EU permanent structured cooperation: operational military headquarters OHQ

After the UK veto against a permanent military headquarters for the European Union, is a new EU core taking shape through the establishment of permanent structured cooperation in the context of the common security and defence policy (CSDP)?

The British veto resulted in a letter from France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain to the EU high representative Catherine Ashton to explore ways to make progress.


Group of five

Bruxelles2 noted that the foreign ministers of Italy and Spain publicly confirmed that they adhere to the proposal by France, Germany and Poland to establish a military HQ for Europe. Following the UK veto, the new letter demands action from the high representative Catherine Ashton. According to Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, everyone knows that the counter-argument about duplicating NATO structures is rubbish: Le club des 5. Espagne et Italie rejoignent le trio de Weimar sur le QG européen (3 September 2011).

Interestingly, the Polish press release about the informal (Gymnich) meeting of the foreign ministers does nothing to enlighten us about the development of defence policy or the initiative by the group of five countries: Informal meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU Member States (undated).

On EUobserver, Andrew Rettman reported on the call for action: Group of five calls for EU military headquarters (9 September 2011)

The Spanish Europa451 website published an article with some details about the letter from the five countries – France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain – to the high representative Catherine Ashton: España y cuatro países piden crear un ejército europeo (9 September 2011).


Public Service Europe

Yesterday on Public Service Europe, Hylke Dijkstra argued that Europe needs permanent military capabilities to respond quickly to international events, while creating efficiencies for member states; in the blog post: Why the EU needs a military headquarters (12 September 2011).


Egmont

The ideas about an operational HQ have been around before the letter from France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain.

Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont (Editors): Europe deploys towards a civil-military strategy for CSDP (Egmont paper 49, June 2011) suggested:

The EU could be the first to create a permanent civilian-military Operational Headquarters (OHQ), in Brussels, which could plan for and conduct both civilian and military operations and, allowing for close interaction with all relevant EU actors, could implement a truly comprehensive approach to crisis management.

SWP

Here is a description (in German) of permanent structured cooperation in the Treaty of Lisbon.

Christian Mölling described the only concrete security and defence policy reform of the Lisbon Treaty, in: Ständige Strukturierte Zusammenarbeit in der EU-Sicherheitspolitik (SWP-Aktuell 2010/A 13, Februar 2010, 4 Seiten).


Need for European action

With or without the help of the EU institutions and the national governments, there is the need for a truly European debate about the strategic defence choices concerning all citizens. Here are a few of my blog posts about the issues and the need for action.

Grahnlaw: EU military headquarters – CSDP permanent structured cooperation (9 September 2011)

Grahnlaw Suomi Finland: Finland and non-aligned in EU: With UK or Europe on defence? (9 September 2011)

Grahnlaw Suomi Finland: EU common defence: Military HQ first choice (10 September 2011)

Grahnlaw: Common European defence: some questions (10 September 2011)

Grahnlaw Suomi Finland: Rejoice! EU CSDP transparency & European Year of Citizens (11 September 2011)

Grahnblawg (in Swedish): EU: JA eller NEJ till permanent strukturerat militärt samarbete? (12 September 2011)



Ralf Grahn

Iceland starts EU membership talks?

Today, 28 May 2009 the government of Iceland is going to put forward a proposal for authority to start negotiations on membership of the European Union.



If the Althingi (Parliament) grants the authority, Iceland is in “pole position” for accession due to its membership in the European Economic Area (EEA). Despite its severe economic crisis, Iceland is a stable democracy. Its Parliament, Althingi, evokes the longest parliamentary tradition in the world. It was established as a legislature and judiciary in 930. Iceland became a member of the Council of Europe in 1950.

Acquis communautaire

The internal market legislation of the European Community (European Union) is already in force. In addition, as an EEA country Iceland participates in a number of other policy areas and EU programmes.

Iceland participates in the Schengen area abolishing internal border controls and improving controls on the external borders, and it is a member of the NATO alliance in common with the mainstream members of the European Union.

In other words, Iceland already fulfils most of the EU membership criteria, although internal political differences and the difficulties concerning fisheries and agriculture should not be underestimated.

We can compare the situation with the EFTA countries Austria, Finland and Sweden. They had negotiated the EEA Agreement, which entered into force at the beginning of 1994. But they went on to upgrade their relationship with the European Union through full membership, which entered into force exactly a year later, in 1995.


***

Membership application: Yes or no?

Today, 28 May 2009 the new Icelandic government is going to propose that the Althingi (Parliament) grants it powers to apply for membership in the European Union.

Iceland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs offers the following overview in English:



Proposal for a Parliamentary Resolution on Application for Accession to the European Union

(Submitted to the 137th session of Parliament 2009)


The Parliament resolves to empower the Government to submit an application for membership of the European Union and upon the completion of negotiations with the Union to hold a national referendum on a prospective membership agreement.


Comments on the Proposal for a Parliamentary Resolution

The proposal on application for membership of the European Union is submitted in order to give the Icelandic people an opportunity to reject or accept an agreement on accession to the EU once negotiations have been concluded.

The application to the European Union is thus not equivalent to membership, upon which, indeed, it is for the Icelandic nation to take the final decision. In addition, a legislative proposal will be submitted on the holding of national referendums on important matters that the Government or Parliament decides to submit to the nation.

Prior to the start of negotiations, extensive consultations will take place with interest groups on agreement objectives in various sectors, such as fisheries, agriculture and regional issues, in the field of public services, the environment, equal rights and currency matters, and the broadest possible consensus will be sought on the basis for negotiations. The possibility of closer monetary cooperation will be explored in parallel to the negotiations on possible accession in order to support the Icelandic krona. Emphasis is placed on an open and transparent process and regular information sharing with the general public and interest groups.

A Committee of professionals will be appointed by the Government of Iceland to carry out the negotiations with the European Union. The Committee will be supported by a broad-based consultative body representing different interest groups, from which the Committee will seek advice and which the Committee will keep informed on the ongoing progress of negotiations. Iceland as a European nation wishes to take an active part in the development of a democratic Europe built on the foundations of social justice, equality and the respect for human dignity and the environment. Europe is the cornerstone of human rights in the world, and an advocate for stability, sustainable development, justice and prosperity throughout the world.
Parties concerned reserve the right to advocate for or against any final agreement, bearing in mind that possible support is contingent upon various provisos.

Iceland’s vital interests include:

• ensuring the sovereign control of water and energy resources and their utilization.

• ensuring the sovereign control of the fisheries resources, the sustainable utilization of these resources, and a share of straddling stocks and as much representation of national interests in international agreements on fisheries as possible.

• ensuring thriving Icelandic agriculture based on food security and safety.

• ensuring the democratic right to manage public services based on social principles.

• defending the rights of workers and labour.

• achieving a favourable and growth based competitive environment for business in Iceland while at the same time taking account of unique factors owing to specific circumstances.

It is foreseen that Parliament will establish a special European Parliamentary Committee, in which all the political parties will be represented, to consult with the Negotiating Committee to the European Union.


***


Iceland’s international relations


The (previous) Government of Iceland presented a report on Iceland’s international relations to the Althingi in March 2009. (The link is to an 11 page excerpt available in English.)





Ralf Grahn

EU Lisbon Treaty “threatens the transatlantic relationship”

Ahead of the European elections Sally McNamara’s views on the Lisbon Treaty and the transatlantic relationship are worth reading. From the Heritage Foundation’s blog The Foundry: A Lisbon Treaty Retrospective? (Posted May 13th, 2009 at 11.41am)


After discussing legitimacy and support, we turn to the effects of the Treaty of Lisbon on the transatlantic relationship, according to McNamara:

“The Lisbon Treaty ... It also threatens the transatlantic relationship, and underscores the EU’s ambitions to become a global power and challenge American leadership on the world stage.”

***

Transatlantic relationship

The transatlantic relationship includes Canada and the United States on the one shore of the Atlantic, and Europe on the eastern shore. Despite economic competition and occasional spats, they form a community of values with broadly similar interests in the world, including international organisations.

In terms of trade and investment, they are firmly linked. The European Union is central in developing transatlantic and global commercial relations.

The financial and economic crisis highlights the need for coordinated solutions, through international institutions and bilaterally. Challenges like energy security become increasingly important, and global warming threatens the whole planet.

The European Union and its North American partners have shared interests in hosts of other policy areas, ranging from global challenges and organisations to daily contacts between citizens.

Common responses to internal and external security challenges are of fundamental importance. The European Union needs to enhance its capability in the fields of foreign, security and defence policy in order to act more coherently in its neighbourhood and to act more decisively in world affairs alongside the USA.

Most of the European Union’s member states are NATO members and the transatlantic defence alliance continues to be important, for the defence of Europe as well as in the wider world.

In its later days, the previous American administration started to mend some of the fences it had broken. The new US administration under President Barack Obama has sought to find common ground and forge stronger ties with the European Union and its member states, including at the April EU─US summit in Prague.

If anything, I reckon that the US government would be relieved to be able to deal with one Europe. In this respect, the Treaty of Lisbon would bring about minor improvements.

McNamara, on the other hand, has learned nothing. She does not see the European Union as a valuable ally, but as a danger. The Lisbon Treaty threatens her exceedingly narrow view of the transatlantic relationship. Hence, a somewhat more coherent Europe would not be a boon for US interests, but the bane of its domination of the world stage, as she sees it.

Still adversarial to the hilt and exaggerating the importance of the Lisbon Treaty beyond belief, the Heritage Foundation seems set on its course to drive a wedge between the United States of America and the European Union.

***

There are, of course, opponents to the Lisbon Treaty on both sides of the Atlantic. Their motives are seldom expressed as openly as by the Heritage Foundation, but are they less misdirected for that?


Ralf Grahn

NATO & EU: Rewarding freeloading?

Since 1 April 2009 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has the following 28 members: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In part, NATO is larger than the European Union. There are seven non-EU NATO members: Albania, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the United States.

The remaining 21 are members of both NATO and the European Union. Double membership clearly represents the European mainstream.

Out of a total of 27 current EU member states, only six have left themselves outside NATO: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden.

These countries represent a fringe within the EU in four respects:

1. Their total population is about 28.2 million, or 5.7 per cent of a total EU population of 495.1 million.
2. Geographically they are more or less on the outer rim of the EU (although Austria has been overtaken and embedded by later entrants).
3. Their definitions of (military) non-alignment or neutrality have kept them outside NATO.
4. Their status with regard to the security and defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy can be described as an opt-out (The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States … ; Article 17 TEU).

To continue the discussion from my post Tony Blair new “EU President?” I ask: How could such a freeloading country (or a representative from one of them) be expected to drive forward a common defence policy and a common European defence?



This is, after all, one of the crucial areas for the European Council, and as such of its coming President.

Do the arguments look different, if we look at the double-hatted High Representative?

Am I being unreasonable or have these countries disqualified themselves from the top jobs under the Lisbon Treaty?

In my humble opinion, responsibilities and rewards should go hand in hand.


Ralf Grahn

Turkey ending its EU membership bid?

Is Turkey going to end its bid for accession to the European Union?

This is the way it looks after the opening of the NATO summit, where Turkey seems to have vetoed the candidacy of Danish premier Anders Fogh Rasmussen to become the next Secretary General.

The Turkish reforms were already down to snail’s pace, so perhaps Turkey’s prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has just decided to drive the last nail into the coffin of his country’s EU aspirations, without having to withdraw the bid formally.


Ralf Grahn

Swedish non-alignment and EU?

Fellow blogger The European Citizen discussed ’Neutrality and Europe’ in a blog post 9 March 2009, primarily from an Irish perspective:

http://theeuropeancitizen.blogspot.com/2009/03/neutrality-and-europe.html

The post concluded that the existence of the internal market and membership of the EU has changed the political context for neutral European states. This doesn't automatically mean that military integration should be adopted, but a range of options should be discussed.

***

I have nothing to object to the conclusion that rational discussion is needed in the countries outside the security policy mainstream of the European Union.

What caught my eye was a detail, the opening sentence where The European Citizen described Ireland, Sweden and Austria as both neutral and EU member states, and asked but can you really be both.

In a comment on an earlier blog post, I had noted that Finland has narrowed down its definition to “military non-alignment”, because the country sees itself as politically aligned through EU membership, including the CFSP and the CSDP.

I also commented that I was unsure of how Sweden defines itself nowadays, although it continued to use both “non-alignment” and “neutrality” when Finland had ceased to utilise these defining terms.

For this comment off the cuff, I did not take the trouble to research the Swedish position. But when Swedish neutrality cropped up in the new post, I decided to take a look.


***

Sweden

Traditional Swedish non-alignment aiming at neutrality in war seems to be in a flux. In the Foreign Policy Declaration of the Government of Sweden 18 February 2009 (Regeringens deklaration vid 2009 års utrikespolitiska debatt i Riksdagen onsdagen den 18 februari 2009), Foreign Minister Carl Bildt mentioned neither non-alignment nor neutrality.

Bildt mentioned the successful foreign, security and defence policies of the European Union and the good cooperation between Sweden and NATO in crisis management. He went on to declare that the Government is going to present a position paper on NATO relations during the spring.

Bildt mentioned Swedish security policy as firm, but in addition he mentioned the proposals for improved Nordic defence cooperation made by Thorvald Stoltenberg. The Swedish Government will consider them in a positive spirit and it promises a Bill on defence policy this spring.


***

In other words, by deliberate omission Sweden is neither “non-aligned” nor “neutral”, but two Government papers will further define NATO relations and (Nordic) defence policy.

I don’t expect any sudden shifts, but Swedish foreign, security and defence policy is changing, although at glacier-like speed.


Ralf Grahn

EU Treaty of Lisbon: Security and defence

The Treaty of Lisbon would take the European Union one step closer to a meaningful common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the prospect of a common defence, compatible with NATO.

The Lisbon Treaty marks a stage in development, when the strictures of intergovernmental cooperation and unanimous decisions are the norm.

Still, a developing common foreign and security policy (CSDP), civilian and military operations, a future common defence, improved military capabilities, the European Defence Agency, coalitions of the able and willing, permanent structured cooperation and a mutual defence clause are given new or beefed-up Treaty provisions.


***

The intergovernmental conference (IGC 2007) gave the Treaty on European Union (TEU) Chapter 2 on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) a new clarifying section 2 on the specific provisions concerning the common security and defence policy (CSDP). First, we look at the text of Article 28a TEU as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/33 and 34):

48) The following new section 2 shall be inserted:


"SECTION 2 PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY"

49) An Article 28 A shall be inserted, taking over the wording of Article 17, with the following amendments:

(a) the following new paragraph 1 shall be inserted and the next paragraph shall be renumbered 2:

"1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.";

(b) paragraph 1, renumbered 2, shall be amended as follows:

(i) the first subparagraph shall be replaced by the following:

"2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.";

(ii) in the second subparagraph, the words "in accordance with this Article" shall be replaced by "in accordance with this Section";

(iii) the third subparagraph shall be deleted.

(c) the present paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 shall be replaced by the following paragraphs 3 to 7:

"3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as "the European Defence Agency") shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 28 C.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 28 E. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 28 B.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in
their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.’.

***

Since Article 28a TEU takes over most of the wording of Article 17 TEU in the existing Treaty, we go to the latest consolidated version of Article 17 TEU (OJ 29.12.2006 C 321 E/17):

Article 17

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of
the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to
a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.

2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping
tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

3. Decisions having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall be taken without
prejudice to the policies and obligations referred to in paragraph 1, second subparagraph.

4. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation
between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the Western
European Union (WEU) and NATO, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this title.

5. With a view to furthering the objectives of this Article, the provisions of this Article will be
reviewed in accordance with Article 48.

***

Desiring to fill the communication gap willed by the Council, we now proceed to construct one consolidated language version out of the 23 that the Council should have published of the Lisbon Treaty Article 28a TEU, by combining Article 17 TEU with the amendments:

Article 28a

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as "the European Defence Agency") shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 28 C.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 28 E. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 28 B.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.’.

***

The main corresponding Article in the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was Article I-40 (OJ 18.7.2003 C 169/18):

Article 40
Specific provisions for implementing the common security and defence policy

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on assets civil and military. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council of Ministers. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. A European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency shall be established to identify operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council of Ministers in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

4. European decisions on the implementation of the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council of Ministers acting unanimously on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or from a Member State. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council of Ministers may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article III- 211.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by the provisions of Article III-213.

7. Until such time as the European Council has acted in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, closer cooperation shall be established, in the Union framework, as regards mutual defence. Under this cooperation, if one of the Member States participating in such cooperation is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other participating States shall give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In the execution of closer cooperation on mutual defence, the participating Member States shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The detailed arrangements for participation in this cooperation and its operation, and the relevant decision-making procedures, are set out in Article III-214.

8. The European Parliament shall be regularly consulted on the main aspects and basic choices of the common security and defence policy, and shall be kept informed of how it evolves.

***

The proposal by the Convention was taken over, with modifications, in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe Article I-41 (OJ 16.12.2004 C 310/30 and 31):

Article I-41
Specific provisions relating to the common security and defence policy

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States, it shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. An Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) shall be established to identify operational requirements, to promote measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

4. European decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs or an initiative from a Member State. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article III-310.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article III-312. It shall not affect the provisions of Article III-309.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

8. The European Parliament shall be regularly consulted on the main aspects and basic choices of the common security and defence policy. It shall be kept informed of how it evolves.

***

A Section with the CSDP provisions clarifies the Treaty.

The Reform Treaty Article 28a TEU is, in keeping with the IGC 2007 Mandate (Council document 11218/07), an almost word for word rendering of Article I-41, paragraphs 1 to 7, of the Constitutional Treaty. Here, as elsewhere, the ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ has become the ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’.

The text of Article I-41(8) on specific CSDP consulting of the European Parliament has been deleted.

The CSDP encompasses both civilian and military means.

The CSDP is firmly planted in intergovernmental cooperation, although civilian tasks may require action by the Commission.

The objective of the Lisbon Treaty is progressively to frame a common Union defence policy and to establish a common defence. But the common defence requires a unanimous decision by the European Council and adoption (ratification) in the member states.

The heterogeneous nature of the European Union as a security and defence community at its present stage of development is ambiguously transmitted by the words ‘certain Member States’.

In fact, there are at least three categories of ‘certain Member States’.

First, we have certain Member States, with a security and defence policy with a ‘specific character’, not to be prejudiced. These are the six (former) neutral or non-aligned countries, which remain outside NATO: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden. The Lisbon Treaty does not define the scope of their exemptions.

Second, there is the opt-out of Denmark (a member of NATO), set out in the Protocol on the position of Denmark, amended to take the Danish opt-outs into consideration. Article 5 (ex 6) of the Protocol defines Denmark’s opt-out from matters with defence implications, Article 13(1), Article 28 A and Articles 28 B to 28 E of the TEU. On the other hand, ‘Denmark will not prevent the other Member States from further developing their cooperation in this area’ (OJ 17.12.2007 C 306/186).

Third, there is the European mainstream, ‘certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty’. For them, EU CSDP obligations and NATO policies have to be compatible.

Some of the CSDP commitments of the member states are: to make civilian and military capabilities available to the EU, to establish multinational forces, to improve their military capabilities.

There are new provisions for existing European Defence Agency, which shall contribute to enhancing military capabilities.

CSDP decisions, including decisions to launch missions, are taken unanimously.

Missions or other tasks may be entrusted to coalitions of willing member states.

Permanent structured cooperation between member states with higher military capabilities are envisioned in Article 28a(6) and in the detailed Protocol on permanent structured cooperation established by Article 28a of the Treaty on European Union:

“PROTOCOL
ON PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION ESTABLISHED
BY ARTICLE 28 A OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
HAVING REGARD TO Article 28 A(6) and Article 28 E of the Treaty on European Union,
RECALLING that the Union is pursuing a common foreign and security policy based on the achievement of growing convergence of action by Member States;
RECALLING that the common security and defence policy is an integral part of the common foreign and security policy; that it provides the Union with operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets; that the Union may use such assets in the tasks referred to in Article 28 B of the Treaty on European Union outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; that the performance of these tasks is to be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States in accordance with the principle of a single set of forces;
RECALLING that the common security and defence policy of the Union does not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States;
RECALLING that the common security and defence policy of the Union respects the obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty of those Member States which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, and is compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework;
CONVINCED that a more assertive Union role in security and defence matters will contribute to the vitality of a renewed Atlantic Alliance, in accordance with the Berlin Plus arrangements;
DETERMINED to ensure that the Union is capable of fully assuming its responsibilities within the international community;
RECOGNISING that the United Nations Organisation may request the Union's assistance for the urgent implementation of missions undertaken under Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter;
RECOGNISING that the strengthening of the security and defence policy will require efforts by Member States in the area of capabilities;
CONSCIOUS that embarking on a new stage in the development of the European security and defence policy involves a determined effort by the Member States concerned;
RECALLING the importance of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy being fully involved in proceedings relating to permanent structured cooperation,
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:

Article 1
The permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 28 A(6) of the Treaty on European Union shall be open to any Member State which undertakes, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, to:

(a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and
(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 28 B of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days.

Article 2
To achieve the objectives laid down in Article 1, Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall undertake to

(a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view to achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light of the security environment and of the Union's international responsibilities;
(b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics;
(c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures;
(d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the ‘Capability Development Mechanism’;
(e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency.

Article 3
The European Defence Agency shall contribute to the regular assessment of participating Member States' contributions with regard to capabilities, in particular contributions made in accordance with the criteria to be established, inter alia, on the basis of Article 2, and shall report thereon at least once a year. The assessment may serve as a basis for Council recommendations and decisions adopted in accordance with Article 28 E of the Treaty on European Union.”

***

Last but not least, we have the upgraded mutual assistance clause in Article 28a(7), the obligation to give aid and assistance if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory. This obligation is unclear concerning ‘certain Member States’, i.e. the neutral or non-aligned ones.

NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of the EU members which belong to NATO.

The European Parliament is marginalised. There is only the general clause on consulting the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy (Article 21 TEU) and the existing Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU).


***

Next time we look at the legal basis for CSDP operations.


Ralf Grahn

Isolationist UK

Yesterday I wrote about the new core areas of European integration, with new member states steadily advancing into the growing Schengen area, the expanding Eurozone and the shared values of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as most of them being dual EU and NATO members.

The more striking contrasts between old and new members are gradually disappearing, and the core groups are growing.

***

The coin has a flip side. The old member states staying aloof from these areas of deeper integration are gradually marginalising themselves.

Rickety rules for unanimous decision making give ample scope for obstructionist tactics, but blocking decisions and hailing aborted deals as success stories is hardly a constructive line to take. It is hard to believe that isolationist policies are going to win friends and help to influence people within the European Union in the long run.

***

One example of the political price self-imposed marginalisation may entail, came when Valéry Giscard d’Estaing answered a question about the new President of the European Council on his blog. VGE emphasised that the person should be selected with care, and he went on to say that he or she should come from a country which belongs to the Schengen area and the Eurozone and adheres to the Charter.

Any British candidate (including Tony Blair) was eliminated 3 to 0.

Of course, VGE is not part of the European Council now, but I imagine that his line of reasoning strikes a note with many European leaders.

***

No wonder that the new Danish government wants to offer its people a chance to abolish the peculiar opt-outs of the country.

Not surprisingly the new Polish government wants to repair the damages caused by its predecessor.

***

The United Kingdom has shown few such signs. These last months Great Britain seems to have drifted farther out into the Atlantic, without getting closer to the United States. The UK used the negative referendums on the Constitution for Europe for domestic purposes, having little to do with the reasons for failure in France and the Netherlands.

The UK launched new demands to generally weaken the treaty it had already signed in 2004 and to introduce non negotiable specific “red lines”. Once again, the European partners showed flexibility.

***

Prime Minister Gordon Brown has not visited the European institutions specifically, something Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy did instantly after being installed.

The present European Commission is fairly pro-business, pro-globalisation and pro-enlargement. As such it could be an important ally for Britain, but nurturing constructive alliances does not seem to top the British agenda.

Brown has said little about the European Union, except that it should have a more global view and stop reforming its institutions. By signing the Treaty of Lisbon but missing the ceremony, Brown managed to harvest scorn from both anti-EU and pro-EU quarters. This snub to Britain’s oldest ally can have done little to enhance Brown’s prestige among European leaders or further British interests.

There are few indications that Brown’s grumpiness has placated the rabid domestic EU detractors, egged on by an imaginative tabloid press. (Calling this crowd eurosceptic is a euphemism.)

Failing to communicate clearly, why Britain’s interests lie within Europe, is a long term legacy of successive British governments, but Gordon Brown has let the situation worsen.

The Tory opposition has done its utmost to make Gordon Brown look like a real statesman, painting itself into a corner on European affairs, should it win a majority with an obligation to pursue real British interests.


***

Perhaps we have to admit that Schengen, the euro and shared values are hopeless causes in Britain for domestic reasons, in spite of the negative consequences of being an outsider. There is one area, crucial for the future, where the United Kingdom could make a signal contribution, if it wanted to: defence.

The UK is a leading member of NATO and it has the best military capabilities among the EU countries. Here it is more difficult to see domestic reasons for the lack of progress. It rather looks like the umbilical cord tying Britain to the USA is the main reason for the failure to advance decisively to build a common European defence.

In the long run there seem to be few options to a common European defence (built on democratic accountability) in conjunction with the transatlantic ties offered by the intergovernmental NATO alliance. In these questions President Sarkozy seems to be somewhat closer to the truth.

As it is, Britain is decidedly an EU outsider, a leader of steadily shrinking groups of like-minded self-marginalising powers.

***

The regional parliament in Scotland has demanded a British referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. This is only an opinion, since ratification is to be decided by the UK Parliament. But it shows that the pressure is growing.

At the same time, Labour is sinking like a stone in opinion polls. This might lead to Brown’s choice of parliamentary ratification being defeated, by the parliament most keen to be seen as the hallmark of parliamentary sovereignty. Hardly anyone believes that a referendum on an EU Treaty (regardless of content) can be won in Britain.

If the ratification process fails in Britain, it is hard to believe that EU leaders, fed up with 35 years of British obstructionism, would embark on a new round of negotiations to bring the UK on board.

A more probable scenario would be that the rest of the European Union, or at least the more willing member states, would re-establish the EU and upgrade its capacity at the same time.

The end result might come as a blessing for secessionist opinion, but it is hard to see how British long term interests would be served by reverting to isolationist policies.

For Great Britain insularity, isolation and exclusion may soon be more than mere mindsets, unless Scotland and Wales decide on a change of Union, leaving England behind.


Ralf Grahn

EU core areas

Quite a lot has been written about it already. Yesterday nine new countries, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia became part of the Schengen area. Internal controls at land and sea borders were lifted, and the airports will follow shortly. The people of these new member states became equal EU citizens in an area of free movement consisting of 24 countries.

A year ago Slovenia was the first new member state to introduce the euro currency, and at the beginning of 2008 the country will be the first of the new members at the helm of the European Union, responsible for the Council presidency. At the same time Malta and Cyprus are going to become eurozone countries. New candidates are striving to achieve the criteria.

The Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union (OJ 14 December 2007, C 303/1) is set to become legally binding along with the Treaty of Lisbon (OJ 17 December 2007, C 306/1). This manifestation of shared European values is going to unite all but two member states, Poland and Great Britain.

The new Polish government looks set to become a constructive force within the European Union. It has not been able to renounce the opt-out from the Charter yet, because it needs the support of the populist and moral conservative opposition to secure ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. But in due course the values of the Charter may join all the countries save one.

Ten out of twelve new member states are already dual EU and NATO members. Only Cyprus and Malta joined the group of militarily uncommitted (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden). Sooner or later the European Union should be able to establish a common defence (democratically accountable) strengthened by the intergovernmental transatlantic NATO tie.

***

Increasingly the core areas of deeper European integration – Schengen, the euro, the Charter, and prospectively defence – attract new members. Ever more the advance groups are made up of both old and new member states. Progressively the distinctions between old and new are erased.


Ralf Grahn


Sources:

European Commission: Enlargement of the Schengen area: achieving the European goal of free movement of persons; Press release, 20 december 2007; http://europa.eu

European Commission: Background on Schengen enlargement; Memo, 20 December 2007; http://europa.eu

European Commission: Sixth report on practical preparations for the euro: countdown for Cyprus and Malta; Press release, 27 November 2007; http://europa.eu

Nato: NATO Member Countries; http://www.nato.int

Expensive peace operations

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) the combined known costs of UN, EU and NATO peace missions reached the record level of $5.5 billion in 2006.

A lot of money, one could say. On the other hand, world military expenditure in 2006 was $1204 billion.

Thus, the grand total of these peace missions was 0.46 per cent of combined military expenditure last year.

Something to think about?


Ralf Grahn


Source:

SIPRI Yearbook 2007, Summary in English;
http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=346

Finland and NATO

President Tarja Halonen has reiterated her opposition to Finnish membership in the NATO alliance. She says that she has seen no convincing reasons for joining, and opinion polls show that a majority of the population is reticent about membership.

A history of post-war efforts to stay neutral, 1,200 kilometres of shared border with Russia, a unilateralist US administration perceived as adventurous and an inward looking mindset help to explain the mental inertia of Finland.

But, at least for the political leaders of the nation, strategic reasoning and the responsibilities of leadership should shift the burden of proof:

If there are no convincing reasons to the contrary (and none have been presented), Finland should act like a normal member of the European Union, which the country joined in 1995. Out of 27 EU members, 21 belong to NATO. To remain on the fringes of both organisations is a poor choice.

The government of Finland should set a clear new course: Full participation to enhance the common foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union, including the achievement of a common defence, and transatlantic ties through NATO membership.


Ralf Grahn


Background:

Tanja Alamurto & Kari Huhta: On the road to NATO: a guide for travellers; Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition; 18 November 2007;
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/On+the+road+to+NATO+a+guide+for+travellers/1135231972465

Tanja Alamurto & Kari Huhta: NATO Pros and Cons; Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition; 18 November 2007;
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/NATO+Pros+and+Cons+/1135231974078

Very latest EU

From 12 until 15 October 2007 I have fed my Finnish blog with some web columns and notices about the European Union. The topics include the EU and globalisation, Turkey’s maturity for EU membership, military assistance within the EU and NATO, the need for the European Union, consolidated versions of the Reform Treaty, ’civil’ members of a military alliance to be and self-inflicted marginalisation.

The adress is:

http://grahnlaw.blogs.fi


The postings have the following headings:


EU globalisaatiossa

Turkki ja EU:n laajeneminen

Sanoma euroskeptikoille

EU:n ja Naton turvatakuut

Uudet EU-sopimukset päivitettyinä

Puolustusliiton siviilijäsenet

Arkaaisessa marginaalissa hyvä olla?



Regards
Ralf Grahn

October in the European Union

I have been fairly busy on my Finnish Euroblog during the first third of October. My aim has been to deal with topical and fundamental questions from a pan-European perspective, but also commenting on Finnish EU policies. There are 22 new blog posts on the address:

http://grahnlaw.blogs.fi


They have the following headings:


Kansa muutosvoimaksi?

Euroopan puolustus ja Nato

Suomen linja pysyy salaisuutena

Euroopan ulkoasiainneuvosto

Mark Leonard

Sotilaallinen mato

Puheet ja teot

Euroblogit

Senaatin valinta

Liberum veto

Pohjoinen ja eteläinen Eurooppa

EU:n luokkakuva

Uudistussopimus englanniksi

Uudistussopimus suomeksi

Mitkä turvatakuut?

Stubbin keskustelukutsu

Euroopan sosialistit keskustelevat

Europarlamentaarikot keskustelijoina

”Ultraliberalismi” katosi

Erkki Toivanen EU:n ulkopolitiikasta

Unionimme koko kuva

Nato ja EU liikkeellä


Regards
Ralf Grahn
http://grahnlaw.blogs.fi