defence policy.
I don’t expect any sudden shifts, but Swedish foreign, security and defence policy is changing, although at glacier-like speed.
Ralf Grahn
Thursday, 26 June 2008
EU: How many humiliations?
Our interlocutor, the Tap Blog, has made a first venture into the world after the imagined European Union collapse. Their vision is a Europe of Nations, in ‘The World Needs Europe’s Nations, Not The EU’ (26 June 2008):
http://the-tap.blogspot.com/2008/06/world-needs-europes-nations-not-eu.html
***
It sounds nice and cosy, but how on earth are the European nation states going to prosper on their own in a harsh world, when they fail to get their act together under the current (and proposed) veto-enabling rules?
Russia has been picking of the EU countries at will, to the extent that it seems to be sorry for their present state of disarray. On the other hand, the EU’s possibilities to negotiate have been blocked by repeated national vetoes.
For a realistic assessment of the EU countries’ predicament, read the summary on EU–Russia relations by Robert Amsterdam ‘A Broken Europe Can’t Negotiate with Moscow’ (25 June 2008):
http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/06/a_broken_europe_cant_negotiate.htm
For a realist assessment of the challenges for Europe, I repeat my recommendation to read the blog by James Rogers, Global Power Europe:
http://www.globalpowereurope.eu/
***
Squabbling with each other and vetoing away their future, the EU member states are in for a lot of humiliations on the international scene.
Most of the time, they can, of course, cobble together a statement deploring the situation …
The Lisbon Treaty would improve the internal efficiency of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy, but the real world effectiveness of its policies would still be hostage to the ‘liberum veto’.
In other words, the proposed improvements are too little, too late.
The European leaders will the good outcomes, but they refuse the means to achieve them.
***
But to propose a Europe of Nations – cosy as it sounds – is taking the wrong turn altogether, as long as there is no convincing explanation of how these proud nations would do better completely on their own or with an added dose of intergovernmental inefficiency.
The Tap Blog, in my humble opinion, suffers from one fundamental flaw. Its object of worship is the nation state.
My yardstick is the interest of the EU citizen. From two main angles: security and prosperity.
We already have our nations, and they are not going to disappear. But we need the team effort called the European Union, indeed a much improved EU, not only willing, but able to defend our common interests.
How many humiliations have to be endured before we get what we need?
Ralf Grahn
http://the-tap.blogspot.com/2008/06/world-needs-europes-nations-not-eu.html
***
It sounds nice and cosy, but how on earth are the European nation states going to prosper on their own in a harsh world, when they fail to get their act together under the current (and proposed) veto-enabling rules?
Russia has been picking of the EU countries at will, to the extent that it seems to be sorry for their present state of disarray. On the other hand, the EU’s possibilities to negotiate have been blocked by repeated national vetoes.
For a realistic assessment of the EU countries’ predicament, read the summary on EU–Russia relations by Robert Amsterdam ‘A Broken Europe Can’t Negotiate with Moscow’ (25 June 2008):
http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/06/a_broken_europe_cant_negotiate.htm
For a realist assessment of the challenges for Europe, I repeat my recommendation to read the blog by James Rogers, Global Power Europe:
http://www.globalpowereurope.eu/
***
Squabbling with each other and vetoing away their future, the EU member states are in for a lot of humiliations on the international scene.
Most of the time, they can, of course, cobble together a statement deploring the situation …
The Lisbon Treaty would improve the internal efficiency of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy, but the real world effectiveness of its policies would still be hostage to the ‘liberum veto’.
In other words, the proposed improvements are too little, too late.
The European leaders will the good outcomes, but they refuse the means to achieve them.
***
But to propose a Europe of Nations – cosy as it sounds – is taking the wrong turn altogether, as long as there is no convincing explanation of how these proud nations would do better completely on their own or with an added dose of intergovernmental inefficiency.
The Tap Blog, in my humble opinion, suffers from one fundamental flaw. Its object of worship is the nation state.
My yardstick is the interest of the EU citizen. From two main angles: security and prosperity.
We already have our nations, and they are not going to disappear. But we need the team effort called the European Union, indeed a much improved EU, not only willing, but able to defend our common interests.
How many humiliations have to be endured before we get what we need?
Ralf Grahn
Tuesday, 15 January 2008
Gordon Brown on Global Europe
Until now, the only thing that has maintained Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s credentials as a European statesman, has been the Conservative Party’s complete lack of constructive EU policy.
Yesterday, Brown did much to cast off his crown as curmudgeon of the year among EU leaders. Speaking to a business audience Brown finally outlined a programme for Britain in Europe, laying the background for future success, coming out strongly in favour of British EU membership and pointing towards the needed economic reforms within the Union.
***
What is needed for future success? Brown clearly placed himself in the economic reform camp:
“The countries and continents that will succeed in the new era of globalisation will be those that are open rather than closed, for free trade rather than protectionism, are flexible rather than rigid, and invest in high skills and the potential of their people.”
***
The future of the United Kingdom lies in the European Union, was the message of Brown:
“But what is clear is that at this time of global economic uncertainty, we should not be throwing into question -as some would - the stability of our relationship with Europe and even our future membership of the European Union --- risking trade, business and jobs. Indeed, I strongly believe that rather than retreating to the sidelines we must remain fully engaged in Europe so we can push forward the reforms that are essential for Europe's, and Britain's, economic future.
The EU is key to the success of business in the UK:
Europe accounts for nearly 60 per cent of our trade;
700,000 British companies have trading ties to Europe;
And 3.5 million British jobs depend upon Europe.
And even in the face of rapid globalisation, our trade with Europe continues to rise, meaning Europe is as important to the future of Britain than ever.”
***
Economic reform is key to the European Union’s future and relevance, according to Brown:
“At the heart of a more competitive Europe in the 21st century must be a long-term commitment to a more outward looking relationship with the rest of the world. This is what I mean in practice by 'global Europe' - a Europe that knows it must face outwards if it is to be open for business.”
***
A few comments:
Great Britain has a lot to give its continental European partners and the EU when it comes to a dynamic business climate, although the Nordic countries may have succeeded at least as well while excelling at public services and social security. Brown’s programme on economic stability, growth, competitiveness and jobs reads like a roadmap to a more prosperous future for European citizens.
On more foreign policy oriented themes, Brown made the case for European climate change and environmental policy and reforming international institutions.
So far, so good. But what did Gordon Brown leave uncovered, at least in this speech?
More than twenty years have passed since the European Community (formerly the EEC) began its transformation into a political union, with efforts to forge common foreign policy as well as new internal policies.
The future security and prosperity of EU citizens is going to depend on how successfully the European Union manages to pool the resources of its member states in the areas of common foreign, security and defence policies, including a common defence.
When are we going to hear this speech?
Ralf Grahn
Gordon Brown: Beyond The Reform Treaty: Business Priorities For A ‘Global Europe’; 14 January 2008;
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page14251.asp
Yesterday, Brown did much to cast off his crown as curmudgeon of the year among EU leaders. Speaking to a business audience Brown finally outlined a programme for Britain in Europe, laying the background for future success, coming out strongly in favour of British EU membership and pointing towards the needed economic reforms within the Union.
***
What is needed for future success? Brown clearly placed himself in the economic reform camp:
“The countries and continents that will succeed in the new era of globalisation will be those that are open rather than closed, for free trade rather than protectionism, are flexible rather than rigid, and invest in high skills and the potential of their people.”
***
The future of the United Kingdom lies in the European Union, was the message of Brown:
“But what is clear is that at this time of global economic uncertainty, we should not be throwing into question -as some would - the stability of our relationship with Europe and even our future membership of the European Union --- risking trade, business and jobs. Indeed, I strongly believe that rather than retreating to the sidelines we must remain fully engaged in Europe so we can push forward the reforms that are essential for Europe's, and Britain's, economic future.
The EU is key to the success of business in the UK:
Europe accounts for nearly 60 per cent of our trade;
700,000 British companies have trading ties to Europe;
And 3.5 million British jobs depend upon Europe.
And even in the face of rapid globalisation, our trade with Europe continues to rise, meaning Europe is as important to the future of Britain than ever.”
***
Economic reform is key to the European Union’s future and relevance, according to Brown:
“At the heart of a more competitive Europe in the 21st century must be a long-term commitment to a more outward looking relationship with the rest of the world. This is what I mean in practice by 'global Europe' - a Europe that knows it must face outwards if it is to be open for business.”
***
A few comments:
Great Britain has a lot to give its continental European partners and the EU when it comes to a dynamic business climate, although the Nordic countries may have succeeded at least as well while excelling at public services and social security. Brown’s programme on economic stability, growth, competitiveness and jobs reads like a roadmap to a more prosperous future for European citizens.
On more foreign policy oriented themes, Brown made the case for European climate change and environmental policy and reforming international institutions.
So far, so good. But what did Gordon Brown leave uncovered, at least in this speech?
More than twenty years have passed since the European Community (formerly the EEC) began its transformation into a political union, with efforts to forge common foreign policy as well as new internal policies.
The future security and prosperity of EU citizens is going to depend on how successfully the European Union manages to pool the resources of its member states in the areas of common foreign, security and defence policies, including a common defence.
When are we going to hear this speech?
Ralf Grahn
Gordon Brown: Beyond The Reform Treaty: Business Priorities For A ‘Global Europe’; 14 January 2008;
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page14251.asp
Friday, 4 January 2008
EU Treaty of Lisbon: High Representative
Is the European Union entering the Facebook era? Perhaps not, but the Lisbon Treaty would go some way towards giving the EU recognisable leading personalities. The new President of the European Council is the clearest example, since this is a new post. If the candidate of the largest political party emerging from the European Parliament elections becomes Commission President, he or she will at the outset be much more of a European figure than the Presidents who until now have been sifted out by the European leaders behind closed doors. The High Representative already exists (presently Javier Solana), but the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is going to take over the external action of the European Commission, as Vice-President, and lead the External action service of the EU.
***
Presently the Treaty on European Union (TEU; latest consolidated version OJ 29.12.2006, C 321 E) sets out the tasks of the High Representative in the following way in Article 26 TEU:
“The Secretary General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.”
The Convention proposed a Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Article I-27, one of its most important institutional innovations. The new Foreign Minister would unite the beginnings of a common foreign, security and defence policy of the Council with the external action, including the resources, of the Commission under a “double hat”, as High Representative and Vice-President.
In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 16.12.2004, C 310) all the Member States signed up to the Treaty, including Article I-28 The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Article I-28(3) added the following provision: The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.
The mandate for the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007; Council document 11218/07) gives a picture of the differences and likenesses between the constitutional setting and the amending Reform Treaty, including the fate of the Minister for Foreign Affairs:
“3. The TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union will not have a constitutional character. The terminology used throughout the Treaties will reflect this change: the term “Constitution” will not be used, the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” will be called High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the denominations “law” and “framework law” will be abandoned, the existing denominations “regulations”, “directives” and “decisions” being retained. Likewise, there will be no article in the amended Treaties mentioning the symbols of the EU such as the flag, the anthem or the motto. Concerning the primacy of EU law, the IGC will adopt a Declaration recalling the existing case law of the EU Court of Justice.”
Reneging on its signature, the United Kingdom had thus created, among other things, the word monster High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission.
***
A few comments from your glossator:
The Lisbon Treaty devalues the rotating six month Presidency of the Council by creating a semi-permanent President for the European Council, who chairs the summits and represents the Union “at his level and in that capacity”, and by the High Representative/Vice-President, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and represents the EU externally.
With about 14 years between the Presidencies, it would be difficult for a Member State to keep up the proficiency to handle these questions. Within the very real constraints of decision making by consensus or unanimity, which mean that the European Union is bound to remain much less than a great power in foreign, security and defence policy, the new posts will give more coherence to Union policies if such have been defined.
Internally, the High Representative/Vice-President should be able, eventually, to coordinate the external action of the European Union better. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty can be seen more as a takeover by the Member States of the ‘Community’ (Commission) external action and its resources than the other way around. Thus, the common foreign, security and defence policies are further entrenched as intergovernmental playing fields, outside the scope of effective democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament.
The High Representative is relieved of his functions as Secretary General of the Council, opening up a coveted position for a “grey eminence”. In the near future the governments of the Member States are going to be intensely occupied with the filling of these offices (President of the European Council, High Representative/Vice-President, Commission President, Secretary General). These processes tend to be less than transparent.
The citizens of the Union can do very little to influence the choices; voting for a political party in the June 2009 elections to the European Parliament may influence the political alignment and person of the next President of the European Commission.
Alongside the nominations, the drafting of a new European Security Strategy has commenced, to replace the ESS of December 2003. Developed guidelines to handle the various security threats of our era would be welcome, as well as clear advances towards common defence commitments.
Interestingly, the EU Treaties are denounced, from different quarters, as being emanations of “socialist plots” and “ultra-liberalistic projects” set in stone. Snappier basic documents in a democratic setting would leave the economic policy orientations to fought out at elections, but objectively the security interests are common to all citizens (despite substantial variations in perceptions and rhetoric).
Long term, the security interests of EU citizens call for effective decision making and democratic scrutiny. The need for institutional reforms is far from over.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) inserts an Article 9e.
Article 9e
1. The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council may end his term of office by the same procedure.
2. The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy.
3. The High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.
4. The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3.
***
The renamed Court of Justice of the European Union is going to be next.
Ralf Grahn
***
Presently the Treaty on European Union (TEU; latest consolidated version OJ 29.12.2006, C 321 E) sets out the tasks of the High Representative in the following way in Article 26 TEU:
“The Secretary General of the Council, High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, shall assist the Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue with third parties.”
The Convention proposed a Minister for Foreign Affairs, in Article I-27, one of its most important institutional innovations. The new Foreign Minister would unite the beginnings of a common foreign, security and defence policy of the Council with the external action, including the resources, of the Commission under a “double hat”, as High Representative and Vice-President.
In the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJ 16.12.2004, C 310) all the Member States signed up to the Treaty, including Article I-28 The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Article I-28(3) added the following provision: The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.
The mandate for the intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007; Council document 11218/07) gives a picture of the differences and likenesses between the constitutional setting and the amending Reform Treaty, including the fate of the Minister for Foreign Affairs:
“3. The TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union will not have a constitutional character. The terminology used throughout the Treaties will reflect this change: the term “Constitution” will not be used, the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” will be called High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the denominations “law” and “framework law” will be abandoned, the existing denominations “regulations”, “directives” and “decisions” being retained. Likewise, there will be no article in the amended Treaties mentioning the symbols of the EU such as the flag, the anthem or the motto. Concerning the primacy of EU law, the IGC will adopt a Declaration recalling the existing case law of the EU Court of Justice.”
Reneging on its signature, the United Kingdom had thus created, among other things, the word monster High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission.
***
A few comments from your glossator:
The Lisbon Treaty devalues the rotating six month Presidency of the Council by creating a semi-permanent President for the European Council, who chairs the summits and represents the Union “at his level and in that capacity”, and by the High Representative/Vice-President, who chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and represents the EU externally.
With about 14 years between the Presidencies, it would be difficult for a Member State to keep up the proficiency to handle these questions. Within the very real constraints of decision making by consensus or unanimity, which mean that the European Union is bound to remain much less than a great power in foreign, security and defence policy, the new posts will give more coherence to Union policies if such have been defined.
Internally, the High Representative/Vice-President should be able, eventually, to coordinate the external action of the European Union better. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty can be seen more as a takeover by the Member States of the ‘Community’ (Commission) external action and its resources than the other way around. Thus, the common foreign, security and defence policies are further entrenched as intergovernmental playing fields, outside the scope of effective democratic scrutiny by the European Parliament.
The High Representative is relieved of his functions as Secretary General of the Council, opening up a coveted position for a “grey eminence”. In the near future the governments of the Member States are going to be intensely occupied with the filling of these offices (President of the European Council, High Representative/Vice-President, Commission President, Secretary General). These processes tend to be less than transparent.
The citizens of the Union can do very little to influence the choices; voting for a political party in the June 2009 elections to the European Parliament may influence the political alignment and person of the next President of the European Commission.
Alongside the nominations, the drafting of a new European Security Strategy has commenced, to replace the ESS of December 2003. Developed guidelines to handle the various security threats of our era would be welcome, as well as clear advances towards common defence commitments.
Interestingly, the EU Treaties are denounced, from different quarters, as being emanations of “socialist plots” and “ultra-liberalistic projects” set in stone. Snappier basic documents in a democratic setting would leave the economic policy orientations to fought out at elections, but objectively the security interests are common to all citizens (despite substantial variations in perceptions and rhetoric).
Long term, the security interests of EU citizens call for effective decision making and democratic scrutiny. The need for institutional reforms is far from over.
***
The Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007, C 306) inserts an Article 9e.
Article 9e
1. The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European Council may end his term of office by the same procedure.
2. The High Representative shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defence policy.
3. The High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council.
4. The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union's external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union's external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities, the High Representative shall be bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent with paragraphs 2 and 3.
***
The renamed Court of Justice of the European Union is going to be next.
Ralf Grahn
Monday, 26 November 2007
Finland and NATO
President Tarja Halonen has reiterated her opposition to Finnish membership in the NATO alliance. She says that she has seen no convincing reasons for joining, and opinion polls show that a majority of the population is reticent about membership.
A history of post-war efforts to stay neutral, 1,200 kilometres of shared border with Russia, a unilateralist US administration perceived as adventurous and an inward looking mindset help to explain the mental inertia of Finland.
But, at least for the political leaders of the nation, strategic reasoning and the responsibilities of leadership should shift the burden of proof:
If there are no convincing reasons to the contrary (and none have been presented), Finland should act like a normal member of the European Union, which the country joined in 1995. Out of 27 EU members, 21 belong to NATO. To remain on the fringes of both organisations is a poor choice.
The government of Finland should set a clear new course: Full participation to enhance the common foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union, including the achievement of a common defence, and transatlantic ties through NATO membership.
Ralf Grahn
Background:
Tanja Alamurto & Kari Huhta: On the road to NATO: a guide for travellers; Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition; 18 November 2007;
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/On+the+road+to+NATO+a+guide+for+travellers/1135231972465
Tanja Alamurto & Kari Huhta: NATO Pros and Cons; Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition; 18 November 2007;
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/NATO+Pros+and+Cons+/1135231974078
A history of post-war efforts to stay neutral, 1,200 kilometres of shared border with Russia, a unilateralist US administration perceived as adventurous and an inward looking mindset help to explain the mental inertia of Finland.
But, at least for the political leaders of the nation, strategic reasoning and the responsibilities of leadership should shift the burden of proof:
If there are no convincing reasons to the contrary (and none have been presented), Finland should act like a normal member of the European Union, which the country joined in 1995. Out of 27 EU members, 21 belong to NATO. To remain on the fringes of both organisations is a poor choice.
The government of Finland should set a clear new course: Full participation to enhance the common foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union, including the achievement of a common defence, and transatlantic ties through NATO membership.
Ralf Grahn
Background:
Tanja Alamurto & Kari Huhta: On the road to NATO: a guide for travellers; Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition; 18 November 2007;
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/On+the+road+to+NATO+a+guide+for+travellers/1135231972465
Tanja Alamurto & Kari Huhta: NATO Pros and Cons; Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition; 18 November 2007;
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/NATO+Pros+and+Cons+/1135231974078
Thursday, 22 November 2007
New European Security Strategy
The European Council adopted the first holistic foreign policy strategy for the European Union in December 2003. “A Secure Europe in a Better World – the European Security Strategy” (EES) has become the basic document for the ambitions of the EU to become a global player; shortly, to export security to avoid importing insecurity.
The EU leaders and elites are not the only ones to profess the aims of peace and security; there is a demand from the citizens of the European Union for the EU to do more.
Sven Biscop of the Egmont Institute has analysed the European Security Strategy and the delivery of its aims. Despite fuzziness in parts, the EES has become a benchmark and a reference framework for the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy.
According to Biscop, Europe has the potential to be a global power. The adoption of the EES has supported the consolidation of the EU’s international actorness. The EES could yield more benefits by a more institutionalised strategic debate and the evaluation of EU policy. The main question is not whether the EES should be rewritten or not. The question is rather whether the EU is effectively implementing it.
Still, rewriting, or rather an EES 2.0, is on the wall. The work has already started.
Carl Bildt, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, told a conference in Stockholm:
“The European Security Strategy that was adopted then [late 2003] broke new ground, and there is little doubt that it has stood the test of time and served us well. But it was never meant to be just a stone tablet preserved for eternity, but rather a living document that would evolve and develop as the European Union developed and as its strategic environment and the challenges associated with it evolved. Much has happened since 2003.”
The process of writing a new European Security Strategy offers the European Union an opportunity to assess the new strategic challenges for the EU’s foreign and security policy, to fill in the gaps in the present EES, to try to reach new levels of consistency and coherence and to analyse the present shortcomings of delivery.
Given the fundamental interests at stake, the citizens of the European Union are entitled to real progress towards a more secure Europe in a better world.
Ralf Grahn
Sources:
A Secure Europe in a Better World – the European Security Strategy; Brussels, 12 December 2003; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g
Sven Biscop: The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture; Egmont Paper 16; Brussels, October 2007; http://www.egmontinstitute.be
Carl Bildt: Speech at the Conference for Global Foreign and Security Policy Challenges and the European Union in Stockholm 8-9 November, 2007; http://www.regeringen.se
The EU leaders and elites are not the only ones to profess the aims of peace and security; there is a demand from the citizens of the European Union for the EU to do more.
Sven Biscop of the Egmont Institute has analysed the European Security Strategy and the delivery of its aims. Despite fuzziness in parts, the EES has become a benchmark and a reference framework for the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy.
According to Biscop, Europe has the potential to be a global power. The adoption of the EES has supported the consolidation of the EU’s international actorness. The EES could yield more benefits by a more institutionalised strategic debate and the evaluation of EU policy. The main question is not whether the EES should be rewritten or not. The question is rather whether the EU is effectively implementing it.
Still, rewriting, or rather an EES 2.0, is on the wall. The work has already started.
Carl Bildt, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, told a conference in Stockholm:
“The European Security Strategy that was adopted then [late 2003] broke new ground, and there is little doubt that it has stood the test of time and served us well. But it was never meant to be just a stone tablet preserved for eternity, but rather a living document that would evolve and develop as the European Union developed and as its strategic environment and the challenges associated with it evolved. Much has happened since 2003.”
The process of writing a new European Security Strategy offers the European Union an opportunity to assess the new strategic challenges for the EU’s foreign and security policy, to fill in the gaps in the present EES, to try to reach new levels of consistency and coherence and to analyse the present shortcomings of delivery.
Given the fundamental interests at stake, the citizens of the European Union are entitled to real progress towards a more secure Europe in a better world.
Ralf Grahn
Sources:
A Secure Europe in a Better World – the European Security Strategy; Brussels, 12 December 2003; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?id=266&lang=EN&mode=g
Sven Biscop: The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture; Egmont Paper 16; Brussels, October 2007; http://www.egmontinstitute.be
Carl Bildt: Speech at the Conference for Global Foreign and Security Policy Challenges and the European Union in Stockholm 8-9 November, 2007; http://www.regeringen.se
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